

# **Greek Literature in the Roman Period and in Late Antiquity**

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*Edited by*  
**Gregory Nagy**



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Volume 8

## **Greek Literature in the Roman Period and in Late Antiquity**

Edited with introductions by

Gregory Nagy  
*Harvard University*

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## Series Introduction

This nine-volume set is a collection of writings by experts in ancient Greek literature. On display here is their thinking, that is, their readings of ancient writings. Most, though not all, of these experts would call themselves philologists. For that reason, it is relevant to cite the definition of “philology” offered by Friedrich Nietzsche. In the preface to *Daybreak*, he says that philology is the art of reading slowly:

Philology is that venerable art which demands of its votaries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to become slow—it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the word which has nothing but delicate cautious work to do and achieves nothing if it does not achieve it *lento*. But for precisely this reason it is more necessary than ever today; by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us the most, in the midst of an age of “work,” that is to say, of hurry, of indecent and perspiring haste, which wants to “get everything done” at once, including every old or new book:—this art does not easily get anything done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate fingers and eyes.

(This translation is adapted, with only slight changes, from R. J. Hollingdale, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* [Cambridge, 1982].)

Nietzsche’s original wording deserves to be quoted in full, since its power cannot be matched even by the best of translations:

Philologie nämlich ist jene ehrwürdige Kunst, welche von ihrem Verehrer vor Allem Eins heischt, bei Seite gehn, sich Zeit lassen, still werden, langsam werden—, als eine Goldschmiedekunst und -kennerschaft des Wortes, die lauter feine vorsichtige Arbeit abzuthun hat und Nichts erreicht, wenn sie es nicht lento erreicht. Gerade damit aber ist sie heute nöthiger als je, gerade dadurch zieht sie und bezaubert sie uns am stärksten, mitten in einem Zeitalter der “Arbeit,” will sagen: der Hast, der unanständigen und schwitzenden Eilfertigkeit, das mit Allem gleich “fertig werden” will, auch mit jedem alten und neuen Buche:—sie selbst wird nicht so leicht irgend womit fertig, sie lehrt gut lesen, das heisst langsam, tief, rück- und vorsichtig, mit Hintergedanken, mit offen gelassenen Thüen, mit zarten Fingern und Augen lesen

...

(Friedrich Nietzsche, *Morgenröthe. Nachgelassene Fragmente, Anfang 1880 bis Frühjahr 1881. Nietzsche Werke* V. 1, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari [Berlin, 1971], 9.)

This is not to say that the selections in these nine volumes must be ideal exemplifications of philology as Nietzsche defined it. Faced with the challenge of describing their own approaches to Greek literature, most authors of these studies would surely prefer a definition of “philology” that is less demanding. Perhaps most congenial to most would be the formulation of Rudolf Pfeiffer (*History of Classical Scholarship* I [Oxford, 1968]): “Philology is the art of understanding, explaining and reconstructing literary tradition.”

This collection may be viewed as an attempt to demonstrate such an art, in all its complexity and multiplicity. Such a demonstration, of course, cannot be completely successful, because perfection is far beyond

reach: the subject is vast, the space is limited, and the learning required is ever incomplete.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that disagreements persist in the ongoing study of ancient Greek literature, and thus the articles in these nine volumes necessarily reflect a diversity of opinions. There is ample room for disagreement even about the merits of representative articles, let alone the choices of the articles themselves. It is therefore reasonable for each reader to ask, after reading an article, whether it has indeed been true to the art of philology. The editor, a philologist by training, has his own opinions about the relative success or failure of each of the studies here selected. These opinions, however, must be subordinated to the single most practical purpose of the collection, which is to offer a representative set of modern studies that seek the best possible readings of the ancient writings.

## **Volume Introduction**

Greek literature, as mediated by the Roman Empire, becomes so definitive, so obviously classical, that it appears to be “time-free” (on the ongoing debate centering on this concept, see Feeney 1995, article 1, especially p. 303). The notional rules for the making of literature, as formulated in schoolbooks of Late Antiquity (especially the third and fourth centuries C.E.), appear to be a cohesive system, which is applicable all the way back to the earlier periods that we know as classical and archaic. In the Roman period, a literary critic like Longinus gives the impression of speaking with an authority derived directly from Greek literature writ large (for an incisive critical assessment, see Russell 1981, article 2).

Greek literature in the Roman period cannot be appreciated without first understanding the reception of that literature in Roman terms. The inherent continuity of Greek literary traditions becomes an aspect of the cultural and even political legacy of the Roman Empire. Pervasive intellectual trends like Atticism (that is, a return to the old Athenian literary language as it existed around the fourth century B.C.E.) need to be situated within the historical context of the Roman Empire (Wisse 1995, article 3; see also in general Bowersock 1974 on the “Second Sophistic”).

The term “Roman Empire” is used here in the broadest possible sense, in order to make room for the earliest attested phases of intensive Greco-Roman cultural interaction. The intellectual agenda and literary formation of a figure like Polybius, for example, have to be viewed against the historical backdrop of an ever-evolving political domination of Greek civilization by Rome (Brink and Walbank 1954, article 4).

In the Late Republic and Early Empire, the political dominance of Roman power, wealth, and prestige is matched by the cultural dominance of Greek literature in particular and of Greek arts and sciences in general. Thus, for example, the patterns of intertextuality in Hellenistic poetry are reenacted most accurately by the poetry of the Augustan Age (Thomas 1998, article 5); in fact, the continuity of intertextual referencing extends further backward in time, from the Roman and Hellenistic eras all the way to archaic Greek poetry and beyond (Barchiesi 1996 and Miller 1993, articles 6 and 7).

Even outside the arts and sciences, classical Greek learning per se became integrated into the cultural legacy of Roman elites. Philosophy, along with literature, was treated as an integral part of this legacy (Barnes 1997 and Striker 1995, articles 8 and 9; see also Nagy 1998). Beyond the rationalism of philosophy, even the mysticism of earlier Greek teachings could merge with the overall project of classical learning (Nock 1927 and 1929, articles 10 and 11).

The merging of ancient Greek institutions with the humanistic program, as it were, of the Roman Empire extended far beyond classical learning in and of itself. For example, distinctions between education and entertainment were readily neutralized in the realm of theater in all its varieties—"high art" as well as "low art" (Jones 1993, article 12).

Moreover, patterns of institutional synthesis extended beyond the Roman elites. For example, various Christian and Jewish traditions became part of the Roman Empire's cultural lingua franca as mediated by Greek literature (Hoek 1989 and Levine 1993, articles 13 and 14). As for the Greek literary legacy of Christian traditions in general, this vast subject is reserved for volume 9.

There is one particular form of Greek literature that openly defies the impression of a "time-free" classicism: the novel. Although the roots of this art form evidently predate the era

of the Roman Empire, it is in the latter historical context that we can see most clearly its distinctness as an anomalous genre. As a literary form, the novel transcends even the concept of genre (Nagy 2001). As a medium of communication, it also transcends linguistic boundaries (witness, for example, the “Jewish novel,” as analyzed by Wills 1995). The readings in the concluding section of this volume convey the varieties of narrative strategies and styles represented by the surviving examples of this multiform medium (articles 15 through 20: Stephens 1994, Winkler 1980, Morgan 1994, Mittelstadt 1967, Reardon 1994, Nimis 1998).

Related to the novel are such idiosyncratic literary forms as represented by Philostratus’s “biography” of Apollonius of Tyana (Billault 1993, article 21) and a quasi dialogue called the *Heroikos*, created probably by the same Philostratus (Pache 2002, article 22; Maclean and Aitken 2001). The varieties of worldviews present in such literature offer precious insights into contemporary philosophical and rhetorical trends as well as religious practices and ideologies, all of which are to culminate in the amorphous cultural world that we call, all too imprecisely, Late Antiquity.

This term, “Late Antiquity,” cannot be invoked without conjuring the complex history of interminable culture wars that led ultimately to the convergence of the Roman Empire as a world power with Christianity as a worldview. Even historical events such as the violent death of the “pagan” Greek woman-scholar Hypatia could be absorbed into the novel world of this tumultuous confluence (see Takács 1995, article 23).



## Further Readings

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## Criticism Ancient and Modern

**DENIS FEENEY**

mihi de antiquis eodem modo non licebit?

Cic. *Or.* 171

Classicists have long taken it for granted that an acquaintance with the literary criticism of the ancients is a useful skill for the student of their literature to master.<sup>1</sup> This rather general and often unarticulated assumption, part of a larger professional concern with unanachronistic historical fidelity, has recently been given a much sharper focus in the work of Francis Cairns and Malcolm Heath.<sup>2</sup> The latter scholar in particular has claimed, not merely that ancient literary criticism is a useful supplement to the critical apparatus of the modern scholar, but that ancient literary criticism is in effect the only apparatus which the modern scholar may use for the purpose of 'poetics', an activity defined as 'a historical enquiry into the workings of a particular system of conventions in a given historical and cultural context'.<sup>3</sup> In the case of fifth-century Attic tragedy, for example, despite the fact that we have no contemporary critical testimony to speak of outside Aristophanes, we are assured by Heath that 'even a fourth-century writer is a priori more likely to be a reliable guide to tragedy than the unreconstructed prejudices of the modern reader'.<sup>4</sup>

In order to set up the *ἄγῶν* which I wish to conduct in this essay, let me, to the accompaniment of litotes, bring on to the stage the scholar whom we honour with this volume, a man more versed than most in ancient literary criticism, and

a man whom few would convict of possessing more than his share of 'unreconstructed prejudices'. A striking leitmotif of Donald Russell's synthetic judgements on ancient literary criticism is his apprehension that, however much 'we cannot help reasoning that the Greeks and Romans must after all know best, since the language and the culture were their own', nonetheless, 'this ancient rhetorical "criticism" ... is fundamentally not equal to the task of appraising classical literature'.<sup>5</sup> This is true, by Russell's account, of the ancient critics' principles of style and allegory (6-7, 98, 131), of their study of *imitatio* (113), literary history (117, 168), and genre (149, 152).<sup>6</sup> Both in *Criticism and Antiquity* and in his valedictory lecture, when he stands back to sum up his impressions of pervasive antithetical currents in ancient literature—impressions which could have been formed only by the most broad and searching reading—he concedes that they do not correspond to anything formulated by an ancient critic (indeed, to anything that *could have been* formulated by an ancient critic).<sup>7</sup>

My own rhetoric will probably have indicated which of the agonists wins my vote, and I have already elsewhere indicated that I think the ancient critics are to be used 'as an aid, even a guide, but not as a prescription, or a straitjacket'.<sup>8</sup> But I would like to develop those earlier brief remarks and justify in detail my partiality for Donald Russell's position. Then I would like to suggest why all critics everywhere should expect to find themselves in his predicament. For the issues raised by my *σύγκρισις* rapidly multiply. An examination of the role of ancient criticism in the study of ancient texts soon spins into its corollary—currently very topical—of the examination of the role of modern criticism in the study of ancient texts;<sup>9</sup> and that issue in turn confronts us with the problem of what we take to be the explanatory power of criticism anyway. No doubt by the end of the essay I will have taken up positions which

Donald Russell would not care to occupy with me, but at least we will have begun in the same camp, and he may be sure that my own forays could not have been undertaken except under his auspices, and with the well-supplied commissariat of his scholarship.

We must begin by delineating the difficulties involved in Heath's claim that ancient testimony is our sole legitimate interpretative key: 'when we are dealing with the evidence of witnesses who are contemporary or near contemporaries, there is at least a presumption of general reliability; certainly, they are more likely to prove reliable guides than the untutored intuition of a modern reader—which is, in practice, the only alternative, and a patently treacherous one'.<sup>10</sup> For all its polemical tone, such a statement captures a basic frame of mind shared by many classicists, and it takes an effort to shake oneself free of its allure.

For a start, we may observe how many ancient aesthetic objects are removed from our critical attention by the strict application of Heath's law. He has concentrated on topics where a good deal of ancient critical evidence is extant (Attic tragedy, the problem of unity), but, even rhetorically, it is worth asking how he would propose we discuss the ancient novel, which was 'drastically undertheorized', as J. R. Morgan puts it, 'even to the extent that there was no word for it in either Greek or Latin'.<sup>11</sup> If modern critics of ancient literature are to confine themselves to the critical horizon of the surviving ancient evidence, then scholars of the ancient novel might as well shut up shop. Or how are we to talk of ancient art according to Heath's model when, for example, there is in the extant corpus of classical literature precisely one reference to vase-painting?<sup>12</sup>

Heath is far more alert to the difficulties of periodization than his precursor Cairns, who, in order to justify his use of a third/fourth-century AD model for interpreting literature back to the archaic period, had to make his now notorious claim

that 'in a very real sense antiquity was in comparison with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a time-free zone'.<sup>13</sup> Still, despite Heath's acknowledgement of the possible anachronism of using ancient critics who are not contemporary with their texts,<sup>14</sup> he remains on thin ice in describing Aristotle as a near contemporary witness to Attic drama. Euripides and Sophocles had been dead for anything between forty-five and eighty-five years by the time the *Poetics* were composed, and Aeschylus for anything between ninety-five and one hundred and thirty-five. By this kind of calculation Pope is a near contemporary witness of Shakespeare's aesthetic, and Tennyson a near contemporary witness of Pope's—and this is quite apart from the problem, to which I return shortly, of what *kind* of witness Aristotle is.

The difficulties in historical perspective glimpsed here open up larger problems with the historicist stance represented by Heath and Cairns. One of the main flaws in this kind of approach is that it cannot do justice to the very sense of history which it purports to champion, for critics such as Heath and Cairns exhibit a systematic refusal to come to terms with the fact that their own critical practice is historically sited.<sup>15</sup> The claim that only a given culture's modes of criticism can work for that culture has some kind of initial plausibility, perhaps, but we have to recognize that this claim itself comes from an identifiable modern philological tradition. Heath is always denouncing modern prejudice, but the idea that we can only read ancient literature in terms of ancient criticism is itself a modern prejudice.<sup>16</sup>

And it is one which it is theoretically impossible to control in the way Heath wishes to, for any modern selection of ancient critical techniques and approaches is inherently partial, in every sense of the word. Heath asserts quite rightly that 'we do not inspect "the poem itself" without

presupposition, and our presuppositions dispose us to find plausible or implausible interpretations of one or another kind';<sup>17</sup> but precisely the same is true of our inspection of criticism. At the most basic level, there is simply so much ancient criticism, and it is so multifaceted, that the modern critic must pick and choose: as Andrew Ford well says of the Homeric scholia, in the course of a sympathetic but dissenting review of Heath (1989), 'we are always taking from them what we find congenial and discarding the rest'.<sup>18</sup> Despite acknowledging the problematic nature of the critical material,<sup>19</sup> in his *modus operandi* Heath does not actually treat the corpus of ancient literary criticism as something that requires interpretation on a footing with the literature. But the corpus is itself, if you like, 'literary', not an inert tool. This is immediately obvious in the case of an Aristotle or a Horace, but it is also true of Servius and the largely anonymous company of the scholia. We are not dealing with a problematic body of material ('literature') which can be explained with the aid of a less problematic body of material ('criticism'): we are dealing with numerous, often contesting, strands of problematic material which interact with each other in innumerable categories of time and space.<sup>20</sup>

The critical terrain, in short, is riven and complex, and our modern image of it is an interpretative construct, every bit as open to anachronism and *parti pris* as our construction of the 'literature'. An example of this is to be found in Heath's use of Aristotle's *Poetics* as evidence in reconstructing the 'emotive hedonism' which he sees as the ruling aesthetic of the tragic drama of the previous century. In using Aristotle as *evidence* for poetic practice in this way, he first of all removes Aristotle from a philosophical context, for, as Halliwell says, in the *Poetics* 'the theory is *normative*, and its principles, while partly dependent on exemplification from existing works, are not simply deduced from them. The

theorist's insight claims a validity which may well contradict much of the practice of playwrights hitherto.'<sup>21</sup> Further, Heath's reading of what Aristotle has to say about the emotions is very much at odds with other recent interpretations of the *Poetics*, notably that of Halliwell, by whose account Aristotle's concept of aesthetic pleasure is one 'in which cognition and emotion are integrated'; indeed, 'Aristotle's conception of the emotions, pity and fear, itself rests on a cognitive basis'.<sup>22</sup> This kind of approach to Aristotle has been behind some compelling recent studies of tragedy, especially those of Martha Nussbaum<sup>23</sup>—though her ethics-based approach is not without its own risks, especially that of making the play, as Terry McKiernan puts it, 'a piece of moral philosophy worn inside-out, with the example or parable on the outside and the argument that the example illustrates hidden within'.<sup>24</sup>

All this has serious implications for Heath, since it is an important part of his purpose to discredit 'intellectualizing' readings of Attic tragedy. If Heath has to read Aristotle in a reductive way in order to make this possible, he also has to disparage another strand of ancient criticism—just as venerable and authoritative, it may seem to other observers—that is, the didactic one, as exemplified in the only genuinely contemporary substantial evidence we have, Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Heath's distinctive intellectual honesty has him acknowledge the prominence of the didactic bent in the ancient tradition, but he dismisses it as a 'habit', not something interesting or important, and certainly not something which gives 'support for the intellectual interests of modern tragic interpretation'.<sup>25</sup> When an ancient critic makes a remark about a text's emotional impact, Heath will commend him, but not when he makes a remark about its didactic impact; it is difficult to see this preference as one that emerges naturally from the material under inspection. Although I have a good deal of sympathy with many of



Heath's objections to the intellectualizing reading of Greek tragedy as it is actually practised, I do not see how he can write it down by elevating one strand of ancient criticism over another.

Heath represents a set of assumptions shared by many classicists, even if he pushes them to their extremest limit. There are doubtless many ways of accounting for the appeal of such an approach—a concern with professional rigour; a belief that only an historicizing approach is intellectually respectable; a desire to make criticism as 'objective' as philology, so that this movement in literary criticism in Classics becomes the counterpart of the anxieties of students of modern literatures over what exactly their *τέχνη* is (a dilemma that goes back to Socrates' interrogation of Ion). I suspect, however, that the main reason why so many classicists attribute such authority to ancient literary criticism is that it relieves them of the distasteful task of attributing any authority to modern literary criticism. The historicist bent of classical training predisposes many of us to be hostile to the idea that the ancient world can be illuminated by modern schemes which may be quite at odds with the conceptual apparatus of the Romans and Greeks,<sup>[26](#)</sup> yet it is an issue which we continually confront, and Charles Segal is quite right to describe it as 'perhaps the central hermeneutic question of our field today'.<sup>[27](#)</sup>

It should be clear from my discussion so far that in my opinion we are all (including Malcolm Heath) doing modern literary criticism all the time, and that students of ancient literature have to learn to live with the hermeneutic gap: 'interpretation ... involves a constantly moving "fusion of horizons" between past and present'.<sup>[28](#)</sup> Just as in the case of ancient literary criticism, however, we are of course always engaged (consciously or not) in selecting which currents of modern criticism to value and which to disparage, and it becomes a decided problem to justify or even to isolate the



criteria by which we perform this selection.<sup>29</sup> If we grant that there is a necessary gap of incommensurability between our criticism and the ancient text (a protasis which not all my readers will accept), does it follow that all modern modes of analysis are equally valid or rewarding?

Attempts have been made to suggest continuities, or at least deep similarities, between certain ancient and modern preoccupations, especially in semiotics and scepticism.<sup>30</sup> The value of such connections will reside in the use to which they are put in practice, and the 'naturalness' of the connections may of course always be challenged on the grounds that we are finding only what we are predisposed to look for: when Simon Goldhill says that the 'fifth century underwent "a linguistic turn"',<sup>31</sup> it is easy to remark that only the intellectual heir of the twentieth-century's 'linguistic turn' is in a position to talk in these terms. Still, when we are dealing with semiotics and rhetoric we may feel more confidence in finding analogies between our interest in language and theirs if we reflect that analogy is itself, after all, one of *their* words. We have, I think, a different kind of problem—though not of course *per se* a disabling one—when there appear to be clear discrepancies between ancient and modern approaches.

Of the critical techniques currently in play, the most problematic from this point of view is probably psychoanalysis, because its scientific apparatus lays open the issue of its truth-claims in a particularly overt form. These truth-claims have for some time been under attack on their own terms anyway, and it is clear that in psychiatric and psychological education and practice the psychoanalytic model of the mind has nothing like the authority that it had even twenty years ago.<sup>32</sup> Even if, for the sake of argument, we concede that the model has some kind of validity for late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century European culture, we still need to contend with the

fact that anthropologists and historians are practically united in doubting the value of applying it to other cultures.<sup>33</sup> It is bad luck for exponents of psychoanalytic criticism in Classics—whether they acknowledge it as such or not—that they are entering a field dominated by the Foucauldian view of sexuality and the self as variably constructed cultural phenomena, in which the current agenda is to ‘define and refine a new, and radical, historical sociology of psychology’.<sup>34</sup> Very few practitioners do in fact make the kind of claim for the transhistorical and transcultural applicability of Freudianism that is advanced by Caldwell, for example,<sup>35</sup> but this only throws into relief the usual evasion of the issue. Repression, unconscious, desire, lack, other: with what stringency are these terms being used?

A major difficulty is brought into focus with a question asked by Segal: One of the big problems with applying any kind of psychological criticism is to try to decide what is the object of the analysis. Are you trying to analyze the author; or ... the relationship between the reader and the text ...; or ... a particular character?’<sup>36</sup> Increasingly the answer to this question is ‘the text’, or ‘the narrative’.<sup>37</sup> Françoise Meltzer puts the case very economically (though remaining faithful to the idea that Freud does have something to teach us about the psyche), in discussing Freud’s necessary use of the known in order to describe the unknown (*das Unbewusste*, the original of ‘the unconscious’): ‘Freud will be “condemned” to describe the unconscious rhetorically, through analogies, metaphors, similes, etymological play, and anecdotes. And the way that future critical theory will choose to read those rhetorical tropes employed by Freud will ultimately ... tell us as much about the “economy” of rhetorical structures and the inner workings of narration as it will about the psyche.’<sup>38</sup> The linguistic turn of Lacan in particular and of post-structuralism in general is presumably

largely responsible for this shift of emphasis towards looking at psychoanalysis as a model of figural language; important, too, have been the mounting reservations about the feasibility of analysing literary constructs ('characters', 'authors') as if they were human beings in an interactive setting;<sup>39</sup> and there may be a part played also by a tacit loss of faith in the scheme as a model of the mind—particularly in trans-cultural studies. The use of psychoanalytical models by Brooks and Quint may be regarded by the acolytes, for whom Freud and Lacan remain clinicians, as a domestication.<sup>40</sup> Still, for most critics the use of psychoanalysis in narratology is doubtless made more acceptable by the fact that the figural nature of the model's claims is so much more obvious than it is when the psyche is the object of analysis. But then one is left wondering what the power of the model really is, and whether any more is being said than that Freud was some kind of narratologist *avant la lettre* (a description which need not be read dismissively, depending on how much value you accord narratology).

Whatever models we employ, we have to acknowledge that there is no use pretending that we are not employing them, and we also have to acknowledge that we will often be employing them unconsciously (they will be 'employing' *us*). As students of long-vanished cultures, we face continually the challenge of respecting our place in history as observers and the place in history of the artefacts we are observing.<sup>41</sup> There is—unfortunately, in the opinion of some—no universally valid way of adjudicating this process, for the criteria by which we perform it are always under negotiation.

These issues are intractable enough, but we need, in conclusion, to uncover a larger presupposition which underpins the approach not only of Heath but of most critics, classicists or not. This is the assumption that

criticism somehow explains literature, is adequate to it in some worthwhile sense. Let us begin with the comparatively mundane observation that great works can or even must break the bounds of interpretative possibility, redefining the critical practice needed to read them, addressing an audience which is not (yet) there: in Wordsworth's formulation, 'every author, as far as he is great and at the same time *original*, has had the task of *creating* the taste by which he is to be enjoyed: so has it been,' so will it continue to be'.<sup>42</sup> Margaret Hubbard makes this point very cogently of Horace's *Odes*, for example, adducing Cicero's philosophical works as an analogy.<sup>43</sup> From this perspective, Heath's search for the most contemporary witnesses presents us with the apparent paradox that it is precisely the contemporary generation who are often worst placed to respond to original works in ways which later generations will find at all helpful (this will of course be an unacceptable conclusion for those who remain convinced that the goal of classical philology's interpretations is no more than to reconstruct the ideal contemporary response).

Heath himself acknowledges the 'obvious danger ... in arguing from Greek literary theory and criticism to the underlying principles of Greek literary practice—that is, from secondary to primary poetics'; as he puts it, 'it is inevitably uncertain whether any given critic or theorist has correctly grasped the nature even of contemporary literary composition'.<sup>44</sup> We have to face the fact that a seance with an Augustan *grammaticus* on the subject of Horace's *Odes* would almost certainly yield us very little that we would value (except that his very incomprehension might jolt us into realizing just how shocking and novel these now tamely canonical poems were on first appearance).<sup>45</sup>

It is precisely his distance on the tradition which makes it possible for Donald Russell to make the synthetic critical judgements he does,<sup>46</sup> and acknowledging this fact helps

put us in a position to appreciate the pitfalls of confusing the modes of explanation with the modes at work in the phenomenon being explained. The analogy with the use and study of language is perhaps instructive. Alcaeus and Stesichorus had an active knowledge of Greek incomparably superior to that of anyone now alive, yet they knew no formal Greek grammar, and the Regius Professor understands—in some meaningful sense of the word—the workings of the Greek language in ways that they could not, and in ways that for certain purposes we will value more highly than whatever intuitions about language may be gleaned from witnesses of the archaic period. Similarly, the anthropologists have been tussling for a long time with the problems involved in recognizing that the very act of analysis, by constructing a sense-making whole, creates an intelligibility of a kind that is not accessible to the members of the society being analysed.<sup>47</sup> The clearest discussion of this dilemma which I know of is provided by David Trotter, reviewing a book on the semiotics of gesture: ‘the cognitive power which the idea of codification generates in the historian’s own understanding of language has been projected onto the world he is studying, where it becomes a moral and social power universally available’.<sup>48</sup>

For our purposes, it is not a matter of saying that one of these modes of knowledge or experience is preferable to the other in each case. Rather, we must recognize that the incompatibility which many detect between modern criticism and ancient literature is not something *sui generis*, but an example of a gap which will be found between any critical act and its object of study.<sup>49</sup> There are diverse ways of dealing with the gap. For myself, I would follow the lead of Bernard Harrison, who constructs a theory designed to show ‘why since Plato [literature] has been permanently at war with theory, and why its role is endlessly to exceed and transgress the insights and outlooks fostered by theory’.<sup>50</sup>

Classicists, of all people, should have the historical perspective to see that any critical act is provisional: in this way we may resist not only the historicists' claim to objective recovery of contemporary response, but also the whiggish triumphalism of many of the modern schools. For the gap which Donald Russell rightly sees between the literature and theory of the ancients has always been there, and always will be.

<sup>1</sup> I am putting as much stress on the 'and' in the title as Donald Russell did when I heard him introducing R. D. Williams's talk at Oxford on 'Virgil and Homer'. I first tried out some of these ideas on the Bristol English-Latin Seminar in November 1991; and an audience at Berkeley heard a (suitably disguised) version in April 1994. My thanks to those present for their comments. I must also thank several people who read a draft of the chapter: Stephen Hinds, Jacques Lezra, Laura McClure, Terry McKiernan, Georgia Nugent, Neil Whitehead, and Jeffrey Wills (who suggested my motto from Cicero). The editors had me think again on various points, and made me wish I had had the space to develop the case further.

<sup>2</sup> Cairns (1972); Heath (1987) and (1989).

<sup>3</sup> Heath (1987), 1 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Heath (1987), 3.

<sup>5</sup> Russell (1981a), 1, 6. Page references in the next sentence of the text are to this book.

<sup>6</sup> For his reservations about the penetration of ancient *imitatio*-studies, see also Russell (1979), esp. 9.

<sup>7</sup> Russell (1981a), 6-7, and (1989), 21. Cf. G. A. Kennedy (1989a), 493, on the fact that 'the ancient criticism we have seems oblivious of major historical features of the literatures'; and Williams (1968), 31, on ancient reflections on the nature of poetry: 'the answers of theorists lagged quite a lot behind the practice of poets'.

<sup>8</sup> Feeney (1991), 3.

<sup>9</sup> De Jong and Sullivan (1994).

<sup>10</sup> Heath (1987), 3.

<sup>11</sup> Morgan (1993), 176. I can only agree with Morgan: 'The obvious point is that there is a lot which is in excess of ancient theory, but that just means that theory had not caught up with practice' (224).

<sup>12</sup> Ar. *Eccl.* 996; my thanks to Barry Powell for this interesting information.

<sup>13</sup> Cairns (1972), 32.

[14](#) Heath (1987), 2-4; (1989), 10-11, 122.

[15](#) Heath (1987, 79 recognizes that 'the preoccupations of literary criticism ... are historical and change in the course of history', but his argument proceeds as if he is exempt from the implications of his insight. My own emphasis on the historical sidedness of the critic is of course ultimately indebted to Gadamer (1960). For classicists' perspectives on the 'hermeneutics of reception', see Martindale (1993*a*) and Nauta (1994).

[16](#) Quite unrealizable, at that, as pointed out by D. F. Kennedy (1993), 8: 'If historicism achieved its aim of understanding a culture of the past "in its own terms", the result would be totally unintelligible except to that culture and moment ... Far from past being made "present", it would be rendered totally foreign and impenetrably alien.'

[17](#) Heath (1989), 122.

[18](#) Ford (1991), 147; I must declare my debt here to this finely argued essay. Cf. Martindale (1993*b*), 123 on Heath's approach: 'we all ... in order to validate our readings, appropriate, *selectively*, pieces of past data. There are reasons for this selectivity, but those reasons are always and never good enough as it were.'

[19](#) Heath (1987), 2-3.

[20](#) Ford (1991), 146-7.

[21](#) Halliwell (1987), 83 (his italics); cf. 9-10, and Halliwell (1986), 3-4.

[22](#) Halliwell (1986), 76; see his whole discussion of pleasure, 62-81, and, for specific engagements with Heath, Halliwell (1989) and (1992), 255. Only after writing this chapter did I see the powerful article of Lada (1993); see esp. 114-18.

[23](#) Nussbaum (1986), esp. 12-15, and (1990), esp. 378-91, on the theoretical issues.

[24](#) My thanks to him for letting me quote from an unpublished essay on ethics in tragedy. Similar reservations in B. Harrison (1991), 15-17.

[25](#) Heath (1987), 47. Heath's main ground for rejecting intellectualizing interpretations as part of 'poetics' is that the poets cannot have intended them (44-5); but, even if we conduct the debate on these terms, I do not see on what evidence he can claim that they did not.

[26](#) Martindale (1993*a*), 5-6 on historicism in the Classics.

[27](#) Segal (1992), 153.

[28](#) Martindale (1993*a*), 7; cf. the points made by D. F. Kennedy (1993), quoted at n. 16 above. The most obvious example of Heath's use of the techniques of modern literary criticism is in his synoptic discussion of individual tragedies in the compass of a few pages; this is not a form of criticism practised in the ancient world, or in the modern world either until John Dryden's 'Examen of *The Silent Woman*' in his 1668 *Essay on Dramatic Poesy* (my thanks to Richard Knowles for this information).



[29](#) On this problem, see Goldhill (1994), 52.

[30](#) G. A. Kennedy (1989a) and (1989b), pp. xi-xii; Sullivan (1994), 14-21.

[31](#) Goldhill (1986), 2.

[32](#) Grünbaum (1984) and (1993); for an ancient historian's perspective, S. R. F. Price (1990), 360-70; a highly critical overview in Crews (1993), with reaction and discussion in Crews (1994). My thanks to Jude, and to my neighbour, Dr James Gustafson, for their conversations about contemporary psychology and psychoanalysis.

[33](#) S. R. F. Price (1990), 370: 'Freudian theory is thus at best extremely problematic, and its imposition on another culture singularly futile'; Dinnage (1993), 66: 'Anthropologists now tend to feel, understandably, that psychoanalytic studies of societies, particularly of non-Western societies, apply unproven theories and a Western bias to cultures with quite different assumptions.' As Neil Whitehead points out to me, such perspectives in anthropology only became possible once the Freudian model had lost a good deal of its authority in its own home culture.

[34](#) Halperin (1990), 40; cf. esp. 41-6 for the 'essentialist/constructionist' debate over 'homosexuality'. Of course our reconstruction of that ancient sexuality and self will always be in dialogue with our own deeply acculturated sense of sexuality and self, of which some kind of Freudianism—however diluted—is inevitably a part; cf. D. F. Kennedy (1993), 40-3.

[35](#) Caldwell (1990), 344; cf. Segal (1992), 153, justifying his use of psychological and anthropological models with the assertion that 'certain categories of human experience are universal'.

[36](#) Segal (1992), 171. I must declare my debt here to the highly interesting response of S. Georgia Nugent to the APA Panel on 'Roman poetry and recent developments in psychoanalytic criticism', 28 Dec. 1993.

[37](#) Brooks (1984) has been particularly influential; his work has stimulated fine work on the *Aeneid* in Quint (1993), 50-96. An interesting parallel to this move is to be found in the emergence of narrative therapy, on which see White and Epston (1990), a reference I owe to Dr James Gustafson.

[38](#) Meltzer (1990), 149.

[39](#) Bonime and Eckardt (1993).

[40](#) Meltzer (1990), 161: 'as with Freud, the unconscious for Lacan represents a clinical problem, a force underlying the behavior of real, living and breathing patients; it is not only an abstract concept to be imagined in differing ways. If the literary critic is ultimately faced with the text, the practicing analyst faces the patient ... "Unconscious" at the moment of such confrontations begins to mean and to matter in fundamentally separate ways.'

[41](#) The oscillations involved in being self-conscious about this double commitment are the subject of ch. 1. of D. F. Kennedy (1993).



<sup>42</sup> From *Essay Supplementary* to the *Preface* (1815); my thanks to David Hopkins for this quotation.

<sup>43</sup> Hubbard (1973), 25.

<sup>44</sup> Heath (1989), 10; cf. the points made by G. A. Kennedy (1991), 116.

<sup>45</sup> This paragraph is not meant to impugn the value of such contemporary critical evidence as we may have for any period; nor is it meant to deny the practical usefulness of reconstructing, as best we can, how a contemporary reader might have reacted to any particular work. The problem is that most critics are very good at getting into a position where they can claim that there is an uncanny overlap between the way they read a text and the way the ideal contemporary reader would have read it too. Further, scholars of this persuasion imply by their practice that something like the *Odes* or the *Aeneid* could somehow be apprehended in one take, 'exhausted', if you will, by their first readership. Finally, the search for the ideal contemporary reader's response makes it practically impossible to entertain the notion of a diverse, contentious initial audience.

<sup>46</sup> Above, n. 7; cf. Russell (1967), 141–3, where he 'stands back from the detail' of the rhetorical tradition in order to put the large picture within the frame of a modern critical theory, only then being in a position to advance his propositions about how to read Catullus and Propertius.

<sup>47</sup> Even if they would no longer adopt the patronizing perspective of Malinowski—as reported by Macintyre (1970), 113—'who insisted that the native Trobriander's account of Trobriand society must be inadequate, that the sociologists' account of institutions is a construction not available to the untutored awareness of the native informant'. The language/grammar analogy is itself used in this connection, normally in a recuperative fashion, as if the interpretative scheme of the observer is genuinely valid for the participant, only 'unconsciously': Lawson and McCauley (1990), 77.

<sup>48</sup> Trotter (1992), 14.

<sup>49</sup> Indeed (as Jacques Lezra suggests to me), if literature is itself in some ways a form of literary criticism, then literature may be thought of as building this gap into what is constitutively literary.

<sup>50</sup> Harrison (1991), 17; cf. Felman (1982), 207, on 'literality [*sic*] as that which is essentially impermeable to analysis and to interpretation, that which necessarily remains unaccounted for, that which, with respect to what interpretation does account for, constitutes no less than *all the rest*: "All the rest is literature," writes Verlaine.' I had not realized, until Stephen Hinds pointed it out to me, that my historical perspective here gives way to a transhistorical essentializing definition of 'the literary'. Well, let it give way.

# LONGINUS REVISITED

**BY**

D. A. RUSSELL

The long lacunae in περί ὕψους, especially the one at 9, 4, preclude any certain reconstruction of its entire argument<sup>1</sup>). The mysterious disappearance of the Second Source, πάθος, must therefore remain mysterious, though various hypotheses more or less meet the existing evidence. It is not the purpose of this essay to debate this problem, but rather to protest against the implications of some attempts to solve it, and to plead for greater attention to be paid to the author's polemical intentions and techniques of advocacy. When Reinhold Brandt<sup>2</sup>), whose ingenious transposition of Chapter 44 to follow Chapter 15 is a natural and stimulating focus of discussion, observes that the possibility of the author's breaking his proposed disposition is ruled out by the express statement at 39, I that there remains "nur noch der fünfte Punkt" he is making, I think, two dubious assumptions, (i) L's actual words do not necessarily imply that all the other four points have been handled. If I refer to 'number five' on a list, I merely refer the reader to that list as it originally stood, and there is no contradiction involved in the hypothesis that one of them has for some reason been postponed and will be taken out of order, (ii) More seriously, the implication that L is to be expected to go through his list in the order in which it was proposed must itself be questioned. It was a precept of ancient rhetoric that chapters (κεφάλαια) should be arranged according to the needs of the case, and not put 'in alphabetical order' ([Dion. Hal.] *Ars* 363, 11 ff.); the orator has different criteria from the grammarian. And περί ὕψους, as I hope to illustrate in this paper, is a highly sophisticated

rhetorical piece, whose polemical ends and main contentions are not at all forecast in the scheme laid down in Chapter 8.

Apart from the difficulty of the disappearance of πάθος, the conventional analysis of the treatise encounters several well-known obstacles. The explicit and ostentatiously precise synopsis at the end of 15 is seriously incomplete, since it entirely omits the chapter on the accumulation of detail (10), in which the writer discusses Sappho's Aphrodite poem. The section on figures (16-29) is not divided under the heads of thought and diction, as we were led to expect; and it is disconcerting that at 29,2 all this part is said to have been added ἐκ παρενθήκης, as (apparently) a sort of parenthesis. Again, the Scheme of the Five Sources is quite clearly infringed in 41-43, where the writer deals with elements which destroy ὕψος, and this discussion includes both diction and σύνθεσις. Moreover, 43 itself seems to be in the wrong place, because ἐκλογὴ ὀνομάτων ought to precede σύνθεσις. A general point is perhaps more significant than these particular ones: the most carefully composed and memorable parts of the book—passages like the σύγκρισις between *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and the whole 'Regel und Genie' episode, not to mention the final dialogue—are discursive additions to the scheme, and not integral to it, though they clearly are integral to the author's general purpose.

## I

I suggest that the Scheme of Chapter 8 has quite a limited function. It is not the honest and complete programme of a technical handbook, divergences from which may be put down to carelessness or a change of attitude which really comes over the writer in the process of composition, but rather the artful *propositio* of the orator, who needs both to

convince his hearers that he has a clear case, and to conceal its weaknesses. As Quintilian has it (X 1,21): *saepe ... praeparat dissimulat insidiatur orator, eaque in prima parte actionis dicit quae sunt in summa profutura; itaque suo loco minus placent ... ideoque erunt cognitae omnibus repetenda*. I hope that the following survey of the book will show what I mean.

It should not be surprising if Longinus works in this way. It is widely recognized that his use of language and exemplification is highly sophisticated; and he is of course well aware of the element of trickery in the orator's profession: πάντη τὸ τοῦ τέλους διακέκλοφεν ὄνομα (16,4) is characteristic praise of a conjuring trick of Demosthenes. Theoretical evidence for rhetorical principles which seem to correspond to his procedures may be found in the pseudo-Dionysian treatises on λόγοι ἐσχηματισμένοι, i.e. speeches which in one way or another go under false colours, and in which the true purpose of what is said is different from the speaker's professed intention. There was clearly a tradition of analysing the ways in which speeches were composed from this point of view. Plato's *Apology*, we are told ([Dion. Hal.] p. 305-6 U-R), combines (a) a speech for the defence with (b) an attack on the Athenians, (c) an encomium of Socrates, and (d) a didactic statement of the sort of man the philosopher should be. This fourfold purpose, the author continues, was imitated by Demosthenes in *de corona*: he also (a) defends himself, (b) attacks his opponents, (c) shows why he deserves the crown, and (d) explains what sort of man a statesman should be.

Is not περὶ ὕψους itself rather like this? L, we may say, (a) defends Plato, (b) attacks Caecilius, (c) shows wherein the greatness of the really great writers lies, and (d) presents a set of prescriptions intended to enable us to achieve ὕψος by becoming the right sort of person. It has apologetic, accusatorial, encomiastic and didactic purposes. Cicero's

*Orator* affords a parallel: it portrays an ideal, attacks the Atticists, and defends Cicero himself.

But we must add a further point here. Central to three of the purposes—the attack on Caecilius, the encomium on the truly great, and the didactic lesson—is the proposition that ὕψος is closely linked with πάθος, emotional tension. This however is irrelevant to, or even at variance with, the need to defend Plato, which is clearly a conspicuous theme in the whole—though it is not of course the primary theme in the sense in which defence is primary in the *Apology* and *de corona*. The tension between two important parts of the case gives rise, I think, to a number of tactical problems, and analysis of the book should take this into account.

## II

I should like to take a few steps towards the kind of analysis I have in mind. In order to do so, I have settled on a certain number of places in the argument from which it seems, on reflection, profitable to look back and see what leads up to what is now said, and hence its place in the execution of the advocate's purpose.

First, the function of chapter 8—the famous Scheme, with its disproportionately large appendage, making the fundamental point that πάθος is a uniquely important, but still not quite essential, element in ὕψος. Leaving out πάθος altogether, the Scheme makes of course coherent sense, and is very probably the framework that Caecilius used. It is obvious, and far from original. Something sufficiently like it can be seen in Demetrius and in Hermogenes. Demetrius (38 ff.) discusses τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές under the heads of διάνοια, λέξεις and σύνθεσις. Hermogenes' σεμνότης (242 ff. Rabe) has its appropriate ἔννοιαι, μέθοδοι, λέξεις, σχήματα and σύνθεσις. These classifications are a reasonable way of analysing components present in any λόγος, and there is no

obvious fallacy in thinking that the presence of particular types of thought, diction or composition, may be diagnostic of a particular quality (χαρακτήρ) of writing. But πάθος is not like this; even if we widen the concept to cover πάθος / ἥθος, i.e. tones of emotion and character, whether intense or sedate, it is not a necessary element of form or content like the rest. Logically, Caecilius was quite right to leave it out <sup>3</sup>).

But L takes him to task for just this, and indeed insinuates that he left out other, unnamed factors also. At the same time, he has to admit that πάθος is not a necessary element of ὕψος, since this clearly occurs in literature without it. I contend that the motive for this admission is the need to defend Plato. For the moment, let us notice the way in which it is made. Caecilius is confronted with a dilemma: either emotion is always present in ὕψος, or it makes no contribution to it at all. To counter the first opinion—which it is highly unlikely that Caecilius should have held—L advances as an acknowledged fact a consideration which represents a considerable concession on his own part, necessary for his tactical purposes, but inconsistent with his main complaint against Caecilius' scheme.

What has led up to this ? First, a complex attitude to the opponent Caecilius. He is inadequate—'too low' (1,1)—because he stands for the view that ὕψος is essentially a matter of finding the right words, not of moral attitude. But at the same time, L would agree with many of his individual judgements, especially his condemnation of a certain kind of frigid ingenuity (4,2 τὰ πλείω προέλαβεν ὁ Καικίλιος). This is to lay a trap, for it will be implied later (33–35) that Caecilius' taste is really no truer than those whom he condemns. Secondly: the opening chapters contain only the merest beginnings of the two themes which are potentially in conflict, Plato and πάθος. In 4, 6, L concurs with the criticism of extravagances in Plato. He seems to do the

same in 32,7, where we hear of critics (Caecilius, naturally) who ridiculed some Platonic periphrases. 32, 7 is meant to remind us of 4, 6—one instance of many where the latter part of the book echoes themes of the early part. But why are the examples castigated in 4, 6 so bad, and all the elaborate metaphors from the *Timaeus* in 32 so good? The answer must lie in the religious overtones of the *Timaeus* teleology, but no hint of this is given at the moment. (Nor, we may add in passing, is the point made explicit at a later point, 43, 5: here what appears to be a trivial comment, that we should place unsavoury details of descriptions in inconspicuous positions, as nature placed our excretory organs, has to be read in the light of the praise given to teleology in 32 and of the general principle that our duty as users of λόγος is to emulate the dignity of the creator and his world.) As to πάθος, the premonitions of this in the first seven chapters are again very slight. Unless we read πάθους for βάθους in 2, 1 (and there is no compulsive need for this), the only allusion to the topic is a dismissive one: there exist faults related to πάθος which are analogous to intellectual and moral faults of triviality, but they are not to be discussed here (3, 5). We should never guess from this that emotional intensity is to play so large a part in the sequel; indeed it is natural to suspect that ἄλλος ἡμῖν ἀπόκειται τόπος refers to a separate treatment altogether, not envisaged as part of the present argument, but rather the ἴδιον ὑπόμνημα of 44, 12. However that may be, there is one point on which these chapters (especially 7) are clear and insistent: that a proper moral understanding of the relative values of things is essential, and that it is the failure to see this that is the real cause of Caecilius' inadequacy.



Let us next take our stand on 13, 1. The reference in ἐπάνειμι γάρ is not clear, and we have no choice but to follow Vahlen and invoke the lacuna. But looking back from this point, we can, I think, discern a continuous development from 10, 1, in which the defence of Plato is a principal object. There is a close link between the discussion of accumulation of relevant detail in 10 and that of αὔξησις in 11-12. This is signalled by σύνεδρος (11, 1) and by the similar terminology of 10, 1 and 12, 3. The function of 10 is apparently in the main preparatory. It comes as a surprise to the reader, and is neither anticipated in the original plan nor mentioned in the recapitulation of the whole section at 15, 12. Now L had made the point (at 8, 3) that ὕψος might be found, without πάθος, in the expansive manner of epideictic oratory. This was to associate it with amplification, not with the single, stunning phrase or with ἐκπληξίς. The discussion in 10 helps to fill the gap in his defences which this position made. For the expansive and exhaustive treatment of emotional symptoms or terrifying situations, as illustrated in that chapter, can be seen both to meet the requirement of emotional impact and to involve a large degree of amplification and fullness. The choice here of an example from Sappho is generally held to do credit to L's catholicity of taste. Perhaps however we should consider rather its tactical appropriateness. This sort of lyric was, as we know, admired by Dionysius, hence probably by Caecilius. In these writers, as also in Demetrius, Sappho is a classic of the smooth or elegant style, her subjects, language and σύνθεσις all contributing to a general effect of charm<sup>4</sup>). L seizes on her with enthusiasm; she combines emotion (not indeed the grandest kind of emotion, but the accompanying Homeric instances provide that) with fullness of detail. And there is piquancy in using a favourite author of the opponent's side. Thus there is built up a connection in the reader's mind between emotional contexts and amplification



procedures. This enables Plato, exemplar of fullness, to acquire, by mere association, a qualification for handling emotion, and so appear a likelier model of ὕψος. We should also notice—though the lacuna at 12, 3 obscures the context—the treatment of Cicero. This must allude to Caecilius’ comparison of Cicero with Demosthenes (Plu. *Demosth.* 3, 1); it would make sense to suppose that L is taking a more favourable view of the great Roman than the ‘Atticist’ Caecilius, and that his defence of him commends itself to his Roman addressee and lends support to the parallel apologia for Plato.

For Plato is certainly the focus of attention in the discussion of μίμησις, 13, 2–14. The starting point is a defence of him against a charge of plagiarism (κλοπή). He is an imitator of Homer. L enters no denial. He assumes that Plato’s practice, which is also the practice of other classical authors, is altogether admirable, indeed a justification of the principle of μίμησις as advocated by L and his contemporaries. This is familiar ground from Horace, *epist.* 1, 19. L’s argument seems to be as follows. First, the passage of *Rep.* 586 A quoted at 13, 1 itself proves that Plato can be sublime; this is in fact a passage in which moral indignation and a vigour of vocabulary which L might elsewhere have regarded as coarse (χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες ... λακτίζοντες καὶ κυρίπτοντες) give life to a lengthy and copious period, containing the same sort of abundance of detail that was studied in 10. Secondly: this granted, it is also taken as read that Plato derived many of his excellences from Homer. This Platonic μίμησις is not only a form of ‘inspiration’—the description of imitation in this way, 13, 2, has elevated its importance, and made it seem a way of acquiring excellence beyond the reach of ordinary mechanical skills—but also a model of that stimulating rivalry in which we engage whenever we ask ourselves ‘how Homer or Demosthenes would have gone to work’. The dominant thought here is regard for posterity: πῶς ἂν ὁ μετ’

ἐμὲ πᾶς ἀκούσειεν αἰών; (14, 3) recalls 4, 7 ἀσχημονεῖν πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, and anticipates 44, 9 τῶν μεγάλων ἢ διηκόντων πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα.

## IV

Plato now recedes temporarily into the background. I look back next from chap. 29 to the whole stretch that begins with the discussion of φαντασία in 15. Throughout the examples of the various figures, the emphasis is laid on two essentials: the presence of πάθος as a condition of success and the importance of occasion (καιρός). Two sections (23, 2-4 and 28) take up the topic of αὔξεις. They are also two of the three places in this part of the book where Plato is adduced: in 23, 3, we have an example of amplificatory plurals from the *Menexenus*, which L tells us he has quoted elsewhere (it is not in the extant parts of περὶ ὕψους); and in 28, 3 it is again the *Menexenus* that provides an illustration of periphrasis. The third place is in 29, where L alludes to a hostile criticism (presumably Caecilius') of a bizarre piece of the *Laws*: this looks back to 4, 6, forward to 32, 7. Longinus does not contest the charge; this is one of the places where Caecilius' taste appears to coincide with his own, even though he would regard it as based on totally false principles.

The most striking part of the discussion of σχήματα is its introduction (16). This makes all the essential points that are to be brought out in the subsequent examples. Particularly important is the comparison between Demosthenes and Eupolis. This does two things: it represents yet again the contrast between serious πάθος and humorous ἥθος (cf. also 29, 2); and it makes the point that it is occasion and manner (τὸ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, 16, 3) that make the vital difference. Moreover it echoes two contrasts which are prominent in the discussion of φαντασία. One is

that between Euripides and Aeschylus; this is a relationship of imitation, in which Euripides is seen striving very hard, but with incomplete success, to achieve Aeschylean effects; for one kind of grand theme in particular, the heroic and martial, he is seen to have no talent (15, 5). The other is the contrast between Hyperides and the poets, which rests on the fact—common ground between L and his opponents, though they would evaluate it differently—that reality and actuality are integral to rhetorical, as opposed to poetical, φαντασία. It should not escape us that it is Hyperides, the Atticists' idol later to be firmly labelled as mediocre, who is adduced to make the point: ὥς νή Δία καί ὁ Ὑπερείδης (15, 10) makes it clear that the choice of example is meant to needle the opposition.

We can take one further step here. Both the discussion of φαντασία and the opening chapter περὶ σχημάτων look back to the account of μίμησις which has preceded. The κεφάλαιον on σχήματα is thus linked by common themes with the previous κεφάλαιον. We are accustomed to see 'gliding transitions' and links between separate themes in Horace; we should accustom ourselves to the same phenomenon in prose works of conscious art, like περὶ ὕψους, for it is a rhetorical and not a specifically poetical feature. We have here in fact a sequence of mimetic relationships: Plato's honourable rivalry with Homer, Euripides striving after the grandeur of Aeschylus, Demosthenes transcending the comic effects of Eupolis. Plato comes well out of this: his success is greater than that of Euripides, his model better than that of Demosthenes.

## V

The so-called 'digression' of 33–36 is, I take it, no digression at all in terms of the true purposes of the book, but a definitive statement of a large part of its main theme,

to be supplemented, as we shall see, in the closing chapter itself. In it, Caecilius' attack on Plato is answered on general principles. The Lysianic lightness he admired is shown not to be an alternative ideal, but an inferior literary quality, as much mistaken as the obvious failures that Caecilius and Longinus would agree to condemn as ψυχρά or μικροπρεπή. Points made in 1-2, in 6-7, in the *Odyssey/Iliad* comparison of 9, and in 16 are taken up in this culminating passage. It is surely right to see L's use of the symbol of the great rivers (35, 4) as a declaration of war on the opposing, Callimachean symbol of the pellucid trickling spring <sup>5</sup>). But the tactical management of the argument in preparation for this burst of eloquence to some extent eludes us because of the lacuna following chapter 30. It is noticeable however <sup>6</sup>) that in 31, 1 Caecilius is mentioned for the first time (in the extant parts of the book) since the *propositio* of chapter 8. The point made against him is failure to appreciate a vigorous, almost vulgar metaphor. This links 31 with the following chapter, which deals with frequency of metaphor and also begins with a reference to Caecilius. The polemical purpose of the book is thus here very much to the fore. Chapter 32 then looks forward plainly enough. This long section on metaphor, with its examples from the *Timaeus* functions as a preparation for what follows. Emotion is, generally speaking, the best excuse for boldness of trope or figure, in metaphor as in everything else. Yet (32, 5) there are non-emotional contexts in Plato and Xenophon where the accumulation of metaphor is in place, namely the teleology of the *Timaeus* and *Memorabilia*; these contexts (φραστικοὶ τόποι 32,6) display the quality of grandeur as much, in their way, as emotional ones (παθητικοί). Yet (32, 7) even Plato sometimes goes too far; an opponent (presumably Caecilius) offers an example of inebriated bombast from the *Laws* which L makes no attempt to defend. The defence he might have made, however, is fairly

clear, for the passage (like those in 4, 6 and 29, 1) entirely lacks the religious emotion that suffuses the *Timaeus* teleology. The contemplation of the κόσμος, the wonder and order of the universe, is, for L, one of the great sources of elevated thinking—as it is, for example, also to Hermogenes (242 ff. Rabe). His concern with it is evident not only in the eloquent generalities of 32, 2–5 but in his reading of individual passages of classical poetry. One example that comes to mind is 9, 7. Bühler (*Beiträge*, 30) has drawn attention to the striking similarity of the asyndetic list τραύματα θεῶν στάσεις τιμωρίας δάκρυα δεσμὰ πάθη πάμφορτα with the even longer list in Cicero *ND* I, 42. But L's account is marked by an insistence on the concept of κόσμος which seems to be his own: the stride of the horses is measured κοσμιῶ διαστήματι; if they take another step, οὐκέθ' εὐρήσουσιν ἐν κόσμῳ τόπον; Hades' fear is not just that his dark realms will be opened up, but of the destruction and break-up of the whole universe, ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου. It would therefore be consistent with L's position to justify bold metaphor in Plato where religious or 'cosmic' feeling is involved, or in passages of high moral indignation, but not elsewhere. That he does not explicitly do this, but accepts Caecilian condemnations of passages which would come under this head without formulating the principle, is an interesting point. His tactical procedure seems rather to be to concede these points, but put them in places where they do least harm. So here he sandwiches the passage of the *Laws* between the lengthy discussion of the much-admired contexts of the *Timaeus* and his vigorous attack on Caecilius' prejudice and its underlying narrow-mindedness. This is the common rhetorical trick of placing embarrassing considerations where they will do least harm.

## VI

Chapters 37 and 38 ostensibly resume the discussion of the Fourth Source after the digression (ἐπανιτέον γάρ 37, 1). But they are not only a sequel to the section on tropes. 38, 1 (ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ εἰς ἐναντιώσεις ἀντιπερίσταται) and 38, 2 (Ἰσοκράτης ... παιδὸς πρᾶγμα ἔπαθε) contain clear echoes of 3, 4 (μήποτε περιστάντες ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸναντίον) and the discussion of τὸ μειρακιῶδες in that context. So the treatment of hyperbole, in offering a further repetition of the principle that it is proper emotional intensity that best justifies linguistic boldness, leads the reader back to the early chapters of the book. This is deliberate: L has already (36, 4) made one such reference backwards (ἀνακάμπει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήνῃμιν τοῦ υπομνήματος [i.e. chap. 2] ἢ παραίνεσις), and this is an indication that we should look out for others. We find them again in 41-43, the account of factors destructive of ὕψος, into which the brief discussion of σύνθεσις (39-40) directly leads. But the point of these chapters on μικροποιᾶ is not quite the same as that which L made in 3-4. There, he was concerned with faults incident to the attempt to achieve ὕψος; here he deals with features which are simply the contrary of it, by no means likely to be acquired when striving after it. And we should observe what they are: rapid and monotonous rhythm, short cola and commata, excessively concise expression. This brings to mind one of the themes which I have been trying to develop, L's need to link αὔξησις with some form of ὕψος, largely because of his concern for Plato's reputation, and in spite of his primary insistence on the factor of overpowering emotion. The reader cannot help noticing how quickly (42) L throws away the proposition that excessive length also destroys tension. There is a charitable and plausible explanation, namely that the brevity is a deliberate 'imitation' of the general subject under consideration. But perhaps it is rather that, once again, the point involves some embarrassment; L needs to show that conciseness is

the worse extreme; the less he says about the dangers of excessive length, the better.

Chapter 43 at first surprises the reader. The argument has already moved on to σύνθεσις, but now we return apparently to ἐκλογή. The common subject of 41-43—the theme of μικροποιία—is not subdivided according to the original Scheme. In fact, the concern of 43 is not so much with words as with the things they represent. The sort of impropriety to be avoided is very much like that which is dealt with in the opening chapters of the book: compare ἀσχήμονας (43, 6) with the ἀσχημοσύνη of 3, 5 and 4, 7. Thus the chapter continues the tendency to echo the opening statements which we have seen at work from 36 onwards, and the structure of the Five Sources is now neglected. The links between 43 and 44 are now quite strong. There is a curious formal balance between 32-36 and 43-44: in both sequences, an unusually long quotation, with full discussion, precedes a passage of general principle and insistence on the moral or philosophical aspects of the subject. We should notice also the exhortation in 43, 5 to 'imitate the creative power of nature'. The moral and religious overtones conspicuous throughout the book here pervade even technical instruction, and in this context prepare the reader for the sequel.

For 44 seems wholly in tune with what has preceded. It rejects the view that political circumstances can be blamed for literary decline. It prefers instead the explanation of moral degeneracy, which theoretically lies within our power to remedy. It presupposes a good deal of the second part of the treatise, so that proposals like Brandt's to move it elsewhere *en bloc* encounter real difficulties in the structure of the book as well as the problem of constructing a sufficiently plausible hypothesis to account for the error in transmission. In particular, the contrast between ὑψηλὰ ... καὶ ὑπερμεγέθεις φύσεις and πιθανὰ ... καὶ δριμύϊαι (44, 1) uses the concepts of the great σύγκρισις between the

‘mediocre’ Lysias and Hyperides and the ‘truly great’ Demosthenes and Plato. L has tried to imply that the ideal that Caecilius stands for, in so far as it was accomplished by the lighter Attic orators, is quite inadequate. It was a bloodless literature for slaves—or rather, for people enslaved to their own desires. The political aspect is perhaps not confined to an apologia for monarchy. Lysias and Hyperides lived in a ‘democratic’ state, in L’s sense, and their inadequacy—for they are *par excellence* δριμεῖς καί ἐντρεχεῖς—cannot be due to political circumstances. So in the overall argument of the book the current ἀφορία λόγων must be attributed to something other than the loss of freedom.

## VII

In seeing the main lessons of L’s book in the topics handled *in extenso* in passages which hang only loosely on the skeleton of the Scheme of Five Sources, we are probably doing no more than formulating the general sense of most readers. What I have tried to add to this is the idea that the Scheme should itself be regarded largely as a tactical move, intended to convince the reader at this point that what is to follow is an orderly account of the subject under just these heads. The impression to be given is that L’s correction of Caecilius amounts to an improved organization of the subject, giving a proper place to a crucial feature that Caecilius had left out. But in fact this crucial feature, πάθος, cannot honestly be regarded as co-ordinate with the other items on the list, and, though a vital point in L’s general view of literary excellence, it is also something of an embarrassment to him as an admirer of Plato. What is important in the rhetorical structure of the rest of the book is not the degree to which the Scheme is in fact executed, but the tactics by which the real main themes are



developed. These themes involve defence of Plato, attack on Caecilius, protreptic, and the idealization of the writer capable of true ὕψος.

It seems clear that this ideal writer—the figure corresponding in a sense to the Socrates of the *Apology* or the Demosthenes of *de corona*—must be morally mature, superior to material considerations, and mentally big enough to grasp big ideas. It would be an exaggeration, but not a total falsehood, to say that περὶ ὕψους is a moral protreptic in the guise of literary criticism. Two comparisons with other works come to mind. Horace and L were, presumably, very different sorts of people; but the *Ars poetica* also contains a moral as well as a technical element. He too wants his pupils to write for posterity. He thinks they need some moral knowledge and understanding. And he believes that avarice cripples the creative mind. His greater stress on technique is due, not to an underlying difference of view from that of L, but to the different purpose and occasion of his work: poetry is more dependent on linguistic techniques even than oratory, and Latin writers are more liable to neglect it (on Horace's view) than *Graeci*. The other comparison is with Onasander's Στρατηγικός, in which H. von Rohden long ago (1873) studied the practice of hiatus and compared it with L's. This book is dedicated to Q. Veranius, consul in 49, who died in Britain in 59. So its approximate date is fairly certain. It is by no means a simple handbook on tactics; the author, known to the Suda as a Platonist who commented on the *Republic*, treats his theme with a strong moral purpose and an eye both to Plato and to Xenophon. His account of the virtues of the good general and the encomium of Rome and the *pax Augusta* in his preface go far beyond his technical need. W. A. Oldfather (Loeb ed., P. 350) is right in saying: "The burden of the treatise is really ethics, morale, and the general principles of success in arms". Moreover, certain turns of phrase (κατασκελετεύω 1, 5, cf. L 2, 1; παρακεκινδυνευμένον 32, 1,

cf L33, 2) and a distinct similarity of tone recall the language of L. It is tempting to find in Onasander a further example of the type of educational work we see in L: a moralizing and uplifting treatment of a technical theme, composed with a number of interlocking purposes in view, addressed to a Roman notable, and acknowledging a period of peace.

OXFORD, St. John's College [1](#)) I owe the stimulus to write this paper to an invitation by Prof. D. M. Schenkeveld to talk about Longinus in Amsterdam in 1977 and I am much indebted to him for help and suggestions, both then and when I came to write up this article. In correcting its imbalances and exaggerations, I owe much also to Miss D. C. Innes. I hasten to add that neither she nor Prof. Schenkeveld is to be held to concur in the implausibilities which remain.

[2](#)) *Pseudo-Longinos vom Erhabenen* (1966), 125.

[3](#)) Miss Innes observes that it is likely that L himself realized, and admitted in the lost passage, that πάθος had to be handled, not as a separate source co-ordinate with the others, but in connection with each of the others in turn. It is indeed probable—and certainly cannot be disproved—that there was a passage which thus put the record straight. But a difficulty remains. The point is so fundamental that L must have known it to begin with. If he did, his 'self-correction' was a conscious one, and the *propositio* itself, as I think, disingenuous.

[4](#)) γλαφυρός or ἀνθηρὸς χαρακτήρ: the unsuccessful storm-examples below (as Miss Innes points out to me) are characterized by the same range of words (10, 4 ἄνθος, 10, 6 γλαφυρόν).

[5](#)) Cf. M. Fuhrmann, *Einführung in die antike Dichtungstheorie* (1973), 178 ff.

[6](#)) I owe much here to Prof. Schenkeveld's remarks on this connection of thought.

# *Greeks, Romans, and the Rise of Atticism*

## Jakob Wisse **1. Introduction**

The man honoured with the symposium of April 1994 and with this collection is, of course, a Hellenist. Nevertheless, he has not just now and again invoked evidence from Latin authors; he has actually published on Latin material. I am thinking of his interesting contribution to the 'Cicero on Tatinic' conference, published in 1988. I, following his example, will try to show that studying Greek and Latin material in close conjunction is, in the case of the rise of Atticism, not only natural, but actually indispensable.<sup>1</sup>

It may be in order to begin by stating, in very broad terms, what I understand by Atticism, so as to preclude misunderstandings. What I shall call Atticism is the movement—both Roman and Greek, and particularly in rhetoric as well as prose literature in general—that harks back to the old models of the classical Athenian period, especially but not exclusively Lysias. I have concluded that the beginnings of the movement seem to belong in the first century BCE.

What I will not try to do is to discuss the causes and antecedents of the rise of Atticism.<sup>2</sup> I shall chiefly confine myself to some more down-to-earth problems: when was Atticism initiated, by whom, and what were the ways in which such a movement and such ideas were transmitted. In trying to answer these questions and to devise a picture that is perhaps more plausible than those presented so far, my main aim is to draw some threads together. The questions themselves are far from new, and the material used as well as many of the analyses will also be familiar. The issue of Atticism, after all, has been amply discussed in the past, especially in the last quarter of the 19th century:

the names that come to mind are those of Rohde, Kaibel, Wilhelm Schmid, and especially of Norden (in his *Antike Kunstprosa*), Radermacher and Wilamowitz.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, however, the secondary literature as a whole resembles a jungle more than anything else, in more than one sense. To start with, as has been pointed out some years ago by Goudriaan (1989, esp. 635–6), academic manners were not always as they should have been. For example Wilamowitz, in his famous article from 1900, ‘Asianismus und Atticismus’, does not deign to mention the name of Wilhelm Schmid, but he does characterise Schmid’s suggestion that the movement started on Rhodes as ‘eine kaum fassbare Verkehrtheit’ (1900, 49).<sup>4</sup> From this jungle fight it was, of course, Wilamowitz himself who emerged as the winner—not because his article is faultless or even particularly lucid, but chiefly, it seems, because of his overriding authority. As a result, that stage of the debate virtually ended in 1900. Of more recent scholars, Dihle has been rather influential, but he did, at least to my mind, obscure the issue rather than illuminate it, not only by his fanciful handling of the ancient evidence, but also by misrepresenting earlier scholarship.<sup>5</sup> This is another way in which the secondary literature resembles a jungle: not only is a real consensus still very difficult to reach, but also the various opinions are often hard to disentangle.

This is, I hope, already sufficient excuse for my again taking up the issue. What I will do is, as the saying goes, to proceed from the known to the unknown. I will take as my point of departure the two relatively secure phases of the Atticist movement in the first century BCE, viz. the Roman phase of ca. 50 BCE, and the Greek phase associated with Dionysius of Halicarnassus of ca. 25 BCE. From there, after an intermezzo where the problems are defined with some more precision, I will move on to the question of the

relationship between these two phases, and to the problem of the first beginnings of the movement.

## 2. The two secure phases

### 2.1 Roman Atticism

We know about Roman Atticism, of course, through Cicero's works, especially the two rhetorical works published in 46 BCE, *Brutus* and *Orator*. What emerges quite clearly from these is a general and relatively undisputed picture of the main characteristics of the movement. The Atticists favoured the use of a pure Latin as they saw it, and more especially a style that was simple and elegant. Their models were the classical Athenian orators Lysias and Hyperides; particularly Lysias they saw as the Attic orator *par excellence*. All the oratory of the period from ca. 300 BCE until their own time they rejected as being 'Asianist', by which they chiefly meant overdone and bombastic. And in this criticism they included Cicero's emotional style, which they likewise regarded as swollen and bombastic. Cicero answers their challenge in *Brutus* and *Orator* by pointing out, among other things, that in persuading an audience, his oratory was far more effective than theirs. He also emphasises that Demosthenes, who often used an emotional style, was no less truly 'Attic' than the simple and subdued Lysias. In other words, Cicero claims that he himself, in following Demosthenes, has as many rights to the title of Atticist as his opponents.

What also emerges clearly from *Brutus*, and is confirmed elsewhere, is that the leader of the movement was C. Licinius Calvus, who, in this same work, is spoken of as dead.<sup>6</sup> And as Bowersock writes (1979, 59), here the trouble begins: when did the movement start? It is commonly

assumed that Cicero's *de Oratore*, published at the end of 55 BCE, does not address the issue of Atticism, whereas the works of 46 BCE do. The usual inference is that Roman Atticism emerged between 55 and 46. Calvus, then, must have died ca. 47.

But, as Bowersock rightly emphasises (1979, 61), this cannot be right. Calvus is never heard of after 54. That is, our numerous records of the eventful years of power politics and civil war between 54 and 46 do not mention this ambitious, gifted young man, who left 21 books of speeches that Tacitus could still read (*Dial.* 21.1), and who was very active in the years 56–54. As Münzer saw (1926, 433), this means that he must have died in 54 or 53. Since he was the leader of the Atticists, the movement must, then, have begun well before 54.<sup>7</sup>

This seems to create a new problem, for we might be tempted to think, with Bowersock (1979, 61–5) and others,<sup>8</sup> that Roman Atticism virtually died with Calvus in 54/53; after all, neither in *Brutus* nor in *Orator* does Cicero mention other, living adherents of the movement. This would make oddities of these two works: written in 46, they would address an issue that was definitely old hat. Bowersock's solution (1979, 62) is to suggest that Cicero was an 'ageing person', who 'could still feel strongly on tired topics'. But even apart from the circularity of such analyses, this will not do. It requires us to imagine that Cicero has written these two works only to refute a man who was at least seven years dead—a behaviour for which 'feeling strongly on tired topics' is surely an understatement. We must suppose that Calvus had followers who were active in 46. Cicero, of course, does not mention them in *Brutus*; but that is because he explicitly refrains from discussing living orators (*Brut.* 231), with only some exceptions *honoris causa*, such as those of Marcellus and Caesar, who are treated by the other interlocutors (248–62). Actually, he does speak of

Atticists and imitators of Lysias in the present tense.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, a well-known passage in a letter to Atticus from 44 BCE (*Att.* 15.1a.2) makes it clear that Brutus was at least inclined to follow Calvus: Cicero there discusses a speech by Brutus and describes it as 'Attic' in the sense of the Atticists, i.e. elegant and unemotional.

What, then, of the virtual absence of Atticism from the earlier *de Oratore*? Contrary to what is usually assumed, the work may show some traces of the budding controversy,<sup>10</sup> but Atticism is still indeed at most a marginal concern. A natural explanation is that the movement was not yet strong enough to provoke Cicero to write a (lengthy) defence.

So, unless we are prepared to take Cicero for a complete fool, we may safely infer the following: the beginnings of Roman Atticism must be put between 60 and 55, with Calvus in a leading role; in 55, when writing *de Oratore*, Cicero did not yet consider the movement worth refuting at length; but after Calvus' death in 54/53, it gained more adherents and this forced Cicero to defend himself in 46. These statements, of course, do not exhaust the matter by far, but for my purpose they may serve as a starting point.

## 2.2 Dionysius and other Greeks

I can be fairly brief about the second relatively secure phase, which is marked especially by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the man he once calls his 'dear friend',<sup>11</sup> Caecilius of Caleacte. Dionysius arrived in Rome in 30 or 29 BCE,<sup>12</sup> and probably not too long afterwards wrote what is for us an extremely valuable document: the *Preface* to *On the Ancient Orators*. Our own time, he writes, at last sees the victory of the Attic Muse over the mindless, bombastic style from Asia that has dominated from the time of the death of Alexander the Great. This resurgence and victory of

the Attic style, he says, is due to the good taste of the Romans, the masters of the world (a point to which I will come back). What we see here is a Greek Atticism with the same basic characteristics as the Roman version of 30 years earlier.

However, there is one difference: Calvus had obviously designated Lysias and Hyperides as the only true models, but Dionysius values almost all the 'classic' Attic orators, not only Lysias and Hyperides, but also Demosthenes, and even the verbose Isocrates. On the other hand, his 'friend' Caecilius seems, like Calvus, to have favoured Lysias above all other models.

### **3. Intermezzo**

So far, so good—more or less. Before tackling any further questions, it seems a good idea to try to characterise the Atticist movement a little more accurately and to formulate more clearly the chief problems that I want to address.

## **3.1 The nature of Atticism**

When I call Atticism a 'movement', that is only because I know no better term. It was in fact a movement, if we understand the term loosely. For what Cicero describes, and what Dionysius describes, is not a movement in the sense of a closed school of thought, with official members, and an official policy and programme. It is, however, a movement in the sense of a fashion or a trend, based on a set of only more or less coherent ideas that is shared by a number of people. The variation in the choice of models well illustrates the absence of a coherent programme: the extremists, Calvus on the Roman side and perhaps Caecilius on the Greek, accept really only Lysias; Dionysius adds Demosthenes, Isocrates, Isaeus and others. What counts,



then, is not whether someone subscribed to a definite programme, but whether he was an Atticist in his own eyes or in those of his contemporaries.<sup>13</sup> For instance, Cicero's letter mentioned above (*Att.* 15. 1a.2) is enough reason to connect Brutus with the movement.

What the Roman and Greek variants conspicuously have in common is the rejection of the oratory and prose literature from the whole period that we call Hellenistic, i.e., the period beginning with the death of Alexander in 323: the style of this period is regarded as bombastic and labeled 'Asianism', as allegedly originating from Asia Minor. Accordingly, both variants had for their chief butt someone from this area and from this period, viz. Hegesias of Magnesia,<sup>14</sup> who lived ca. 300 BCE or somewhat later.

Thus in the Atticist view, literary history is divided into three periods: first, a 'classical' period, located in the glorious past of classical Athens; then, a falling off, a long period of decline and degeneration; and finally, their own time, which is at last striving to restore and revive the glory of the past. It seems a good idea, as Thomas Gelzer has advocated, to use the term 'classicism' for such a tripartite view of history.<sup>15</sup> Of course, it may be disputed whether or not this use of the term is really ideal, but for now at least, I will use it in this sense. A precise term for this concept is attractive because it alerts us to the fact that the same tripartite view of history had asserted itself in a number of other disciplines already. I cannot reiterate the evidence here, but the same idea seems to have taken root in the visual arts as early as 150 BCE: at least some sculptors around that time saw themselves as reviving the high standards of the past after a period of decline that had started ca. 300 BCE.<sup>16</sup> The same pattern established itself in philosophy around 90 BCE at the latest: e.g., in the view of Antiochus of Ascalon, Plato and his immediate followers in the early Academy had devised the true philosophy, which

had been betrayed in the period after that (see *Fin.* 5.9–14). In other words, classicism was rife in our period, and Atticism must surely be connected with this general trend.

Atticism, then, is by nature a form of classicism, i.e., it has this particular tripartite view of history. What deserves emphasis is that this view need by no means be true. To an important extent, it is a form of image building, for by this view the proponents of the movement proclaim themselves to be the restorers of the classical standards. Wilamowitz (1900, 1–8) already pointed out (and this was perhaps his most important contribution) that ‘Asianism’ was not, at least not originally, the name of a real movement or even of a real stylistic period: it was a term of abuse coined by the Atticists to disparage the period they rejected. This view of history may be untrue in another sense also: the proponents of a renewed ‘Attic’ style may try to attain this ideal and may try to write like their classical models, but this does not mean they will actually do so. To begin with, they are not necessarily imitating every aspect of their models. More importantly, they may be very bad judges of their own efforts. The style of Dionysius himself, it has been observed, was far less innovative and truly Attic than he would probably have liked to think. But this does not alter his view of himself or his ideals, and he remains an Atticist.<sup>17</sup>

The discrepancy between theory and practice need cause no surprise, if only because to a native speaker of Greek, the inclusion of even a limited number of ‘Atticisms’ must already have given his style and language a recognisable Attic flavour. It does, however, imply that much caution is necessary in the analysis of the style of Dionysius and other Atticists. Only a very careful synthesis in the field of the stylistic practices of the relevant authors (and this is not yet, as far as I know, available)<sup>18</sup> would be meaningful here and could tell us something about the Atticist movement as such.

Much more could be said, especially about the relationship between language and style. That, however, would take us too far afield. It is time to go back to the rise of the movement.

## **3.2 The problem**

What we have is two securely dated movements which are very much alike, the earlier one Roman, the slightly later one Greek. It is, to my mind, clearly unacceptable to separate them, as Dihle, for example, seems to do,<sup>19</sup> and to pretend they have little to do with each other. Most scholars have indeed posited some sort of connection. There are, however, quite a number of possibilities regarding the precise nature of this connection. First, as in the view of Norden (1898) and again of some moderns, the movement may be originally Greek, and early, i.e., stemming from the early second century BCE. The two movements we have looked at would then, probably, be independent descendants of this earlier one. A second possibility was favoured by Wilamowitz (1900, 31-51). It resembles the first, but puts the origin around 60 BCE with Greeks who worked in Rome. Both these variants are in line with the old and still dominant belief that the Romans, in the first place, took all their ideas from the Greeks, and in the second place, cannot possibly have influenced Greek thought. As to the latter point, many scholars, of course, have looked down on Dionysius of Halicarnassus (cf. Goudriaan 1989, 666-75), but it seems they usually looked down on the Romans even more: even in his case, the suggestion that he might have been influenced by Roman ideas has, until rather recently, hardly been seriously entertained. Bowersock, though with hesitation, broke at least this taboo, and advocated a third possibility (1979, esp. 67; cf. also Innes 1989, 245-6). Though he did cling to a Greek origin of the movement,

around 65, he supposed that the Atticism of Calvus and his friends must have led to the Atticism of Dionysius. As I will presently set forth, my view, which may be regarded as a development of Kennedy's (1972, 241-2; 351-3), goes one step further: I think the movement was originally Roman, and was passed on to Greeks working in Rome.

In what follows, I shall begin by arguing that the first alternative, the early dating, is virtually impossible. Then I shall try to show that a Roman origin is the most natural hypothesis in view of what our sources tell us. And finally, I will address the question that was already a central issue in Bowersock's article: if Atticism was originally Roman, how did it reach Dionysius, Caecilius and their fellow Greeks?

## **4 The origins**

Norden, in his *Antike Kunstprosa*, put the origins of Atticism ca. 200 BCE. The reason, it seems, was not so much a wish to avoid crediting the Romans with the movement, but his tendency to interpret every criticism of bombastic style as Atticism. He saw the whole history of style as a battle between Asianism and Atticism.<sup>20</sup> So when the early second century geographer and historian Agatharchides (as quoted by Photius)<sup>21</sup> criticised Hegesias for his puerile and bombastic style, this was for Norden a sign of Atticism. However, this procedure would make even Aristotle into an Atticist, and it is fairly clear (as Radermacher already remarked (1899, 355)) that in Agatharchides' criticism the characteristic features of the Atticist movement were still lacking: he did not appeal to classical models, he did not call Hegesias an Asianist, and there is no sign of the classicistic three-period view of history.<sup>22</sup>

The early dating has recently been revived by Preisshofen in his contribution to the *Entretiens* on Classicism at Rome, published in 1979. And as the proceedings of this

colloquium show, this dating was acceptable to most of the other participants. His reason is the turn to classicism in the visual arts around 150 BCE (mentioned above § 3), with the typical three-period scheme applied to art history. This scheme, he thinks, cannot have originated in theories of sculpture or painting, but must have derived from rhetoric. Therefore, rhetorical classicism, i.e. Atticism, must be earlier than 150 BCE. That this should have been so readily accepted is a little surprising: it is unclear why rhetoric should be the first candidate for having devised the scheme. And what we know of second-century rhetoricians does not encourage the view: they were busy with other things, such as quarreling among themselves over *status* theory, and with the philosophers over education.

Some additional evidence is also available to date the movement in the first century. Cicero, in *Orator* 89, speaks of *istis novis Atticis*, 'these modern Attics'; in *Brutus* 284, he writes that Calvus *ipse errabat et alios etiam errare cogebat*, Calvus 'was in error himself and caused others to err with him'. Taken by itself, this might only concern the recent, Roman version of Atticism. However, Dionysius in his *Preface* also consistently speaks of Atticism as a fairly recent phenomenon, e.g. in 3.3, 6.8–9, where he talks of the change for the better: *τηλικαύτης μεταβολῆς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ γεγεννημένης* ('such a great change having come about in this brief period of time').<sup>23</sup> The two passages from Cicero and the passage from Dionysius strongly confirm each other. They point to a date of ca. 60 BCE for the beginning of Atticism as a whole.

## 5. The Originators

Who originated the movement? As I have already said, for most scholars it has been natural to posit a Greek origin. Wilamowitz is a good example. Having mentioned Dionysius' statement that Rome had a decisive influence, he writes

(1900, 45), speaking about the 60's and 50's BCE: 'Schon damals gait, was er [Dionysius, JW] von Rom sagt, dass es als Centrum der Welt den Ton angab; aber Römer können ihn unmöglich angegeben haben'. The Greeks in Rome, Wilamowitz concluded, rethought their classics, and inaugurated classicism. Dihle (1977, 170-4) even thought he could pinpoint the Greek grammarian Philoxenus of Alexandria as the instigator of the Roman variant.<sup>24</sup>

But why, we must ask, should it have been Greeks? Let us see what Dionysius says in the beginning of the third chapter of his *Preface* (3.1, 5.21-6.1 U.-R.):

αἰτία δ' οἶμαι καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἐγένετο ἡ πάντων κρατοῦσα Ῥώμη πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀναγκάζουσα τὰς ὅλας πόλεις ἀποβλέπειν καὶ ταύτης τε αὐτῆς οἱ δυναστεύοντες κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου τὰ κοινὰ διοικούντες, εὐπαίδευτοι πάνυ καὶ γενναῖοι τὰς κρίσεις γενόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν κοσμούμενον τό τε φρόνιμον <ἐκάσ>της<sup>25</sup> πόλεως μέρος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιδέδωκεν καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον ἠνάγκασται νοῦν ἔχειν.

'I think the cause and the origin (ἀρχή) of this great change to be almighty Rome which forces all the cities to look to her for guidance, and those who rule her virtuously and administer the world in all good faith: they are well educated and noble in their judgements, and because they have honoured the sensible element of < each > city this has gained even more strength, and the foolish element has been forced to be sensible.'

In itself, this is not decisive. I don't think we should insist on ἀρχή, 'origin'; Dionysius does not clearly speak about the origin of the movement, only about the reason for its success. Moreover, he might just be flattering his patrons. But let us again look at *Brutus* 284: Calvus 'was in error himself and caused others to err with him'. If we take this at all seriously, as I think we must, Calvus himself was the originator of the movement. This may be clinched by the following observation: in *de Oratore*, Cicero repeatedly

ridicules Greek rhetoricians and their like as impractical and pretentious people. If Atticism had been originated by Greeks, it is therefore hard to imagine that he would have missed the opportunity to ridicule it in *Brutus* and *Orator* as one of those fanciful and impractical Greek notions; after all, the impractical nature of Atticism is one of his persistent arguments against it (e.g. *Brut.* 289–90). But he does nothing of the sort: neither *Brutus* nor *Orator* contains even a hint at such a Greek origin. The coterie of Calvus, then, produced not only the neoteric poets, but also Atticism, with Calvus himself in the leading role. And in 46, as we have seen, Brutus and others were still continuing the movement.

## **6. The transmission**

This seems to leave us with a problem: how did an originally Roman movement manage to influence Greek rhetoricians? It is again Bowersock who has addressed this issue, for although he thinks a Greek must have been initially responsible for Roman Atticism (1979, 63), he does take Dionysius seriously (1979, 66), and reckons with decisive Roman influence on the Greek movement. Bowersock's own solution, however, is slightly odd. He writes that 'the relation between the two Atticist movements can be most naturally explained by reference to Q. Aelius Tubero, the patron of Dionysius' (1979, 68): it is Tubero who 'reviewed with [Dionysius] the whole controversy over Atticism and Asianism' (1979, 69). Here we see the prosopographical method, with its reliance on individual relationships, at its weakest. Is Dionysius supposed to have reacted with so much enthusiasm that he took it upon himself to spread the word to all the Greek cities? Such a restricted, personal transmission is already implausible in itself.

Moreover, in his *Preface* Dionysius writes about a broad Greek movement, which has already been going on for some (short) time; and in the passage just quoted in § 5, he



mentions the influence of Romans (in the plural). What seems to have happened is that the movement spread through intensive contacts between Roman and Greek intellectuals, probably at first in Rome, though soon also elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> That is to say, in more fashionable terms, there must have been an intellectual network in Rome consisting of both Greeks and Romans.

Now the concept of a 'network' is a very useful one, but we must beware of possible misunderstandings. Quite recently, I heard a Renaissance scholar use it in the sense of 'circle': he spoke of some humanist 'and his network'; and if we don't look out, the 'Scipionic circle', which has at last been ruled out of court, will enter again under the name of the 'Scipionic network'. This is not what I am referring to when I use the term 'network'. What I mean to say is that there must have been many contacts, of various sorts and varying intensity, between numerous Greek and Roman intellectuals.

Now it may well be asked whether there is any other evidence, apart from Atticism itself, for such a network, and for the hypothesis that Greeks seriously took notice of the Romans and their ideas. There is indeed such evidence. Already in the 60's and 50's BCE at least some of the numerous Greeks who worked in Rome as grammarians, rhetoricians, etc., occupied themselves with the Latin language and Latin literature. Elizabeth Rawson has assembled the evidence. We may think, for example,<sup>27</sup> of Cornelius Epicadus, a freedman of Sulla's, who wrote, among other things, on the technical subject of Roman cognomina. There was Alexander Polyhistor, who must have used Latin sources for his history of Rome; Ateius Philologus, who also dealt with Greek and Latin, worked until perhaps 30 BCE. This already takes us much further in time—and there must be much more material, into the Augustan age.



Let me illustrate this by means of the case of a remarkable though far from likeable man: L. Cestius Pius. Despite his Roman name, he was a Greek, who had made a name for himself as a rhetorician or declaimer in his native Smyrna or in Asia in general. Already in that stage of his career, he vehemently disliked and attacked Cicero, as appears from the following anecdote that Seneca the Elder tells us (*Suas.* 7.12–3). Cicero's son, governor of Asia somewhere in the 20's, once invited Cestius to a dinner party. Cicero Junior was in his cups and kept forgetting who Cestius was, so finally a slave said: *hic est Cestius, qui patrem tuum negabat litteras scisse* ('this is Cestius, the one who said that your father couldn't read and write'). Young Cicero was not pleased: he had Cestius flogged immediately—which, Seneca says, was only right. Now Cestius, we may venture to say, took his revenge: he came to Rome to become one of the most famous and sharp-tongued declaimers of Augustan times; he is mentioned very frequently by Seneca the Elder, where he appears, even for a declaimer, as an extremely conceited and aggressive man. But what is most remarkable about him is that, though a Greek (cf. *Sen. Con.* 9.3.13), he only declaimed in Latin. Moreover, a famous pupil of his, Argentarius, also a Greek, did the same (*ib.*). And from the way Seneca reports this, it is clear that though such a restriction was unusual, a Greek declaiming in Latin was in itself not at all considered exceptional.

This is, I think, already strong evidence for the existence of a truly Graeco-Roman cultural 'network' throughout the relevant period, but it must be only a fraction of what can be found. Although I have not yet looked systematically at the material, I think that Seneca the Elder is bound to yield more.<sup>28</sup> What I hope to be able to do in the near future is to attempt to reconstruct at least part of this network, just as the late Elizabeth Rawson has done for the end of the

Republican period. In my opinion there is a real challenge here, for a number of developments, such as that of Augustan literature as a whole, might need to be rethought from this perspective.<sup>[29](#)</sup>

## **7. Conclusion**

However that may turn out, I hope to have shown that, despite the confusing number of opinions on the beginnings of Atticism, it may not, in the end, be too hard to choose between them and to devise an overall picture. Of course, I have left aside several issues and glossed over some problems that may turn out to be nasty ones, especially that of the relation between language and style; not to mention the question of the subsequent history of the movement in Latin and in Greek and the light this might throw on its beginnings. Also, the material is scanty, and every new piece of evidence may shatter all our carefully constructed schemes. Nevertheless, considering the actual evidence we have, I hope my picture, as it is, is a plausible one: it was in the coterie of Calvus that Atticism took shape ca. 60 BCE; it spread through a Graeco-Roman network, to emerge, for us, as a Greek phenomenon in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. And as to this Graeco-Roman network, it will no doubt be possible to unearth some representatives who are less repulsive than Cestius Pius.

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<sup>1</sup> I want to thank Nancy Laan for several forms of help with this piece, and Doreen Innes for the stimulating discussions on this and similar topics during the symposium. All errors and infelicities are, of course, mine alone.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. below n. 22.

<sup>3</sup> See bibliography for the titles, and the very useful survey of the debates of the period by Goudriaan 1989, 595–677.

<sup>4</sup> Goudriaan 1989, 635. Schmid's suggestion was made in his Antrittsrede (1898, 11: Goudriaan 1989, 634), which I have not seen.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., when trying to establish a firm connection between Stoicism and the *genus subtile* (1957, 185), he presents Cotta, the Academic spokesman in *de Natura Deorum*, as a Stoic, as well as Torquatus (either the Epicurean spokesman in *de Finibus*, or his father who once ridiculed the Stoics: *Fin.* 1.39); also, he reports (1957, 170 n. 2) that Wilamowitz (1900) discussed 'das

Aufkommen des Attizismus in Griechenland', though Wilamowitz himself put the beginnings of the movement in Rome (below, § 5).

<sup>6</sup> *Brut.* 283; 284; cf. *Fam.* 15.21.4 (probably from the end of 46: see Shackleton Bailey's commentary).

<sup>7</sup> On Calvus' activities in 56–54 see esp. Münzer 1926, 430–3. Note also that he is not attested to have held any office. All this fits in very well with a birth-date for Calvus in 82, which was convincingly defended by Sumner (1973, 149), less well with the date of 88 that was favoured by Münzer (1926, 429–30).

<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in particular, Douglas (1955, 242; 1966, xii–xiv; 1973, 125–6—but contrast 1973, 127), who, however, puts Calvus' death in 47 or not much earlier (1966, xiii and ad 283).

<sup>9</sup> E.g., 64; 67; 285–91 *passim*.

<sup>10</sup> Esp. in 3.25–37: see the introduction to this passage in Leeman-Pinkster-Wisse (forthc.).

<sup>11</sup> *Pomp.* 3.20, 240.14: τῷ φιλάτῳ Καικιλίῳ.

<sup>12</sup> *Ant. Rom.* 1.3.4 with 1.7.2.

<sup>13</sup> This implies that the history of the movement does not coincide in any straightforward manner with the history of oratorical styles: see below. Cf. also the sensible, though over-polemical remarks of Douglas (1973, 125–7).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 286–7; *Orat.* 226; 230; D.H. *Comp.* 4.11, 9.9–15; 18.21–9, 79.9–84.3; Strabo 14.1.41.

<sup>15</sup> Gelzer 1979, esp. 9–12; actually, he adds the presence of a specific theory about the qualities that mark the 'classical' period.

<sup>16</sup> Plin. *Nat.* 34.49–52, cf. Preisshofen 1979, 269–71.

<sup>17</sup> An extreme illustration of a discrepancy between stylistic ideal and stylistic practice is the much earlier case of Hegesias, who was later considered the typical Asianist, and whose fragments do show a style that is rather hard to swallow: surprisingly, Hegesias considered himself a follower of Lysias! (*Brut.* 286: H. imitated Charisius who imitated Lysias; *Orat.* 226: H. imitated Lysias.)

<sup>18</sup> Lasserre 1979 is rather unsatisfactory.

<sup>19</sup> Dihle (1977, 176), mainly as a result of his excessive emphasis on the grammatical aspect. Thus also Douglas, explicitly (1973, 125 n. 89) or implicitly (1966, xii–xiv: only the Latin variant discussed), though he had earlier, with much hesitation, given the Greek side some attention (1955, 242–3).

<sup>20</sup> See Norden 1898, esp. 149–51.

[21](#) Agatharch., *GGM* 1.119.33-122.24 = Phot. *Bibl.* 250 (446a16-447b5), containing Hegesias *FGrH* 142 T3; F 6-14.

[22](#) Radermacher is in general very good on the antecedents of Atticism (1899, 351-60), as on a number of other issues: his article deserves more attention.

[23](#) Cf. 1.1, 3.5 τῷ καθ' ἡμῶς χρόνῳ; 1.2, 3.10 ἐν ... τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις; 2.2, 4.23 ὁ καθ' ἡμῶς χρόνος; 2.3, 5.6) τὸν παρόντα χρόνον; 2.3, 5.10 ταχεῖαν τὴν μεταβολήν (cf. 2.4, 5.11-4); 2.5, 5.18 νεωστί. Dionysius' wording is not very precise and can easily be brought in line with Cicero's testimony (*contra* Dihle 1977, 164).

[24](#) Though not of the Greek variant (cf. above with n. 19).

[25](#) In the context, the τῆς πόλεως of the MSS seems impossible to interpret. Hurst (1982, 859) seems to take it as referring to Rome, which doesn't make much sense; the reference of 'de la cité' in Aujac's Budé ed. is unclear to me; and Usher, in his Loeb edition, translates 'of the population'! A distributive phrase is called for, referring (as does the earlier πόλεις) to the Greek cities.

[26](#) Innes (1989, 246) likewise suggests 'mutual cross-fertilisation between Greeks and Romans' regarding Atticism, but with much hesitation, and in a context where she stresses a general 'Greek lack of interest in Roman literature' (1989, 245). Like most others, she seems to assume that the movement probably started among Greeks, though again with much (justified) caution.

[27](#) Also, a number of Greek grammarians took Latin to be derived from the Greek Aeolic dialect, and even wrote works 'On the Latin language': Hypsicrates of Amisus, Philoxenus, Tyrannio (the Elder or the Younger: cf. Rawson 1985, 69).

[28](#) See already the list of the declaimers mentioned by Seneca in Bomecque 1902, 143-201.

[29](#) I have not been able to take into account White's study (1993), which seems to offer a very interesting analysis of Augustan poetry in the context of a chiefly Roman network.

# **THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SIXTH BOOK OF POLYBIUS**

## I. INTRODUCTION

IN 1943 one of the authors of this paper set out a case<sup>1</sup> for the view that the sixth book of Polybius' *Histories* contained two layers, written at different times, and indicating a change in the historian's assessment of the achievements and merits of the Roman hegemony. The arguments there put forward met with some acceptance;<sup>2</sup> but the recent burst of interest in the problems of the sixth book has shown that unanimity is still remote. Among scholars writing since 1943,<sup>3</sup> one, G. B. Cardona,<sup>4</sup> is a 'separatist' who accepts the views of De Sanctis; another, W. Theiler,<sup>5</sup> believes that three 'layers' of composition can be detected and isolated; three, E. Mioni,<sup>6</sup> H. Erbse,<sup>7</sup> and H. Ryffel,<sup>8</sup> are 'unitarians', but vary in the date they assign to the composition of the *Histories*; and K. Ziegler<sup>9</sup> in his *R.E.* article on Polybius argues for composition in the sixties followed by a revision and publication before 146.

The justification of adding yet a further item to a long and growing bibliography is that its authors, after approaching the problem from different sides, one from that of Greco-Roman philosophy, and in particular of Cicero's philosophical works, the other from a general preoccupation with Polybius, have reached certain unanimous views about the sixth book. To anticipate conclusions, they are convinced that the attempt to dissect Polybius' argument in Book 6 into layers is mistaken and misleading;<sup>10</sup> that the 'unitarian' view is correct; but that many 'unitarians' have exaggerated the logical wholeness of Polybius' argument, consequently missing its full significance. The book is indeed a whole, but it remains a muddled whole. It is in many respects a failure,

albeit an impressive failure. Nevertheless, though its importance has often been minimized, it has exercised a truly remarkable influence on subsequent political thought and action. This presupposes merits in it which have perhaps not hitherto been adequately defined.

This paper, therefore, will first discuss the general problem of the composition of the *Histories* and of those alleged contradictions in the sixth book which have led to the 'separatist' theory; secondly it will analyse the argument and indicate the logical relationship between the various strands in Polybius' exposition; finally it will attempt an estimate of Polybius' degree of success or failure in making a unity of Book 6. The authors' view of the date of composition and publication will emerge in the course of the discussion.

## II. THE WRITING AND PUBLICATION OF THE HISTORIES

An error of method, which has led to much misunderstanding, especially among scholars interested only in Polybius' constitutional essay, is to attempt to study Book 6 in isolation from the *Histories* as a whole. It is, however, with the composition of the whole work that any investigation of a particular book must begin; and indeed the view that Book 6 contains passages derived from two stages in Polybius' thought is linked with the well established fact that the *Histories* show traces of a second plan, which led to the insertion of occasional passages in books already written, and in at least one (Book 3) that was already published. Clearly the number, distribution, and extent of these affect our expectation of similar insertions in the sixth book. First, therefore, we shall review briefly what is established with some degree of certainty about the conception, composition, and publication of Polybius' work.<sup>1</sup>

Originally planned to go down to 168, the *Histories* were later extended to cover the period to 146 and the



immediate aftermath of the Achaean War.<sup>2</sup> It is a reasonable assumption that Polybius' decision to extend them beyond 168 was taken only after the double débâcle of 146, since this is the date chosen for the new conclusion. Svoboda's argument<sup>3</sup> for two stages in the revision (a general intention to continue beyond 168, conceived before 146, and a later decision to make this latter the concluding year) rests on a single passage which can be otherwise explained,<sup>4</sup> and the existing work shows no signs of any provisional plan of extension. Erbse's contention<sup>5</sup> that the whole was conceived and written after 144 overlooks the clear indication of revision in 3. 4. 1: *κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν*.

Prior to 146 Polybius had written at least Books 1–15. The evidence for this lies in such passages as presuppose an independent Greece (and Achaean League)<sup>6</sup> and more particularly in references to Carthage as still in existence.<sup>7</sup> There is some force in Erbse's argument<sup>1</sup> that the present tenses used in the 'comparative' chapters of Book 6 are examples of the 'achronistic' use of the tense in a *syncrisis*. For instance, the Spartan kings referred to in the present tense in 6. 45. 5 no longer existed (here Polybius is closely following his source, Ephorus).<sup>2</sup> But granted that a discussion of Carthaginian naval drill (52. 1 ff.) is less appropriate to the middle of the second century than to the third, it is untrue to say that 'die karthagische Flotte war seit Jahrzehnten aufgelöst'.<sup>3</sup> The peace after Zama left Carthage ten ships, of which six were used against Antiochus; and references to ships' timber seen by Cato at Carthage in 153 and to the rebuilding of the Punic fleet suggest that talk of Carthaginian naval power played a big part in the création of a bellicose atmosphere at Rome prior to the Third Punic War.<sup>4</sup> The Romans were always exceptionally sensitive to any naval threat,<sup>5</sup> and even if talk of a resurgence of Carthaginian naval power was merely rumour or propaganda, discussion of Carthaginian skill at sea was no

anachronism in the years before 150.<sup>6</sup> In any case, Erbse's argument breaks down once he turns to passages outside Book 6; for even the unwarranted extension of the 'achronistic present' to passages forming no part of a *syncrisis*<sup>7</sup> does not explain why Polybius should offer political advice to the statesmen of a city which on this hypothesis no longer existed.<sup>8</sup>

Had Polybius written more than fifteen books before the Third Punic War ? Recently Aymard has suggested<sup>9</sup> that the praise of Aristaenus for preserving the Achaean League by his agreement with Rome (18. 13. 8-9) is not easily explicable unless composed before 146; the implication, at which he hints, would be that Polybius had in fact composed up to Book 18 before this date. However, this thesis is not compelling; and it might equally well be argued, if any chronological conclusions are to be drawn from this passage (which is doubtful), that the references to *τῆς παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἀσφαλείας* and to the utter destruction of the country which Aristaenus avoided, hint at the disaster of 146, which was due to the abandonment of Aristaenus' policy. Moreover, if Book 18 was written before 146, 18. 35. 9, with its reference to the fall of Carthage, was evidently a later insertion; and though it does indeed occur in a digression, digressions are not necessarily later intrusions. We conclude that no firm evidence has yet been adduced for assuming the composition of more than Books 1-15 before 150-146.

There is good reason to think that by about 150, and indeed during the years immediately preceding that date, Polybius had published four, or possibly five, books (on Book 6 see below). The evidence for this lies in several passages which appear to have been inserted at the last moment in Books 3 and 4 because of their topical interest or with the intention of influencing contemporary policy in Greece or Rome.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, 5. 88-90 on the earthquake at Rhodes in

226 fits awkwardly into its present context, and Holleaux argued cogently<sup>1</sup> that, in view of the many places in Book 4 where it could have been introduced admirably, that book was already published when Polybius decided on his digression. This would suggest that the early books were published separately and at intervals: it would of course tell us nothing of the length of such intervals, nor rule out the possibility that Book 5 appeared very shortly after Book 4. In fact the two books go closely together, and along with Book 3 they cover the events of a single Olympiad;<sup>2</sup> hence one might reasonably assume that they were published at approximately the same time.

Naturally the question has been raised, whether Polybius had published more than Books 1–5 before the Third Punic War; and Mioni<sup>3</sup> has argued that all the first fifteen books were not only published, but also written, between 151 and 147.<sup>4</sup> This thesis gives an easy explanation of the advice to Punic (and Roman) leaders in 9. 9. 9–10, a passage which must otherwise be assumed to have been left unaltered when the book was published after the destruction of Carthage (which is not indeed impossible); and Polybius' reference to visiting New Carthage can refer to a journey in 151/0 and yet form part of the original composition. On the other hand, Mioni's hypothesis implies that Polybius wrote nothing during the seventeen tedious years of internment; yet in the five years 151–146, when he was busy first visiting Spain and Africa and then taking up the threads of life in Greece, only to break off again to join Scipio at Carthage and embark on a voyage of discovery in the Atlantic—in short during the few years when we can trace his very many activities with some chronological certainty, he is supposed to have composed and published fifteen books. Such a theory is not only unproven but bears the stamp of improbability.

Book 6, however, stands by itself. A passage in Book 11 (1a. 5) distinguishes Books 1–6 from the rest as having been equipped with *προγραφαί* (contents lists attached to the outside of the scroll),<sup>5</sup> which have since disappeared;<sup>6</sup> and the grouping together of these books perhaps offers some support for the view that they were published together. More cogent is the fact that both its subject-matter and its place in the work link Book 6 with Books 1–5; and if these were published in fairly quick succession just before 150, there is a presumption that Book 6 was published with them. As will be argued below, there is nothing in Book 6 which points to a later date than 150, and a good deal that is relevant to the period just before that date.<sup>1</sup> We have no means of knowing if it was *written* after Book 5 and before Book 7. In any case the book is obviously one to which Polybius gave considerable thought, and one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that its construction underwent several changes before publication. Here we would only insist that such revision has left no recognizable trace in the book, and is not to be associated with any separation of it into layers.<sup>2</sup>

Of the publication of the rest of the work nothing is known, except that there appears to have been a posthumous edition (39. 5), and further that the change of plan involved not only an extension down to 146–144, but also the insertion of a few passages in earlier books. One may reasonably suppose that after retiring to Greece from Carthage<sup>3</sup> Polybius published further books: but no evidence enables us to say how many and at what intervals. Many of the criteria adopted to distinguish ‘late’ from ‘early’ passages are quite unsubstantial. For example, attempts to distinguish a development in Polybius’ views on *τύχη*<sup>4</sup> break down, because at all periods he tends to use the word in a variety of senses; traces of Stoic doctrine<sup>5</sup> are likewise useless as evidence of later insertions, and are apt to lead

to circular arguments; and passages referring to Polybius' voyages are no proof of lateness, since, despite Cuntz's arguments to the contrary,<sup>6</sup> those in the western Mediterranean at any rate were probably made before 146.<sup>7</sup> This leaves only a handful of passages which must have been insertions at a later date.<sup>8</sup> The list is not long,<sup>1</sup> and it is confined to three books, of which only one had certainly been published before 146 (Book 3). Although these passages clearly indicate a little working over (especially in Book 3, which had in any case to be revised in view of the extended plan), this does not amount to very much. The insertions are mainly details affecting the plan of the work, or matters of geography (in which Polybius was increasingly interested, as Book 34 demonstrates). In themselves they would not lead a reader to expect large-scale additions of a very different character, revealing changes of philosophical opinion and outlook such as are postulated for Book 6. With this in mind, we may turn to the problems which that book presents.

### III. POLYBIUS AND ROME

The sixth book of the *Histories* contains many contradictions:<sup>2</sup> but of these one in particular has been held to require special explanation. This is the apparent contrast between those passages of the book which emphasize the stability of the Roman mixed constitution<sup>3</sup> and those in which the idea of universal change and decline is applied to the Roman constitution no less than others.<sup>4</sup> The history of the problem raised by this contrast has been sketched in *C.Q.* 1943, 73 ff., and need not be repeated here. It will, however, be necessary to reexamine the view there accepted that the two apparently opposed judgements on the Roman State are to be associated with two periods in the development of Polybius' ideas and two separate layers in the construction of Book 6. The theory that Polybius

changed his mind about the durability of the Roman constitution after witnessing the early stages of the Gracchan revolution was there considered and dismissed.<sup>1</sup> Likewise, the suggestion<sup>2</sup> that Polybius revised his conception of the Roman constitution under the philosophical influence of Panaetius was rejected as unlikely. The question of Polybius' sources in Book 6 is being deliberately excluded from the present discussion; but we may note here (a) that the date of Panaetius' arrival in Rome is still unknown,<sup>3</sup> (b) the inherent improbability of the young philosopher's having exercised so formative an influence on the older historian.<sup>4</sup> On this point there seems no reason to alter the conclusion reached in *C.Q.* 1943, 86.

Did Polybius change his views on Rome in the light of the events of 150–146? This view, accepted in *C.Q.* 1943, 86 ff., has a certain plausibility. The year 146 stands out as an epoch in the writers of the Empire<sup>5</sup> and later Republic, particularly in Sallust;<sup>6</sup> and Polybius himself had made it the concluding date for his *Histories*. The belief that the decline of Rome sprang from the removal of all outside threats, which Sallust stresses in the *Jugurtha* and the *Catiline*, is connected closely with the famous debate between Cato the Censor and Scipio Nasica on what was to be done with Carthage. Nasica had argued that to destroy Carthage was to remove the last external threat capable of disciplining the *plebs*;<sup>7</sup> Cato replied that if Carthage was a real threat, she was better out of the way so that Rome might be free to devise a remedy for internal discord.<sup>8</sup> What was Polybius' attitude towards this controversy? The assumption that he accepted Nasica's argument needs reconsideration.

In the first place Aymard has recently demonstrated<sup>1</sup> that there is no evidence for the common picture of Scipio Aemilianus as a reluctant conqueror who foresaw the risks inherent in world dominion. The famous scene beside the burning city of Carthage is no more than a recognition of the



instability of human fortune, and the certain doom awaiting all mortal things. Scipio here revealed a proper Hellenistic sensibility;<sup>2</sup> but one need not speak of 'hopeless pessimism'.<sup>3</sup> A much popularized anecdote in Valerius Maximus (4. 1. 10) relates how Scipio Aemilianus, in the course of his censorship of 142/1, spontaneously changed the official prayer from one *ut populi Romani res meliores amplioresque facerent* to the more modest formula: *Precor ut eas perpetuo incolumis seruent*. This apparently significant incident<sup>4</sup> has, however, been shown by Aymard to be without historical foundation. Aemilianus' exploits at Carthage and Numantia, like those of his father in Macedonia and Epirus,<sup>5</sup> reveal the loyal servant of the Senate and the uncritical exponent of aggressive imperialism. The approval with which Cato greeted news of his early achievements at Carthage<sup>6</sup> hardly suggests that Aemilianus shared the policy or the doubts of his kinsman Nasica.

If Aemilianus was a supporter of imperialism, it is not unlikely that Polybius' viewpoint was similar.<sup>7</sup> The matter is not, however, so clear as Aymard suggests.<sup>8</sup> Polybius, he alleges, nowhere recognizes the funereal consequences of foreign conquest. But when, at the end of Book 6, he envisages the ultimate decline of the Roman mixed constitution, Polybius makes the first stage in the process leading to the *μεταβολή* that at which the State arrives *εἰς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον*.<sup>9</sup> In a later passage<sup>10</sup> the growth of extravagance at Rome is said to have become manifest after the fall of Macedon, when Rome grew conscious of her *ἀδήριτος ... ἐξουσία*; and indeed this date for Roman supremacy is clearly envisaged in the original plan for the *Histories*. Nevertheless, though 6. 57 makes 168 an epoch in Roman conquest, and though this chapter clearly links conquest with decline, it also assumes a considerable lapse of time between the attainment of

uncontested sovereignty (§ 5), and the beginning of decline (§ 6), during which period prosperity continues ἐπὶ πολὺ, and political rivalry keeps on growing (προβαινόντων ἐπὶ πλέον). That Rome has already reached the epoch of δυναστεία ἀδήριτος Polybius admits; but he deliberately does not commit himself to any opinion about where she stands in the succeeding process, though the change over to a future tense suggests that she has not yet reached the point when ἄρξει ... τῇς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἢ φιλαρχία κτλ. Hence, although it is clear that at the time he wrote Book 6 Polybius believed the μικτή to be endangered, there are no grounds for assuming that he also believed that the process of disintegration (ἄρξει ... μεταβολῆς) had already begun; indeed, had he believed this, he must surely have made yet clearer the differences between the contemporary Roman constitution and that at the time of Cannae (see below, p. 112). Hence his attitude towards the controversy between Nasica and Cato must be judged against the background of a μικτή which is indeed endangered, but is still intact. That attitude is indicated in a passage (6. 18. 5) in which he states that when the Romans are freed τῶν ἐκτὸς φόβων, and reap the consequent prosperity, any tendency to excess and disproportion is countered by the checks of the mixed constitution, which automatically restores the equilibrium. This chapter reads very much like a reply to Nasica's argument that Rome required some threat from abroad<sup>1</sup> to maintain concord; for her constitution is a sufficient guarantee of Roman success either in the face of external dangers or when she is free of them. The argument here has sometimes been interpreted as contradicting the view that Rome will ultimately decline; but as was pointed out in *C.Q.* 1943, 75, there is really no contradiction, since Polybius is here analysing the mechanics of the μικτή, which ensure political success so long as the μικτή lasts, without, however, in any way guaranteeing its permanence.



Polybius, then, was most likely a supporter of Cato and Aemilianus (who together secured his return to Greece)<sup>2</sup> in the political controversies of c. 150 B.C.; and after reading the carefully worded account of the arguments of the Greeks about Roman policy towards Carthage<sup>3</sup> we may reasonably assume that he accepted the legalistic defence of Roman policy. Indeed, on the basis of a remarkable Polybian phrase in Diodorus 32, F. E. Adcock argues<sup>5</sup> plausibly that 'Polybius probably yielded to the temptation to defend Roman frightfulness by treating it as though it followed some kind of natural law'. Further evidence of Polybius' passion for reducing political phenomena to some kind of natural law will appear in the course of the present discussion.

It was pointed out above that the two passages in Books 6 and 31 which refer to 'universal dominion' imply that Roman decline began to be apparent after 168 B.C. When in fact did Polybius first grow critical of the Roman political system and Roman society? The answer to this question lies in several passages which show clearly that from the time of his arrival at Rome Polybius was awake to Roman shortcomings. Writing on the First Punic War, he asserts (1. 13. 12-13) that both Rome and Carthage were still uncorrupted in principle (*ἀκμὴν ἀκέραια ... τοῖς ἔθισμοις*). Taken in conjunction with the statement that by the time of the Second Punic War Carthage had already deteriorated (6. 51. 3 ff.), this passage shows Polybius already applying the concept of acme and decline to Rome and Carthage when he was composing Book 1: and though it contains no mention of Roman decline, the context of ideas is one which envisages its likelihood. Later in the same book there is a specific reference to such deterioration. In 1. 64. 1 ff. Polybius asks why the Romans, now that they are masters of the world, can no longer put such large fleets to sea as in the First Punic War,<sup>1</sup> and promises an answer in Book 6 (an answer

which has not in fact survived). Here he points clearly to deterioration following upon the acquisition of world dominion. More interesting is the statement in 18. 35. 1 that in earlier times no Roman would have accepted a bribe; but that nowadays the same is not so true. 'Earlier times' are there defined as 'before [the Romans] undertook wars across the sea (τοῖς διαποντίοις ... πολέμοις) and while they still maintained their own ἔθῃ καὶ νόμιμα. Now in his comparison between Carthage and Rome in Book 6 Polybius says that τά περὶ τούς χρηματισμούς ἔθῃ καὶ νόμιμα<sup>2</sup> are still well maintained at Rome at the time to which his comparison applies, i.e. nominally the time of Cannae (but see below); and in 6. 56. 2 and 14 he tells us that the Romans were still incorruptible at that time. Hence it seems likely that by διαπόντιοι πόλεμοι Polybius is thinking of the wars in Greece and the East, which followed on the Second Punic War.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, in Polybius' opinion, from 200 onwards some change in moral standards took place; and the results of this became evident from the time Rome achieved universal dominion, i.e. after 168. Such a view was not peculiar to Polybius. As early as 184 Cato's censorship was celebrated by the setting up of a statue in his honour in the temple of Salus with an inscription to the effect that 'when the Roman State was tottering to its fall, he was made censor, and by helpful guidance, wise restraints, and sound teachings restored it again'.<sup>4</sup> Cato's censorship was especially directed<sup>5</sup> against faults of luxury and moral decline. It was remarkable for 'the impression which it made upon Roman tradition'.<sup>6</sup> Polybius cannot have remained ignorant of the disputes it had engendered, and consequently he must have been aware that the issue of moral decay at Rome had been raised in sharp public controversy sixteen years before he set foot in Italy.<sup>7</sup> By 168 it must have become almost a commonplace.

This change in Roman morals and customs might have been expected to occasion Polybius some little embarrassment in his discussion of the mixed constitution. Nominally he is describing this as it existed at the time of Cannae;<sup>8</sup> that is why his account occurs immediately following on the description of that battle.<sup>9</sup> But in fact much of his argument is true only for the time at which he is writing (when the decline had presumably already begun), and not for a date sixty to seventy years earlier.<sup>10</sup> Polybius is aware to the discrepancy and twice in surviving passages draws attention to it;<sup>1</sup> and though much of his account is couched in present tenses, he states at the end that it is the year 216 with which he is concerned.<sup>2</sup> A fragment now placed in chapter 11<sup>3</sup> seems to be part of a defence against any criticisms he may incur on this score. 'In so far as any view of a matter we form applies to the right occasion', he writes, 'so far expressions of approval or blame are sound. When circumstances change, and when applied to these changed conditions, the most excellent and true reflections of authors seem often not only not acceptable, but utterly offensive.' This reads rather like a plea in advance against any criticism levelled against his account of the Roman constitution as not corresponding to the conditions with which his readers were familiar. But in general Polybius had no reason to emphasize the changes which had occurred between 216 and c. 160-150 B.C.; indeed he did not regard them as very significant or of great importance to his theory, which was primarily concerned with the explanation of Roman success.

From the time he conceived a history of Rome he had been conscious of some measure of decline from the great days of the Second Punic War; he did not require the arguments of a Scipio Nasica or the events of 146 to persuade him of this. As was already pointed out in *C.Q.* 1943, 75 f., there was nothing in the theory of the mixed

constitution to exclude decay; and we have now seen that there was nothing in the external history of Rome, subsequent to the date when Polybius embarked upon his work, to lead him to change his emphasis, and stress change and decay rather than stability.

His argument is in fact one, and remained one throughout his book. It is 'to describe *πῶς καί τινί γένει πολιτείας* Rome in less than fifty-three years subjected the world to her sole government'.<sup>4</sup> This purpose is frequently repeated:<sup>5</sup> and although, as we saw (above, p. 98, n. 2), at some date after 146, Polybius decided to extend his work to that year and its immediate aftermath, in order to facilitate the passing of judgements on conquered and conquerors<sup>6</sup> and so assist his didactic purpose, this did not in his eyes involve any fundamental change of intention. It is noteworthy that when in the epilogue he summarizes the purpose of his *Histories*, he resorts to the familiar phrases of Book I. In short: from the outset Polybius was conscious of change and even decay in the constitution and *mores* of the Roman people, but he was conscious of it always as something incidental and not of prime importance. In the sixth book it remains subsidiary to the main theme.

#### IV. THE ELEMENTS OF BOOK 6

After these general considerations we may turn to Book 6; and here we shall attempt to establish two points: (1) That every division of the text into 'layers' raises more difficulties than it purports to solve, since thereby essential elements of Polybius' theory are separated from one another; and (2) that, in spite of several serious contradictions, Book 6 possesses a unity of plan.

Polybius' political tenets in Book 6 can be brought under six headings. The first four are of a general nature; the last two are specifically applied to Rome.

1. *Prognostication*. Polybius maintains that he can supply the reader with a quasi-scientific law which will enable him to advance a diagnosis and prognosis of political success and failure in the past and the future respectively.<sup>1</sup> 2. *The biological pattern*. A pattern is asserted to underlie the world of nature as well as that of politics. Its stages are birth, prime, and decay.<sup>2</sup> 3. *The anacyclosis*. By this term is denoted an invariable cycle of constitutions which also is due to nature. After an initial, pre-social, era the sequence runs as follows: kingship and tyranny; aristocracy and oligarchy; democracy and mob rule—to be followed by a new circle. The first, third, and fifth are ‘good’ constitutions so far as they go. They cannot, however, last since they are bound to turn into the second, fourth, and sixth forms, the perverted constitutions of tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule.<sup>3</sup> 4. *The mixed constitution*. Some relative stability can be achieved by a constitution in which there is a mixture and balance of the elements of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, that is, of the ‘good constitutions’ named under (3) above.<sup>4</sup> This may be called the *μικτή* or mixed constitution. 5. *The archaeologia*. Rome is said to be remarkable for exhibiting (up to a point) the stages of the *anacyclosis*. This is shown by an account of her early history, *the archaeologia*.<sup>5</sup> 6. *The Roman mixed constitution*. Rome’s rise to world power is traced to the excellence of her constitution, which is said to be a perfect example of the *μικτή* mentioned under (4) above.<sup>6</sup>

This is as formidable a set of propositions as any, and might defeat a professional philosopher. Polybius was not a professional philosopher and his propositions are neither fully thought out nor satisfactorily combined. It has been said above<sup>7</sup> that the contradiction between the *anacyclosis* and the *μικτή* has given rise to the hypothesis of two separate drafts, supposed to embody different plans and ideas. But contradictions abound and Laqueur’s analysis

ought to serve as a warning example:<sup>8</sup> if every non-sequitur must be built up into a different draft, there would be many such drafts; if, on the other hand, every contradiction must be toned down to secure unity, scant attention can be paid to Polybius' opinions. Are the contradictions removed if one, or several, of the above tenets are removed, and assigned to a different draft?<sup>9</sup> It is our contention that they are not. This perhaps is best demonstrated by the hypothetical removal, one after the other, of the first four general propositions (see sections 1-6 of this chapter of our paper). If each of them can be shown to be indispensable for Polybius' argument, a *prima facie* case for its unity will have been made. If, at the same time, contradictions can be shown to persist, these will be seen to be inherent in Polybius' theory (see below, pp. 115 ff.).

### *The Alleged Stratification of Book 6*

#### *1. Prognostication*

A practical purpose is fundamental to Polybius' history. It is announced early in Book i, and Polybius has recourse to it at various points. This purpose, too, is fundamental to his political theory and its neglect has vitiated the analysis of Book 6. The knowledge of historical causes and the subsequent application to politics of this knowledge are clearly stated to be the chief benefits derived from history (1. 2. 8). On knowledge thus gained the diagnosis of a political situation is based, and, in turn, this diagnosis may be used to forecast the future (3. 1-2). 'Prognostication' is easily practised in the case of most Greek States; the case of Rome, however, calls for a greater effort owing to her complicated constitution and the prevailing ignorance of her early history (3. 1-3).<sup>1</sup> Reference is made to prognostication at various 'strategic points' in Book 6—at chapters 4, 9, 10, and 57. In all these cases the ulterior, practical, purpose of



prognostication is combined with all, or at least some, of the central propositions of this book, that is, with the biological pattern, the *anacyclosis*, and the *μικτή*. At 4. 11 f. prognostication is linked with the *anacyclosis* and, less clearly, with the *μικτή*. An insight into ‘beginnings, origins, and changes’ of States (that is, the *anacyclosis*) is said to enable the student of history to predict similar changes when they are likely to appear again. Such study must also have a relation both, in general, to the mixed constitution, and, in particular, to the Roman (mixed) constitution, to which, though without a mention of the word ‘mixed’, it is applied at section 13.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, for the first time in this book the concept of nature is introduced. It is asserted that these changes are ‘natural’, particularly in the case of Rome. Later in the book this rather vague indication of a ‘natural law’ is further explained, though never sufficiently so. All these arguments are repeated, and elaborated, at 9. 10–14 and at 57. Finally, prognostication is most clearly related to the three other concepts at chapter 10, where (in the sections 2, 6, and 12) Lycurgus is described in the terms earlier used for the Polybian idea of history. By means of a correct diagnosis of the political changes described in the foregoing chapters (*ἐκαστα τῶν προειρημένων συννοήσας*—that is, the *anacyclosis*)<sup>3</sup> Lycurgus came to understand the workings of a natural and immutable law (*ἀναγκαίως καὶ φυσικῶς*) and consequently inferred (*συλλογισάμενος*) the unstable character of all unmixed constitutions. On this basis he is said to have made a prognosis as to what he had to avoid, and thus came to conceive the mixed constitution of Sparta. Here prognostication clearly appears combined with natural law, *anacyclosis*, and *μικτή*. At sections 13 f. it is added that the Romans, without the ratiocination, reached the same result by a process of trial and error.

Now if a division into two layers were made, these passages would have to be separated in accordance with

this division. Of the six passages above mentioned, chapters 2, 3, and, perhaps, 10 would be assigned to the first draft, 4, 11, 9, and 57 to the second. The result would present difficulties. For 10 can be admitted to the first draft only if it is believed to have been 'touched up' to fit in with the second draft, as it contains a reference to the *anacyclosis*.<sup>1</sup> But in that case every mention of prognostication (apart perhaps from the introductory references in chapters 2 and 3) would have been shifted to the second draft. This, however, would involve a jump from the frying-pan into the fire. For then the first draft, which presumably contained the mixed constitution, would be left altogether without the idea of prognostication (which in this book most clearly bears out Polybius' practical purpose)<sup>2</sup> or, at any rate, would have room only for a prognostication without the criteria of the natural law and the *anacyclosis*—clearly a *pis aller*.

For prognostication is in fact one of the unifying principles of Book 6. It is connected primarily with the *anacyclosis*, but also with the natural pattern of birth, prime, and decay, and, to some extent, with the mixed constitution.

## 2 and 3. *Biological pattern and Anacyclosis*

Some years ago L. Zancan pointed out that the schematic sequence of constitutions provided by the *anacyclosis* logically excludes the idea of decadence, and is thus of a different order of thought from the biological pattern of birth, prime, and decay—although both are called 'natural', *κατὰ φύσιν*. It will be discussed below whether the idea of decadence is in fact fully excluded from the *anacyclosis*.<sup>3</sup> Here we have to debate the effect on Polybius' propositions if the *anacyclosis* were stated without the biological pattern or, conversely, if that pattern were stated without the *anacyclosis*.

If Polybius, without mentioning his biological scheme, had proposed a circular theory of political constitutions, his



readers would not have understood why he considered political affairs (as defined by the *anacyclosis* and the *μικτή*) to be 'natural phenomena'. Unless the world of politics is set against the natural background of growth and decay, Polybius would be left without a criterion for his prognostication. But in fact the biological pattern is given the place of a fundamental tenet, a 'law of nature'. Three passages connect the biological law with the *anacyclosis* and theory of prognostication,<sup>4</sup> a fourth states an exception to the rule, and a fifth relates the rule to the cycle as a whole.<sup>5</sup> If the theory of layers is adopted, these passages must be assigned to different drafts—four of them to the second draft, and one,<sup>6</sup> though in no way different from the rest, to the first. This surely militates against any separation of Polybius' theories of politics and biology.

If, on the other hand, the biological scheme were left without the theory of constitutions, the difference between life 'natural' and life 'political' would remain undefined and we should find a biological law without a political content. Again the five passages just enumerated militate against this view.

How far is the biological pattern applicable to the *anacyclosis*? The concepts may be related in two ways. The pattern of birth, prime, and decline may be applied in turn to each section of the cycle—so that, for example, within the first section a distinction is made between the origins, the prime, and the *décliné* of kingship. This is a dynamic conception of history which would well suit the historical portion of Book 6. Some traces of it are found in the description of political changes in the *anacyclosis* (chapters 4-9), and it may have occurred in the *archacologia*. But it is not fully applied, for Polybius is at pains to overcome the schematic impression of a mechanical sequence of constitutions. Attention must be given to the terminology of evolution in these chapters. The 'beginnings' (*ἀρχή, γένεσις*,

or the like) of each constitution in turn are stressed.<sup>1</sup> Next the constitutions are established and reach their prime; this is clearly implied in the various descriptions, but it must be noted that the word *ἀκμή*, which would be expected, does not in fact occur in the descriptive sections, since all the stress is laid on the initial and final stages of each form, and decline is assumed, immediately a constitution is fully (and withal too securely) established. The final stage of each constitution merges into the next; so that in the same passages there are found words denoting the 'end' of an old dispensation and the 'change' to, and beginning of, a new one.<sup>2</sup> This serves to give an impression of gradual change rather than of revolution, and this impression is strengthened by the repeated use of words implying 'growth' rather than revolutionary change.<sup>3</sup> A close reading reveals, furthermore, that Polybius has made no attempt to apply the biological stages to the three 'perverted forms' (*παρεκβάσεις*). For these are described as the final stages in the dissolution of the constitutions proper, so that a picture is formed, not of six (or seven) constitutions, but of three pairs—kingship changing to aristocracy via tyranny, aristocracy changing to democracy via oligarchy, and democracy changing to a post-constitutional form of society via mob rule.<sup>4</sup> These evolutionary aspects help to counteract a schematic application of the biological pattern and, linking the several sections, focus attention on the cycle as a whole.

In the second place, the biological pattern may be applied to the cycle as a whole. No hard-and-fast distinction is, however, made between the *anacyclosis* as the biological pattern repeated several times over, and the *anacyclosis* as a whole cycle described in terms of an uninterrupted evolution. It is interesting to note that (apparently without any appreciation of the difference between the two) both variations of the cycle occur in the introduction and the

epilogue to the *anacyclosis* (4. 11–13, 9. 10–13). In the former Polybius asserts that ‘he alone who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops will be able to see when, how, and where the growth (*ανξησις*), perfection (*ἀκμή*), change (*μεταβολή*), and end (*τέλος*) of each are likely to occur again’.<sup>5</sup> The words ‘of each’ render *ἐκάστων* and it would seem natural to refer them to the various constitutional forms, the succession of which makes up the cycle. But when Polybius comes to restate the point in the second of the two passages, the scope of the argument is somewhat wider and he appears to be referring to the position of a State within the whole of the cycle. ‘Anyone who clearly perceives this may indeed in speaking of the future of any State (*λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος τῶνς πολιτείας*) be wrong in his estimate of the time the process will take, but ... will very seldom be mistaken as to the stage of growth or decline it (*ἐκαστον*) has reached, and as to the form into which it will change.’<sup>1</sup> And when in both passages Polybius finally applies the biological pattern and the *anacyclosis* to Rome, he is clearly thinking of the *whole* of Roman history.<sup>2</sup>

The question, then, arises how Rome can be brought within the framework of the *anacyclosis* and the biological pattern. For this some evidence is at our disposal—chapters 51 and 57 as well as the fragments of the *archaeologia*—which will be discussed below.

#### 4. *The mixed constitution*

We pointed out earlier<sup>3</sup> not only that there was nothing in the theory of the *μικτή* to exclude the degeneration envisaged in the *anacyclosis* but that in fact Polybius’ only subject throughout the book was Roman success—to which the danger of decay was no more than incidental. All that remains to be done here is to give an indication of the gain to Polybius’ argument concerning the mixed constitution if

the division into layers is abandoned. We cannot here argue, as we did in the last two sections, that ‘separatism’ tends to disperse passages belonging to the same, or a related, train of ideas. For the division into layers was made precisely in order to separate the passages concerned with Roman stability (the *μικτή*) from those concerned with instability (the *anacyclosis* and the biological law). But not even in this case is an unambiguous result obtained by the assumption of two layers. For, as was mentioned above,<sup>4</sup> chapter 10, which contains both the *μικτή* and the *anacyclosis*, can be assigned to the first draft only through special pleading. In fact, the chapter contains no difficulties, and the validity of its argument would never have been impugned but for the wish to separate the *μικτή* from the *anacyclosis*. If the setting of the chapter is left undisturbed a valuable hint at the unity of the argument is obtained. For then the *μικτή* will be seen to be connected with the other component parts of Book 6. Lycurgus is said to have employed the (Polybian) practice of prognostication, and to have employed it for a practical purpose.<sup>5</sup> He aimed at political stability, and succeeded in preserving for a long time the prime of the Spartan constitution<sup>6</sup>—that is, he slowed down the working of the ‘biological law’. He is credited with an insight into the natural law as it affects political life.<sup>7</sup> He is said to have inferred that each of the ‘unmixed’ constitutions is subject to decay, as it appears in the working of the *anacyclosis*, and to have decided, therefore, that only a ‘mixed’ constitution was likely to guarantee stability and survival for any length of time.<sup>8</sup> On this principle he founded the Spartan (mixed) constitution with its high degree of stability.<sup>1</sup> If we add that Rome is said<sup>2</sup> to have achieved the same result by a process of trial and error (as shown by the *archaeologia*), it will be seen that chapter 10 appropriately closes the general introduction to Book 6, in that the various parts of Polybius’ theory are

brought together into a more comprehensive kind of unity, which contains all his major propositions.<sup>3</sup>

### 5 and 6. *The 'archaeologia' and the Roman 'mixed constitution'*

In contemplating Roman politics and Roman history Polybius must have been struck by two things above all. In contrast to the ceaseless change of Greek constitutional history, Rome had exhibited considerable stability. On the other hand, unlike the more enduring constitutions of the Spartan type, the Roman constitution had not stood still but, in its early stages, had exhibited an unexpected likeness to the earlier portions of the *anacyclosis*. In the terms of his political theory, it had, while appearing to embody the *anacyclosis*, nevertheless succeeded, at the proper moment, in retarding the movement of the political cycle. Hence Polybius addressed himself to the task of demonstrating both Rome's *anacyclosis* and the growth of Rome's μικτή. This he did in the *archaeologia*, which is linked by a number of passages to the rest of his theories.

Applied to Rome the *anacyclosis* did not indeed exclude decline (in fact it furnishes the material for some impressive warnings),<sup>4</sup> but was chiefly used to account for the growth of Roman power. Now the *archaeologia* in which this story was told is lost but for a few fragments. Some of its characteristic features have, however, been elicited from Polybius' own references.<sup>5</sup> The story was told so as to instruct a largely Greek public as to the nature of early Roman life and politics.<sup>6</sup> It was to describe the early constitutional changes of Rome, and to record the 'struggles and trials' that accompanied the growth of the mixed constitution.<sup>7</sup> It was, further, to explain the likeness of early Roman history to the early portions of the *anacyclosis*,<sup>8</sup> and to define the point at which Rome attained to her mixed constitution, which is identified with her acme.<sup>9</sup>

Now it is well known that the early history of Rome is told with somewhat similar pretensions by Cicero in the second book of the *De republican*.<sup>10</sup> The question naturally arises whether Cicero's account can be used to fill the gaps in Polybius' *archaeologia*. Unfortunately it is controversial to what extent Cicero did draw on Polybius. F. Taeger, claiming Polybius as Cicero's source in every pertinent detail, has exaggerated the amount that can be known for certain, and has been reproved by V. Pöschl and others.<sup>11</sup> But Pöschl's criticism is often oversharp, and for our present purpose three of his arguments need to be reconsidered.

Cicero's account of Roman history appears to have been carried no farther than immediately after 450 B.C., the year of the second decemvirate—a date neither very obvious nor very important.<sup>1</sup> A fragment following the Polybian *archaeologia* seems to be referring to the same year 450, as being the end of his own account in which he had described the growth of the Roman *μικτή*; <sup>2</sup> at this point Polybius concludes the historical account, and turns to a static description of the mixed constitution and of the army at Rome, which fills the bulk of the book. If, as seems certain, both Cicero and Polybius break off upon reaching the same rather unimportant date, it is likely enough that E. Meyer and F. Taeger were right in asserting Cicero's dependence on Polybius for the final date of the *archaeologia*.<sup>3</sup> The choice of this date may be partly due to the nature of Polybius' sources. What is more relevant, however, is the coincidence between the early history of Rome—or, rather, the account of that history which Polybius took from a Roman annalist<sup>4</sup>—and the early stages of the *anacyclosis*. The sequence in both cases is, Kingship (Romulus, etc.) into Tyranny (Tarquinius Superbus); Aristocratic republic (institution of two annual magistrates, etc.) into Oligarchy (decemvirate). At this point doubtless Polybius closed his narrative because the Roman polity had acquired its



decisive ('mixed') features. There were regents with some monarchic powers; the aristocracy deliberated on policy;<sup>5</sup> and the tribunate and *concilium plebis* had been conceded to the commons so as to avoid the dangers inherent in an oligarchy, without, however, depriving the aristocracy of its decisive function. Thus Rome had stayed the movement of the cycle and had avoided the road to democracy. Here follows the transition to the descriptive portion of the book. The implication is that, between 450 B.C. and the beginning of the Second Punic War, the Roman constitution no longer changed, though it may have been improved and perfected in the next 200 or so years.<sup>6</sup> Polybius is, then, asserting that the mixed constitution at Rome was established in the fifth century B.C. and that since 450 B.C. and, again, since the time of Hannibal no fundamental change had taken place in the body politic; in her early history Rome, more than any other State, had experienced the movement of the *anacyclosis*, and yet, unlike many others, later achieved stability, and came to eschew further change.

If it is agreed that Cicero used Polybius for the final date of the *archaeologia* and for the general pattern of his narrative, a like question arises as regards the combination of the *μικτή* with the *anacyclosis*. Cicero's account of early Rome combines the cycle with the *μικτή*. Even Romulus is said to attempt a 'mixture' of powers though, as in early Sparta and Carthage, the constitution was mixed but not at all balanced. 'Haec enim ... ita mixta fuerunt et in hac civitate et in Lacedaemoniorum et Carthaginensium ut temperata nullo fuerint modo' (*De rep.* 2.42). Whether Polybius, too, thought that the Roman constitution was first 'mixed' and later also 'balanced', or whether he assumed that the 'mixture' was not achieved until after the time of the decemvirate, is a question that need not detain us here. Whatever the details of his narrative, it is obvious that, like Cicero, he must have used the *archaeologia* to mitigate the

contradictions that were bound to arise if he wished to combine the zigzag movement of the cycle, the biological concepts of growth, prime, and decay, and the static *μικτή*. Rome (Polybius argued) had achieved her *μικτή* in a 'natural' process of evolution—that is, she went through the early stages of the *anacyclosis*, reached her acme in the mixed constitution and, thereafter, avoided any further approach towards the (dangerous) third sector of the cycle. And it was there, consequently, that her danger still lay.<sup>1</sup>

## V. THE UNITY OF BOOK 6

If we were right in asserting that the subject of Book 6 is not twofold—Roman success and Roman decline—but consists of a single question—Roman success, to which the decline was no more than incidental—why is there a jumble of theories instead of a straightforward account of the Roman *μικτή*? In reply to this question we are suggesting that Polybius did not see the Roman *μικτή* as a simple thing of which a simple account could be given. He was concerned to state principles and to lay down rules that could be used as foundations for this, or any similar, analysis. He lays down rules from which emerge, (i) the natural or regular development of any political community—a blue-print, as it were, of political evolution; (ii) the relation to this blue-print of the history of Rome; and (iii) the nature of the mature Roman constitution which is defined as a mixture and balance of powers, and compared with other cases of 'mixed' constitutions.

### i. *Natural evolution in politics*

The second and third of the points just mentioned seem to be more closely related to Polybius' subject. However, if he had dispensed with the first, and most general, proposition, both the biological scheme and the *anacyclosis* would have been superfluous. But along with them he would have sacrificed the general rule from which he claims to deduce



the fate of States; thus there would have been no theoretical foundation for the political diagnosis and prognosis at which he was aiming.<sup>2</sup> The rule that he lays down is the biological law of birth, growth, and decline, which is in everyone's experience. States do in fact rise, grow, and fall, and in this regard conform to the rule of nature. But since birth, prime, and decay mean one thing to the body natural, and quite another to the body politic, and, again, since the various social groups differ in their conventions, the biological law needs to be filled with a political content. This is found in a scheme of six of the traditional constitutions with a seventh added on, in order to make the whole pattern into the likeness of a circle.<sup>3</sup> Nature has arranged the order by which the various stages follow one another—or so Polybius asserts. To stress the rigid character of this sequence he employs an unusual name instead of the common *κύκλος*. The 'closed circle', or *ἀνακύκλωσις*, cannot be broken, though the speed of its motion can be retarded. It appears to be the function of the *μικτή* to act as a brake; and the brake can be put on at any stage of the *anacyclosis*.

The combination of a biological law with the *anacyclosis* and the *μικτή* has proved a fertile source of confusion. The difficulty does not chiefly lie in the relation of the mixed constitution to the cycle, though 'separatists' would have found it harder to make their points if Polybius had argued his case more cogently. In fact the relation between the two propositions is straightforward enough: the *μικτή*—at any rate in Polybius' opinion—must always be seen against the background of the *anacyclosis*.

A greater difficulty lies in the combination of the biological law with the *anacyclosis* and its counterpart in Roman history, the *archaeologia*. Various contradictions are bound to arise from Polybius' plan to apply to history a biological pattern (the law of growth and decay) and a logical concept

(the predetermined sequence of constitutions). The *anacyclosis* is of a different order of thought both from the biological pattern and from the historical and dynamic *archaeologia*. The contradictions spring from Polybius' attempting to unify these several concepts.<sup>1</sup>

The biological pattern would require a route up to maturity and a route down to the end. With this badly accords the zigzag of the *anacyclosis* as the body politic moves up to kingship and down to tyranny and, again, up to aristocracy and down to oligarchy and, finally, up to democracy and down to mob rule. And there is revolution, rather than evolution, when the aristocracy turns out a tyrant, when the commons oust a ruling oligarchy, or when a dictator comes to deal with the anarchy of mob rule. On the other hand, we have had occasion to notice Polybius' attempts to use terms indicative of growth and gradual change when he describes these revolutions.<sup>2</sup> We can now add that the zigzag movement of the constitutions and the combination of evolution and revolution, within the closed cycle, are more realistic and more true to the nature of politics than the simple biological pattern or the schematic *anacyclosis*. The same applies to the realm of nature from which originally Polybius' pattern was taken. Ups and downs and a combination of gradual and abrupt changes occur in nature without invalidating the proposition that organisms grow and decay.

The picture would be less confused if Polybius had clearly identified *one* stage of the cycle with political maturity, or if he had at least, like Cicero, attempted to state a hierarchy of constitutions.<sup>1</sup> No order of value is preserved in the theoretical account of the three 'good' constitutions, kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. This encourages guessing and, in fact, any one of these may qualify for the second prize, the first being reserved for the *μικτή*. H. Ryffel has advanced some arguments in favour of casting kingship

for this role.<sup>2</sup> An argument in favour of aristocracy may be drawn from the somewhat heterogeneous chapters 51 and 57, which identify political maturity with the preponderance in counsel of the aristocracy, and political decline with that of the commons. But even democracy may enter the ring on the strength of Polybius' praise, in Book 2, of democracy in the Achaean League.<sup>3</sup> But it need perhaps cause no surprise if it is asserted that none of these answers can really carry conviction. There is no trace in Polybius' work of an especial admiration for kingship, whether Stoic or otherwise. As for democracy, his remarks about the Achaean League have little, if any, bearing on the problems of Book 6.<sup>4</sup> And while we may expect Polybius to be in favour of aristocratic government both on personal grounds and on the strength of his remarks in the chapters 51 and 57, it is well to remember that these chapters belong to a section of the book that stands in no immediate relation to the *anacyclosis*. There is no indication in Book 6 (not even in the chapters just mentioned) that Polybius intended to award a second prize. He is chiefly concerned with the problem of political stability, and to a writer with this point in mind aristocratic government was bound to appear just as deficient in the decisive quality as were the two remaining 'good' constitutions. They are all equally unstable because they are all equally 'unmixed'. Cicero, whose aims are *toto cœlo* different, introduces, or reintroduces,<sup>5</sup> a second prize, and a hierarchy of constitutions.<sup>6</sup>

Here some remarks on chapters 51 and 57 may be made. The relevance of these chapters can be overstated. They come towards the end of the book, and are less concerned with the theoretical foundation of the *anacyclosis* and the *μικτή* than with an application of these theories—chapter 51 to the historical context of Cannae, and chapter 57 to political prophecy. Nevertheless, if in these chapters there is found an identification of the acme of political development

with aristocratic preponderance, the question remains how this assertion is related to the earlier theoretical chapters. Is Polybius attempting to contradict his earlier pronouncements and, in a tentative way, to identify political maturity with aristocratic government? We think not. Chapter 51 provides a comparison, applied to the time of Cannae, between Rome and Carthage, and an attempt to account for Roman superiority at the decisive moment. Polybius asserts that at Carthage *deliberation* on policy had passed from the Senate to the commons while at Rome it was still in the hands of the Senate. Now it is clear (from 12. 3) that under the *μικτή* deliberation on policy was a prerogative of the Senate,<sup>1</sup> and the next chapter (13) shows the Senate taking all decisions of this kind. Hence the remarks at 51 must be referred to the *μικτή*, with which in the context of Cannae Polybius was concerned. For the *μικτή* never implied that deliberation was shared between the three governing sectors of the State. Thus for deliberation to pass from the Senate to the commons would indicate that the fundamental character of the *μικτή* was breaking up; and the same applies to the more violent changes of chapter 57. This interpretation would serve to remove the otherwise flagrant contradiction between these chapters and the earlier portion of the book. If earlier on Polybius argued that the Rome of the time of Cannae possessed a *μικτή*, it is the *μικτή*, and not the aristocratic sector of *the anacyclosis*, which he is describing at chapter 51. This is borne out, too, by the wider context of this chapter—which is the comparison between the Roman (mixed) constitution and the other *μικταί*. Chapter 57 is put in more general terms and forms the final section of Polybius' excursion into political science. However, it is obvious that the State which went through great hardships and arrived *εἰς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον* (57. 5) must be Rome and if so, as is suggested above (p. 104), the

reference must be to the Roman *μικτή*. At the same time there was some justification for finding in these closing chapters the terminology of the *anacyclosis*, though it was a mistake to identify these constitutions of the acme with the ‘unmixed’ aristocracy instead of with the *μικτή*. For both at 51 and 57 the wheel of constitutions is seen in motion, and in addition to the *μικτή* and the *anacyclosis* we find the biological pattern and an especial stress on political maturity. However, Polybius had taken care not to define too closely the way by which, after the destruction of the *μικτή*, the motion of the cycle is resumed, just as he had taken care not to define too closely the point on the cycle which Rome had then reached (see above, p. 104). No specific place for the *μικτή* had been provided in the description of the *anacyclosis*. Consequently the *anacyclosis* is alluded to only vaguely in that in both chapters the breaking up of the *μικτή* results in popular sovereignty.

On the other hand, there is nothing to prove that Polybius was aware of the more fundamental disharmony between the biological pattern and the *anacyclosis* that would arise unless the biological stages of birth, prime, and decay were identified with the relevant stages of the *anacyclosis*. This identification is made in the chapters 51 and 57, and presumably, so far as the origin and acme were concerned, was made also in the *archaeologia*; but the acme is left unidentified in the theoretical account of the *anacyclosis*.<sup>2</sup> The cause for this failure is not hard to guess. It must surely lie in the fact that, unlike Cicero, Polybius was unwilling to profess a (theoretical) preference for any one of the three constitutions because, as we have said, in his opinion, all ‘unmixed’ constitutions are equally unsatisfactory. For, again unlike Cicero, he was chiefly concerned with the problem of political stability, and is committed to approve only one constitution—the *μικτή*, which has no place in his theoretical account of the *anacyclosis*. After the *anacyclosis*

there follow the theoretical account of the *μικτή*, the narrative of the *archaeologia*, in which, probably, the Roman acme was identified with her mixed constitution, the descriptive section on the Roman *μικτή*, and, finally, after a comparison between the various mixed constitutions, the breaking up of the *μικτή*, which at the same time is a decline from the exalted position of a political acme. There is no contradiction in terms between the earlier and final portions of the book. This, however, is achieved only because Polybius has kept the various parts of Book 6 within barely connected departments. Immediately these artificial boundaries are removed there reappears the fundamental disharmony between the biological pattern and the *anacyclosis*. Polybius did not attempt to tackle the difficult problems inherent in this contradiction, and never explicitly dealt with the position of the *μικτή* within the cycle of constitutions.

With much emphasis Polybius announced that the *anacyclosis* was part and parcel of the household of nature.<sup>1</sup> Precisely how true is it to nature? Polybius was hardly blind to the fact that most States do not conform to his (supposed) law, and in some passages outside Book 6 shows himself less dogmatic.<sup>2</sup> In Book 6, however, his temper is different. Athens and Thebes are rejected from the inquiry because their process of growth (*αύξεις*) was not *κατά λόγον*, their periods of acme did not last for any length of time, and the changes they underwent were too violent.<sup>3</sup> While these remarks and the following sections do not exclude a reference to the *μικτή*, the terminology makes it fairly obvious that it is chiefly the *anacyclosis* Polybius has in mind. The key term here is *κατά λόγον*, and the reference is to the 'regular' or 'reasonable' sequence of constitutions as arranged by nature in the shape of the *anacyclosis*. While it would be an overstatement to say that *κατά λόγον* means the same as *κατά φύσιν*, or any of the other phrases



containing φύσις used in Book 6,<sup>4</sup> there is little doubt that Polybius here attributes to nature that conformity to rule and reason which Greek rationalists liked to discover in nature, and dub λόγος. To a similar theory Aristotle objected that every constitution may turn into every other constitution.<sup>5</sup> Confronted with this remark, Polybius, in the true spirit of *a priori* thinking, would doubtless have rejoined that the States that did not conform were exceptions and that exceptions did not invalidate a reasonable rule.<sup>6</sup> And any one persistent enough to inquire which States could in fact be called 'normal' in the meaning of that rule would no doubt have been referred to the history of Rome—the model of a normal evolution.

## ii. *The organic character of Roman history*

In what relation does the history of Rome stand to the 'natural' or 'normal' development of States as laid down in the *anacyclosis*? If a reader comes to scan Book 6 to determine which other States do in fact conform to the rules of the *anacyclosis*, he will soon find that Roman history is considered the only dear case of a normal evolution. After laying down the general rules of the biological pattern and the political *anacyclosis*, Polybius attempts to show that the history of Rome bears out these principles. His proof was presented in the *archaeologia*, and is now lost.<sup>1</sup> But several remarks are extant from which it can be gathered that the *archaeologia* described Rome as the State with the most 'natural' evolution. This is clearly expressed at 4. 13. 'I hold that this method of explanation [i.e. the biological pattern and the *anacyclosis*] will fit the constitution of Rome more than any other; for her formation and growth have from the very beginning been according to nature', κατὰ φύσιν. Insufficient attention has been given to this and similar passages. So long as the attention of critics was held by the alleged incompatibility between the stable μικτή and the

unstable *anacyclosis*, the repeated reference to Rome's natural development seemed to go badly with the stability of the mixed constitution. But even 'unitarians' like Pöschl and Ryffel have found it hard to make do with this, and, consequently, their interpretations of the Polybian principle of nature do not much help to elucidate its application to Rome.<sup>2</sup> It will be noted that after his description of the *anacyclosis* Polybius restates and amplifies his thesis of the natural evolution of Rome, thus implying that it is the biological pattern in the shape of the *anacyclosis* he is thinking of. A sound knowledge of these principles, he says at 9. 11, will enable the observer to diagnose the stage of growth or decline any constitution may have reached, and to presage further developments—that is, in accordance with the *anacyclosis*. He then (§ 12) repeats his assertion that his method is more applicable to Roman history than to any other, making specific reference to his earlier pronouncements about Rome's organic development,<sup>3</sup> and adding that 'her change to the opposite' (that is, her decline) 'will equally be according to nature'. 'This' (he concludes, § 14) 'will be obvious from what is said hereafter.' In this chapter Polybius had spoken of growth no less than of decline. Hence the reference in *διὰ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθησομένων* must be of a very general nature, equally applying to the growth of the Roman body politic, as described in the *archaeologia*, and to the process of decline which is set out as a warning to Rome, though without mention of her name, in chapter 57. This is precisely the kind of prognostication Polybius had been claiming to teach. In the biological pattern, as realized in the *anacyclosis*, he had found a criterion for this task, and in Roman politics an object to which the criterion could be applied. The importance of Rome for the theory of the *anacyclosis*, and that of the *anacyclosis* for an understanding of Rome, are (to him at any rate) reciprocal. Roman history (in his biased



opinion) derives its 'natural' character from the *anacyclosis* because it follows the course of 'natural' change laid down by political theory; but, conversely, the *anacyclosis*—a political theory formulated without reference to Rome by Greek philosophers—is confirmed by what he considered the true facts of Roman history. Rome has the most natural or normal history because he considered it to be a replica of the *anacyclosis*. This invested Roman history with the dignity of a scientific test case. He believed that two-thirds of the political cycle as laid down in this theory had been borne out by the facts reported in the *archaeologia*. With this point in mind, it is easily seen that a warning against the dangers inherent in the third sector of the cycle—that of political decline—would seem to Polybius to have all the combined weight of theory and practice. This lends an added importance to the closing chapter but one (57), which completes the various strands of the book. It completes the *anacyclosis* because of the impending misrule inherent in the last sector of the cycle; the *archaeologia* because of the decline (*φθορά*) of the country whose *ἀρχή* and *συστασις* have been traced; and the *μικτή* because of the danger of releasing the brake which only the mixed constitution can provide.

### iii. *Rome's mixed constitution*

Rome is not, however, exemplary only for her normal evolution. She is no less exemplary for her mixed constitution. Polybius' third task lay in the discussion of the mixed constitution, and in a comparison of the Roman *μικτή* with Sparta and Carthage, the two outstanding examples of this constitution. It is now seen that if this had been put in the form of a simple answer to the simple question 'What constitution enabled Rome to gain world power?' two important features would have been absent from Polybius' account. There would have been no yardstick giving a 'normal' constitutional evolution, against which could be

measured Rome's achievement past and present and her probable fate in the future; and, further, there would have been no explanation of the distinctive way in which, according to the historian, Rome acquired her mature constitution; in short, history without 'scientific' presupposition and without ulterior purpose—*Polybius dimidiatus*. Now the relation of the *μικτή* to the other theoretical portions of Book 6 was noticed above.<sup>1</sup> What remains to be done is likewise to discuss the comparative sections 10. 12-14, and chapters 48-56. In the latter Polybius points out that while Rome was adapted to a policy of conquest Sparta was not. This argument is not linked with the theoretical portion of the book. But in the former passage he argues that the Roman *μικτή* was not, like the Spartan, a thing 'made', but was the outcome of a natural process of growth.<sup>2</sup> This is clearly linked with the *anacyclosis*, which contained the ideal model of this evolution, and with the *archacologia*, which contained the narrative of the Roman *anacyclosis* up to the point when the *μικτή* was introduced. The essential difference between the mixed constitutions of Rome and Carthage is stated at chapter 51 and was discussed earlier in this paper.<sup>3</sup> Polybius is concerned with an historical point in the context of Cannae; the detailed comparison is to follow thereafter.<sup>4</sup> He is explaining why at the moment of conflict the Roman *μικτή* proved stronger than that of Carthage. The explanation lies in the fact that, in the Second Punic War, Carthage was beyond her prime while Rome had only just reached it. The acme is identified with aristocratic preponderance in political deliberation; and we have argued that these remarks refer to the mixed constitution in which, according to Polybius, such preponderance existed. The initial conundrum was how Rome not only survived the disaster of Cannae but acquired world dominion. The answer suggested in the comparative chapters of Book 6 is this.

Rome was able to reach her commanding position owing to two factors. She was more adapted to conquest than Sparta. Furthermore, she succeeded in applying the brake of the *μικτή* before the arrogation of full power by the commons, as implied in the last third of the *anacyclosis*. Her opponent, Carthage, having lost her balanced constitution, was already passing through that phase of her history. This implies an obvious lesson for the future of Rome.

There is, then, only *one* subject in Book 6—*τίνι γένεται πολιτείας* Rome was able to acquire world power (2. 3). The answer would have been more simple, and more within the historian's capacity, if he had not tried to base it on first principles. As it is he has laid claim to a 'science' of political diagnosis and prognostication, and this claim has made the answer more complex than it need have been. It involves the statement of a fundamental principle—the pattern of origin, prime, and decay—and, on this foundation, the *anacyclosis*, the *archaeologia*, and finally, the mixed constitution.

His account abounds in loose ends and contradictions. These are not, however, removed if more or less arbitrary cuts are made; for they follow from the application of a unified plan, and are inherent in Polybius' principles. His major theories have long been exploded; and there is little in the most original feature of the book—his 'science' of prognostication—which could now justly be called scientific. And yet Polybius did succeed in drawing attention to certain important features in the social structure and the political history of Rome. This he could not have done without a determined attempt to base the writing of Roman history on fundamental principles, and to use Greek political theory to supply them. In this attempt lies the unity of the sixth book.

C. O. BRINK  
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<sup>1</sup> C.Q. xxxvii, 1943, 73-89; this article gives a history of the problem and a bibliography up to 1943.

<sup>2</sup> For example by A. H. McDonald, *O.C.D.* s.v. 'Polybius'; H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220-150 B.C.* (1951), 247 ff. Dr. McDonald, to whom we are indebted for discussion of the problem, is now in substantial agreement with the view put forward in this paper.

<sup>3</sup> We omit authors only incidentally concerned with Polybius, such as T. A. Sinclair, *History of Greek Political Thought* (1952), 269-75; G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 3rd ed. (1951), 140 f.; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (1948-9), i. 193, 205, 269, ii. 98, 102, 138; M. Oilier, *Le mirage Spartiate*, ii (1943), 125-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Storie, interpret, in ling, ital.*, ii (1949), pp. i-xxxi; cf. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, iii. 1 (1916), 205-9.

<sup>5</sup> *Hermes*, lxxxi, 1953, 296-302, 'Schichten im 6. Buch des Poly bios'.

<sup>6</sup> *Polibio* (1949): see especially pp. 33-78. Mioni dates the publication of all Book 6 before 146, while admitting the possibility of two stages in composition before that date.

<sup>7</sup> *Rh. Mus.* xciv, 1951, 157-79, 'Die Entstehung des polybianischen Geschichts-werkes'. Erbse dates the whole work long after 146.

<sup>8</sup> *Μεταβολή πολιτειῶν* (1949), *passim*, but especially pp. 180-228 (with Appendix V); this work contains a useful criticism of V. Pöschl, *Römischer Staat u. gr. Staatsdenken bei Cicero* (1936). It does not concern itself with the date of composition.

<sup>9</sup> K. Ziegler, *R.E.* xxi (1952), s.v. 'Polybios (i)', cols. 1440-1578, especially 1489-1500. This article gives a useful survey and bibliography without making any new contributions to the problem of Book 6.

<sup>10</sup> Despite the arguments of C.Q. xxxvii, 1943.73 ff.

<sup>1</sup> The basis of study is still G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, iii. 1 (1916), 201-19 (with earlier bibliography). Two important articles are those of M. Holleaux (p. 100, n. 1, below) and M. Gelzer (p. 102, n. 1, below). The most recent accounts are in Mioni, *op. cit.*, 33-48; Ziegler, *op. cit.*, cols. 1474-1500.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 3. 1. 4-6; and for the extension 4. 1; 4. 6; 4. 12-15. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Phil.* lxxii, 1913, 465-83.

<sup>4</sup> In 31. 12. 12, dealing with the escape of Demetrius I Soter of Syria from Rome in 162, Carthage is mentioned as still in existence; this De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, 202 f., shows to be best explained on the hypothesis that 31. 11-15 was a contemporary memorandum later incorporated in the narrative (cf. Thommen, *Hermes*, xx, 1885, 229-30). 31. 21. 3 is irrelevant.

<sup>5</sup> *op. cit.*, 170 ff.

<sup>6</sup> 2. 37. 7-8; cf. 4. 30. 5; 31. 3 ff.; 73. 6 ff.; 5. 106. 4.

<sup>7</sup> 1. 73. 4; 6. 52. 1-3; 56. 1-3; 9. 9.9-10; 14. 10. 5; 15. 30. 10; on 31. 12. 13 see n. 4 above. On 12. 25, which points to composition before 146, see Walbank, *C.R.* lix, 1945, 39-42; Galbiati, *De fontibus M. Tulli Ciceronis* (1916), 447-8.

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit., 170 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Jacoby, *F.G.H.* 70 F. 149 (Strabo 10. 4. 16) and notes ad loc.

<sup>3</sup> Erbse, op. cit., 172.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. App. *Lib.* 92; 134; Zon. 9. 26; Livy, *per.* 47. 48; Florus, i. 31. 7; Oros. 4. 22. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. G. T. Griffith, *C.H.J.* v, 1935, i-14.

<sup>6</sup> On the problem of the Carthaginian fleet between the Second and Third Punic Wars see Gelzer, *Phil.* lxxxvi, 1931, 267(= *Vom römischen Staat*, i (1943), 84-85); Scullard, op. cit., 288-9.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., 172 'Diese anschauliche, der Bindung an eine Zeitstufe entzogene Verwendung des Verbums ist aber bei Polybios nicht auf die Synkrisis beschränkt.' He applies it to 1. 73. 4; 14. 10. 5; 15. 30. 10; and 31. 12. 11f.

<sup>8</sup> See 9. 9. 9-10, a passage not considered by Erbse.

<sup>9</sup> *R.E.A.* lxii, 1940, 12, n. 2; 14, n. 7.

<sup>10</sup> See Svoboda, op. cit., 469 ff.; De Sanctis, op. cit., 204 ff. The passages are 3. 21, 9 ff. (Carthaginian treaties); 4. 30. 5 (on an Acamanian alliance: 5. 106. 8 might be linked with this passage); 4.31. 3-33. 12 (war not the worst of evils; Arcadia and Messenia should combine against Sparta); 4. 73. 6-74. 8 (Elis should resume her *asylia*). They point to publication a little before the last troubles flared up in Greece.

<sup>1</sup> *R.E.G.* xxxvi, 1923, 480-98 (= *Études*, i, 445-62). The suggestion that 5. 88-90 is in fact displaced from immediately after 4. 56 (J. de Foucault, *Rev. Phil.* xxvi, 1952, 47-52) involves too many assumptions to be convincing; and had the digression occurred here, Polybios must have introduced it somewhat differently.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. H. Nissen, *Rh. Mus.* xxvi, 1871, 260.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., 36 ff. Already in *Hermes*, xxxi, 1896, 519ff., K. J. Neumann had argued that Polybios' request to his readers to treat any honest mistakes charitably (16. 20. 5 ff.) indicated the prior publication of Books 1-15 before 146: but this is a false conclusion.

<sup>4</sup> 'In esilio e in patria': op. cit. 38. But if we can accept Nissen's hypothesis op. cit., 271) that Polybios accompanied Scipio to Spain in 151, and went on with Scipio to Africa to visit Masinissa, who died in 149-8 (cf. 9. 25. 4), he can scarcely have been back in Rome before 150; and in the autumn of that year the exiles returned to Greece (Paus. 7. 10. 12; cf. Plut. *Cato Mai.* 9; Nissen makes it September 150). If the return is put in 151 (Benecke, *C.A.H.* viii, 302; Scullard, op. cit., 239), it must be before Aemilianus' departure from Spain, which hardly fits Pausanias: *ἐκκαίδεκάτῳ ὕστερον ἔτει* the deportation in 167.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Laqueur, *Hermes*, xlvi, 1911, 180–4.

<sup>6</sup> F. Leo, *Gesch. der röm. Lit.* i (1913), 326, n. 1, thinks this occurred when a posthumous edition of the whole of the *Histories* superseded the original books, whereas Laqueur, loc. cit., associates the loss with the transference of the text from scroll to codex.

<sup>1</sup> On Ch. 18 see below, p. 105.

<sup>2</sup> In *Phil. Woch.* 1930, 1182, in a review of Wilsing, *Aufbau u. Qitellen von Cicero's Schrift 'de re publica'*, Philippson argues that when in Cicero, *De rep.* 2. 11. 22, Laelius is made to say that Scipio's argument (which *ex hypothesi* draws largely on Polyb. 6) is a *nova ad disputandum ratio, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris*, this implies that in 129, the dramatic date of the dialogue, Polybius 6 was not yet published. Such precision would indeed be remarkable in the *de re publica*, a work in which Cicero was 'écrivain pres de trois quarts de siècle après ces événements, n'ayant nullement la prétention de faire œuvre historique et ne ressentant jamais la hantise de l'exactitude du détail chronologique' (A. Aymard, *Mélanges géographiques Faucher* (1948), 37; for some such chronological errors cf. K. Bilz, *Die Politik des P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus* (1936), 43, n. 40.) Indeed Laelius' remark is rather a warning against trying to reconstruct Polybius' *archaeologia* too mechanically from Cicero, as is done by F. Taeger (*Die Archäologie des Polybios* (1922)); *contra* V. Pöschl, op. cit. 42–99). On the relationship between the two works see below, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Polyb. 39. 2. 1–3 (= Strabo 8. 6. 28) shows him present at Corinth a little after its capture; and cf. 39. 3–5.

<sup>4</sup> Von Scala, *Studien des Polybios*, i (1890), 159 ff., argues that Polybius developed from a rationalist position to one of cautious acceptance of *τύχη*; Cuntz, op. cit., 44 ff. sees the development as one from belief to incredulity; cf. De Sanctis, op. cit., iii. 1. 213–15: *τύχην* is merely a convenient formula for dramatizing the fortuitous occurrence of certain facts and incidents. See further Walbank, *C. Q.* xxxix, 1945, 6–7; Mioni, op. cit., 140–5 (a good analysis, which can be criticized mainly for attempting to subsume irreconcilable concepts under a single definition); Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 1532–43.

<sup>5</sup> Von Scala (op. cit. *passim* and especially 325–33) argues for a conversion to Stoicism; cf. Susemihl, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit*, ii. 110, n., for a list of assumed Stoic insertions in Books 2–5.

<sup>6</sup> Supported by K. Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 1453 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Convenient résumé in De Sanctis, op. cit., iii. 1 209 ff.; cf. Mioni, op. cit., 44–46.

<sup>8</sup> These are: 3. 4. 5 (the revised plan); 3. 32. i (reference to 40 books and the fall of Carthage); 3. 37. 11 (the part of Europe washed by the Outer Sea has only recently come under our notice: probably a reference to the campaign of D. Junius Brutus Callaecus in 138/7: cf. Cuntz, op. cit., 34–37); 3. 39. 6–8 (reference to the Via Domitia, constructed in 120. This passage forms a *crux*: cf. Cuntz, op. cit., 20–27; De Sanctis, op. cit., iii. i. 212–13. A posthumous insertion by the editor is not impossible; but there seems no reason but the date to question the

authenticity of the passage. De Sanctis observes that the road between Nice and Marseilles was laid down by Q. Opimius, the consul of 154; and Mioni, op. cit., 46, follows him. But Polybius is speaking of the road from Marseilles, or the Rhône, to Emporiae); 3. 57–59 (forms a whole and is probably late: cf. 57. 4: Greek men of action now relieved from the ambitions of a military or political career: this must have been written after 146; 59. 7: Polybius' voyage on the Outer Sea, probably after the sack of Carthage, cf. 34. 15. 7 = Pliny, *N.H.* 5.9); 3. 61. 11; 86. 2 (probably after 133 since it implies the Rubicon frontier, not that of the Aesis; Cuntz, op. cit., 27–34, argues convincingly for attributing this change to Tiberius Gracchus); 10. 11. 4 (autopsy of New Carthage, probably visited 151/0); 12. 2.1; 3. 1–6 (on the lotus, and on Africa: these passages suggest that Polybius had already visited the country; but whether this is also true of Corsica (3. 7–4. 4) is uncertain. We know of no visit of Polybius to this island); 12. 27 ff. (stress on *αὐτοπάθεια* and reference to Odysseus' wanderings date this after 151, and probably after 146: cf. *Class. et med.* ix, 1948, 171 ff.).

<sup>1</sup> Polyb. 2. 21. 8 has been ignored; it can be satisfactorily explained without the assumption of a late insertion (see below, p. 103, n. i). The date of the Achaean chapters 2. 37–70 has recently been questioned by Gelzer, *Hermes*, lxxv, 1940, 27–37 (cf. *Abh. preuss. Ak.* 1940, No. 2, pp. 32), who argues that they were a late insertion made after 146. His arguments (partially accepted by Ziegler, op. cit., 1476) cannot be discussed in detail here; but it should be noted that they fail to explain 2. 37. 8 ff., a passage clearly written before 146 (since it implies the continued existence of the Achaean League), but also clearly part of the *Histories*, and not explicable as borrowed from some supposed juvenile work dealing with Achaea. The hypothesis of Cardona, op. cit., i (1948), pp. xcvi, n. 1, lxxiii–lxxiv, that such a work was written before Polybius came to Rome, is not based on any evidence.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 108 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See especially 3. 7; 10. 6–14; 18. 5–8. In 10. 6–14 Polybius describes Lycurgus' mixed constitution set up *ἵνα μηδὲν αὐξάνο-*

*μενον ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον εἰς τὰς συμφυεῖς ἐκτρέπεται  
κακίας, ἀντισπωμένης δὲ τῆς ἐκάστου δυνάμεως  
ὑπ' ἀλλήλων μηδαμοῦ νεύη μηδ' ἐπὶ πολὺ  
καταρρέπη μηδὲν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἰσορροποῦν καὶ  
ζυγостаτούμενον ἐπὶ πολὺ διαμένη κατὰ τὸν  
τῆς ἀντιπαθείας λόγον ἀεὶ τὸ πολίτευμα.*

*ἀντιπαθείας* 'thanks to the principle of reciprocity' is Reiske's emendation for the meaningless *ἀντιπλοίας* of the manuscript. Pöschl, 52–54, n. 21, has translated *ἀντι-πλοίας* as 'luffing to', i.e. sailing into the wind to meet a sudden squall. But Greek and Roman craft were not capable of sailing close-hauled to windward, without which luffing to is impossible. On 18. 5–8 see below, p. 105.

<sup>4</sup> The idea of decay is stressed in 4. 11–13; 9. 11–14; 51. 3–8; 57. All these passages specifically envisage a decline in the Roman constitution.



<sup>1</sup> Op. cit., 85–86. The description (2. 21. 8) of Flaminius' land-law as ἀρχηγὸν ... τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς had been associated with the Gracchi by Ed. Meyer, and his view was widely followed; but it is probable that in this passage Polybius has in mind the outburst of popular assertiveness associated with Flaminius' career, which ended in the fiasco of the double dictatorship of Fabius and Minucius, and the election of such leaders as Flaminius and Varro who, at Trasimene and Cannae, were responsible, in the eyes of the Senate, for bringing Rome within an inch of ruin. It is clear that Polybius exaggerated the role of the tribunate from the time of Cannae onwards (cf. 3. 87. 8 πλὴν τῶν δημάρχων), and his belief in Flaminius' maleficent role may help to explain the strange remarks on the tribunate to be found in 6. 16. 3–5. But there is no necessary connexion between the remark on Flaminius and the Gracchan revolution.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., 86: the view is that of Kornemann, *Phil*, lxxxvi, 1931, 180 ff., and is rightly rejected by Mioni, op. cit., 63; cf. Oilier, op. cit., 158–9.

<sup>3</sup> Schmekel, *Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, 4–7, puts it in 144–142; Laqucur, op. cit., 223–49, after 142; Susemihl, op. cit., ii. 86 towards 140; Cuntz, op. cit., 77, between 138 and 132; while Svoboda, *Phil*, lxxii, 1913, 477, and Kornemann, *Phil*, lxxxvi, 1931, 183, suggest a date earlier than 149. Cichorius, *Rh. Mūs.* lxxiii, 1908, 220 ff., argues that Panaetius was present in the Third Punic War; but Pohlenz, *R.E.* 'Panaitios' (1949), 422, is non-committal ('eher vor als nach 146').

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Reitzenstein, *Gött. Nachr.* 1917, 406 ff.; Pohlenz, *R.E.* 'Panaitios', col. 423.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Pliny, *N.H.* 33. 150; Veil. Pat. 2. 1. 1; Florus, i. 33. 1; 34. 18; Orosius, 5. 8. 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Catiline*, 10. 1; *Jug.* 41; cf. *Hist.* 1. 11; 1. 12. See Gelzer, *Phil*, lxxxvi, 1931, 271 ff. (= *Vom römischen Staat*, i. 93).

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Cato mai.* 27. 3 f. See further *C.Q.* xxxvi, 1943, 87, n. 5. On the thesis that Rome's decline followed on her conquest of the world see Bickerman, *R.E.L.* xxiii, 1946, 150; Gelzer, *Phil*, lxxxvi, 1931, 273 ff.; Aymard, *Mélanges de la société toulousaine d'études classiques*, ii, 1948, 109, n. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Cato mai.* 27.2 f.

<sup>1</sup> Loc. cit., 101–20.

<sup>2</sup> His father Aemilius Paullus struck a similar note after the defeat of Perseus; cf. 29. 20. 1–4; Plut. *Aem.* 27.

<sup>3</sup> Gelzer, *Phil*, lxxxvi, 1931, 294. The story in Orosius (5. 8. 1), if it is more than a piece of rhetorical embroidery, shows merely that in 133 some people at Rome, including perhaps Aemilianus, recognized the importance of *concordia*; nothing more.

<sup>4</sup> Gelzer, *ibid.* 292; E. Skard, *Euergetes-Concordia* (Oslo, 1932), 76.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch's excuse that Aemilius acted παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιεικῇ καὶ χρηστῆνοῦσαν (*Aem.* 30. 1) is facile and unconvincing (cf. De Sanctis, *Storia dei*



*Romani*, iv. 1, 350, n. 300). For Aemilianus' ready imitation of his father's cruelty, see Livy, *per.* 51; De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, iv. 2 (1953), 346, n. 1003.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Cato mai.* 27. 4; in *Phil.* lxxxvi, 1931, 298 (= *Vom römischen Staat*, i. 111-12), Gelzer rightly identifies the policies of Cato and Aemilianus.

<sup>7</sup> Thus, in 6. 50. 3 it is accounted a merit in the Roman constitution that it is better adapted to conquest than that of Sparta.

<sup>8</sup> Loc. cit., 109-10.

<sup>9</sup> 6. 57. 5.

<sup>10</sup> 31. 25. 6.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 6. 18. 2: *τις ἔξωθεν κοινὸς φόβος*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 35. 6. 1-4 = Plut. *Cato mai.* 9. It does not, of course, follow that Cato accepted the implications of Polybius' theories on the state.

<sup>3</sup> 36. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 32. 2 (cf. 4): *ὅτι οἱ τὰς ἡγεμονίας περιποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι κτῶνται μὲν αὐτὰς ἀνδρεία καὶ συνέσει, πρὸς αὐξήσιν δὲ μεγάλην ἄγουσιν ἐπικεία καὶ φιланθρωπία, ἀσφαλίζονται δὲ φόβῳ καὶ καταπλήξει*. See further Gelzer, *Phil.* lxxxvi, 1931, 290 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *C.H.J.* viii, 1946, 127-8.

<sup>1</sup> It does not affect our argument if Polybius has taken over this criticism from Philinus (*C.Q.* xxxix, 1945, 13).

<sup>2</sup> 6. 56. 1 ff.

<sup>3</sup> In 1. 71. 8 Polybius applies the expression *διαπόντιο ζπόλεμος* to the First Punic War (from the point of view of Carthage); but the coincidence in phrase is not to be pressed, for he cannot be thinking of so early a date here. Dr. A. H. McDonald has reminded us that an annalistic tradition (Livy 39. 6) makes the introduction of luxury at Rome the aftermath of Manlius Vulso's Galatian expedition of 189-188.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Cat. mai.* 19. 4.

<sup>5</sup> On Cato's censorship see H. H. Scullard, *op. cit.*, 152 ff.: 'the last real attempt of the old-fashioned Romans to re-establish a more austere manner of life in the face of the social and moral decline which was resulting from Rome's expansion in the Mediterranean world and her contacts with the East.'

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Pöschl, *op. cit.* 64-65. Polybius quotes Cato's criticisms of Roman morals in 31. 25. 5; and compare Livy 34. 4. 2: 'duobus vitiis, avaritia et luxuria, civitatem laborare, quae pestes omnia magna imperia everterunt'.

<sup>8</sup> 3. 118. 9-12.

<sup>9</sup> 3. 2. 6; 11B. 9-12; 5. 111. 10.

<sup>10</sup> For example, the position of the Senate inside Italy as described in 6. 13. 4-5.; the development of the system of sending senatorial *legati*, 6. 13. 6; the Senate's reception of royal embassies, 6. 13. 9; the account of the *publicani* (identified with the 'People') 6. 17. On the other hand, some features are true for 216 but not for 150: e.g. the reference in 6. 16. 3 to the People's passing of legislation detrimental to the Senate must refer back to the time of Flaminius (cf. 2. 21. 7-8: above, p. 103, n. 1). The same is true of his account of the tribune's position as the servant of the people: 6. 16. 3-5. Many of these discrepancies seem to spring from the schématic character of the exposition in this book.

<sup>1</sup> 6. 11. 13; 12. 10.

<sup>2</sup> 6. 58. 1.

<sup>3</sup> 6. 1. 1. 10.

<sup>4</sup> 1. 1. 5: with *πῶς* Polybius indicates the history as a whole, with *τὶνι γένει πολιτείας* Book 6. See *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 76, n. 2 for criticism of Zancan, *Rend. 1st. Lombardo*, lxix, 1936, on this score.

<sup>5</sup> 6. 2. 3; 8. 2. 3; 39. 8. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. 3. 4. 4: there is no reason to think that such judgements would be adverse to Rome. The accounts of the Third Punic War, the destruction of the pseudo-Philip in Macedon, and the Achaean War, are all given from the Roman point of view and there is no doubt where Polybius' sympathies lie; cf. 36. 17. 13-15 (support of pseudo-Philip is *δαιμονοβλάβεια*); 38. 1. 5 (Carthage gave posterity 'some ground, however slight', for defending her, the Greeks gave none); 4. 1-9 (duty of the historian to speak out on the faults of the Greeks); 7. 1-8. 15 (worthlessness of Hasdrubal: the Greeks and Carthaginians alike in their leaders); and his account of the Achaean War and its aftermath in Books 38 and 39.

<sup>1</sup> 6. 2. 8; 3. 2; 4. 11-13; 9. 10-14; 10.2 6, 12-14; 57. 2-4, 5-9.

<sup>2</sup> 6.4. 11-13; 9. 11-14; 43-2; 51. 3-8; 57.

<sup>3</sup> 6. 3. 5-9. 14.

<sup>4</sup> 6. 3. 7 f.; 10.

<sup>5</sup> 6. 11a; cf. 4. 13; 9. 13 f.; 57. 10. There is no ancient authority for this convenient term.

<sup>6</sup> 6.11. 11-18. 8; cf. 43-57.

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 102 ff.

<sup>8</sup> R. Laqueur, *Polybios* (1913), 223 ff.

<sup>9</sup> For some of the suggested divisions of the book, see *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 79 ff., 83 f.

<sup>1</sup> The subject-matter of what was the bulk of the sixth book is indicated by these remarks—the discussion of the Roman constitution from ch. 11 onwards,

and the *archaeologia*, now almost entirely lost.

<sup>2</sup> Both at 6. 4. 12 f. and 9. 12 f. the prime (*ακμή*) of the Roman constitution is referred to. While this need not mean more than the middle stage of the biological pattern (as described above, p. 108, and again below, pp. 110 ff.), it will be seen that the Roman *ακμή* is the mixed constitution—cf. 6. 57. 10, 58. i, referring back to the description of the *μικτή*, 11 ff.; and below, pp. 116 ff.

<sup>3</sup> The words *ἑκαστα τῶν προειρημένων* occur at 6. 10. 2, and refer to the *anacyclosis* described in the preceding chapters.

<sup>1</sup> Laqucur, op. cit., 245.

<sup>2</sup> Sec 6. 2. 8 and 3. 2.

<sup>3</sup> L. Zancan, *Rend. Ist. Lombardo*, lxix, 1936, 499 ff., cf *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 73–75. For the idea of dcdadcncc, sec below, p. 116,

<sup>4</sup> 6. 4. 11–13; 9. 11–14; 57. 4.

<sup>5</sup> 6. 43. 2; 51. 3–8.

<sup>6</sup> 6. 43. 2; indeed, De Sanctis thought the mere mention of the biological pattern a sufficient cause for removing to the second draft chs. 43–44: against this, see *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 83.

<sup>1</sup> Early monarchy 6. 5. 4; kingship 5. 10; 6. 1; 7. 1 (tyranny 7. 8); aristocracy 8. 1 (oligarchy 8. 5); democracy 9. 3 (ochlocracy 9. 7).

<sup>2</sup> 6. 7. 8 *ἐγένετο μὲν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς, ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο*, change tp aristocracy; 8. 5 *μετέστησαν μὲν τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ταχὺ δὲ κατεσκευάσαν κτλ.*, change to democracy; 9. 7 *τὸ μὲν τῆς δημοκρατίας καταλύεται, μεθίσταται δ' εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἢ δημοκρατία . . .*, (9) *ἕως ἂν ἀποτεθῇριωμένον πάλιν εὖρη δεσπότην καὶ μόναρχον*.

<sup>3</sup> 6. 4. 12 *ἑκαστον αὐτῶν ὡς φύεται*, 5. 4 *φύεσθαι*, 10 *ἀρχὴ βασιλείας φύεται*, 6. 12 *βασιλεὺς ἐκ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος*.

<sup>4</sup> 6. 7. 8; 8. 5; 9. 9

<sup>5</sup> 6. 4. 11, Paton's trans.

<sup>1</sup> 6. 9. 11, Paton's trans.

<sup>2</sup> 6. 9. 12–14, cf. 4. 13.

<sup>3</sup> Above, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> p. 110.

<sup>5</sup> 6. 10. 2 and 6; see above, p. 109.

<sup>6</sup> 6. 10. 11 **πλεῖστον ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν χρόνον διεφύλαξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.** Polybius uses the word *ἐλευθερία* to denote the essence of the Spartan constitution at its best. This appears to be Ephorus' idea of Sparta and it is fully explained at 6. 46. 7, 48. 2, 3, and 5.

<sup>7</sup> 6. 10. 2 **ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων συννόησας ἀναγκαίως καὶ φυσικῶς ἐπιτελούμενα.**

<sup>8</sup> 6. 10. 2 *ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων*, referring to the *anacyclosis*; 10. 2 f. Lycurgus' inference (*συλλογισάμενος*); 10. 6 **ἃ προῖδόμενος Λυκούργος οὐχ ἀπλὴν οὐδὲ μονοειδῆ συνεστήσατο τὴν πολιτείαν.**

<sup>1</sup> 6. 10. 7 *ἐπὶ πολὺ διαμέυη*. There is of course no suggestion of absolute permanence; cf. 10. 11 *πλεῖστον ὧν ἡμῖς ἴσμεν χρόνον*.

<sup>2</sup> 6. 10. 12-14.

<sup>3</sup> The various propositions are stated above, p. 108.

<sup>4</sup> For Polybius' warnings see 6. 9. 13; and 57.

<sup>5</sup> Meyer, *Rh. Mus.* xxxvii, 1882, 622-3; 4599.3/4 De Sanctis, op. cit., ii. 41, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> 6. 3. 3 and 11. 4.

<sup>7</sup> 6. 10. 14.

<sup>8</sup> 6. 9. 13 *κατὰ φύσιν ἀπ' ἀρχῶς ἔχουσιν τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τὴν αὐξησιν*.

<sup>9</sup> 6. 11. 1 f., cf. 57.10 and 51.5. See below, pp. 116 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero, *De rep.* 2. 3 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Taeger, op. cit.; Pöschl, op. cit., 50 ff. (see above, p. 101, n. 2).

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *De rep.* 2. 62 f.

<sup>2</sup> 6. 11. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Meyer, op. cit., 623 ff., Taeger, op. cit., 100.

<sup>4</sup> Fabius Pictor, according to Gelzer, *Hermes*, bcix, 1934, 50, n.; but a recent writer is rather more sceptical—see P. Bung, Q., *Fabius Pictor, der erste römische Annalist* (Cologne thesis, 1952), 198 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For the deliberative function of the aristocracy, see below, p. 118.

6 6. 11. 1 καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἀπὸ  
τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προ-  
διευκρινουμένων ἦν καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ τέλειον  
ἐν τοῖς Ἀννιβιακοῖς καιροῖς, ἀφ' ὧν ἡμεῖς εἰς  
ταῦτα τὴν ἐκτροπὴν ἐποιησάμεθα.

<sup>1</sup> There was, then, some sound sense in Taeger's suggestion, based on Cicero, that Polybius conceived of Roman history as the evolution of a *μικτή* within the cycle of constitutions (op. cit., 109). But he spoilt his case by ascribing to Polybius Cicero's mixed kingship and mixed aristocracy. There is no reason to assume that Polybius combined *μικτή* and *anacyclosis* in the same way as Cicero. On the contrary, Polybius' harping on the 'natural' character of Roman history (as explained below, p. 121) would make him wish to draw attention to the likeness between the stages of Roman history and those of the *anacyclosis* with its simple, and 'unmixed', constitutions. If this is so, Pöschl's criticism of Taeger (op. cit., 50 ff.) would seem to be justified in some details, but does not take account of the merits of Taeger's case. H. Ryffel, op. cit., 183, n. 343, is fairer as regards Taeger, but is obscure on the question of Rome's *anacyclosis*.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 109 f.

<sup>3</sup> The additional constitution, the régime of force in the pre-social (or post-social) monarchy, is not a *πολιτεία* in the technical sense of Greek political theory. It lacks a *παρέκβασις* and its sole purpose is to close the gulf fixed between the pre-constitutional and the constitutional stages of society. If this point is observed, the chronological inference from the confusion of six and seven forms, *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 79, need not in fact be drawn. The same explanation, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to the meaning attached to the term *μόναρχος* in this, seventh, constitution (ibid.). This special usage was bound to clash with the more usual employment of the word, but is restricted to a single context and, probably, taken over from Polybius' source.

<sup>1</sup> L. Zancan, op. cit. (above, p. 110, n. 3), 508, has charged Polybius with legerdemain in indiscriminately applying to history the logical *anacyclosis* and the biological, or 'organic', pattern—two different concepts of political life. But Polybius cannot be fairly charged with hiding what he deliberately asserted, namely, the approximation of the two. Nor is it fair to say, as was asserted both by Zancan and by E. Mioni (*Polibio*, 69 f.), that owing to its schematic, circular form there is no place for decay in the *anacyclosis*. Three stages of decline are clearly envisaged within the cycle—that is, tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule issuing into the dictatorship of brute force.

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 111.

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *De rep.* 1. 46 and 56–69.

<sup>2</sup> H. Ryffel, op. cit., 216.

<sup>3</sup> For democracy in the Achaean League, see 2. 41. 5; for a similar problem in Macedonia, 31. 2. 12.

<sup>4</sup> The passages in Books 2 and 31 contain, in fact, a more modern, Hellenistic, usage of the word democracy. Independence from monarchic rule seems to be the main point—see J. A. O. Larsen, *C.P.* xl, 1945, 88 ff, and T. A. Sinclair, *op. cit.*, 272.

<sup>5</sup> Here the problem of Polybius' sources has some relevance to our discussion—but this is beyond the scope of our paper.

<sup>6</sup> See above, n. 2, and, especially, Cicero *op. cit.*, 1. 69: 'ex tribus primis generibus longe praestat mea sententia regium, regiautem ipsi praestabit id quod erit acuatim et temperatum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis'.

<sup>1</sup> 6. 12. 3, 'the consuls refer urgent business to the Senate for deliberation'. The reference of 51 to the *μικτή* and the connexion with 12 and 13 is stated by Taeger, *op. cit.*, 112 f., and reaffirmed by Pöschl, *op. cit.*, 61. Unfortunately they also offer much inconclusive speculation about 'good' and 'bad' *μικταί*, and about an acme within a mixed constitution.

<sup>2</sup> The acme of a constitution is mentioned at 6. 4. 12 and at 9. 12—that is, in the introduction and the epilogue of the *anacyclosis*—but not in the descriptive chapters 5–9. 9. Nor is there a clearly marked apogee in any of the constitutions of the cycle—see above, p. 111. And though he stressed the 'beginning' and 'end' of each of the 'good' constitutions, Polybius was yet at pains to let the various forms merge into each other—see above, *loc. cit.*

<sup>1</sup> 6. 9. 10 *αὐτὴ πολιτεῖαν ἀνακύκλωσις, αὐτηφύσεως οἰκονομία.*

<sup>2</sup> For example in (the passages about Achaëa, cited above, p. 117, n. 3; cf. *C.Q.* xxxvii, 1943, 89, n. 2.

<sup>3</sup> 6. 43. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Thus Pöschl, *op. cit.*, 51, as modified by Ryffel, *op. cit.*, 182 f.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Politics* 5. 12. 1316a11, criticizing Plato, *Republic*, 8. 546.

<sup>6</sup> For examples of this mode of reasoning in Book 6, see 43. 5: the success of Thebes is said not to be due to her constitution but to the personalities of her leaders; likewise Athens, ch. 44; at 10. 12 Sparta is said to have achieved her *μικτή* untaught by adversity, i.e. Lycurgus founded the Spartan *μικτή* and there was no prolonged sequence of constitutions. For the last passage, see below, p. 121, n. 2.

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 113 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Pöschl, *op. cit.*, 50 ff., denies the relevance to Rome of the *anacyclosis*, and holds that Carthage, Sparta, and Rome are said to have had natural evolutions 'weil diese Staaten sich in einem natürlichen Lebens-process entwickelt haben' (p. 54)—which is begging the question. Ryffel, *op. cit.*, 221 ff., equally denies that in calling Roman history 'natural' Polybius was thinking of the *anacyclosis*. He maintains that the natural process to which Polybius here refers is the biological pattern behind the *anacyclosis*. This leaves unexplained why, then, growth and decline should be more natural in the case of Rome than in any other.

<sup>3</sup> 6. 9. 13, citing 4. 13.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 112 f.

<sup>2</sup> Neither at 6. 10. 12–14 nor at 50. 2 is preference given to Sparta or to Rome (50. 3 raises a different issue). Cato (*ap. Cic. De rep.* 2. 1) gave the preference to the Roman constitution as being the work of many men over a long period. But Polybius is merely contrasting a creation *διὰ λόγου* with an empirical development. Hence there is no reason to assume that he is here arguing against Cato (so Oilier, *Le mirage Spartiate*, 151), or indeed that he has Cato in mind at all.

<sup>3</sup> The comparison is made at 6. 51–55; for our discussion see above, pp. 117 ff.

<sup>4</sup> 6. 52. 1 *τὰ κατὰ μέρος*.



# GENRE THROUGH INTERTEXTUALITY: THEOCRITUS TO VIRGIL AND PROPERTIUS

Richard F. Thomas

## **1 Genre and Idyll**

“Like many other authors of our era, he experienced that impetuous impulse of literature that no longer tolerates the distinction of genres and wants to shatter the limits.”

The subject is a writer of this century, namely Hermann Broch,<sup>1</sup> but the assessment could apply equally to a number of Hellenistic poets, in whose works we can very definitely trace the production of new forms out of existing ones. Our ability to observe this process is of course greatly limited by accidents of survival, by uncertainties as to the priority of one work over another, and so on. Even so, there can be little doubt that the name of Theocritus is one that comes to mind when we think of such generic revolution. And yet, we might also ask, how exactly did a poet such as Theocritus “refuse to tolerate the distinction of genres” or “shatter the limits”? What genres was Theocritus replacing, and with what was he replacing them? It is an oft-repeated fact that Theocritus and his readers would still have called what he was doing *epos*, and this very observation leads to a problematizing on the synchronic level of the notion of ‘genre’. I will not here address in any detail the extremely complex issue of what genre constitutes for the ancients, or for us, but it is reasonable to expect that even if any definition other than those which look to metrical form becomes problematic, the enquiry itself is likely to be productive.

Many of the discussions of genre in the Hellenistic period seem to me intensely diachronic, historicist and even anachronistic in their foundation and approach: issues of alteration, law breaking,



mixing, and the like are clearly ones under which critics approach the issue retrospectively and with a taxonomical attitude that may be divorced from any sense of the immediacy of the issue.<sup>2</sup> I would prefer here to attempt a series of synchronic snapshots, that is, to try and recover the compositional mentality or attitude towards the evolving form not only in Theocritus, but also, briefly, in two Roman poets who, I believe, can be seen to be working in a similar way with their tradition, and who like him are involved in the transformation of forms or genres. In all of these cases intertextual binding, as well as intertextual difference, will be the building blocks of the process, for it is by binding their composition to preceding forms (particularly those rooted in performative occasion), or by distinguishing it from those forms, that the poets in question create a pose towards, and an involvement in, the issue of genre. Mary Depew (1992: 330) has put the matter well: “The awareness that the break between contemporary poetry and its models is entirely unbridgeable and the awareness of the loss of the community-sanctioned occasions that engendered poetic types are the conditions under which the concept of genre comes into existence—not by way of instantiating traditional kinds, but by imitating them.” Gow (1950: xxiv) gives the Suda’s record of the ‘genres’ ascribed to Theocritus, with various surviving *Idylls* assigned to these genres: (22, and perhaps 24 and 26 are ‘Ὑμνοί; 28–31 are Μέλη, and so on). While these designations may seem convenient, I would rather avoid them as being at best not particularly meaningful in a post-performative culture,<sup>3</sup> at worst positively misleading for the same reason, and I would prefer, at least as a way of approaching the issue, to think more loosely of a Theocritean poetic corpus, to which no particular name or generic identity attaches. In a sense, genre for our purposes will be a result of the manipulation of models. T.G. Rosenmeyer, who shows how *unhelpful* a term genre is as a taxonomical tool, put this best when he wrote: “The Hellenistic manhandling of genres, that is to say, the manhandling of the great ancestors’ achievements, carries forward an old Greek pastime. What results is not a *Kreuzung der Gattungen*, a hybridizing of genres, but an exercise in the freedom of

*aemulatio*.”<sup>4</sup> This will mean that, if the poet ranges far enough in his use of models, the new product will not always be readily recognizable, and will perhaps defy generic labels, which is why terms like ‘epyllion’, ‘idyll’, ‘satire’, and so on—all post-performative terms, and themselves not very useful—come into being. I shall return to the word ‘idyll’ somewhat later.

For reasons that will emerge, I am particularly avoiding the term ‘pastoral’ as constituting a reference to genre. Kathryn Gutzwiller, in her stimulating recent book on Theocritean ‘pastoral’, groups together the early Theocritean poems which she (and others before her) regards as constituting a distinct, identifiable genre, recognizable not simply by form or content, but because of a shared and coherent ‘inner structure’, that is, the ordering of form and content in such a way that they come together and recognition of them grants the individual ‘bucolics’ their independent status, and ultimately their generic status as pastoral.<sup>5</sup> My main reason for differing from her arguments is that they *prima facie* isolate the earlier (in terms of MS order) of Theocritus’ *Idylls* and exclude the later ones (so-called mimes, hymns, encomia, etc.), and create a barrier to allowing those later ones to participate in any possible ‘inner structures’ that might be found to be similar to those of the earlier poems (and that will be found in the pages to come, for instance). A further problem comes from the assumption that pastoral is a ‘major genre’, mainly it would seem because the second and third generations of pastoral give it such a status. This again involves us in a teleological and diachronic relationship to the text, which, as I said, I will try to avoid, in the hopes of better recovering some sort of synchronic compositional picture. Gutzwiller’s distinction (1991: 12) of the ‘major genre’ of pastoral from ‘subgenres’<sup>6</sup> such as ‘propemptikon’ and ‘genethliakon’ is also problematic, since from the perspective of performative authenticity and credibility these latter (however slight they may be—that is not the issue) have a greater claim to the status of genre than does pastoral.

## 2 Theocritean Intertextuality

Let us begin with Theoc. 24, the *Herakliskos*. We have the intertextual pre-conditions, that is, the well-known fact that Theocritus was drawing throughout from Pindar's first *Nemean*. Acknowledgement and demonstration of that fact by the author and appreciation of it by the reader are virtual requisites to any reading of the poem, and coincidence with and difference from the model is one of the major dynamics in constructing the meaning and emphasis of the new version. Nor is there simply this single model in play: when Theocritus insists on the age of Heracles at the time of this feat by having the poem begin, 'Ηρακλέα δεκάμηνον, he is presumably not referring simply to Pindar's claim that the hero was just born (*N.* 1.35), but also to that of Pherecydes (fr. 28 M) that he was one year old, and possibly even to the Apollodorus tradition (8 months old). All of these perhaps go back to a vaguer tradition (in E. *HF* 1266) which simply has Heracles unweaned at the time.<sup>7</sup> Out of this grows the *zetema*, and *zetemata* are simply the products, or by-products of intense emulative intertextuality.

To continue with Pindaric connections, the differences in Theoc. 24 are also what move it away from the encomiastic basis of the model. The ways in which this happens, particularly in the first part of the poem, are well known: in particular Theocritus elaborates and creates a whole new narrative with infinitely more detail. In Pindar the baby Heracles is simply laid in saffron swaddling clothes (38 κροκωτόν σπάργανον), and the rest of the narrative fairly simply records the arrival of the serpents, Heracles' seizing of them, the concern of Alcmena and her attendants, their arrival, the arrival under arms of Amphitryo and the Cadmean leaders, the general delight of all at the prowess and heroism of Heracles. That simplicity is warranted by the genre: in a victory ode to a man claiming to be of the Heracleidae, all that is needed (or wanted) from the narrative is a demonstration of the ancestor's prowess.<sup>8</sup>

The details of Theocritus' treatment create a different world, and remove the focus, and with it the hymnic genre, of the model: Alcmena bathes and feeds the two babies and puts them to bed in a shield despoiled from King Pterelaus by Amphitryo—that is what you use shields for in Alexandrian poetry.<sup>9</sup> This is the

first of many deflections of the heroic in this poem-deflections which ultimately destroy the generic basis of the myth as we observe it in the Pindaric context. The same may be said of the lullaby that Alcmena sings to the babies:

“εὔδεν, ἐμὰ βρέφεια, γλυκερόν καὶ ἐγέρσιμον ὕπνον·

εὔδεν, ἐμὰ ψυχά, δὺ’ ἀδελφεοί, εὔσοα τέκνα·

ὄλβιοι εὐνάζοισθε καὶ ὄλβιοι ἄω ἴκοισθε.”

(24.7-9)

Some of the language here has a slightly colloquial ring to it, which would tend to undercut the heroic flavor of the narrative,<sup>10</sup> as would the repetition and patterning, which is found elsewhere in popular contexts.<sup>11</sup> And so it goes on: when the serpents arrive Iphicles screams and kicks off his blankets;<sup>12</sup> while Heracles is despatching the serpents, Alcmena takes six lines to tell Amphytrion to get up, which he does, but by the time he can get dressed and armed the whole business is over. All marvel at the boy’s feat, he laughingly offers the serpents to his father, while the latter goes back to bed, with his mind on getting back to sleep.

The remainder of the poem continues the deflection of Pindaric or heroic material. In *N.* 1 Teiresias was brought in, and proceeded to tell of Heracles’ future feats, and of his eventual immortality, again what we would expect given the theme and addressee. The same fame is predicted by Theocritus’ Teiresias, but it is set in the context of domesticity and far from the ‘realities’ of heroism: the women of Greece will sing, at their weaving, of Alcmena; it is *she* who will be honored for the fame of Herakles. That said, Teiresias moves on to more practical matters, averting the evil intended by Hera against Alcmena’s house: she must fumigate, sacrifice and carry out a variety of acts which simply belong to the world of magic, a world familiar to contemporary readers as their own, and also familiar from writings such as Theoc. 2, and later from another revolutionary poet, Nicander. Again, there is no trace of this advice in Pindar’s poem.

The same may be said of the next section of Theoc. 24, the last before the poem breaks off into its fragmentary state. Lines 103-40 treat the education of Heracles, a subject also covered

by Apollodorus (2.4.9). Much of the training is traditional (chariot-driving, boxing and wrestling, sword-fighting, etc.), but the very first item has attracted attention: γράμματα μὲν τὸν παῖδα γέρων Λίνος ἐξεδίδαξεν, υἱὸς Ἀπόλλωνος μελεδωνεὺς ἄγρυπνος ἥρως. (24.105-6)

Gow (1950: *ad* 24.105) observes: “Γράμματα, though they take the first place in the education of a gentleman (Pl. *Thg.* 122e), have none in that of a mythical hero, and T. has perhaps transferred this function to the best-known of Heracles’ pedagogues [Linus] because in the education of a Hellenistic prince it is the most important, though it should be mentioned that in Alexis (fr. 135) Heracles is having a reading lesson from Linus”. There is no further interpretation, but these comments contain the seeds for pertinent observations. First, as Gow notes, the matter of Heracles’ education is a theme from comedy, and hymnic authenticity can hardly be sustained when such a genre is invoked (that way lies parody). Once again, then, we might see Kroll’s *Kreuzung* at work, or, as I would prefer to see it, engagement with and deflation of the original hymnic mode. Beyond that, the addition of γράμματα to the curriculum is perfectly consistent with Theocritus’ use of a lullaby, domestication of the narrative, and alteration of Teiresias’ advice: we have Heracles functioning not just like a Hellenistic prince, but, in learning γράμματα he also functions like a Hellenistic scholar—Linus in a sense is a Zenodotus, Callimachus or Apollonius, at the head of the list of teachers of an utterly transformed and modernized Heracles.

One phrase has not received sufficient attention, at least in the Theocritus criticism: ἄγρυπνος ἥρως, ‘vigilant hero’. Ἀγρυπνία is of course the condition of writing of the learned scholar-poet, a term applied by Callimachus to Aratus, and imitated by the Roman neoteric Cinna.<sup>13</sup> In a poem that begins its life with Pindar and the praise of the hero we find a philological hero, a figure much like the poet himself, an ultimate rewriting of the tenns and conditions of what constitutes heroism.

Even if the poem ended with a prayer for the poet’s victory (cf. Gow on 141 ff.), there can be little doubt that any occasion at which it was presented had little or no impact on shaping it as a

performative genre.<sup>14</sup> Indeed the only clear reference to occasion occurs in a marginal comment and, although the end is fragmentary, nothing else suggests an occasion. It may for that reason be doubted whether it is even useful loosely to categorize it as a hymn. We can, then, see where a poem like the *Herakliskos* comes from, and we can observe the transformations through which it has gone; what is less easy is to give it a generic title that would mean anything.<sup>15</sup>

My second example is *Idyll* 22, the *Dioscouri*, a poem which has generally been held in some contempt, although its standing is improving.<sup>16</sup> Gow's schoolmasterly tendencies came to the fore in his discussion of this work, both in his commentary (1950: 383 "seems to bear traces of considerable carelessness in writing") and also in an earlier article where Theocritus looks like a plagiarizing dullard in a kindergarten class:<sup>17</sup>

"Having by him a poem or fragment on the Dioscouri and Apharidae, T. pulled it out of the drawer, added Kastor's speech, scribbled a duel out of the *Iliad*, and clapped the whole into place."

This is representative of the burden under which Hellenistic poetry still labors: its intertextuality is seen as incompetent theft and its experimentalism is held up to classical norms and found offensive and deficient. The impression of disunity establishes itself, I believe, precisely because the poem in a sense is a demonstration of generic multiplicity. As Todorov (1976-7: 161) has said: "From where do genres come? Why, quite simply, from other genres. A new genre is always the transformation of one or several old genres: by inversion, by displacement, by combination". That is surely true of much Theocritean poetry, but it is especially the case with a poem such as 22.

I will not discuss the opening prayer to the Dioscouri (1-26), the boxing match between Polydeuces and Amycus (80-134), or the duel between Castor and Lynceus and the epilogue (137-211). Sens (1994) shows the multiplicity of intertextuality crafted by Theocritus in the prologue. This serves as a signpost to the reader of the varieties of composition to come; it is in a sense an advertisement of the literary eclecticism of the poem, a warning

that models and their renovation are the order of the day. As for the duel, “scribbled ... out of the *Iliad*”, it has received more sympathetic and more sensitive treatments since. In particular Hutchinson (1988: 162–7) has analyzed the balance and antithesis between the two fights, and shows how effectively Theocritus incorporates and reworks the Homeric and Apollonian duels into his poem. I would only disagree with Hutchinson in his conclusions, preferring to follow the view of Effe (1978), who sees Theocritus subverting the mythical tradition. Surely much of the point of the second duel is to show that in his savagery Castor is just as extreme as Amycus; heroism itself is denigrated. Gow’s understated epigram (1950: 384) still commands assent: “it is extremely hard to see why T. should choose this story to recommend Castor.” Hutchinson’s study is well complemented by that of Sens (1992), who explores in particular the subtleties of Theocritus’ use of the Homeric text.

I would like to investigate the way a reading of the two encounters (and the poem in general) may follow from some lines of the poem that have attracted less attention than others. I refer to the narrative from 27–53, and the stichomythic exchange between Polydeuces and Amycus (54–74), and I will argue that both of these sections have internal, Theocritean intertextual connections that serve to assimilate the hymn to the Dioscuri to a non-hymnic, even ‘bucolic’ mode. In the process, then, what was a pair of epic contests is itself converted to a grotesque form of bucolic contest, dealing not in words but rather in blows and death, but recognizable nevertheless and recognizable in pan because of the expectations created by those earlier sections.

First the stichomythy. The Dioscuri, in the land of the Bebryces, come upon Amycus, and Polydeuces does the talking:



## ΠΟΛΥΔΕΥΚΗΣ

χαίρε, ξεῖν', ὅτις ἐσσί. τίνες βροτοί, ὧν ὅδε χῶρος;

## ΑΜΥΚΟΣ

χαίρω πῶς, ὅτε τ' ἄνδρας ὀρῶ τοὺς μὴ πρὶν ὅπωπα;

ΠΟ. θάρσει· μήτ' ἀδίκους μήτ' ἐξ ἀδίκων φάθι λεύσσειν.

ΑΜ. θαρσέω, κούκ ἐκ σεῦ με διδάσκεσθαι τόδ' ἔοικεν.

ΠΟ. ἄγριος εἶ, πρὸς πάντα παλίγκοτος ἡδ' ὑπερόπτης;

ΑΜ. τοιόσδ' οἶον ὀρᾶς· τῆς σῆς γε μὲν οὐκ ἐπιβαίνω.

ΠΟ. ἔλθοις, καὶ ξενίων κε τυχὼν πάλιν οἴκαδ' ἰκάνοις.

ΑΜ. μήτε σύ με ξείνιζε, τά τ' ἐξ ἐμεῦ οὐκ ἐν ἐτοίμῳ.

ΠΟ. δαιμόνι', οὐδ' ἂν τοῦδε πιεῖν ὕδατος σύ γε δοίης;

ΑΜ. γνώσεαι, εἴ σευ δίψος ἀνειμένα χεῖλεα τέρσει.

ΠΟ. ἄργυρος ἢ τίς ὁ μίσθος - ἐρεῖς; - ᾧ κέν σε πίθοιμεν;

ΑΜ. εἷς ἐνὶ χεῖρας ἄειρον ἐναντίος ἀνδρὶ καταστάς.

ΠΟ. πύγμαχος ἢ καὶ ποσσὶ θένων σκέλος ἀντιπαλαίω;<sup>18</sup>

ΑΜ. πῦξ διατεινόμενος σφετέρης μὴ φείδω τέχνης.

ΠΟ. τίς γάρ, ὅτῳ χεῖρας καὶ ἐμούς συνερείσω ἱμάντας;

ΑΜ. ἐγγὺς ὀρᾶς· οὐ γύννις ἐὼν κεκλήσεθ' ὁ πύκτης.

ΠΟ. ἢ καὶ ἄεθλον ἐτοῖμον ἐφ' ᾧ δηρισόμεθ' ἄμφω;

ΑΜ. σὸς μὲν ἐγώ, σὺ δ' ἐμὸς κεκλήσεαι, αἶ κε κρατήσω.

ΠΟ. ὀρνίθων φοινικολόφων τοιοῖδε κυδοιμοί.

ΑΜ. εἴτ' οὖν ὀρνίθεσσιν ἐοικότες εἴτε λέουσι

γινόμεθ', οὐκ ἄλλῳ κε μαχεσσαίμεσθ' ἐπ' ἀέθλῳ.

(22.54-74)

The passage has not received much attention, perhaps because critics have hurried on to focus on the 'problems' in the later parts of the poem. Gow (on 55-74) saw how unusual the lines were: "The ensuing dialogue in stichomythia is without parallel elsewhere in epic narrative. At Opp. *Cyn.* 1.20ff. there is an absurd dialogue in distichs between Oppian and Artemis which possibly suggests that dialogue interruptions of the kind were less rare than now appears". The exchange gets very brief treatment in the standard work on stichomythy: "In the twenty-second, the *Hymn to the Dioscoridae*, we find a more natural and so more spirited quality in the dialogue between Polydeuces and Amycus" (Hancock: 1917: 3) Hutchinson observes that the poem



“exhibits stichomythia of the most saliently tragic type (54 ff.). Not only is each utterance kept strictly to one line, but the whole conduct of the dialogue is very close to Euripides in particular”.<sup>19</sup>

When we think of stichomythy, we tend to think of agonistic contexts, and most readily, as do Hutchinson and others, of tragedy, and of Euripidean tragedy in particular. We could also think of comedy. But stichomythy is clearly a very mobile form which is not tied in origin or potential manifestation to any genre, and there seems little point, *prima facie*, in claiming that Euripides or any other tragedian is in Theocritus’ mind as he composed these lines, or that the critical response would be one that would look primarily to tragedy. Surely it makes more sense to turn to a closer ‘source’, namely Theocritean bucolic. Stichomythia may be ‘unparalleled in epic narrative’, but there are parallels closer to home than a Syrian writing under Caracalla and going by the name ‘Oppian’. Our need for the maintenance of generic compartments (a phenomenon demonstrably alien to Theocritus) has perhaps prevented us from looking away from hymn, narrative and tragedy-from looking *to* the ‘bucolics’.

*Idylls* 4, 5 and 8 (this latter perhaps not of Theocritus) all contain amoebean and to some degree agonistic passages. Only 4 approaches 22 in the sense of having true stichomythy, with alternation each line:

ΒΑΤΤΟΣ

Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Κορύδων, τίνοσ αἱ βόες; ἦ ῥα Φιλώνδα;

ΚΟΡΥΔΩΝ

οὐκ, ἀλλ' Αἶγωνος· βόσκειν δέ μοι αὐτὰς ἔδωκεν.

ΒΑ. ἦ πὰ ψε κρύβδαν τὰ ποθέσπερα πάσας ἀμέλγες;

ΚΟ. ἀλλ' ὁ γέρων ὑφίητι τὰ μοσχία κῆμὲ φυλάσσει.

ΒΑ. αὐτὸς δ' ἐς τίν' ἄφαντος ὁ βουκόλος ὥχετο χώραν;

ΚΟ. οὐκ ἄκουσας; ἄγων νιν ἐπ' Ἀλφεὸν ὥχετο Μίλων.

ΒΑ. καὶ πόκα τῆνος ἔλαιον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀπώπει;

ΚΟ. φαντί νιν Ἡρακλῆι βίην καὶ κάρτος ἐρίσδειν.

ΒΑ. κῆμ' ἔφαθ' ἅ μάτηρ Πολυδεύκεος ἦμεν ἀμείνω.

ΚΟ. κῶχετ' ἔχων σκαπάναν τε καὶ εἵκατι τουτόθε μῆλα.

ΒΑ. πείσαι κα Μίλων καὶ τῶς λύκος αὐτίκα λυσσῆν.

ΚΟ. ταὶ δαμάλαι δ' αὐτὸν μυκώμεναι αἶδε ποθεῦντι.

ΒΑ. δεῖλαιαί γ' αὐταὶ τὸν βουκόλον ὥς κακὸν εὔρον.

ΚΟ. ἦ μὰν δεῖλαιαί γε, καὶ οὐκέτι λῶντι νέμεσθαι.

(4.1-14)

Battus then delivers two lines, Corydon responds with three, and so on. When we look at this opening next to Polydeuces' discussion with Amycus, various parallels emerge: for instance Battus begins with a question (τίνοσ αἱ βόες;) as did Polydeuces (τίνες βροτοί, ὦν ὁδε χῆρος). What is striking is that the exchange between Battus and Corydon concerns the absence of Aegon, a cowherd who is also a boxer! And a boxer who has gone off with one 'Milo' to the Olympic games. Gow (1950: *ad loc*) denies that this Milo can be the famous sixth-century boxer from Croton (almost surely the scene of the poem), but it seems to me we have left any real world and have entered into one where time, myth and history are blurred into a scene which is clearly related not only to a special type of fiction through Milon, but also to the only other strict stichomythv in Theocritus, the pre-fight exchange between Polydeuces and Amycus in Theoc. 22.

The connection between the two poems is confirmed by the exchange at 4.11, when Battus, like Polydeuces initiator of the stichomythy in 22, responds to Corydon's claim that Aegon is the equal of Heracles with a certain sarcasm:

ΒΑ. κῆμ' ἔφαθ' ἅ μάτηρ Πολυδεύκεος μεν ἀμείνω.

Battus: 'Yes and my mother used to say I was better than Polydeuces.' (4.9)

Through this internal intertextuality, we see an intrusion of myth into the bucolic world, a world which conversely we take back with us when we read 22, and which problematizes its status as a hymn, and its status as something distinct from the bucolics.<sup>20</sup> What is curious here is that Theocritus' only reference to Polydeuces outside Theoc. 22, occurring in the only other passage in his corpus in strict stichomythy, seems to have escaped critical notice-presumably because 4 is a 'pastoral', 22 a 'hymn'. Such is the power of generic taxonomies to close off enquiry across the lines drawn by those taxonomies. D. Halperin (1983: 132), has claimed of 22: "To be sure, the poem contains stichomythy, dramatic monologues, and other features traditionally foreign to the hymnic form, but Theocritus' fondness for contaminating poetic conventions, in itself a common characteristic of Alexandrian poetry in his day, may well be judged to overrule formal objections to its inclusion in the category of hymns." It seems to me rather that if 'contamination' is pervasive enough, the generic identity of the model becomes completely lost. The bucolic world is also built into the encounter at 22.27-53, the narration immediately preceding the stichomythy which we have been discussing. Dover (1971: lvii) points to its status as a *locus amoenus*, and even hints at its associations with bucolic, but in the end he backs off and is unable to carry his observations through to their logical conclusion: "Description of idealised rural scenes, appropriate enough in bucolic, intrudes also into the heroic poems, e.g. at ... XXII.37ff.—where, however, it is possible also to discern the influence of much earlier models, e.g. the description of Kalypso's dwelling in *Od.* v.63ff." Those earlier models are also models for the bucolic *locus amoenus*, of course, but let us look at the description in question.

In this connection it may be useful to look to Apollonius' version of the encounter between Amycus and Polydeuces which is, after all, part of an undeniably narrative account. I assume

here that the version of Apollonius is prior to that of Theocritus.<sup>21</sup> Apollonius has the Argonauts make landfall at the end of A.R. 1, and at the beginning of the second book he simply relates the arrogance of Amycus and then proceeds to have him challenge the Argonauts. Polydeuces responds and the preparations for the fight ensue. Theocritus' version, original and clearly of his own devising, is very different. At 22.27, the hymnic prologue completed, the poem virtually begins anew, and in the style of epyllion:

ἡ μὲν ἄρα προφυγοῦσα πέτρας εἰς ἔν ξυνιούσας  
 Ἄργῳ καὶ νιφόεντος ἀταρτηρὸν στόμα Πόντου,  
 Βέβρυκας εἰσαφίκανε θεῶν φίλα τέκνα φέρουσα.

ἄρα connects to what precedes, but otherwise the narrative very much resembles the beginning of other epyllia: (Cat. 64.1) *Peliaco quondam prognatae vertice pinus..*,<sup>22</sup>

Castor and Polydeuces disembark and make their way inland, only to find themselves in the midst of a *locus amoenus* to rival the most idyllic in Theocritean (or other) pastoral:

εὖρον δ' ἀέναον κρήνην ὑπὸ λισσάδι πέτρῃ  
 ὕδατι πεπληθυῖαν ἀκηράτῳ· αἱ δ' ὑπένερθε  
 λάλλαι κρυστάλλῳ ἢ δ' ἀργύρῳ ἰνδάλλοντο  
 ἐκ βυθοῦ· ὑψηλαὶ δὲ πεφύκεσαν ἀγχόθι πεῦκαι  
 λεῦκαι τε πλάτανοί τε καὶ ἀκρόκομοι κυπάρισσοι  
 ἄνθεά τ' εὐώδη, λασίαις φίλα ἔργα μελίσσαις,  
 ὅσ' ἔαρος λήγοντος ἐπιβρύει ἄν λειμῶνας. (22.37–43)

The spring at least is not original to Theocritus,<sup>23</sup> but it, and scenery of any sort, are absent from Apollonius' version. The bucolic tone, before the narrative has given any sense of what is to come, is unmistakable. Next we encounter the terrible inhabitant of the place: 44 ἐνθα δ' ἀνὴρ ὑπέροπλος ἐνήμενος ἐνδιάσκει. He is nowhere named (he dodges questions as to his identity, and will simply call himself the 'Boxer' at 69), which further has the effect of taking him out of mythic time, and he is

described with lavish, ecphrastic care: crushed ears, huge chest and broad back, muscles like boulders shaped by winter torrents. The description refers to its own artifice as he is compared to a sculpted figure: 47 σφυρήλατος οἷα κολοσσός.<sup>24</sup> His dress is described too, in ways that might lead us to misidentify him: a lion-skin about his neck, fastened by the paws.

I would like to turn to the preamble of another encounter, which like that in Theoc. 22 also results in a contest, though a more agreeable one. At the beginning of the *Thalysia* (7) the narrator and two friends are going from town to the harvest-festival. We soon get a brief *locus amoenus*, tied to the aetiology of a Coan spring:

... Χάλκωνος, Βούριναν ὅς ἐκ ποδὸς ἄννε κράναν  
εὖ ἐνερεισάμενος πέτρα γόνυ· ταὶ δὲ παρ' αὐτάν  
αἴγειραι πελέαι τε εὐσκιον ἄλσος ὕφαινον  
χλωροῖσιν πετάλοισι κατηρεφές κομόωσαι (7.6-9)

Later in the poem, this *locus amoenus* will come to life as the group arrives at the spring; and it will receive more elaborate treatment (135-47), in which bees also figure, as occurred in the version in 22.<sup>25</sup>

As in 22 there is an encounter in 7, in this case with a named figure, though he is none the less mysterious for being named. Lycidas, recognizably a goatherd, gets a description to parallel that of Amycus: not a lion-skin, but appropriately a goat-skin around his shoulders, an old tunic and broad belt, and he holds a wild olive club. As in 22, there follows an exchange, leading into a contest, the two songs that constitute the center of the *Thalysia*. By resisiting the urge to classify into hymn, bucolic, and so on, we avoid the creation of barriers within the Theocritean corpus, and can see the contest of Theoc. 7 resonating in that of Theoc. 22, as well as in those of the 'bucolics'.<sup>26</sup>

I would suggest, then, that *Idyll* 7 mediates between on the one hand the simply bucolic poems (to which it is clearly connected) such as 4, 5, and 6, and on the other a poem such as 22, whose epic and hymnic elements have been in a variety of ways assimilated to the bucolic tradition. After we have examined these sequences of 22, the intertextual prelude, the

assimilation to bucolic scene-setting and amoebean, the transformation of Homeric contests, all that is left of Theoc. 22 are the skeletal remains of a formal hymn (23-6, 135-6, 212-23), and even these lines are in a sense metapoetic in that they draw attention to the artifact as much as they sustain any performative illusion. It is, as it was with *Idyll* 24, easy to see the source of Theocritus' poetics in much of this, and it is also relatively easy to trace the changes to which Theocritus subjects this traditional material. What is less straightforward is how we define the genre of the product, and whether we should even attempt to do so.

This generic indeterminacy is bequeathed by the Hellenistic poets (and particularly by Theocritus, I would argue) to the Roman poets, and that is where I would briefly turn for confirmation of the process we have identified in Theocritus, and for further observation of the process. Again, the guiding principle is that transformation and genesis occurs through intertextual manipulation of the model(s). Once genre, in its function as a performance- or occasion-based form has been dismantled, in a sense it then becomes the ideal model for a new, similarly intertextually oriented form.

### **3 Virgilian Intertextuality**

Now for a brief look at Virgil's use of intertextuality as a means of genre-building or genre-manipulation, and specifically in relation to some of the themes and issues identified in Theocritus. In his sensitive study of the Virgil's use of Theocritus to construct his book of *Eclogues*, Paul Alpers (1990: 28) has noted: "The genius of the *Eclogues* was very largely a matter of returning to, realizing, and transforming Theocritean interests and practices." Among other examples he refers to the second *Eclogue* and to the ways in which the lament of Polyphemus is transformed into that of the shepherd Corydon. In the process the genre itself becomes more consistently pastoral. Although one might differ from Alpers in his view that the whole book becomes consistently pastoral, the transformation that he sees in the second *Eclogue* is clear and traceable.

Alpers is not interested so much in the ways Theocritus himself had transformed the Homeric Cyclops into the erotic Polyphemus, thereby starting the process that is in a sense simply repeated by Virgil. Like the second *Eclogue*, Theoc. 11 constandy refers to its own relationship to its model, most obviously in the humorous irony implicit in the Cyclops' stating that Galatea may burn his soul, or his one eye if she wish (52-3), or when he refers to the possibility that 'some stranger' may come to his island (61), or when he claims that on land he is a somebody (τις φαίνομαι ἤμεν)—not an οὔτις, that is!

When Virgil turned Polyphemus into Corydon he simply continued the rewriting of his tradition that Theocritus had done, although his own intenextuality became more complex, the models controlled and transformed, more numerous. So *Ecl.* 2.25-7 draws from Theoc. 6.34-8 (also Polyphemus), while Corydon's mannered couplet at *Ecl.* 2.63-4 derives from a speech by the reaper Bucaeus at Theoc. 10.30-1. Alpers (1990: 29) describes the process as follows: Virgil does "not simply turn Polyphemus into a normal human shepherd on his own terms: he has done so by coordinating, making internally consistent and continuous, Theocritus' depiction of lovelorn 'clowns', to use the Elizabethan term". I would agree with this, but would put it in a slightly different way: by invoking the words of a Theocritean reaper into a poem which transforms the (already bucolicized) Polyphemus into the shepherd Corydon (who is also acquainted with reapers; 2.10 *messoribus*), Virgil adverts to the manner of his composition and to the very transformation that he is carrying out.

Virgil continued to transform genre through intenextuality in the *Georgics* and *Aeneid*, and we may look to one specific instance, related to the preceding discussion. His method of incorporating the Cyclops into his epic involves narrative intricacy: Aeneas, relating the odyssey of the Trojans, repons the narrative of Achaemenides the shipwrecked Greek, who, while constantly referring to the text of *Od.* 9, relates the horror to the Trojans. In the process I believe Virgil implicates and refers to the Theocritean Polyphemus, through his camouflage as the Virgilian

Corydon.<sup>27</sup> Achaemenides refers to the infestation of the land with pastoral Cyclopes:

nam qualis quantusque cavo Polyphemus in antro  
lanigeras claudit pecudes atque ubera pressat,  
centum alii curva haec habitant ad litora vulgo  
infandi Cyclopes et altis montibus errant.

(Verg. A. 3.641–4) This of course has good Homeric pedigree,<sup>28</sup> but Virgil has also borrowed his own bucolic language to express the idea: at *Ecl.* 3.99 we find *frustra pressabimus ubera palmis*, and more importantly while in *Aen.* 3 we have 100 Cyclopes wandering in the high mountains, Corydon had boasted of his 1000 sheep which wander in the mountains of Sicily (where those mountains of *Aen.* 3 will be found): *Ecl.* 2.21 *mille meae*

*Siculis errant in montibus agnae*,<sup>29</sup>

A few moments later the blind Polyphemus comes into sight, as Aeneas takes over the narrative from Achaemenides. He appears as *pastorem Polyphemum* (657), just as the second *Eclogue* opened with the words *Formosum pastor Corydon ardebat Alexin*. A Cyclops *pastor* is cast in terms of another human pastor, himself the literary son of an earlier (Theocritean) Cyclops, whom he resembles only through intenextuality. Virgil's monstrous line at *Aen.* 3.658, with its three elisions, is justly famous:

monstrum horrendum, *informe*, ingens, cui lumen ademptum.

Here is the epic reality, a reality which strips away Corydon's pitiable self-deception (rooted in that of the Theocritean Polyphemus) about his own appeal to *formosus Alexis*:

nec sum adeo *informis*: nuper me in litore vidi,  
cum placidum ventis staret mare.

(Verg. *Ecl.* 2.25–6) Aeneas, dispassionate observer of Polyphemus, corrects Corydon's delusion, a delusion shared, as we noted, by the Theocritean Polyphemus at Theoc. 6.34–8, a figure who can never be disentangled from Corydon from *Ecl.* 2, and who accordingly comes into play in any reflection on the Polyphemus of *Aen.* 3. The reader who makes these connections will bring to the *Aeneid* questions about its 'genre' not dissimilar



to those brought to the 'hymns' of Theocritus. A reader who does not accept these connections presumably resists because the genre of pastoral is distinct from the genre of epic, even when written by the same poet, employing the same language, referring to the same model(s)!

## 4 Propertian Intertextuality

Propertius 2.34, antecedent to Ovid's highly self-conscious *Tristia* 2 and a remarkably original work, closes out a book of elegy which (unlike the metaphorically programmatic *Monobiblos*) constantly refers to its own artifice, and to its place in its tradition. One of its most prominent sequences is a survey of the poetic career of Virgil. Propertius refers to Virgil's whole career, still of course under way, and in doing so he seems to provide structural information: the 12 books of the *Aeneid* receive six lines (61-6; I am assuming the length of the epic was known in the mid-twenties, to which Prop. 2 is dated), which is in proportion to the two lines devoted to the four books of the *Georgics* (77-8), but the ten *Eclogues*, Virgil's 'elegiac' work, receive ten lines (67-76)—one line per poem:

*Aen.*: Actia Vergilium custodis litora Phoebi  
Caesaris et fonis dicere posse ratis,  
qui nunc Aeneae Troiani suscitāt arma  
iactaque Lauinis moenia litoribus.  
cedite Romani scriptores, cedite Grai!  
nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade.

(61-6; 6 lines for 12 books)

*Ecl.*: tu canis umbrosi subter pineta Galaesi  
Thvrsin et attritis Daphnin harundinibus,  
utque decem possint corrumpere mala puellas  
missus et impressis haedus ab uberibus,  
felix, qui uilis pomis mercaris amores!  
huic licet ingratae Tityrus ipse canat,  
felix intactum Corydon qui temptat Alexin

agricolae domini carpere delicias!  
quamuis ille sua lassus requiescat auena,  
laudatur facilis inter Hamadryadas.

(67-76; 10 lines for 10 poems)

*Geo.*: tu canis Ascraei ueteris praecepta poetae,  
quo seges in campo, quo uiret uua iugo.

(77-8; 2 lines for 4 books)

For Propertius, one of the *Eclogues*, Virgil's chief exploration of the amatory dilemma, will be worth as much as two books of the *Georgics* or the *Aeneid*. A generally appreciative coda follows, which has the *Eclogues* chiefly in mind as it makes the transition to more conventional love poets who form the climax of the poem:

tale facis carmen docta testudine quale  
Cynthius impositis temperat articulis,  
non tamen haec ulli uenient ingrata legenti,  
siue in amore rudis siue peritus erit,  
nec minor hic animis, ut sit minor ore, canorus  
anseris indocto carmine cessit olor.

(79-84)

Propertius is treating Virgil as an author of interest to amatory readers, and for this his focus is naturally on the *Eclogues*, which he converts and appropriates, again through intertextuality, to his own amatory tradition. It rather looks as if Propertius is in a sense giving us a mini-*Eclogue* book—one line for each of Virgil's poem, with ordered reference to many of the individual *Eclogues*:

1 tu canis umbrosi subter pineta Galaesi (2.34.67)

~

Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi (*Ecl.* 1.1-2)  
siluestrem tenui Musam meditaris auena.

2 Thvrsin et attritis Daphnin harundinibus, ~ (2.34.68)

(*Ecl.*

	nec te paeniteat calamo trivisse labellum <sup>30</sup>	2.34)
3	utque decem possint corrumpere mala puellas ~ quod potui, puero siluestri ex arbore lecta aurea mala decem misi; cras altera mittam.	(2.34.69) ( <i>Ecl</i> 3.70-1)
4	missus et impressis haedus ab uberibus. ~ ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae ubera.	(2.34.70)  ( <i>Ecl</i> 4.21-2)
5	felix, qui uilis pomis mercaris amores! ~ sis bonus o felixque tuis!	(2.34.71)  ( <i>Ecl</i> 5.65)
6	huic licet ingratae Tityrus ipse canat. ~ cum canerem reges et proelia, Cynthus aurem uellit et admonuit: "pastorem, Tityre, pinguis pascere oportet ouis, deductum dicere carmen.	(2.34.72)  ( <i>Ecl</i> 6.3- 5)
7	felix intactum Corydon qui temptat Alexin ~ ex illo Corydon Corydon est tempore nobis. <sup>31</sup>	(2.34.73) ( <i>Ecl</i> 7. 70)
8	agricolae domini carpere delicias!	(2.34.74)
9	quamuis ille sua lassus requiescat auena, ~ omnia fert aetas, animum quoque, saepe ego longos cantando puerum memini me condere soles, nunc oblita mihi tot carmina, uox quoque Moerim iam fugit ipsa.	(2.34.75) ( <i>Ecl</i> 9.51-4)
10	laudatur facilis inter Hamadryadas. ~ iam neque Hamadryades rursus nec carmina nobis ipsa placent.	(2.3.476)  ( <i>Ecl</i> . 10.62-3)

There is not an absolute, line-by-line correspondence, and some of the preceding parallels are more slight than others, but there is sufficient parallelism to suggest that Propertius' ten lines represent a conscious effort at rewriting, in miniature, the book of *Eclogues*. And what matters on the larger level of genre is that

the erotic potential of the *Eclogues* has, in Propertius' ten-line version, become the sole preoccupation: elegy rewrites pastoral (perhaps as that very pastoral had itself once rewritten Gallan elegy)<sup>32</sup> and in the process creates and recreates its genre-which, after all, is how idylls, eclogues and elegies came to be.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Blanchot, in Todorov (1976-7: 159).

<sup>2</sup> For varieties of approaches of the types indicated, all productive in various ways, see (with further bibliography) Fantuzzi (1980: 433-50).

<sup>3</sup> It is a given throughout that whatever the functional verisimilitude of forms in Hellenistic poetry, performance does not generate those forms.

<sup>4</sup> See Rosenmeyer (1985: 74-84). This article seems to be little known by classicists, for an obvious, if not good, reason; interest in Kroll's important article (1924: 202-24), as in Rossi's more theoretical scheme (1971: 69-94), has never waned, but in my view needs to be modified in the light of Rosenmeyer's article.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gutzwiller (1991: 11).

- <sup>6</sup> For which she looks to Fowler (1982: 111–8)—though he does not deal in the kinds of subgenres which she proposes.
- <sup>7</sup> For the references, see Gow (1950: *ad loc.*).
- <sup>8</sup> While I do not wish to imply that the Pindaric model is free from generic complexity (and we often monumentalize the model in studying the alluding poet), it does seem conventional in its portrayal of the heroism of Heracles.
- <sup>9</sup> Gow, who notes (1950: *ad* 4) that the shield seems to be an invention of Theocritus, hypothesizes a connection to the Ptolemies to whom there *may* be an allusion in line 11 (shields appear on some Ptolemaic coinage); this seems to me fanciful, and it ignores the shield's perfectly satisfying function in the narrative.
- <sup>10</sup> See Gow (1950: *ad loc.*), for the observations that ψυχά as a term of endearment occurs here first, while εὔσοα ('safe and sound') is not to be found elsewhere.
- <sup>11</sup> See Dover (1971: xlviii–xl).
- <sup>12</sup> The scream provides logic to the story; in Pindar the women are struck by mysterious pangs, and Theocritus' making Iphicles scream (Heracles cannot do so, of course) may be seen as a correction of Pindar's implausibility.
- <sup>13</sup> Ross (1975: 21–2, 29 n.2); Thomas (1979: 195–206).
- <sup>14</sup> See also Dover (1971: *ad loc.*), who assumes some sort of occasion at which the poem was performed.
- <sup>15</sup> I have been content to use the term 'idyll' for Theocritus' poems, even though there is uncertainty about the status of the word. Gow (1950: lxi–lxii) observes that the Greek εἰδύλλιον is confined to the scholia to Theocritus, and otherwise in antiquity occurs in Latin at Plin. *Epist.* 4.14, *proinde sive epigrammata sive idyllia sive eclogas sive, ut multi, poematia seu quod aliud vocare malueris, licebit voces*. The implication is that it (and the others with which it appears) is a term of convenience, and lacking in generic (and certainly 'bucolic') specificity—even arbitrarily applied. Gow does not give Pliny's immediately preceding and following words, which make it clear that the author of the poems in question is willing to define them only by metrical form: *unum illud praedicendum videtur, cogitare me has nugas meas inscribere 'hendecasyllabosqui titulus sola metri lege constringitur*. [Gow's citation] *igito tantum hendecasyllabos praesto*. This seems to me a mon-, valuable perspective on the issue of genre-definition than one would think from the sparse attention it has received. What did Theocritus call his poems? Would he, like Pliny, have opted for the metrical or formal default, *epos*? Or perhaps Wilamowitz was right in thinking he gave them more or less the individual titles with which they have generally come down to us (see Gow lxi–lxxi for problems), or again perhaps the word εἰδύλλια was original. If so, what we have seen of Theoc. 24's intertextual relationship with *N.* 1 will be a factor when we read the view of Stephanus (Gow 1950: lxxi) "εἶδη *autem* Pindari sunt qui dicta putent tanquam diversa odorum, sic etiam Εἰδύλλια Theocriti."
- <sup>16</sup> See most recently, with bibliography (particularly the work of F.T. Griffiths), Sens (1994).
- <sup>17</sup> Cf. Gow (1942: 18). It is a curious paradox that Gow, who did so much for the study of Theocritus, so often seems critically, or perhaps temperamentally, incompatible with his author.
- <sup>18</sup> The text of this line is that which I suggest in Thomas (1993), though the conjecture is by no means sure. The transmitted text (δμματα δ' ορθά) gives no sense.
- <sup>19</sup> Hutchinson (1988: 164 and n.34), where he claims' with reference to Kroll and Rossi, "it seems justified to talk here of 'contamination of genres.'"
- <sup>20</sup> Although not strictly in stichomythy, *Idyll* 5 further suggests a pastoral resonance to the exchange in 22. This exchange, between Comatas and Lacon, is more

threatening and agonistic than the one in 4, although there is less in the way of dictional or other situational parallelism; Lacon's τάν σαυτῶ πατέων εχε τάς δρύας does, however, recall in tone and diction Amycus' words at 59 τῆς σῆς γε μέν οὐκ επιβαίνω.

[21](#) So Gow (1950: *ad loc.*). On counter-views particularly that of Köhnken (1965: 118–21: Theocritus is more 'traditional' and therefore should have priority in 22 and in 13), see Moulton (1973: 41–7, cf. 44 n. 12). See also Sens, "Appendix" to his article in this volume (201–2).

[22](#) Cf. Sens "Appendix" in this volume (201–2) for similarities at Theoc. 13.16, 21, and, for that matter, the beginning of Apollonius' *Argonautica*.

[23](#) See Gow (1950: *ad* 22.37) for representations of the spring in art.

[24](#) Cf. Cat. 64.61 where the embroidered Ariadne comes to life in Catullus' description, only to go back, in an analogy, to a statue: *saxea ut effigies bacchantis*.

[25](#) Cf. Tränkle (1963: 505), for connecting the description at 22.32–3 with that at 5.33–4 and 7.132–4.

[26](#) Gutzwiller's chapter on "Contest and Conflict" makes some interesting observations on Theoc. 4 and 5, but at the same time suffers because of her strict definition of pastoral (the index refers to no *Idyll* subsequent to 16); the contests of 7 and 22 would have fit well into her analysis, but are excluded for reasons that are ultimately artificial.

[27](#) I hope we have come some distance in our appreciation of the multiple focuses sustained in Virgilian intertextuality since 1972 when Glenn, mainly responding to Floratos (1959), tried to forbid us from seeing any depiction but that of the *Odyssey* behind Virgil's description (Glenn 1972). We now think better of Hellenistic poetry, and are prepared to allow Virgil to have thought well of it Glenn's article, which has many astute observations, mainly focuses on *Aen.* 3.660–1 (*lanigeræ comitantur oves; ea sola voluptas! solamenque mali [de collo fistula pendet]*), and on the exceedingly difficult issue of the status of the supplement to 661 (which would find a model nowhere in Homer, but clearly in Theoc. 11.38 συρίσδεν δ' ὡς οὔτις ἐπίσταμαι ὦδε Κυκλώπων, and in other representations). Glenn is probably right to follow most editors in excluding the supplement (Geymonat prints it in square brackets), on grounds of MS support and other textual indications, and because of the strong parallel with *Aen.* 10.858–60 (on which see Harrison's good note *ad loc.*, and at 10.858–66), which looks back, along with *Aen.* 3.660–1, to Horn. *Od.* 9.447–60, Odysseus' speech to his favorite ram. The supplement must, however, have been made by a reader of some empathy, since it would Alexandrianize the couplet in a way quite familiar from elsewhere in Virgil; one is even tempted to suggest DServ.'s 'resolution' of the problem at *Geo.* 4.141: "*ipsius manu duplex fuit scriptura*". And in any case, I find it difficult to exclude from Virgil's *solamenque mali* the (ποττόν ἔρωτα) φάρμακον that so clearly sets the tone of Theoc. 11. My own theory for thinking there is so little that can be *demonstrated* to look to Theocritus in Virgil's lines is that Virgil had Corydon in a sense act as intermediary and highlight the complexity of intertextuality. This will not please those for whom the *Aeneid* belongs simply to the ὕψος! On the issue, cf. also Cesareo (1929: 173–215), absent from Glenn's otherwise full bibliography. Cf. also *EV* sv. "Polifemo."

[28](#) Cf. *Od.* 9.183–9, 237–9, although these are contradicted by 122 (οὐτ' ἄρα ποίμνησιν κατὰίσχεται [νῆσος])).

[29](#) This son of intertextuality may best be seen as a form of what I have called 'window' reference; cf. Thomas (1986: 188–9).

[30](#) For this parallel, see Shackleton Bailey (1952-3: 16 n.2), with a reference to the generally high number of Virgilian reminiscences in these lines.

[31](#) The closer parallel is in fact to *Eel.* 2.1 (*formosum pastor Corydon ardebat Alexin*) and Alessandro Barchiesi is probably right in suggesting to me that here in the middle of his *Eclogues*, within the cerutude of the frame's referring to *Eclogues* 1 and 10, the references are less strictly ordered, as in the following line, where there seems to be no precise Virgilian parallel.

[32](#) Cf. Ross (1975).



# SIMONIDES AND HORACE ON THE DEATH OF ACHILLES

ALESSANDRO BARCHIESI

	παῖ[σέ] σ. [ . . . σὺ δ' ἥριπες, ὥς ὅτε πεύκην	<i>POxy 2327, fr. 5</i>
	ἢ πίτυν ἐν βήσ[σαις οὔρεος οἰοπόλου	
	ύλοτόμοι τάμ[νωσι	
	πολλὸν δ' † ἥρῳσ[	end of column
5	ἢ μέγα πένθ]ος λαὸν [ἐπέλλαβε· πολλὰ δ' ἐτίμων,	beginning of
	καὶ μετὰ Πατρ]όκλου σ' ἄ[γγεῖ <del>κούσαν</del> ἐνί.	column <i>POxy</i>
	οὐ δὴ τίς σ' ἐδ]άμασσεν ἐφ[ημέριος βροτὸς αὐτός,	2327, fr. 6 +
	ἀλλ' ὑπ' Ἀπόλλ]ωνος χειρὶ [τυπεῖς ἐδάμης.	3965, fr. 1
	Παλλὰς δ' ἐγγύ]ς ἐοῦσα πε[ρικλεῖς ἄ]στ[υ καθεῖλεν,	
10	σὺν δ' Ἡρῇ, Πῆ]ριάμου παισὶ χ[αλεπτ]όμ[εναι	
	εἵνεκ' Ἀλεξά]νδροιο κακόφρ[ονο]ς, ὥς τὸν [ἀλιτρόν	
	ἀλλὰ χρόνω]ιθείης ἄρμα καθεῖλε δίκ[ης.	

I reproduce the text of Simonides fr. 11.1-12 as given by West 1993a.6, which corresponds to W<sup>2</sup> with the restorations proposed *exempli gratia* in his apparatus. In his initial publication, Parsons 1992a.28 recorded West's proposal to locate *POxy* 2327, fr. 5 immediately before 2327, fr. 6, which in turn overlaps with *POxy* 3965, fr. 1; these three fragments laid out with two others form Simon, fr. 11 W<sup>2</sup>. Parsons 1992a observes (i) that 2327, fr. 5 clearly speaks of the death of a hero, fr. 6 of the death of someone who dies at the hand of Apollo; (ii) that the physical evidence of the papyrus is compatible with, but does not provide absolute proof of, the relationship mentioned above between the two pieces; and (iii) that nonetheless other contexts can be imagined for fr. 5, even within the *Elegy on Plataea*, to which certainly belongs fr. 11.6-45 W<sup>2</sup>. The "heroic death" which is compared to a tree cut down by woodcutters could be that of one of the combatants in Plataea<sup>1</sup> rather than that of Achilles, as it would have to be if West's collocation for fr. 5 is accepted.

West's proposal, which provides my starting point, seems to me undeniably the best so far advanced, for two reasons: (i) fr. 5 ends one column and fr. 6 begins another;<sup>2</sup> (ii) the use of a simile which so clearly alludes to Homer (as I shall show below) presupposes strong epic coloring. If the simile

appeared in the “hymn,” or proem, to Achilles (and not in a battle narrative), the Homeric effect is very much in accord with some other allusions already observed in the same context; for example, the ways in which ὠκύμορος and ἄοίδιμος are used, as shown by Lloyd-Jones 1994.1–3. The hymn to Achilles would appear even more enriched if we could see it as a sort of hymn to Homer as well. On the other hand, I find no sign that Simonides in any fragment of the Plataea battle elegy, even when displaying epic coloring,<sup>3</sup> went so far as to employ that most Homeric of epic features, i.e., the extended simile. (See Stehle in this volume for other divergences from Homeric style.)

I would like, therefore, to point out a consequence of the consecutive collocation of *POxy* 2327, fr. 5+6, One which remains valid even if we do not accept West’s excellent restorations for vv. 1–3. That is, even if all these restorations prove to miss the mark, the following sequence can still be safely reconstructed: (i) *Someone strikes a blow*: Apollo against Achilles, to judge from 11.7–8 W<sup>2</sup>; (ii) *the warrior falls like ...* (an unspecified kind of tree?) *or like a pine cut by woodsmen in the glades. ...*

This is sufficient to make us think that this fragment, in the position assigned it by West, was the model for Horace *C.* 4.6.9–12:

*ille, mordaci velut icta ferro  
pinus aut impulsus cupressus Euro  
pmcidit late posuitque collum in  
pulvere Teucro.*

As in Simonides, the comparison describes the blow and the unforeseen fall of Achilles. And, as in Simonides, the comparison is twofold, one part being a pine tree cut down by axes. The sonorous combination *mordaci ... icta* recalls the *figura etymologica* ὕλοτόμοι ... τάμνωσι. I see no reason to think that we are dealing with a *locus communis* here. On

the one hand, the two poets apply the same image to the same moment in the Trojan cycle, and the various accounts of the death of Achilles do not seem to offer many alternative sources. And, on the other hand, the similes of the type “fall like a tree” can be divided into two categories: (i) typical deaths in Homeric battle scenes;<sup>4</sup> (ii) in later poetry, the downfalls of various strange types. Thus, Apollonius speaks in this way of the Giants, the Spartoi, and Talos; Catullus of the Minotaur; and Vergil of a boxer and, metaphorically, of the fall of an entire city.<sup>5</sup>

It is clear that both Simonides and Horace, taking their Homeric originals for granted, can quite similarly refer to the image of a hero's death in battle. This time, however, the hero is the greatest of all, not least because of his height. Note, with Kiessling-Heinze, how *procidit late ... in pulvere* alludes to *Od.* 24.39–40, where, among the shades, Achilles hears the story of his death from Agamemnon. If Horace, as I believe, is here making use of both Simonides and *Odyssey* 24, it is interesting to note that the Homeric model was already present in Simonides himself. For if it is true that Simon, fr. 11.6 W<sup>2</sup> speaks of the urn in which were united the ashes of Achilles and Patroclus (so West), it is clear that Simonides too was looking to *Odyssey* 24, which is the most detailed Homeric text on the death of Achilles. And the very fact that Simonides made a Homeric allusion reinforces Simonides' following programmatic declaration that it was Homer who had made memorable the short-lived heroes.<sup>6</sup> Horace continues and extends this intertextual linkage.

R. G. M. Nisbet (*per litt.*) adds that the use of *late* in Catullus 64.109 is also pertinent in that it seems to be echoed by Horace. Compare his *ille ... velut ... pinus ... procidit late* with *nam velut ... pinum ... illa prona cadit late* (Catull. 64.105–09). It is worth noting that Horace employs the fall of the Catullan Minotaur to recall the Homeric model

έν στροφάλιγγι κονίης | κείσο μέγας μεγαλωστί (*Od.* 24.39–40), as though the echo of the Minotaur served to introduce a divergent, less sympathetic, point of view,<sup>7</sup> whereas the Roman poet chooses to look at Achilles' death with a sense of liberation from a threat which is altogether alien to the Greek models here summarized: Homer, Simonides, and (see below) Pindar.

In both Simonides and Horace, the Homeric simile receives a new justification. At the risk of sounding too rationalistic, I would note that tradition has it that Achilles was not struck at the throat or the breast—as is usually the case with Homeric warriors who fall to the ground “like a tree”—but at the heel<sup>8</sup> or ankle. Achilles' fall is modeled on that of a tall pine, not only because of its height,<sup>9</sup> but also because his body was felled by a blow to the base, just like a tall trunk assailed almost at its root by the woodcutters.<sup>10</sup>

The context in Horace *C.* 4.6.1–20, as has been noted by the commentators, takes its direction, by and large, from Pindar *Paean* 6,<sup>11</sup> where Apollo kills Achilles, although Pindar's sober description of the fatal blow, θρασεῖ φόνω πεδάσας (v. 86), cannot have been the inspiration for Horace's simile. His description of Achilles as *filius ... Thetidis marinae* (v. 6) is usually compared to Pindar *Paean* 6.83f., κυανοπλόκοιο παῖδα πόντιας Θέτιος, but the *Elegy on Plataea* now offers us two other parallel periphrases: fr. 10.5 W<sup>2</sup>, κούρης εἰναλῆς ἀγλαόφημε πάϊ, and 11.19–20, θεᾶς ἐρικυδέος υἱέ | κούρης εἰναλίου Νηρέος.<sup>12</sup> It may be that these and other similarities<sup>13</sup> directed Horace's memory from Pindar to Simonides—both poets being important models for the Fourth Book of the *Odes*. To Simonides' function as a model in some of the lyrics of the Fourth Book—cf. 4.9.5–7, *non ... Pindaricae latent Caeaeque ... Camenae*—I shall return elsewhere;<sup>14</sup> for now let me merely point out how Simonides' *Plataea* and Horace's *C.* 4.6. have in

common (more so than Pindar) the use of myth in a patriotic context.

Horace orients his poetry towards the *Carmen Saeculare*. He thus finds himself in a situation which is not usual for him (a poet who has unexpectedly been called a *vates* in a public inscription);<sup>15</sup> nor does it have strong support from Greek precedents. The elegiac production of Simonides is important because it offers a rare precedent (apart from epic, epinician, or threnody, but in rapport with all three), of a poet who sings themes of collective importance which are based on public patronage.<sup>16</sup> Simonides exalts, in a sort of hymnic proem, the heroism of Achilles, who contributed to the Greek victory over the Trojans; he then sings, as an updated Homer, of the battle against the Persians for the survival of Greece. The panhellenic tone<sup>17</sup> anticipates Herodotus' linkage of the siege of Troy and the Persian invasion: Greece vs. Asia, and Achilles as forerunner of the fighters at Plataea.<sup>18</sup> The intervention of Apollo, the only one capable of stopping him, is recorded *ad maiorem gloriam* of the hero. Horace is about to sing of the rebirth of Troy, which Apollo had made possible<sup>19</sup> by killing Achilles, the man who would have put to the sword the entire race (Hor. C. 6.4.16–20); a victorious Achilles would have meant no Aeneas, no Rome, no Augustus (21–24). The agreement and opposition between the two contexts show how neatly Horace has extracted an image from a hymn to Achilles killed by Apollo and transferred it to a song for Apollo the killer of Achilles.<sup>20</sup>

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Barchiesi 1995; translated by David Sider, who gratefully acknowledges the assistance of John Van Sickle and the author. With kind permission of *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*.

- 1 Parsons, followed by Lloyd-Jones 1994.1, suggests Masistios or Mardonios. According to Herodotus (for what the comparison is worth), Mardonios was struck down while fighting on a white horse (9.63) and Masistios, thrown from his wounded horse, was dispatched with great difficulty by a blow to his eye, the only part of his body left uncovered by his armor (9.22).
- 2 Parsons 1992a. Barigazzi 1963.70 had already tentatively raised the possibility of placing the simile among the fragments on the battle, but, knowing only *POxy* 2327, he desisted.
- 3 Cf. West 1993a.9 (with an emphasis different from mine and in a different context): 'The initial hymn to Achilles struck an epic note ... there is even an epic simile. ... There is no change of register as we move into the main narrative.'
- 4 *Il.* 13.389-91 = 16.482-84 is the closest parallel to Simonides, and seems to be West's principal guide in his reconstruction

ἤριπε δ' ὥς ὅτε τις δρῦς ἤριπεν ἢ ἀχερωΐς  
ἢ ἐ πίτυς βλωθρή, τήν τ' οὔρεσι τέκτονες ἄνδρες  
ἐξέταμον πελέκεσσι νεήκεσι νήϊον εἶναι·

Note that the second simile describes the death of a major warrior (Sarpedon), an episode which more than superficially seems to anticipate Achilles' fate. Among other Homeric models, note *Il.* 17.53ff. for the role of the wind as a destructive agent, which anticipates Eurys in Horace.

- 5 Cf., e.g., Ap. Rhod. 1.1003ff, 3.1374ff., 4.1682ff. (where in one simile are combined the actions of the wind and of woodcutters); Catull. 64. 105ff. (see below, n. 7); Verg. A. 2.626ff., 5.448ff. The *locus classicus* for the comparisons along these lines is now Nisbet 1987.
- 6 The allusion works on so many levels that its density calls to mind the intertextuality we are accustomed to attribute to Alexandrian poetry, (i) In *Od.* 24, Agamemnon tells Achilles of his future fame (83-84, 93-94), after having recounted his death in a manner designed to complete the fame ordained by the *Iliad*. Simonides first implicitly recalls this passage in his narration, then he declares explicitly that Homer has immortalized the names of the heroes, and he continues, in his own fashion, Agamemnon's discourse on untimely death and the perpetuation of Achilles' name, (ii) If, then, as seems probable given the hymnic structure, Achilles was regularly cited in the second person, Simonides found a surprising way to recreate the grammatical situation of *Od.* 24, not otherwise reproducible, i.e., Simonides picks up from Agamemnon his second-person address to Achilles about his death and funeral (with its effects of the type "the flames consumed you ... we gathered your white bones ..."). (iii) On the other hand, this adherence to the model could also produce (in the best tradition of intertextuality) effects of deviation and innovation. For example, it seems probable that Simonides attributed the death of Achilles to Apollo alone, with a resulting modification of the Homeric tradition in which Paris is normally seen as Achilles' murderer. (See, however, Gantz 1993.625-28.)



- [7](#) Catull. 64 is pertinent also because the human victims sacrificed to the Minotaur (64.80) are later recalled at the sacrifice of Polyxena (362–70), while the image of Achilles becomes ever more disquieting. The mortal blow by Apollo is foreshadowed by his absence from the marriage which will lead to Achilles' birth (209–302).
- [8](#) Stesichorus had earlier (if one accepts the reconstruction of Gamer 1993.159), made mention of a blow to the ankle (σφυράς, *POxy* 3876, fr. 43.ii.S). In another direction, R. G. M. Nisbet has pointed out to me that *mordaci* ... *icta* is comparable to the bite of a serpent (Ov. *Trist.* 5.4.12. *ictus ab angue*; note also the use of *mordax* for arrows poisoned with snake venom, Ov. *Pont.* 3.3.106), and that the blow to the ankle is comparable to the typical bite of a serpent (Ov. *Met.* 10.10: *occidit in talum serpentis dente recepto*).
- [9](#) Which need not exclude other motivations: Herodotus 6.37 is evidence for the idiomatic phrase “destroy like a πῖτυς”= “destroy utterly,” since this tree, once cut down, is incapable of regrowth. Horace employs the reverse image of the resilience of the Romans (C. 4.4.57): *duris ut ilex tonsa* [v.l. *tunsa*] *bipennibus*, which is based on Pi. *P.* 4.263–69; cf. Lefkowitz 1991.159. We do not know what other tree Simonides mentioned, but for Horace's choice of the cypress we may imagine that the tree is appropriate for reasons either realistic (height, lack of solidity), symbolic (funerary associations), or mythological (the cypress was “invented” by the divine protagonist of the Horatian ode; cf. Ov. *Met.* 10.107: *nunc arbor, puer ante deo dilectus ab illo*).
- [10](#) In a less rationalistic vein, the duplicity of the agents mentioned in the model, the woodcutters and the wind, with their distinct traditions in epic similes, seems to suggest a hesitation on the part of the poet concerning the mysterious and inexplicable nature of the divine intervention which brought about the end of Achilles' life. I owe this observation to Richard Hunter.
- [11](#) Cf. Fraenkel 1957.400–07.
- [12](#) Cf. Rutherford in this volume on fr. 11.19 W<sup>2</sup>.
- [13](#) One may imagine that the specialists on this period are already at work on the connections between Findar and the new Simonidean fragments: e.g., see, Rutheford and esp. Mace forthcoming. One may hope for results which also involve Horace, given that the “dialogue” between Pindar and Simonides brings up poetic themes and programs which will be important for Horatian lyric; cf. C. 4.9.5–7 (quoted below).
- [14](#) For now one may simply note that C. 4.7 has been at the center of speculation about Horace as imitator of Simonides (or Semonides!). Cf. Cataudella 1927–28.229–32, Oates 1932.76–90. Further links are necessitated by the new Simonides fragments 19–29 W-; cf. Parsons 1992a.43, West 1993a. 10-H (“Lives, leaves”), and Sider in this volume. And Theocritus 16, an important model for C. 4.8 and 4.9, can now be re-evaluated (thanks to Parsons 1992b. 10–12) in terms of its allusions to Simonides (keeping in mind the methodological lesson of Merkelbach 1952). I shall discuss Hor. C. 4.8 and 4.9 at greater length in Barchiesi forthcoming.
- [15](#) See below, n. 20. *Vatis Horati* (C. 4.6.44) comes as a complete surprise because Horace had already defined himself as *vates* in the hist verse of *Epod.* 16, with a vastly different significance and context. The (anachronistic)

role of *chorodidaskalos* which Horace assumes in C. 4.6 is compatible with the Pindaric influence, but also of course with the Simonidean.

[16](#) On the commission and genre of Simonides' *Plataea*, see the useful article of Aloni 1994.

[17](#) "Panhellenic" need not imply a reference to a particular commission. Aloni 1994 well illustrates the conflicts implicit in the development of the panhellenic ideology, offering interesting arguments for a Spartan commission. See also Qoedeker 1995 and her essay in this volume. Naturally, however, the "civil" Horace of this period is interested in the development of a language which celebrates anti-Persian unity. His use of *Medus* at *Carm. Saec.* 54 to indicate the Parthian danger is a good example of what I mean, as are the "Sea Battle at Salamis" staged by Augustus in 2 BC and the other Augustan revivals of Athenian figurative propaganda; cf., e.g., Hardie 1986, index s.v. Persians. These kinds of Augustan cultural propaganda do much to explain the function that Simonidean celebratory elegy plays in the lyrics of Horace's Fourth Book of Odes.

[18](#) Simonides is therefore a pioneer in the process of painting the Trojans as barbarians, which emerges in the course of fifth-century Athenian cultural history. As Boedeker also notes in this volume, the new fragments, in fact, permit us to assign an earlier date to this evolution. Cf. the observations of Cole 1993.53–54 and n. 6, writing on Bacchylides without knowledge of the new Simonides papyri.

[19](#) The link between Horace and the text of Simonides is stronger if in 11.10 *W*<sup>2</sup> we read Πριάμῳ παῖσι χαρίζομεναι, as is argued by Parsons 1992a.28 and Luppe 1993.3f, rather than χαλεπτόμεναι (West 1993a.6); cf. Luppe's rendering: "Apollo tötete Achilleus den Troem zu Gefallen."

[20](#) C. 4.6 ends with a reference to the role of public singer assumed by Horace for the *Carmen Saeculare*: *vatis Horati* (44). It would be interesting to understand better the poetic persona assumed by Simonides in his *Plataea*. West's reconstruction (1993a.7–9) speaks at length of the prophetic activities of Teisamenos, the divine *mantis* who foresaw the course of the battle and who affirmed the gods' agreement to a Spartan victory. Perhaps Simonides was somehow suggesting a link between the seer Teisamenos, guarantor of the future, and the singer Simonides, guarantor of the memory of this action. ("As a *vates*, Horace is the mouthpiece of the god both of poetry and of prophecy, pronouncing incantatory verses, fabricating the *carmina* that themselves fabricate the Roman secular present and guarantee its future," Putnam 1986.123.) In West's reconstruction, Teisamenos not only predicts the victorious strategy, but also prophesies long lasting future memory of the Greek victory (fr. 14.5–6 *W*<sup>2</sup>). There is a notable similarity to the language used by Simonides for his own function as singer who guarantees the memory of this action (fr. 11.20–28 *W*<sup>2</sup>). On the persona of the performer of the elegy, see further Stehle in this volume.

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# SAPPHO 31 AND CATULLUS 51: THE DIALOGISM OF LYRIC

**PAUL ALLEN MILLER**

**M**ikhail Bakhtin, in “Discourse in the Novel,” formulates what seems an ironclad distinction between poetic and novelistic discourse. Poetry, he argues, is essentially “monologic” and strives for a unity of discourse, “so that the finished work may rise as unitary speech, one co-extensive with its object.” The novel, on the other hand, is “dialogic,” representing a multiplicity of voices, not only through its characters, but also in its style, ideology, and representation of society.<sup>1</sup> This distinction, while provisionally useful for establishing what is unique to novelistic discourse, offers an ultimately unsatisfying account of dialogism’s role in literature as a whole, and poetry in particular. To remedy this problem and thereby deploy the considerable power of Bakhtin’s theoretical insights for a more satisfying account of the poetic as well as the novelistic, this paper will propose that a further distinction be made between primary and secondary dialogism. Such a distinction, as Caryl Emerson and Gary Saul Morson have pointed out, is implicit in Bakhtin from the beginning, though never made explicit.<sup>2</sup> This failure on Bakhtin’s part to distinguish between the various but related ways in which he uses the terms *dialogue*, *dialogism*, and *dialogic* has, in turn, become the source of no small amount of confusion.

From this perspective, the term *primary dialogism* refers to that interplay of voices and concepts which is found in realist fiction and daily life. It designates that set of relations which governs the exchange of complete “utterances” between individuals, social groups, and/or their fictional

representatives: the utterance being, as Bakhtin defines it, the basic unit of speech, delimited not by the sentence, the proposition or the paragraph, but by the completion of one speech act by one speaker and the beginning of a second by another.<sup>3</sup> Primary dialogism, thus, represents that font of social and linguistic interaction from which the larger and more abstract phenomenon of secondary dialogism springs.

This latter phenomenon, which results from the speaker's simultaneous response to past and anticipation of future utterances, every time (s)he speaks, represents that more subtle level of dialogical interaction which occurs not only within utterances, but even within individual words. For every word we use carries with it the sights, sounds, and, smells, the social and rhetorical contexts of its previous uses.<sup>4</sup> Thus as Bakhtin points out in his Dostoevsky book, even soliloquies are in essence dialogic. Clearly, this latter form of dialogism can be found in poetry as well as prose.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Bakhtin admits as much in a later essay, "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences":

Is not any writer (even the pure lyricist) always a "dramaturge" in the sense that he directs all words to others' voices, including to the image of the author (and to other authorial masks)? Perhaps any literal, single-voiced word is naive and unsuitable for authentic creativity. Any truly creative voice can only be the *second* voice in the discourse. Only the second voice—*pure relationship*—can be completely objectless and not cast a figurai shadow.<sup>6</sup>

My argument is that we can use this concept of secondary dialogism to help clarify the differences between a lyric designed for oral performance and a lyric of the book, that the concept of dialogism in its broadest form can make us see that these are in fact two very different genres of

composition. To illustrate this thesis I will examine the work of two representative poets. Sappho and Catullus, and will take as a basis of comparison Sappho 31 and its translation; Catullus 51. By looking at these two poems, which are in some ways practically identical but were produced in and for radically different dialogical situations. I hope to demonstrate the validity of this distinction between the two forms of dialogism and its usefulness in making generic discriminations. The crucial determinant in this investigation will be the establishment of the radically different contexts of utterance which characterize these two texts.

We can begin by imagining the setting for which Sappho's poetry was first intended. It is now widely accepted that the primary mode of diffusion, if not composition, for Sappho's poetry was oral performance, inasmuch as there was virtually no book trade in Greece until the late fifth century.<sup>7</sup> Such performances imply, in turn, a certain anticipation of how the poem's addressees would have received it. For utterances are always other-directed, and this is particularly so in the case of public artistic performances where the audience is immediately present. Such poems are of necessity communal events, rather than closeted confessions. Each new performance is a separate utterance, indissolubly linked to the moment of enunciation and so forever reinforcing the radically occasional nature of archaic lyric.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, as Bakhtin points out, the ways these anticipations of an audience's response structure a text, and ultimately its interpretation, constitute the dialogic situation staged by that text and serve to distinguish one literary genre from another.<sup>9</sup> Thus, to understand a poem such as Sappho 31, the reader must begin by asking what sort of performative context would have been required for such a work to have had a public meaning on the island of Lesbos; that is to say, on what sort of occasion could such a poem

have been appropriately sung to a public which was well acquainted with the poet, and indeed constituted her friends, neighbors, and potential political allies and enemies in this small island community?<sup>10</sup> This is very different from the question posed by the traditional romantic understanding of lyric: what is the poet trying to express? In a dialogic analysis, it is the relation of “responsive understanding” between poet and public which is foregrounded.<sup>11</sup>

The most obvious performative context which comes to mind for Sappho 31 is a song performed for a wedding, since it is difficult to imagine many other occasions when a man and woman would be publicly seated together in close converse, in Lesbos’ sexually segregated society. Indeed 31 is the sole text in Sappho’s corpus to show a woman and a man in an intimate conversation.<sup>12</sup> This interpretation of the poem was, of course, standard up until the mid-fifties, having been first advanced by Wilamowitz and later vigorously defended by Snell.<sup>13</sup> In 1955, it was to many people’s minds decisively refuted by Page, who termed it a “theory ... based on nothing but a preconceived notion about Sappho’s moral character. “Kirk-wood. thus, refers to Page’s having “demolished” a view which could only appeal to the “sentimentally inclined,” and which was designed to repress Sappho’s homoeroticism.<sup>14</sup> Yet such an indictment is little more than an *ad hominem* attack, and in this reader’s case it is applicable neither on the count of sentimentality nor of homophobia. More importantly. McEvilley has persuasively shown that both Snell’s and Wilamowitz’s major theses were more correct than even they realized. He makes three major points: first, the term *anêr* (“man”) in Sappho always refers to a husband; second, the direct comparison with a god only occurs in marriage poems; and third. Lesbos in all the surviving literature would appear to have been so sexually segregated as not to have allowed

the sort of public interaction between a man and woman portrayed in the poem, except in the context of marriage.<sup>15</sup> Ruth Neuberger-Donath has also demonstrated, by using comparative evidence gathered from the Homeric poems, that any time a man and woman are shown to be sitting *enantios* to one another, they are necessarily *philos* to one another. It can thus be assumed, she concludes, that the couple celebrated in Sappho's poem were in fact man and wife, and probably recently so.<sup>16</sup>

This reading is also a tempting solution because Sappho wrote numerous epithalamia and, as Judith Hallet has noted, the social function of her verse would appear to have been that of preparing the young women of Lesbos for their communally sanctioned roles.<sup>17</sup> Likewise Gregory Nagy has recently argued that Sappho's role as a singer was that of a *khoregos*, a publicly sanctioned poet/educator comparable to Aleman in his "Partheneia":

To say that Sappho is an "educator" is a prosaic way of saying that her assumed role, through her lyric poetry, is that of *khoregos*, "chorus leader," speaking both to and about members of an aggregate of female characters who are bound together by ties that correspond to the ties that bind a chorus together.

Her expression and probable practice of homoerotic love was thus, like that of her male counterparts, a form of *paideia*, not the public expression of a private desire.<sup>18</sup>

It is, of course, impossible to prove whether this poem was actually sung at a wedding(s) or not, but the attempt to formulate a response to the question of the poem's performative context goes a long way towards elucidating the concrete nature of its dialogical situation. For it makes clear the radically different nature of Sappho's poetry from the vastly more privatized verse which is read and written today. Moreover, as of yet, there have been no other

satisfactory performative contexts envisioned, and those who have opposed this interpretation have generally chosen to ignore the question altogether, leading to anachronistic interpretations in which Sappho is read more as an author composing books of poetry, than as an archaic singer performing orally before her peers.<sup>19</sup>

At all events, the poem can hardly have been intended to be heard by the citizens of Lesbos as a purely personal confession. Its focus is not the *moi*, but the *toi* and the *kenos*.<sup>20</sup> The initial naming complex concentrates not on the speaking voice's ego, but on that of the addressees: "This man seems equal to the gods, that sits opposite you and listens close by to your sweet voice." Likewise the feelings of the speaking subject are only present to the extent that they can be directly expressed in an objectified and externalizing catalogue of symptoms.<sup>21</sup> In fact the poetic ego, through its enactment of a universalizing symptomology, functions as an analogue to the central mythic section of a Pindaric ode. It renders public and understandable a unique experience which otherwise would be purely personal and thus meaningless to the public at large. As Kirkwood says, "Sappho used herself as the illustrative equivalent of a simile or myth."<sup>22</sup> We find out next to nothing about the poet herself, or the persona she wishes to project; instead, we are invited to marvel at the devastating effect of the woman's beauty, even as this unnamed, godlike man sits before her, seemingly unfazed. What we have is a poem of praise, directed in the first instance to the young woman and in the second to the man sitting across from her.<sup>23</sup>

If, however, 'we examine Catullus' translation of this same poem, the dialogical relation has changed. First, Catullus no longer thinks in terms of communal occasions, but in terms of private readers or intimate friends.<sup>24</sup> Second, the poem now not only gains its meaning from its relation to its

audience, but also from its relation to other poems in the corpus. These poems provide the primary context in which the individual poem is to be understood. Our vision of Lesbia and Catullus is unalterably modified by our knowledge of these other poems, and thus the poem itself is in constant dialogue not only with its readers, but with the other poems of the collection. It is, in fact, this intertextual quality of Catullus' work that gives it that sense of intimacy which all readers perceive. We seem ever to be eaves dropping on the poet in dialogue with himself, but that dialogue is infinite because it is always being reshaped and remodelled by our own reading of the corpus.<sup>25</sup>

Aside from the final stanza of Catullus 51, it and its Sapphic model appear to be substantially alike, except for the seemingly minor difference that Catullus names his addressee Lesbia.<sup>26</sup> Now, there is no great mystery as to whom the name Lesbia referred. Apuleius tells us (*Apology* 10) that it was a woman named Clodia, who is generally thought to have been either Clodia Metelli or one of her sisters. A more important question, though, is: what is the poetic significance of this particular pseudonym? The answer is twofold. First, and most obviously, *Lesbia* is the metrical equivalent of *Clodia*, so that if Catullus chose to circulate a private manuscript, the actual name could have been easily substituted. Second, and more important for our purposes, *Lesbia* is also the Latin adjective denoting a woman from Lesbos, in this context obviously Sappho.<sup>27</sup> In Sappho's original, however, she is the one who is tongue-tied. Likewise she is the singer of the poem, not its recipient. Yet in Catullus' version, the woman named with an adjective which alludes to Sappho is in the opposite position. She is now the object, not the subject. She is the woman sung about, not the singer.<sup>28</sup> There has been an inversion of roles, which as we shall see will have reverberations throughout the collection, and which



necessarily calls the poet's double relation to both his reading public and his predecessors into question. For each of these relations is now mediated by the other and can only be understood from within the other's perspective. The poem is neither a simple presentation of an event to the reading public, nor a univocal reproduction of Sappho's original, but a complex mixture of both, situated within the larger context of Catullus' portrayal of the affair as a whole.

The point is a somewhat obvious one, though it has yet to be fully considered. For, in the very act of self-consciousness this alteration supposes, Catullus' poem comes to transcend the moment of its enunciation and enters into a new and more complex series of dialogic relations which ultimately center around the multi-voiced and often conflicting intentions of the Catullan poetic ego as they are revealed in poem 51's relations with the other poems in the collection.<sup>29</sup> There is, then, in this one name, *Leshia*, a measure of conscious reflexivity, which is utterly alien to Sappho's original. This seemingly innocent substitution of *Lesbia* for *Clodia* opens a whole range of questions about artistic intent and self-conscious intertextuality which would be unimaginable in Sappho's predominantly oral culture.

Are we for example to assume, given the use of the name *Lesbia* in the context of a poem by Sappho, that there is a reciprocity of symptoms between Catullus and his beloved, so that not only Catullus is Sappho, but also the woman who bears the Sapphic epithet? Or has there been a mere inversion of roles? From the beginning we are in a quandary as to what precise roles Catullus and Lesbia/Clodia/Sappho are going to play, and as to what levels of conscious intent the triple-faceted object of Catullus' desire corresponds. Moreover, what does it mean to send Lesbia/Sappho a reinscription of her own poem into another language, another alphabet, especially when this Lesbia/Sappho is only Sappho and not Clodia through a trick of orthography,

through a private code made possible by writing? No simple answers can be supplied to these questions. But what is interesting is the fact that we have now entered into a new genre of poetry whose radically different context of enunciation makes those questions not only possible, but necessary. For they show we are now in a complex and sophisticated world of literary allusions, artistic self-consciousness, and psychological ambiguity, a cosmopolitan and Hellenistic world alien to the predominantly oral culture of archaic Lesbos.

Nonetheless, this reading of 51 has only scratched the surface of the complexities and circuitous routes of responsive understanding this poem contains. For, in this same alteration of Sappho's original can also be seen still another motif of Catullus' poetry, which can be tracked throughout the collection, and which constitutes one of the primary thematic elements organizing it as a whole: that of sex-role reversal.<sup>30</sup> A precise parallel to Catullus' intertextual alteration of expected sex-roles in 51 can thus also be seen in poem 70's relation to its original, Callimachus' eleventh epigram, wherein the passive and active roles played by Catullus and Lesbia respectively in 70 are reversed in Callimachus' original.<sup>31</sup> There the man, Callignotis, is active, and the girl, Ionis, is passive. Likewise, in poem 68, Catullus compares his own need to overlook Lesbia's infidelities with that of Juno's ignoring the *omnivoli plurima furta Jovis*.<sup>32</sup> And this thematic element of the collection, in turn, can be seen as adding yet another ironic level to Catullus' use of the name Lesbia for Clodia, inasmuch as it was widely thought in antiquity (probably correctly) that Sappho was a Lesbian in both senses of the word. As such, she could have easily been thought of as usurping the masculine role (did not Horace refer to her as *mascula Saffo*?), and hence within the binary logic of conventional Roman sexual relations: if Catullus was on the

receiving end of Lesbia's infidelities, he would thus naturally be in the woman's or at least the effeminate position.<sup>33</sup>

Given the recurrent nature of this motif of sex-role reversal in the Catullan collection, it is perhaps not accidental that another important example of this same phenomenon can be found in the final strophe of poem 11, the only other poem in the collection written in Sapphic stanzas: "And let her not look for my love which has perished through her blame, just as a flower at the edge of the meadow when touched by the passing plough." And, as it turns out, the particular sex-role reversal found in the poem appears to be a direct imitation of still another fragment attributed to Sappho (105c), thus seeming to confirm the thesis that 11 and 51 are to be read as a diptych.<sup>34</sup> Yet there is more to this stanza than a simple imitation of Sappho, or another example of sex-role reversal. Indeed, by means of its brutal imagery, the reader gains admittance into a realm of associations, which lead him or her into the darkest and least conscious depths of the Catullan poetic ego, into images of mutilation and disease such as Attis' self-castration in 63, or 76's reference to the Lesbia affair as a *perniciēs pestis*.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, however, through this double image of the flower destroyed by the plough, the collection demands still another even more complex reading, linking all these poems in a further set of associations which ultimately produce an image of artistic self-consciousness and deliberate inter- and intratextuality unimaginable in an oral context; with the result that the reader has simultaneously a sense of being let into the secret reaches of the Catullan soul, even as (s)he recognizes that it is through that soul's conscious will to artistry that this very insight is possible.

The plough of poem 11's final stanza was of course a common symbol in ancient literature for the masculine phallus while the flower often signified an unmarried

woman. Thus in Catullus' first epithalamium, for example, the bride is referred to as *flos* or *floridus* four separate times. Hence Catullus, in at least a figurative sense, portrays himself here as deflowered by the phallus of *mascula Lesbia*. Moreover, this same conjunction of images, the flower and the plough, is also found in Catullus' second epithalamium, where it is made unmistakably clear that the flower represents the still virgin bride-to-be, and the plough the ravishing male.<sup>36</sup> In addition, it will also be recalled that Sappho's poem 31, the original for Catullus 51, was itself probably created for a wedding, so that if Catullus could count on his readers recognizing the wedding background of Sappho's original, then the creation of an ironic contrast between 51 and 11, as poems of marriage and divorce, would have been evident. Thus Sappho herself, through her poetry and its various erotic themes, becomes the unifying subtext, uniting what have often been read as the first and last poems of the affair into a complex dialogical unity in which each poem's meaning is relativized by the reading of the other and by the way in which both of these poems are read by other texts in the collection, such as the epithalamia, the Attis, and poem 76's reflections on the affair as a *perniciēs pestis*.<sup>37</sup> Yet the ironic relation obtaining between 11 and 51 is raised to an even higher power when it is seen that poem 11's imitation of Sappho (105c), which in 62 functions as a symbol of intact virginity, here is transformed into an image of Lesbia's insatiable lust.<sup>38</sup> Taken as a totality, this set of poems (11, 51, 61, 62, 63, 76) and their Sapphic recollections allude to the full range of Catullus' emotions, ranging from dumbstruck awe, to fear, loathing, and obsessive images of defloration and castration.

This complex set of both inter- and intratextual dialogical relations, in which Catullus 51 necessarily becomes embedded because of its role within the Catullan collection,

would be unimaginable for its Sapphic original. Rather than illustrating the linear temporal movement of a performance which must first and foremost be construed in its immediate communal and cultural context, the Catullan poem becomes part of a complex dialogue which moves forward and backward within the Catullan collection itself, as well as back and forth between its literary sources. It is only from within this complex textual network that the individual poem then starts to refer to the larger world of Roman and Hellenistic culture in which it was produced. Each individual moment of the Catullan ego as presented within the collection becomes a dialogical nexus which communicates with all the others. In the Catullan corpus, the reader always participates in a multifaceted dialogue constituted first by the poems themselves and only secondarily by its reading public. Yet the limits of that dialogue can never be fully mapped, never completely exhausted. The process of rereading and interpretation within its bounds is ultimately infinite.<sup>39</sup> For a poetry of oral performance the process of interpretation is also, properly speaking, infinite, but the hermeneutic circle it describes is not in the first instance the internal dialogue of the poet, but his or her dialogue with both the (oral) poetic tradition and the collective ideological and social world in which it is performed.

Bakhtin's work, then, allows us to understand the difference between orally performed and written lyric more completely than previous theories have. For the concept of dialogism allows us to see that the primary focus of a work is its relation to its context, both performative and textual, and that written and orally performed texts must necessarily conceive of their contexts in radically different ways. Moreover, by distinguishing between primary and secondary dialogism, we have been able to maintain Bakhtin's concept of the unique nature of novelistic discourse—as allowing multiple, separate linguistic

consciousnesses to come together in an ongoing, serious but relativizing play—while at the same time making use of Bakhtin’s broader theoretical insights into the inherently dialogical nature of all language, genres, and consciousness, without being forced to see these phenomena as precursors of the novel.<sup>40</sup> Consequently, the concept of secondary dialogism allows the full range of Bakhtin’s theoretical insights to be applied to ancient texts, rather than seeing them as primarily useful for the study of prose from Rabelais and the sixteenth century onward. Finally, this reading has shown that not only *can* we apply Bakhtin’s concepts to ancient literature, but through them we are also able to make fine distinctions which allow us to see those texts in a new light. Therefore works which on the surface may appear to be closely related can be shown to pertain to radically different dialogical situations and thus to be different types of utterances. Hence, through the concept of secondary dialogism, we have been able to show that the poems of Sappho and Catullus, even when their semantic contents are all but identical, represent two quite separate genres of composition.

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- <sup>1</sup> Bakhtin 1981.278, 284-88, 296-98, 300, 325-31. The importance of this distinction as well as its controversial nature have been pointed out by more than one critic. See Morson and Emerson 1989.53-54; de. Man 1989.111; Roberts 1989.133 and Todorov 1984.64-67.
- <sup>2</sup> Morson and Emerson 1989.52-53. For Morson and Emerson's attempt to separate out the different senses of dialogism, from a different point of view, see 1990.49-62.
- <sup>3</sup> Bakhtin 1981.274-76, 282, 326, 332-33 and Morson and Emerson 1989.53. On the utterance as a complete verbal performance by one speaker which expects a reply from another, see Bakhtin 1986a.71-73, 82, 92-93; Todorov 1984. x and 43-44 and Volosinov 1986.94-96.

There is still considerable dispute over whether the texts originally published under the names of Volosinov and Medvedev were: a) in reality written by Bakhtin; b) heavily influenced by him; or c) rejoinders in a dialogue in which he was influenced by the others as much as he influenced them. All commentators agree, however, that there are numerous and striking similarities between the works of the members of the Bakhtin circle. The main areas in which there remain disputes about the compatibility of the theoretical positions elaborated in these works are: whether Bakhtin shared the latter two's Marxism; and whether Medvedev and Volosinov can be said to think in terms of closed, binary oppositions, while Bakhtin can be said to prefer open dialogized pairs. Neither of these problems has a direct bearing on my argument. Thus I shall consider the various works of the Bakhtin circle as all part of the same discourse, even if they were not all written by the same author. In my citations, I use the names under which the texts were published in English. For more views on this debate, see Morson and Emerson 1990.11, 77, 102, 104, 106-07, 111,

118-19, 124-25. 161-62, 479 ns. 6-7; Holquist 1990.8; Todorov 1984.11; Bakhtin/Medvedev 1985. vii and ix.

<sup>4</sup> Bakhtin 1981.276-77, 279-80, 282, 293; 1984.73; Todorov 1984.48-49 and Volosinov 1986.19, 23. On the internal dialogism of individual words, see Bakhtin 1981.279 and Morson and Emerson 1990.138-39.

<sup>5</sup> Bakhtin 1984.120; 1986a.93, Morson and Emerson 1990.49, 131, 143, 146.

<sup>6</sup> Bakhtin 1986b.110. On the importance of this passage, see Roberts 1989.133-34 and Todorov 1984.68. On Bakhtin's wavering on the possibility of dialogism in lyric, see Morson and Emerson 1989.6 and 54-55. Tavis 1988.75 and 77 has argued that Bakhtin in his early work "Toward a Philosophy of the Act," employs a dialogic method in his analysis of Pushkin's "For the Shores of Your Distant Country." Thus at the beginning and at the end of his career Bakhtin was more liberal in his granting of dialogic status to poetry than he was in the middle period of his work. Bakhtin's reading of the Pushkin poem can be found in 1990.208-31.

<sup>7</sup> See Snyder 1989.17; Griffith 1989.60; Gentili 1985.3, 41, 75, 204-05; Hallet 1979.461-64; Segal 1974.139-40, 153; Russo 1973/74.709; Havelock 1982.17-20, 189; 1963.37-39, 43. On the lack of a substantial book trade in the sixth and seventh centuries, thus eliminating the only alternative mode by which Sappho's poetry could have been widely diffused, see Harris 1989.92-93, as well as 84-87.

<sup>8</sup> Gentili 1985.52; Zumthor 1983.48, 56, 234; Winkler 1981.65; Finnegan 1977.129; Adkins 1972.5; Havelock 1963.46, 121, 182-83. On the unrepeatability of utterances, see Bakhtin 1986b.108 and Morson and Emerson 1990.126.

<sup>9</sup> Bakhtin 1986a.60-65, 95-96; Bakhtin/Medvedev 1985.11, 130-31; Morson and Emerson 1990.129, 290; Todorov 1984.82.

<sup>10</sup> Lasserre 1989.147. On Sappho's possible political problems, see the reference to her exile during the reign of the tyrant Pittacus, *Marm. Par.* Ep. 36 (p. 12 Jacoby), reprinted in Campbell 1982.8-9; on oral poetry's audience as a small, relatively homogeneous social group, see Zumthor 1983.40.

<sup>11</sup> Bakhtin 1986a.95-96, 1984.87-88; Morson and Emerson 1990.129-30.

<sup>12</sup> Griffith 1989.59. Race's statement (1989.31) that the situation presented at the beginning of 31 is "ordinary" is anachronistic in its assumption of routinized commerce between unrelated members of the opposite sex.

<sup>13</sup> Wilamowitz 1966/1913.5; Snell 1931.71-90.

<sup>14</sup> Page 1955.30-33; Kirkwood 1974.121-22; see also Snyder 1989.20.

<sup>15</sup> McEvilley 1978.1-9. Lasserre 1989.150-51, argues persuasively against McEvilley's suggestion that the wedding scene evoked by the poem might be imaginary.

<sup>16</sup> Neuberger-Donath 1977.199-200. Wiseman (1985.153) also accepts the Wilamowitz thesis, finding support for it in Catullus. For further corroborating

views, see Griffith 1989.59-61; Lasserre 1989.149-52; Winkler 1981.73; Fränkel 1975.176 and Treu 1954.178-79.

[17](#) Hallet 1979.450, 456, and 461-64. See also Gentili 1985.102-08; Calame 1977.396 and Segal 1974.141 and 153.

[18](#) Nagy 1990.435 and 370-71, especially: "It should be clear that I understand the monodic form not to be antithetical to the choral but rather predicated on it. A figure like Sappho speaks as a choral personality, even though elements of dancing and the very presence of a choral group are evidently missing from her compositions. Still, these compositions presuppose or represent an interaction, offstage, as it were with a choral aggregate." This is another way of saying the performance implies an immediate and formalized dialogic relationship with the listening public. For more on Sappho's relation to Aleman and *paideia*, see Calame 1977.88, 126-27, 369, 421-34; Hallet 1979.463-64; Dover 1978.181; Lefkowitz 1981.51-52; Stigers 1981.45.

[19](#) Thus Race 1983.92-93 argues that while Wilamowitz's wedding hypothesis solves the historical problem of the performative context it "creates a literary one," since the word *marriage* is never mentioned. But the dichotomy is false. Literary problems are always simultaneously historical ones, inasmuch as works of literature are profoundly dialogized utterances which presume a relation of responsive understanding between themselves and their audiences or reading publics. Literary questions are thus inevitably social and historical questions as well.

[20](#) Snell 1953.52.

[21](#) Page 1955.26-27; Fränkel 1975.176.

[22](#) Kirkwood 1974.122; West 1970.314-15.

[23](#) Burnett 1983.236; Lasserre 1989.157.

[24](#) Wiseman 1982.38-39.

[25](#) There remains disagreement over how much of Catullus' corpus was arranged by the author himself. Although there is more and more reason to believe Catullus arranged the collection as a whole, there is at minimum widespread belief that he arranged at least poems 1-51. My argument does not depend upon accepting any one schema of arrangement, but rather on the notion that we read the poems in terms of one another, and that the numerous cross-references between the poems and the use of repeated motifs show that they were meant to be read as a group, whether they were originally placed in the order we now have them or not.

On the consensus, that at least part of the present collection was arranged by the author, see Skinner 1988.337. Among those who believe the collection as a whole is the work of the poet are: Ellis 1979/1889.1-5, with some minor rearranging of 61-68; Wiseman 1985.136-37, 1969.30; Quinn 1972.9-20 and 38-50; Skinner 1988.338, n. 2, where she revises her claim (in 1981.passim) that only 1-51 were arranged by the author; Ferguson 1986.2; Minyard 1988.343-53; Dettmer 1988.371-81 and Arkins 1987.847-48.

[26](#) For a recent discussion of the close relations between the two texts, see Vine 1992.251-58 and Wiseman 1985.152-53.

[27](#) Fredricksmeier 1983.69.

[28](#) Skinner 1981.88.

[29](#) Thus Fredricksmeier (1983.66-68) has noted Catullus' use of the word *identidem* ("again and again, habitually") as one of the parallels linking poems 11 and 51. It has no analogue in Sappho's original and changes what was a particular occasion in the original into a constantly recurring one. Professor Charles Platter has pointed out to me that this adverb may also be making reference to the common recurrence of the adverb *deute* in archaic lyric. See Kirkwood 1974.112, 249, n. 23 and Sappho I.

Note also Commager's interesting observation (1965.87): "Where [Sappho 31] has two verbs to describe the action of the girl and one for the spectator, Catullus reverses the emphasis, also adding the adjective *misero*. The alterations, admittedly minor, suggest that the poem will be even more self-centered than Sappho's."

[30](#) Rubino 1975.294.

[31](#) Page 1975.93.

[32](#) For a fuller examination of these issues see Miller 1988.127-32.

[33](#) *Epistles* 1.19.28, see also. Porphyrio's commentary on this passage, reprinted in Campbell 1982.18-19. On the binary logic of conventional Roman sexual relations, see Wiseman 1985.10-14.

[34](#) Quinn 1972.163; Duclos 1976.86.

[35](#) For 76 as "a sort of summary and model for the entire elegiac and erotic segment of the Catullan oeuvre," including specific reminiscences of poem 51, see Rutøno 1975.289; see also Wiseman 1985.170-71; Quinn 1972.102 and Commager 1965.97-98.

[36](#) Ferguson 1985.44; Fredricksmeier 1983.73; Putnam 1974.79-80. Poem 62.39-47: *Ut flos in saeptis secretus nascitur hortis,/ ignotus pecori, nullo convulsus aratro,! ... sic virgo, dum intacta manet, dum cara suis est:/ cum casium amisit polluto corpore florem,/ nec pueris iucunda manet, nec cara puellis.* ("As a solitary flower which has been born in a walled garden, unnoticed by the herd, and yet to be plucked by the plough ... so the young maid, while she remains untouched, is dear to her family; yet once she has lost the chaste flower and her body is befouled, she remains neither a joy to the boys, nor dear to the girls.")

[37](#) Ferguson 1988.14; Wiseman 1985.153; Duclos 1976.78; Quinn 1972.56.

[38](#) Quinn 1972.162.

[39](#) For an excellent reading of the temporal complexity of Catullus' poetry and how each new reading both builds on and surpasses all past readings, with particular reference to poem 11, see Sweet 1987.514, 522-23, and 526. Rereading is of course something only available in a literate poetic tradition.

[40](#) Morson and Emerson 1990.9, 131, 155, 236-40, 307, 319-25, 328-30;  
Bakhtin 1984.87-88.



## Roman Aristotle

JONATHAN BARNES

When Theophrastus died, his library, which included the library of Aristode, was carried off to the Troad. His successors found nothing much to read; the Lyceum sank into a decline; and Peripatetic ideas had little influence on the course of Hellenistic philosophy. It was only with the rediscovery of the library that Aristotelianism revived—and it revived in Italy. For the library went from the Troad to Athens—whence, as part of Sulla's war-booty, to Rome. There Andronicus of Rhodes produced the 'Roman edition' of the *corpus Aristotelicum*. It was the first complete and systematic version of Aristotle's works, the first publication in their full form of the technical treatises, the first genuinely critical edition of the text. Andronicus' Roman edition caused a sensation. It revitalised the languishing Peripatetics. It set off an explosion of Aristotelian studies. It laid the foundation for all subsequent editions of Aristotle's works, including our modern texts. When we read Aristotle we should pour a libation to Andronicus—and to Sulla.

That story is the main subject of the following pages. It is familiar enough; my argument will be laborious; I have nothing new to say about it; and my general conclusions are dispiritingly sceptical. But recent scholarship on the topic has taken to the bottle of phantasy and stumbled drunkenly from one dogmatism to the next. Another look at the pertinent texts may be forgiven—and in any event the story is a peach.

My concern (let me stress at the start is the way in which Aristotle's texts reached Rome—and us. I am not concerned with the general influence of Peripatetic ideas on the Roman

intelligentsia—that is a vast and a complex question; nor am I concerned with the specific influence of Aristotle’s ideas on the Roman intelligentsia—that is a different question, less vast and more complex. Indeed, I deal neither with the history of ideas nor with the history of philosophy: my subject is an episode in the history of books and the book-trade.

## 1. STRABO’S STORY

Strabo is the main source. There are supplementary texts, the most important of which is in Plutarch.<sup>1</sup> Here, first, are Strabo and Plutarch.

From Scepsis came the Socratics, Erastus and Coriscus, and also Coriscus’ son, Neleus, a man who attended the lectures both of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and who took over Theophrastus’ library, which included Aristotle’s. For Aristotle left his own library to Theophrastus, to whom he also entrusted the school. (Aristotle was the first man we know to have collected books, and he taught the kings of Egypt how to put a library together.)<sup>2</sup> Theophrastus left it to Nelcus, who took it to Scepsis and left it to his successors. They were not philosophers and kept the books locked away and carelessly stored. When they heard that the Attalid kings, by whom their city was ruled, were eagerly searching for books in order to set up the library at Pergamum, they hid them underground in a sort of tunnel,<sup>3</sup> where they were damaged by mildew and worms. Some time later the family sold the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus for a large sum to Apellicon of Teos. Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher. That is why he tried to repair the worm-damage by transferring the writings to new manuscripts but did not complete them satisfactorily; and he published the books full of errors.

Thus it was that the older Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus did not possess the books at all—except for a



few, and in particular the exoteric works—and so were not able to do any serious philosophy but merely declaimed generalities. Their successors—once these books became available—were better philosophers and better Aristotelians; yet they were obliged for the most part to speak at haphazard<sup>4</sup> because of the number of mistakes.

Rome too had a considerable hand in this. For immediately after Apellicon's death Sulla, who had captured Athens, took his library and brought it here, where the scholar Tyrannio, who was an amateur of Aristotle, put his hand to it, having buttered up the librarian. And certain booksellers made use of bad scribes and did not check the copies something which happens with other books which are copied for sale, both here and at Alexandria. Not enough of this. (Strabo, 13. 1.54 (608 9)) <Sulla> reserved for himself the library of Apellicon of Teos, which included most of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus (which were then not yet familiar to most people). It is said that after the library had been taken to Rome the scholar Tyrannio prepared most of it and that Andronicus of Rhodes obtained copies from him, made them public and drew up the catalogues which are now in circulation. The older Peripatetics were themselves evidently accomplished and scholarly men; but the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus which they had come across<sup>5</sup> were neither numerous nor accurately written<sup>6</sup> because the estate of Nelcus of Scepsis (to whom Theophrastus had left his books) was passed on<sup>7</sup> to men who were unambitious and not philosophers. (Plutarch, *Sulla* 26 (468 Bc)<sup>8</sup>) Strabo does not cite any authority for his story. Elsewhere he says that he heard Tyrannio lecturing (12. 3. 16 (54H)), and also that he 'studied Aristotelian philosophy together with Boethus' of Sidon (16. 2. 24 (757)).<sup>9</sup> He might well have heard the story from Tyrannio or from his Aristotelian lecturer.<sup>10</sup> Plutarch cites no authority either; but his text is strikingly close to Strabo's, and it is tempting to suppose that either Plutarch



copied from Strabo or else the two men drew from a common source.<sup>11</sup> If the two men drew from a common source, then Strabo whatever he may have heard from his cronies—knew the story in a written form.

## 2. ARISTOTLE

Aristotle died in 322. No other text says that he left his library to Theophrastus. His will does not mention his books—nor does it leave ‘the school’ to anyone.<sup>12</sup> But there is no particular reason to disbelieve the report; and a few other texts<sup>13</sup> state or imply that the books of Aristotle were later found in company with the books of Theophrastus. I assume that ‘Aristotle’s library’ means ‘the books which Aristotle *owned*’. (Strabo’s statement that he was a great book-collector finds some corroboration elsewhere.<sup>14</sup>) Later phases of the story concern the works which Aristotle *wrote*. But there is no inconsistency here—a man may decently own copies of what he has written.

Aristotle once dead, the story concerns the fate of a double parcel of books: it is not a story about the fate of Aristotle’s books but a story about the fate of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Nevertheless, I shall have nothing to say about the fate of Theophrastus’ works (which bristles with difficulties of its own); and indeed, like most scholars, I shall sometimes, and with no excuse, write as if Aristotle alone were involved.<sup>15</sup>

## 3. THEOPHRASTUS AND NELEUS

Theophrastus died in the early 280s.<sup>16</sup> His will contains the provision: ‘all my books to Neleus’ (Diogenes Laertius, 5. 52).<sup>17</sup> Neleus is also named as one of the executors of the will (5. 56); and he is one of the ten to whom Theophrastus entrusted ‘the garden and the portico and the houses’ which he intended to become a little philosophical college (5. 52). We know nothing else about Neleus.<sup>18</sup> It is pleasing to

suppose that his stewardship of the books marked him as Theophrastus' candidate for the scholarchate,<sup>19</sup> and that when Strato was elected in his stead he left, with his books, in a pique.<sup>20</sup> But the supposition is at best a pretty guess.

Coriscus—Neleus' father—and Erastus were pupils of Plato (Diogenes Laertius, 3. 46);<sup>21</sup> and the two men knew Aristotle: like him, they enjoyed the hospitality of Hermias at Assus.<sup>22</sup> Coriscus—the name but not the face—achieved immortality when Aristotle decided to make him a philosophical John Doe.<sup>23</sup> Why Strabo calls the two men Socratics is unclear.

#### 4. THE ALEXANDRIAN CONNECTION?

The date of Neleus' death is a matter of conjecture. Since he heard Aristotle as well as Theophrastus, he is perhaps unlikely to have outlasted the 270s.<sup>24</sup> According to Strabo and Plutarch, Neleus left the books to his offspring, who were *ἰδιῶται*, laymen rather than philosophers.<sup>25</sup> But here there is contrary testimony. It comes from the opening pages of Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*, pages which survive only in summary form.

Larensius—P. Livius Larensis—had an extensive library, surpassing all the great libraries of the past—including those of Aristotle the philosopher, and Theophrastus,<sup>26</sup> and Neleus, who preserved their books; from him ... our king, Ptolemy Philadelphus, bought them all and took them to lovely Alexandria along with the books from Athens and Rhodes. (3ab) Ptolemy Philadelphus reigned from 284/2 to 247/6. The dates fit the presumed chronology of Neleus' life; there were close connections between the Peripatos and the Egyptian court;<sup>27</sup> and there is nothing intrinsically implausible in Athenaeus' account.<sup>28</sup>

A second trace of the same account is perhaps to be found in al-Farabi, who is reported as saying that the Roman Emperor Augustus defeated < Cleopatra >, put her to death,

and took over the rule. When he had secured it, he inspected the libraries and the [dates of] production of books, and found there manuscripts of Aristotle's works, written in his lifetime and in that of Theophrastus.<sup>29</sup>

Al-Farabi's report is consistent with the story in Strabo—we need only suppose that at some point the manuscripts went from Rome to Egypt.<sup>30</sup> But it seems more likely that the report represents a later episode in the tale which Athenaeus started to relate.

That tale is inconsistent with Strabo and Plutarch. Attempts to concoct a single coherent history are mistaken in principle and implausible in practice.<sup>31</sup> We may believe at most one of the accounts—or make an eclectic choice.

Athenaeus' version is independent of the tradition represented by Strabo and Plutarch, and it cannot be dismissed as a misunderstanding of Strabo's text.<sup>32</sup> Where did it come from? Later, at 203c, Athenaeus again refers briefly to the Alexandrian library. The reference is sandwiched between two quotations from Callixeinos of Rhodes, who wrote a work *On Alexandria*, perhaps in the second century BC.<sup>33</sup> It has been suggested that 203e, the meat in the sandwich, also derives from Callixeinos; and hence that 3ab, being on the same subject, comes from Callixeinos too.<sup>34</sup> But this argument is tissue-thin. Better confess scepticism about Athenaeus' source.

It is more pertinent to ask why there should have been two distinct stories about the matter. And it is seductive to imagine that one of them, at least, was invented in order to support a disputable claim.<sup>35</sup> Athenaeus' story, we might imagine, originated in Alexandria: some proud Alexandrian—a scholar or a librarian—swore that the authentic texts of Aristotle's works had passed into the Alexandrian library at an early date, so that the Alexandrian Aristotle was the real McCoy. The story in Strabo and Plutarch, we might imagine,

started up elsewhere: someone—in Athens or in Rome?—denied that Neleus had ever sold the books to Egypt and told a different tale, which established the pedigree of a different Aristotle.

It is as easy as it is fruitless to speculate further. But if this general line of thought were roughly true, then we might tentatively point to two features of Strabo's story which give him the edge over Athenaeus. First, Strabo's version is the more complex, and it is set out with circumstantial detail; were it merely a fiction designed to authenticate a text, it would have no cause to be so fussy. Secondly, Strabo's version insists on the poor condition of the texts in question: if his story was invented as a publishing puff, then the advertising agency was no good at its work.<sup>36</sup>

Evidently, neither of these considerations will carry much weight. Two further texts will later prove relevant<sup>37</sup>—for the moment let us continue with Strabo's version.

## 5. THE TUNNEL

Neleus' unphilosophical descendants locked the books away—that is to say, as the sequel makes clear, they did not let peripatetic scholars consult them. And when they heard that the Attalids were on the look-out for books, they buried their library underground, where it was attacked by damp and worms. The Pergamum library was founded, according to Strabo (13. 4. 2 (624)), by Eumenes II, who reigned from 197 to 158: Aristotle's books went underground in the first part of the second century BC.

This episode in Strabo's story has been rejected: after all, it is argued, if Neleus' descendants did not care for the books, why on earth should they have buried the things instead of making a few bob out of them?<sup>38</sup>

Arguments of this general type are familiar enough in the history of ancient philosophy—and, I dare say, in historical studies generally. Such and such a story—we are told—is intrinsically implausible: therefore it is fiction rather than

fact. But on reflection it must appear that such arguments lack merit. Implausible stories are no more likely to be fiction than plausible stories; indeed, an implausible story is, if anything, less likely to be a romance: the standards of plausibility are higher in fiction than they are in fact.

Of course, the Tunnel at Scepsis may be a genial romance; but I see no reason for disbelief: either swallow the story or suspend judgement. In any event, this, the prettiest part of Strabo's account, is also the least important part from a historical point of view. It doesn't matter a hoot whether the books were buried in a tunnel (or a cave or a cellar)—or simply left in their existing state of neglect. What matters is that they did not go to Pergamum, that they did not re-enter the world of learning and philosophy.

## 6. APELLICON

Later, Neleus' family did sell the books—to Apellicon of Teos. The transaction is recorded by Posidonius, who says that Apellicon 'philosophized in the Peripatetic vein, and had bought up Aristotle's library and many others (for he was extremely wealthy)' (F 253. 149–51 EK = *FGrH* 87 F 36 = Athenaeus, 214d). Posidonius does not mention the vendor of the library; nor does he name Theophrastus alongside Aristotle. But these are trifles—the passage offers a version of one part of Strabo's story.

It is tempting to suppose that Posidonius was Strabo's immediate source.<sup>39</sup> It is true that Strabo cannot have derived all his information from the passage which we now read in Athenaeus; but although this passage comes at the end of a long and apparently verbatim citation from Posidonius,<sup>40</sup> it exhibits various infelicities and confusions, and scholars have disputed whether or not Athenaeus is still quoting. If he is not quoting but paraphrasing, then Posidonius may have been Strabo's source for the whole story—and Plutarch's too.

However that may be, the text has some importance inasmuch as Posidonius' account conflicts with the report in Athenaeus, 3ab: if we accept Athenaeus and the Alexandrian connection, then we must reject Posidonius as well as Strabo and Plutarch. Now it is true that in the Posidonian passage the language is highly coloured, the detail journalistic—and bitchy. But the basis of the passage appears to be factual; and Posidonius is not to be lightly dismissed. Things do not look good for Athenaeus. (But one further text remains.<sup>41</sup>) Posidonius' account presumably comes from the *History*, which he wrote in fifty-two books and which went down to about 80 BC.<sup>42</sup> We do not know precisely when the *History* was written; but it was certainly done before 55 BC (when Posidonius died), and hence long before Strabo wrote his *Geography*. At least part of Strabo's story can thus be traced back to a date some three decades at most after the events which it describes.<sup>43</sup>

What little else we know of Apellicon comes mostly from the same passage in Posidonius.<sup>44</sup> Born at Teos, he settled in Athens and acquired Athenian citizenship. After some shady dealings with documents in the Metröon he prudently emigrated; but he soon bounced back and was favoured by the temporary tyrant Athenion—after all (as Posidonius says) both men were Peripatetics. A coin bearing his name shows him as one of the Athenian mint magistrates in 88/7.<sup>45</sup> And in the same year Athenion sent him out as general in charge of an expedition to Delos. The troops were cut to pieces by the Romans, but the general got away.

Strabo says that Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher. But this is perfectly consistent with Posidonius' report that he 'philosophized in the Peripatetic vein'; and we happen to know that he wrote a book defending Aristotle in the matter of his friendship with Hermias.<sup>46</sup>

Posidonius links the purchase of the library to the theft from the Metröon, thus implicitly dating it before Apellicon's

voluntary exile. He returned to Athens μετ' οὐ πολὺ—but we do not know enough about the chronology to give any precise date to the purchase. What exactly did he manage to buy? Three texts suggest three rather different answers.

Posidonius refers to 'the library of Aristotle', suggesting that Apellicon bought up everything which had been taken to Scepsis by Neleus.

Strabo speaks of 'the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus'; and, as the following sentence shows, he means the books *written by* Aristotle and Theophrastus. Does he mean us to understand that Apellicon bought only a part of the library—namely, the part consisting of the original manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus?<sup>47</sup>

In an Arabic catalogue of Aristotle's works<sup>48</sup> there is an entry which reads: 'His books which were found in the library of a man called Apellicon.'<sup>49</sup> The words have been construed as a book title—perhaps the title of an anthology; and it has been inferred that Apellicon bought only this one item from the family of Neleus.<sup>50</sup> The words are perhaps better construed as a section title—and then the few items which follow it may be identified as the books which came from Apellicon's library.<sup>51</sup> (And we shall infer that Apellicon bought a *ὑπόμνημα*, a set of letters, a work entitled *πολιτεία* in two books—and perhaps nothing more.) In either case the catalogue is inconsistent with Strabo. And it perhaps lends indirect support to Athenaeus, 3ab; for if Apellicon found only a handful of manuscripts at Scepsis, then the others must already have been lost or sold and why, then, not suppose that they had been sold to the king of Egypt?<sup>52</sup>

But here we are in Cloud-cuckoo-land. The catalogue no doubt had a good Greek source;<sup>53</sup> but between it and us there stand a Syriac and an Arabic translator. We have at best a fractured and distorted view of the original text; and it is folly to prefer a dubious inference from a probable confusion in a shadowy text to the clear and explicit



evidence of Strabo and of Posidonius. (And so, finally, we may say farewell to Athenaeus, 3ab.) As for Strabo, it is misguided to wring from his bluff text the subtle implication that Apellicon did not buy the whole library: some texts may be squeezed for information in this sort of way, others may not. All in all, it seems reasonable to believe that Apellicon found and bought a cache of books, which included a number of supposed autographs of the first two Peripatetic scholars and which had been taken to Scepsis by Neleus some two hundred years earlier.

What did Apellicon do with the books he had acquired? Strabo's account is clear: being a bibliophile, Apellicon wanted to make good the damage which the books had suffered, and to this end he had new copies of them made; but—not being much of a philosopher—he made a fist of the corrections and supplements, and he published texts full of errors. Apellicon's edition, whether because it was vilely done or because it was produced by an unlovely man at an inauspicious moment, made no great stir. Indeed, Strabo is the only author to mention it.

Some scholars, without rejecting Strabo's account outright, have denied that Apellicon produced an edition of Aristotle and Theophrastus.<sup>54</sup> But Apellicon is said to have made new and corrected copies, and he is also said to have published the works—that is to say, to have made them generally available for further copying. And I cannot see what more he would have had to do in order to prepare an 'edition'. Of course, it may all be a romance and a lie. But there is no reason to disbelieve Strabo, and certainly no reason to reject his account in favour of a thesis which finds no support in any text at all.

## 7. THE HELLENISTIC PERIPATOS

'And the consequence was ...' Strabo interrupts his historical narrative to make an observation. The older Peripatetics, after Theophrastus, had no books at all—or at any rate only



a few, and those mostly the exoteric writings; as a result they did no serious philosophy, and were content—or obliged—*—θέσζις ληκυθίζειν*, to declaim generalities.<sup>55</sup> The later Peripatetics, after Apellicon's edition, were better off; but even so for the most part they wittered, since Apellicon's texts were so poor. Plutarch is kinder than Strabo inasmuch as he allows that 'the older Peripatetics ... were in themselves evidently accomplished and scholarly men'; but it is not clear precisely what he intended to say about them.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps he amalgamated Strabo's two generations, lazily conjoining the two explanations ('no books', 'bad copies') which in Strabo apply to different groups of men. Perhaps he referred only to Strabo's older generation, who possessed nothing apart from the *exoterica*, few in number and 'inaccurate' inasmuch as they were essays in *haute vulgarisation*.

However that may be, it is a commonplace of modern scholarship that the Peripatos went into a decline on the death of Theophrastus, a decline from which it did not recover until the end of the millennium.<sup>57</sup> There were Peripatetics after Theophrastus; but they were little men, and they contributed little. Moreover, the Peripatetic philosophy was little esteemed during the Hellenistic period: the Porch and the Garden and the Sceptical Academy were the schools which counted; and if these schools argued interminably with one another, they scarcely knew or cared about the Peripatetics.

The commonplace—like most commonplaces—is true enough. There were Peripatetics of note after Theophrastus (there was Strato, there was Critolaus); but they do not stand comparison with the older masters or with the heroes of the Stoa and the Academy and the Garden. Again, the Lyceum was not completely unknown to the other schools; but it had relatively little influence on them. Strabo exaggerates and simplifies. But he does not invent.

How, then, to explain the sinking of the Peripatetic sun? Well, Strabo observes, there were no good books about—and you cannot do serious philosophy without a decent library. Before 85 BC you couldn't find any texts at all (except for the popular essays of Aristotle); and after 85 BC you were stuck with a wretchedly inadequate edition.

Strabo's explanation, alas, is valueless—and for several pretty evident reasons. Here one point will suffice: the explanation could work only if the library which went to Scepsis had included *all* extant copies of the major works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Question: Why, for two hundred years, did Theophrastus' successors do no work on logic? Answer: Because they had no copies of the *Analytics*. Evidently, the answer is at best thin; but it has no body at all unless *all* copies of the *Analytics* had been carted away to Scepsis.

Now the transportation of Aristotle's library to Scepsis does not by itself imply that no copies of the *Analytics* were thereafter to be found in Athens. We shall reach this conclusion only if we suppose in addition that there were no copies of the *Analytics* outside Aristotle's own library. And there is no reason to make this additional supposition: for all we know, Aristotle may have made multiple copies of his works; for all we know, his pupils may have taken copies for themselves; for all we know, the Lyceum may have had a library of its own which contained the works of the Master. There is no cause to imagine that Strato and his friends stood by and watched the only copies of their most valued texts sail off across the Aegean.

In any event, we have positive reason to suppose that some later Peripatetics had access to copies of various Aristotelian works. Eudemus probably owned some of Aristotle's writings on 'physics'<sup>58</sup>—and it is plain from what we know of his philosophical activities that he, like Theophrastus, made a close study of Aristotle's major works. No text suggests that Eudemus' library was ever buried in a

tunnel. Again, the titles of Strato's works indicate an interest in 'topics' (Diogenes Laertius, 5. 59–60); and we can scarcely doubt that he had read some of what we now know as Aristotle's *Topics*. It is a decent guess that the books which Strato left to Lycon<sup>59</sup> constituted the school library,<sup>60</sup> and the school library will surely have contained works by its first two masters.

Nor were the works reserved for card-carrying Peripatetics: a letter preserved by Philodemus, which probably comes from the pen of Epicurus, refers unambiguously to Aristotle's *Analytics* and *On Nature*.<sup>61</sup> The papyrus text is fragmentary; and scholars have imagined various contradictory explanations for the references. But the context makes it plain that these are works which the Epicureans knew about and in all probability had read.<sup>62</sup> Again, there is evidence in a work by Alexander of Aphrodisias conserved in Arabic translation—that Ebulides of Megara had criticized not merely Aristotle's personal morals<sup>63</sup> but also his logical acuity; and the nature of the criticism strongly suggests that Ebulides had read the *Prior Analytics*.<sup>64</sup> Again, it seems that someone in the Hellenistic period had written a commentary, or perhaps a paraphrase, of (parts of) the *De generatione et corruptione*.<sup>65</sup> Again, Posidonius surely read some Aristotelian material—at least the *Meteorological*.<sup>66</sup>

It was not only philosophers who knew of Aristotle's writings. Philochorus knew either the *Meteorologica* or something rather like it.<sup>67</sup> Callimachus used Aristotelian material for his book *On Birds*;<sup>68</sup> Aristophanes of Byzantium produced an epitome in four books of Aristotle's *Ἐπὶ ζῴων*;<sup>69</sup> and in one form or another Aristotle's zoological writings were widely known in the Hellenistic period.<sup>70</sup> In addition, the Alexandrian library, in which Aristophanes worked, is explicitly said to have contained copies of Aristotle's logical writings including numerous forgeries.<sup>71</sup> No doubt it was there that Artemon collected his eight books of

Aristotle's letters<sup>72</sup> if this Artemon is to be identified with the grammarian from Cassandreia.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the library had an impressive holding of Aristotle's works if the catalogue of Aristotle's writing preserved by Diogenes Laertius has Alexandrian origins.<sup>74</sup>

More such references could be added. I do not insinuate that Aristotle's texts were bestsellers in the Hellenistic period. But they—or some of them—were certainly available; and in particular, they were available to the later Peripatetics. Strabo's story cannot perform the explanatory task which he sets it. (From which we may not conclude that the story itself is a fiction.) 8. SULLA

'And Rome too had a considerable hand in this': that is to say, Rome did its bit to ensure that the later Peripatetics had no decent books.

Sulla, having taken Athens, stole Apellicon's library and in 84 bc brought it back to Rome.<sup>75</sup> What did the library then contain? Scholars assume that the original manuscripts of Aristotle were still on the shelves; but it is likely enough that, having made his improved transcripts, Apellicon destroyed the useless originals—and hence that Sulla's booty contained only Apellicon's edition.<sup>76</sup> However that may be, Sulla appears to have kept the things to himself; for the next character in the story, Tyrannio, does not come on stage until long after Sulla's death in 78 bc. So far as we know, neither Sulla nor anyone else took any immediate notice of his invaluable booty.

What happened to the books on Sulla's death? It is generally supposed that his son Faustus inherited the library.<sup>77</sup> No text tells us that this was so; but it is no doubt a reasonable guess—and we do possess one reference to the library of Faustus. In April 55, Cicero wrote to Atticus from Cumae, and remarked with pleasure: 'ego hic pascor bibliotheca Fausti' (*Att.* 4. 10. 1). Some scholars suppose that Cicero read the books at home: they observe that Faustus

got into debt and was obliged to sell his possessions (Plutarch, *Cicero* 27. 6 (874d)); and they surmise that Cicero had picked up the books.<sup>78</sup> There is no evidence for this—apart from the sentence I have just quoted. Other scholars suppose that Faustus had a villa at Cumae<sup>79</sup> with a library in which Cicero was allowed to browse. (No doubt it was the villa to which Faustus' father had retired.<sup>80</sup>) There is no evidence for this—apart from the sentence which I have just quoted.

In any event, Cicero does not mention seeing any Peripatetic works in Faustus' library<sup>81</sup>—even though in the same letter he pretends that he would 'rather sit on the stool which you place under the portrait of Aristotle than on a consular chair'

## 9. TYRANNIO

But Tyrannio saw them. Tyrannio is a familiar figure from Cicero's correspondence.<sup>82</sup> He was a scholar and a lover of Aristotle, and by flattering the librarian he got to see the Peripatetic books. When did he see the books and what did he do with them?

He was taken prisoner in the Second Mithridatic War, when Lucullus captured his home city of Amisus in 71 BC. Murena asked for him as his own prize of war (for the man was already celebrated as a literary scholar)—and immediately gave him his freedom (Plutarch, *Lucullus* 19. 8 (544c)). He removed to Rome either in about 70 (if he went under his own steam) or in 67 (if he travelled with Murena) or in 65 (if he waited for Lucullus). He made a name for himself among the Roman intellectuals, and Cicero's letters show that in the 50s he was hobnobbing with the mighty.

Two arguments have suggested a late date for his work on the Aristotelian texts. The first is meretricious. Tyrannio's work on accents, which he dedicated to Atticus, is generally put in 46 or 45, on the basis of *Att.* 12. 6. 2.<sup>83</sup> The book (it is

alleged) showed the influence of Peripatetic theories—but no knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. This implies that, in 46, Tyrannio did not yet know much about Aristotle: hence, that he had not yet been through the Sullan manuscripts. An enticing line of thought—but quite worthless. For we know next to nothing about the contents of *On Accents*—and certainly not enough to affirm that it did, or did not, show knowledge of Aristotle's views.<sup>84</sup>

Secondly, a genuine argument—though an argument from silence. In the middle 50s (perhaps in 56) Tyrannio rearranged Cicero's library, to Cicero's considerable satisfaction.<sup>85</sup> Cicero refers often enough to libraries. He refers frequently to Tyrannio and frequently to Aristotle.<sup>86</sup> He never couples the two names; he never hints that Tyrannio showed any interest in Aristotle; he never intimates that Tyrannio concerned himself with Sulla's library. Silence rarely proves much; but this particular silence is sustained and surprising—it suggests that Tyrannio did not get into Sulla's library until after the death of Cicero.

Nothing, so far as I can see, tells against dating Tyrannio's activities in the library to a period after 45.<sup>87</sup> One negative (act tells in its favour.

What exactly did he do when he got past the librarian?<sup>88</sup> Strabo uses the word *διβχβιρίσατο* (there is a variant reading, *ἐνεχειρίσατο*); Plutarch uses the word *ἐνοκενάσασθαι*. None of these words is a technical term from the science of librarianship; but each has a reasonably clear meaning. Strabo must mean to say that Tyrannio took in hand or *managed* the library (or that it was *entrusted* to him); Plutarch must mean that he *prepared* it presumably for publication. Certainly, our sources imply that he did some relatively serious work on the material—they do not say merely that he had a look at it or riffled through a scroll or two.

Plutarch does not say that Tyrannio published an edition, and neither does Strabo. But Strabo does remark that ‘certain booksellers made use of bad scribes’—which implies a publication, if not an edition. Does Strabo mean to suggest that the booksellers had independent access to the Sullan library, or does he rather insinuate that they were working under Tyrannio’s aegis? I incline to the latter view; but in either case we may reasonably speak of a ‘Roman edition’ of Aristotle.

Yet Strabo’s sentence about the booksellers is syntactically odd inasmuch as it lacks a main verb.<sup>89</sup> I suspect that the text is corrupt. Now according to Plutarch, ‘it is said that when the library had been taken to Rome the scholar Tyrannio prepared most of it and that Andronicus of Rhodes got hold of copies from him, published them and wrote the catalogue which is now in circulation’ (*Sulla* 26 (468b)). Plutarch does not mention any edition by Tyrannio; and Strabo—that is to say, our text of Strabo—does not mention Andronicus. Perhaps Strabo’s text has lost not merely a main verb but a sentence or two? Perhaps Strabo originally remarked that Tyrannio, having worked in the library, offered copies of the manuscripts to Andronicus, who entrusted their publication to incompetent booksellers? Were that so, then we might well conclude that Plutarch’s source was in fact the very passage of Strabo which, in a truncated version, we can still read.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, we should then conclude that neither Tyrannio nor an independent consortium of booksellers ever produced a Roman edition of Aristotle. But I have abjured such drunken speculation.

## 10. AFTER TYRANNIO

Faustus Sulla had a bad war and was killed in 46. We do not know what happened to his remaining possessions,<sup>91</sup> and there are conflicting reports about the fate of his family.<sup>92</sup> In any event, after Tyrannio had put his hand to the



manuscripts—whether this occurred before or after 46—we hear nothing at all of the things.<sup>93</sup>

No text suggests that Tyrannio himself took them away, legitimately or illegitimately, and added them to his own vast library;<sup>94</sup> nor that he gave them to Andronicus; nor that Andronicus bought or purloined them. Certain manuscripts, of unparalleled philosophical interest, reached Rome in 84 BC. They remained there unnoticed and unread for perhaps forty years or more. Cicero, whose appetite for philosophy was as voracious as his love of literature was passionate, and who had sat in the very library which contained the things, does not once mention them. Tyrannio worked them over. And then the manuscripts disappeared from view. No later Peripatetic keens their loss—or shows any knowledge of them or of the story of the Tunnel.

It is a strangely flaccid end to an originally robust story. It is indeed so strange that the most gullible of scholars might feel the gentle tug of scepticism. Can things *really* have happened like that? Is it not more plausible to think that the whole story was dreamed up as an elaborate joke? Yet we cannot be sceptical about the whole story (unless we are prepared, *pari ratione*, to be sceptics about the whole of ancient history): Apellicon surely bought, or thought he had bought, some Peripatetic manuscripts; these manuscripts—or transcripts made from them surely came to Rome with Sulla; Tyrannio surely saw them and did something on them. And then they were lost or destroyed.<sup>95</sup>

## 11. ANDRONICUS OF RHODES

Andronicus is said by Ammonius to have been the eleventh scholarch of the Lyceum.<sup>96</sup> Scholars have doubted the report inasmuch as elsewhere Ammonius makes Boethus of Sidon the eleventh scholarch (*In APr* 31. 11).<sup>97</sup> A simple emendation will unembarrass us;<sup>98</sup> but the issue is of no account here—except in so far as it has been thought to



have some bearing on the questions of where and when Andronicus worked.

First, when. The putative scholarchate helps us little; for we have no rigorous chronology for the Lyceum in this period. If Andronicus was eleventh scholarch, then we can place him some time in the first century BC. But this is hardly a thrilling result.

Philoponus says that Andronicus was the teacher of Boethus (*In Cat.* 5. 16); and this will give us a date for Andronicus—if we can find a date for Boethus.<sup>99</sup> The only evidence for Boethus' chronology is a reference in Strabo: 'Boethus ... with whom I studied Aristotelian philosophy' ( *Βοηθός . . . ὃν συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν*

*ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια*)' (16. 2. 24 (757)). We might initially take this to mean that Strabo and Boethus had been *fellow-students* of philosophy. But when *συμφιλοσοφεῖν* is used with the dative, the person referred to in the dative case may be a teacher rather than a fellow-pupil.<sup>100</sup> Strabo was born in the middle 60s;<sup>101</sup> and so we may infer rough birth-dates for Boethus: either the middle 60s (if he and Strabo were fellow-students) or some twenty or thirty years earlier (if he was Strabo's teacher).

Then if Andronicus taught Boethus, he will have been born either in about 90 BC or else some twenty or thirty years earlier.<sup>102</sup> The connection with Boethus will afford no greater precision than this.

There is one other piece of evidence—but it is the evidence of silence. Cicero never mentions either Andronicus or Boethus; and he says more than once in the 50s and 40s that Cratippus was the leading Peripatetic in Athens.<sup>103</sup> This silence has been thought to cast doubt upon the alleged scholarchates of Andronicus and Boethus. Here I consider it as evidence for their dates. Cicero knew the philosophical landscape reasonably well, and his letters give him constant opportunity to display his knowledge. Boethus was

indubitably a serious figure in the history of the Peripatos—far more serious than Cratippus. Had Boethus been active during Cicero's lifetime, he would surely have come to Cicero's attention—and Cicero would have indicated as much. And the same can be said of Andronicus.<sup>104</sup>

Suppose that Boethus was a contemporary of Strabo. Then he will not have flourished as a scholar until after Cicero's death. Suppose that Andronicus was only a decade or so older than Boethus—born, say, in the early 70s. Then his main intellectual activities may also have taken place after Cicero's death. These late datings are, so far as I can see, consistent with the little else we know about the Peripatetics of the period; and they offer the simplest explanation for Cicero's silence.

None of this is probative; and it is not difficult to think up half a dozen different explanations for the Ciceronian silence. None the less, the late dates, given our evidence, are the least unreasonable to profess.

Next, where did Andronicus work? He was born in Rhodes, an established centre of Peripatetic learning.<sup>105</sup> Plutarch presumably places him in Rome, where he got his copies from Tyrannio; and it is in any case plausible to suppose that, like most philosophers of the period, he travelled about the world. His edition of Aristotle is sometimes called 'the Roman edition'. The nomenclature—except for the definite article—is uncontroversial if it is taken to imply no more than that the edition was based (at least in part) on manuscripts which Andronicus had acquired in Rome. But it has been disputed whether the edition was prepared and published in Rome. After all, if Andronicus was Peripatetic scholar, then he will at some time have settled in Athens; and surely Athens was the proper place to edit a new text of Aristotle?

Similar things are said of Boethus. If he was scholar, then he surely settled in Athens. If he taught Strabo, it was surely in Athens. And if he was a fellow-student, Athens again will have been their meeting-place—would Boethus,

who hailed from Sidon, have gone *to Rome* to study Peripatetic philosophy?

Yet there is no evidence that Strabo ever went to Athens, although his travels are well documented in the *Geography*. We know that he spent much time in Alexandria (2. 3. 5 (101)); and it is possible that there he heard in the company of Boethus—the peripatetic Peripatetic Xenarchus.<sup>106</sup> We know that he was in Rome in the middle 40s.<sup>107</sup> It was surely there and then that he heard Tyrannio's lectures (12. 3. 16 (548)). And I suspect that it was then and there that he studied with or under Boethus.

However that may be, the only evidence for thinking that Boethus was ever in Athens is the evidence for his putative scholarchate. And the only evidence for thinking that Andronicus was ever in Athens is the evidence for his putative scholarchate. Scholars are naturally reluctant to believe that anything as learned as a text of Aristotle could have been produced in Republican Rome, and so they spirit the editor off to Greece. But this is to prefer prejudice to evidence: Strabo's story ends in Rome, and nothing in Plutarch hints that, with Andronicus, we leave Rome for Athens—or for Rhodes.

More important than Andronicus' date of birth and place of work is the date of his work on Aristotle and Theophrastus. Unless we reject Plutarch's evidence, the edition must be dated later than Tyrannio's activities in the Sullan library.<sup>108</sup> In other words, it cannot be dated before 65; it is implausible to date it before Cicero's death; and it need not be dated before the 20s. As for a *terminus ante quem*, that is fixed only by Andronicus' death.

There is one further piece of evidence—once again, the evidence of Cicero's silence. Cicero does not mention Andronicus' work on the texts. He refers frequently to Aristotle and to Aristotelian texts.<sup>109</sup> Not once does he suggest that anything novel or exciting had happened to them in his lifetime. The silence can be explained in

indefinitely many fashions. But there is one explanation which takes the prize for simplicity and plausibility: Cicero does not mention the edition of Aristotle because it was not produced until after his death.

## 12. ANDRONICUS THE SCHOLAR

We know a reasonable amount about Andronicus' intellectual activities: he wrote a book *On Division* which Plotinus praised and Porphyry knew;<sup>110</sup> he wrote a paraphrastic commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* which Plotinus also esteemed<sup>111</sup> and to which Simplicius makes some thirty brief allusions;<sup>112</sup> he passed comments on parts of the *Physics*;<sup>113</sup> and he had something to say about Aristotle's psychology.<sup>114</sup>

In addition, there are the *Πίνακες* to which Plutarch refers and which ran to at least five books.<sup>115</sup> This work, a 'biobibliography' or *Life* plus *Catalogue*, survives only in an Arabic version, which was presumably done from a Syriac translation of the Greek.<sup>116</sup> The Arabic text calls its author Baṭlamīyūs al-Garīb or Ptolemy the Unknown, a nomenclature which has induced extravagant conjectures about his identity and date."<sup>117</sup> In the dedicatory letter, to one Gallus,<sup>118</sup> Ptolemy explains that when he was first asked for a work on Aristotle, he thought to give Gallus a copy of Andronicus' book; later, realizing that the book was too long and too difficult, he determined to write a compendium of his own on the subject—which he did alone and unaided, when his copy of Andronicus was not to hand.<sup>119</sup> We are not obliged, or expected, to believe the profession of originality—it is a common literary conceit;<sup>120</sup> but even if we infer that Ptolemy's work was in fact an epitome of Andronicus' *Πίνακες*, we must still wonder how much of Andronicus we can glimpse through the fog and darkness of the Arabic text.

At any rate this much is clear: Ptolemy's work was far shorter than Andronicus' *Πίνακες*. Even if, as is likely, the first book of the *Πίνακες* consisted of a biography of Aristotle

and contained a transcription of his will,<sup>121</sup> there remain four books (at least) for the catalogue proper. It is true that Andronicus appears to have dealt with all the works written by or ascribed to Aristotle;<sup>122</sup> but even so, an organized list of titles would scarcely have filled a single scroll. And in fact Andronicus' *Catalogues*—like the great model for all such works, the *Πίνακες* of Callimachus—evidently contained more than a mere list of titles: in addition, for some works at least, it gave an *incipit* and an indication of length;<sup>123</sup> it dealt with questions of authenticity; and perhaps it discussed the proper arrangement and order of Aristotle's writings—for Andronicus famously urged readers to start with logic.<sup>124</sup> Andronicus also drew up a *Πίναξ* of Theophrastus' writings: we hear virtually nothing about this work<sup>125</sup>—but presumably it followed the same format as the Aristotelian *Πίναξ*.

A substantial *œuvre*, and on good Peripatetic themes.<sup>126</sup> But how sound was he as a scholar? Plotinus esteemed him, and so did Porphyry. According to Boethius, 'antiquity regarded him as a precise and industrious judge and cataloguer<sup>127</sup> of Aristotle's books'.<sup>128</sup> Themistius praised him for the lucidity of his exposition<sup>129</sup>—and so too did Galen, a man who rarely praised scholars other than himself (*An. Corp.* 4. 782 Kühn). And the moderns have given him a decent press—it has been roundly asserted that 'he was a fine scholar and in certain respects an innovator, a good example of Hellenistic erudition and scholarship, with the imperfections and merits of his age';<sup>130</sup> and it has been claimed that his *Life* of Aristotle disdained the tittle-tattle of most ancient biographies and went for sober scholarly facts.<sup>131</sup> The *Πίνακες* indubitably represents a major and original piece of learning: Andronicus did for the Peripatetics what Apollonius of Tyre had done for the Stoics<sup>132</sup>—and did it, so far as we can now judge, with more zeal and in more detail.

Yet there is room for doubt about his judgement. He athetized the *De interpretatione*—and on patently inadequate grounds.<sup>133</sup> In addition, he collected twenty books of Aristotelian *Letters*,<sup>134</sup> which he presumably took to be genuine—although they included the evidently forged correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander.<sup>135</sup> But it would be perverse to ground a pessimistic assessment on such a small basis.

In any event, none of this yet bears upon my central concerns. Scholars have supposed that Andronicus edited a text of Aristotle which was, or contained, our modern *corpus Aristotelicum*, and that in doing so he in effect created all or at least some of our modern Aristotelian texts. Then it is to be asked: first, did Andronicus produce a canonical *edition* of (all or some of) Aristotle's works? Secondly, did Andronicus establish the *corpus Aristotelicum* or a canonical *corpus Aristotelicum*? Thirdly, did Andronicus create all or some of Aristotle's main treatises?

### 13. THE ANDRONICAN EDITION

The evidence for an edition, in the strict sense of the word, is meagre: it consists in Plutarch's statement that Andronicus 'published' ('εἰς μέσον θείναι') the manuscripts which he secured from Tyrannio. That is to say, Andronicus published the Aristotelian texts which he got from Tyrannio, who had found them in the library of Sulla, who had liberated them from the house of Apellicon, who had bought them from the family of Neleus, who had inherited them from Theophrastus, who had inherited them from Aristotle. Nothing in Plutarch's brief remarks says or implies that these texts included all the works which Andronicus catalogued in his *Πίνακες*; but Plutarch does clearly imply that the texts included all Aristotle's main philosophical works (and, less clearly, that they excluded the 'exoteric' works). Scholars often suggest that the Andronican edition coincided, more or less, with the contents—or with the genuine contents—of our *corpus*



*Aristotelicum*; but if this speculation is correct, then it is correct by hazard.

Scholars also often write as though Andronicus' edition offered the world for the first time a reliable text of Aristotle's writings; and they imagine him combing libraries for manuscripts, collating them, and producing a solid Teubner edition.<sup>136</sup> In Plutarch there is no whiff of this romantic perfume. Plutarch does not say that Andronicus produced a scholarly edition of Aristotle's works, nor that he collated any manuscripts: he says that he published the copies which Tyrannio provided him with. He does not even say that Tyrannio turned over to Andronicus the manuscripts which he had found in Sulla's library—or that Andronicus himself ever troubled to look at them. Admittedly, Plutarch's story might be imagined to have a sunny ending—once the books from the Tunnel were back in circulation the Peripatetics could philosophize again. But Strabo's story is doggedly gloomy. (Even if his text originally contained a reference to Andronicus, the ending was still glum.) And it is evident that the operetta will not tolerate a rollicking final chorus; for according to Strabo (as we have him), Tyrannio was working from rotten manuscripts, to which his copyists added blunders of their own; and according to Plutarch (and perhaps originally according to Strabo), Andronicus published copies taken from these same rotten manuscripts.<sup>137</sup> There is no reason to think that Andronicus' text was any better, from an editorial point of view, than the texts which earlier readers had perused. All we are actually told is that he gave the world transcriptions of some poor manuscripts. The 'Roman edition' of Aristotle, so far as we can judge, offered nothing new to the scholarly public.

We possess several thousand pages of ancient commentary on Aristotle's works, many of them written by serious scholars (Alexander, Ammonius, Simplicius). The commentators frequently refer to variant readings, and are acutely aware that different manuscripts present different

texts.<sup>138</sup> So far as I know, in none of these textual discussions is there any reference to a ‘canonical’ edition of the Aristotelian works, or any hint that one particular manuscript tradition might be better than another. Certainly, there is no passage which refers to Andronicus as the author of a canonical edition. Indeed, in all the pages of later commentary, there are only two passages which associate Andronicus with textual scholarship—and one of these passages is a sham.

The sham is Dexippus, *In Cat.* 21. 18–19. Dexippus reports that according to Boethus and Andronicus the phrase *λόγος τῆς οὐσίας* was missing from certain manuscripts of *Cat.* 1<sup>a</sup>1: he thus implies that Andronicus—and after him Boethus—reported variant readings and therefore had consulted, or at least learned about, a variety of manuscripts. But Dexippus is paraphrasing the lost commentary of Porphyry; and—alas for Dexippus—we happen to know, from Simplicius, what Porphyry actually said. He said that some manuscripts must have omitted the phrase *τῆς οὐσίας* at *Cat.* 1<sup>a</sup>1 inasmuch as Boethus and Andronicus ignored these words in their paraphrases (Simplicius, *In Cat.* 29. 28–30. 5). Porphyry does not refer to textual investigations by Andronicus and Boethus; he does not refer to Andronicus’ edition of *Cat.* Dexippus misread Porphyry: what appears to be evidence of scholarly beavering by Andronicus is evidence of shoddy work by Dexippus.

The second passage is Simplicius, *In Phys.* 440. 14–17 (on *Phys.* 202<sup>a</sup>14): Simplicius read the text which we find in our medieval manuscripts; but he reports that Andronicus had a different and evidently inferior—reading. (He does not speak of an emendation by Andronicus,<sup>139</sup> nor does he suggest that Andronicus had chosen his reading from a selection of manuscript offerings. He simply reports that Andronicus had presented, and attempted to explain, a bad text.) What are we to make of this silence? You might suggest that since



Andronicus' text had become the standard edition, there was no sense in reporting specifically Andronican readings. But this does not fit with the one reference to an Andronican reading which we do possess: Simplicius does not write as though the Andronican text were canonical. You might, secondly, suggest that Andronicus in fact stands behind all or many or some of the anonymous references to variant readings which are reported by the later commentators. This suggestion could be true—but it is unverifiable. There is a third possibility: I suspect that Andronicus' textual activities aroused little interest among Aristotelian scholars and left little mark on Peripatetic scholarship.<sup>140</sup> And this would not be particularly surprising if, as Plutarch's report implies, Andronicus merely published copies of corrupt manuscripts.

#### 14. THE ANDRONICAN CORPUS

I have written of 'our *corpus Aristotelicum*'. The phrase 'our corpus' is, I take it, generally used to refer to the ordered series of works, genuine and spurious, printed in Bekker's Aristotle. And this is an amiable enough convention—provided it is realized that 'our corpus', thus understood, was invented in 1830. Bekker's sequence is not found before Bekker not in earlier printed editions, not in the medieval manuscripts, not in the ancient commentaries. It would be astonishing had Andronicus put together 'our corpus', presciently anticipating the work of another scholar in another land and another millennium.

Those scholars who believe that Andronicus invented 'the corpus' no doubt have something less magical in mind. Bekker's edition contains forty-five items,<sup>141</sup> of which perhaps fifteen are spurious. Call the remaining thirty genuine items 'the modern canon'.<sup>142</sup> Then Andronicus' supporters may be represented as maintaining that it was he who invented the modern canon.

Did he invent it? The best evidence for thinking that he did is the evidence of Ptolemy's catalogue. The catalogue

certainly does not correspond precisely to Andronicus' Πίναξ, and the assumption that it is based closely on the Πίναξ is not indisputable. None the less, let us grant the assumption, λόγου ἔνεκα; for if we do not, then there is no case at all for making Andronicus the master canoneer.

Ptolemy's catalogue, in its present form, lists just under a hundred items.<sup>143</sup> The works appear to fall into groups—although the Arabic text does not mark any subdivisions.<sup>144</sup> Items 29–56 form such an ordered group, a group which I shall call 'Ptolemy's corpus'; the set of its elements I shall call 'Ptolemy's canon'. Ptolemy's canon contains all the elements of the modern canon, save *Insomn.*, *Div Somn.*, *Resp.*, and *EN* (which do not appear anywhere in the catalogue). It is likely enough that the two brief essays, on dreams and divination in dreams, were taken to be parts of *Somn.*, which does figure in the canon. And *EN*? Many scholars have guessed that Ptolemy's canon originally contained *EN*, which accidentally dropped out at some point in the painful history of the text. Perhaps the same is true of *Resp.*

Ptolemy's canon contains three items which are not in the modern canon. The presence of one of them, *Anatomies*, is surprising.<sup>145</sup> The other two are *MM* and *Plant*.

Of the fifteen spurious works included in the modern corpus, only seven are found in Ptolemy, and they are scattered through the catalogue, forming no block or set. Elsewhere in the catalogue there are four titles which might possibly be doublets of four of the canonical works.

Within Ptolemy's corpus things are ordered thus: first logic; then ethics (including politics); then poetics and rhetoric; physics; psychology; biology; and finally metaphysics. This order is different from the order of Bekker's corpus; but it answers fairly well to the general practice recommended by the late Platonist teachers: 'we should begin with logic ... after logic, we should proceed to ethics, and then to physics, and mathematics, and finally to theology' (Ammonius, *In Cat.*

6. 5–9). Ammonius is rehearsing a commonplace.<sup>146</sup> (Theology is metaphysics.) Thus the Ptolemaic canon corresponds in content to the modern canon, and the Ptolemaic corpus to the corpus of late antiquity.

If the Ptolemaic corpus is Andronican, then we may properly conclude that Andronicus invented, if not the modern corpus, then at least the modern canon. Is the Ptolemaic corpus Andronican? If we are to ascribe it to anyone before Ptolemy, then it is reasonable to ascribe it to Andronicus; for we know that Ptolemy used Andronicus, and there is no one else we know he used. Hence either Andronicus or scepticism. Is there any reason for scepticism?

Consider, for example, the order of the works in the Ptolemaic corpus. It would be rash to suppose that this was precisely the Andronican order.<sup>147</sup> Other scholars worked between Andronicus and Ptolemy, and Ptolemy's work may well reflect the influence of later scholarship—perhaps, say, of Adrastus, a teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who wrote *On the Order of Aristototele's Writings*.<sup>148</sup>

Moreover, it should be remarked that, although the later commentators frequently discuss questions bearing on the order and arrangement of Aristotle's works, the name of Andronicus appears only once in such discussions,<sup>149</sup> and there is no hint anywhere that his arrangement came to be regarded with any special veneration. Here, as with his textual activities, Andronicus cuts no figure in the commentaries.

The order of the Ptolemaic corpus corresponds roughly to the order of subjects in the thin doxography which Diogenes Laertius appends to his *Life of Aristotle* (5. 29–33); and it is plausibly urged that Diogenes' discussion represents a late Hellenistic account of Aristotelianism.<sup>150</sup> I guess that Andronicus was aware of such a doxographical ordering and that he used it as a basis for his arrangement of some of the Aristotelian works. Later scholars will have taken a broadly

similar approach, one instance of which we may see in Ptolemy.

So much for Andronicus' corpus, the ordered sequence of works. What of his canon? Here three facts may be adduced. First, Andronicus' canon, unlike the canon of Ptolemy, will not have contained the *De interpretatione*, a work which he regarded as spurious.<sup>151</sup> Later commentators regarded the *De int.* as an essential part of Aristotle's logic: it deals (to put things crudely) with *propositions*, items which come half-way between the *terms* which are the subject of *Cat.* and the *syllogisms* which are the subject of *APr.* Dropping *De int.* from the canon may thus make a significant difference to the way in which Aristotle's logic is construed; and had Andronicus' view prevailed, the history of logic would have been substantially different.

Secondly, and in a similar vein, Andronicus' canon will not have included precisely our *Cat.* In his commentary on the final chapters of the *Categories*—the so-called 'postpredicaments'—Simplicius reports that 'some scholars, among them Andronicus, say that these chapters were added, contrary to the aim of the book, by someone who entitled the *Categories* *Πρὸ τῶν τόπων*' (*In Cat.* 379. 8–10). There are difficulties with this report;<sup>152</sup> and in particular, it is uncertain whether, according to Simplicius, Andronicus athetized the postpredicaments or placed them elsewhere in the corpus. A parallel text in Boethius perhaps lends support to the latter option.<sup>153</sup> But in any event, it is evident that Andronicus' version of the *Categories* did not contain the pages which conclude our modern editions: Andronicus' *Cat.* was different from our *Cat.*

Moreover, our modern text of *Cat.*—at least in its general structure—was the text current *before* Andronicus set to work; for Andronicus found the postpredicaments attached to *Cat.*, and did not like what he found. Here our Aristotle not

only does not follow Andronicus—it represents a state of affairs which Andronicus tried to change.

The third point is longer and more complicated: it concerns Simplicius, *In Phys.* 923. 3–925. 2<sup>154</sup>

In late antiquity it was generally agreed that our eight-book *Physics* falls into two parts.<sup>155</sup> A minority, which included Porphyry,<sup>156</sup> made the division at the end of Book 4. Most made the division at the end of Book 5. At the beginning of his commentary on *Phys.* 6 Simplicius offers a short essay on the topic, in which he defends the majority view:<sup>157</sup> together with ‘the Peripatetics’ he is content to call *Phys.* 6 ‘Zeta’ or ‘the sixth book’; but he holds that, in the strict sense, only Books 1–5 are properly entitled *Φυσικά*, Books 6–8 constituting a distinct work *Περὶ κινήσεως*.

The essay twice cites Andronicus. First, Andronicus is reported as favouring the five-three division. Immediately after this reference to Andronicus, Simplicius cites a letter from Theophrastus to Eudemus in which a sentence from *Phys.* 5 is said to occur *ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς*: the citation is taken to show that Theophrastus also took the majority view, regarding Book 5 as continuous with Books 1–4. Secondly, Simplicius reports that although Andronicus took *Phys.* 6 to be the first book of the *Περὶ κινήσεως*, none the less he made it follow directly on *Phys.* 5. Just before this second reference to Andronicus, Simplicius quotes a phrase from an otherwise unknown biography of Eudemus written by an otherwise unknown Damas: the biography spoke of ‘the three books concerning motion in Aristotle’s treatise on nature’ and hence justified the title *Περὶ κινήσεως* for *Phys.* 6 8.

It is widely supposed that Simplicius must have taken the two quotations, from Theophrastus’ letter and from Damas’ biography, from Andronicus. This supposition in turn suggests a more entertaining hypothesis: perhaps Simplicius modelled the whole of *In Phys.* 923. 3–925. 2 on Andronicus; perhaps, indeed, the major part of it is actually a fragment

from Andronicus' *Πίνακες*.<sup>158</sup> This is fantasy. Nothing in the text suggests that Simplicius is quoting Andronicus. There is no evidence that the reference to Damas came from Andronicus—there were plenty of sources of esoteric learning on which the later commentators could draw. It is perhaps more tempting to assign the Theophrastan letter to Andronicus; but nothing positively invites the assignation. We are warranted in printing 923. 9 and 924. 19–20 as *testimonia* to Andronicus (not, of course, as *fragmenta*); and if nothing excludes the notion that Simplicius took rather more from Andronicus than this, nothing supports the notion. It is idle to develop theses about Andronicus' *modus operandi* on the base of this Simplician text.

But the text may still yield something. Andronicus, according to Simplicius, held that our *Phys.* 1–5 form a unity, and that our *Phys.* 6–8 form a unity. He also held that our *Phys.* 6 (his *Περικινήσεως A*) followed immediately on our *Phys.* 5 (his *Φυσικά E*). Simplicius appears to imply that Andronicus did not regard our *Phys.* as a unitary work; at any rate, he does not say that Andronicus took the conjunction of his *Φυσικά* and his *Περικινήσεως* to constitute a single whole, nor that he gave it a unifying title. Perhaps Book *A* of the *Περὶ κινήσεως* followed Book *E* of the *Φυσικά* in the way in which, say *Cael.* I follows *Phys.* 8. If this is so, then *Phys.* was not to be found in Andronicus' canon.

The division which Andronicus adopted, and which 'the Peripatetics' accepted, has nothing to recommend it; and if our *Phys.* is to be divided anywhere, the cut should come at the end of Book 4, where Porphyry made it. Porphyry's view was not a novelty: it is to be found in Nicolaus of Damascus.<sup>159</sup> Nicolaus probably wrote after Andronicus; but perhaps the four-four division was found earlier, and perhaps Andronicus' contribution to scholarship on the *Physics* consisted in replacing the four-four division by a five-three division.



What conclusion is to be drawn from all this? If Ptolemy followed Andronicus reasonably closely, then Andronicus' *Πίνακες* contained a group of works which correspond roughly to the genuine items in the modern *corpus Aristotelicum*. The *order* of the items in Ptolemy's canonical group was different from the order in our Aristotle; and it would be absurd to suppose that the Andronican order was the same as 'our' order. As for the *content* of the canon, Ptolemy is close to us—but the few detailed pieces of evidence which bear on the contents of Andronicus' canon all point to differences between him and Ptolemy.<sup>160</sup>

None the less, it is perhaps not excessively credulous to hold that Andronicus' *Πίνακες* grouped together a number of works which corresponded, *grosso modo*, to Ptolemy's canon—and which therefore correspond *grosso modo* to the modern canon. And thus, in an etiolated sense, Andronicus founded the canon. Or rather, he founded the canon if his grouping of the texts was an original enterprise. Is there evidence for originality?

A text which I have so far kept in the wings must now make its appearance—it is the text upon which Andronicus' reputation as the founder of modern Aristotelian scholarship ultimately rests. In his *Life* of Plotinus, Porphyry explains how he came to edit his master's works.

Plotinus himself entrusted me with the task of arranging and correcting his books, and I promised him when he was alive—and assured his other companions—that I would do so. First, I judged that I should not leave the books in the chronological order in which they had confusingly been published: rather, I should imitate Apollodorus of Athens and Andronicus the Peripatetic, the former of whom collected Epicharmus the comic poet into ten volumes while the latter divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, collecting related material into the same place [  
*ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς*



πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτόν συναγαγών

]. And so I divided the fifty-four books of Plotinus I possessed into six enneads (I was delighted to hit upon the perfection of the number six and the enneads); and in each ennead I united the related texts, putting first in order the higher subjects. (*Vit. Plot.* 24) Porphyry invokes Apollodorus and Andronicus in a specific connection. Plotinus' essays had been 'published' as they were written, and the only order they had was chronological.<sup>161</sup> Porphyry determined—perhaps controversially—to change this: he would organize the stuff into volumes and arrange it by subject-matter. It is as a model (and perhaps as a justification) for this that he refers to Apollodorus and Andronicus. Porphyry means to suggest, I think, that his organization of the material into a certain number—a highly significant number—of volumes imitated the procedure of Apollodorus,<sup>162</sup> while his unification of related texts was modelled on the work of Andronicus. According to Porphyry, then, Andronicus found Aristotle's (and Theophrastus') writings in a jumble—they had no thematic ordering. And he reduced them to coherence and to order.<sup>163</sup>

Although Porphyry does not name his source, the most plausible guess takes us to a work by Andronicus himself, namely the *Πίνακες*. Plutarch refers to the work as being current in his day; Ptolemy could refer his readers to it; and I assume that it would have been available to Porphyry. Porphyry's report of Andronicus' accomplishment will then go back to the horse himself. And in any event, scholars have not felt tempted to doubt its general veracity.

Porphyry implies that Andronicus put Aristotle's texts in some sort of systematic order, but he leaves us to guess at the details for ourselves. A first guess might run like this: Andronicus found the works—*Cat.*, *Cael.*, *PA.*, *Pol.*, and the rest—offered higgledy-piggledy to the world. In such circumstances, Aristotle was not easy to read; and Andronicus determined to assemble a *corpus* the

consecutive study of which would yield a coherent and satisfactory understanding of Aristotle's philosophical system. His sequence no doubt started with the logical works, *Cat.*, *APr.*, *APst.*, ... [164](#) no doubt *GA* came after *PA*, *Pol.* after *EN*, and so on.

This guess cannot be the whole truth. For Porphyry does not say or imply that Andronicus arranged the *canonical* works of Aristotle into a coherent sequence. Rather, he indicates that Andronicus arranged *all* the works of Aristotle into a satisfying order. The evidence of Ptolemy confirms the indication: Andronicus' *Πίνακες* may not have enumerated a thousand items; but the items constituting the canon formed only a fraction of the total. None the less, Porphyry implies that before Andronicus there was no standard and systematic ordering of Aristotle's works; and so, in particular, he implies that there was no canon and no corpus. Thus Porphyry gives us the evidence for Andronicus' originality.

## 15. ANDRONICUS AND THE, TREATISES

Most scholars think that Porphyry's text gives us evidence for very much more than this. For the text is taken to provide an affirmative answer to the third of my three questions: [165](#) did Andronicus create all or some of Aristotle's major treatises? 'After all, it is argued, according to Porphyry, Andronicus "divided the works of Aristotle ... into treatises, collecting related material into the same place". In other words, he did not merely place, say, *Cael.* before *GG*: he created *Cael.* and *GC*, by uniting various separate essays or pamphlets and forming them into single treatises. Who composed, created, our modern *Metaphysics*? Andronicus, not Aristotle; for Andronicus found a dozen Aristotelian essays on such topics as substance and form and first principles; he collected them together, perhaps adding a few bridge passages and cross-references, and he set them under one title. Before Andronicus there was no such work as Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Take your copy of the OCT

*Metaphysics*. Tear it apart. Rebind it as a dozen or so separate pamphlets. Shuffle well, and read. *That* is how ‘the *Metaphysics*’ was read before Andronicus; that is how Aristotle wrote it. You may think that Andronicus did a good job, giving intelligible and systematic form to Aristotle’s philosophy; or you may think that he did a bad job, disguising the essentially piecemeal and aporcttic nature of Aristotle’s thought. But in either case, his influence on the history of Aristotelianism was immeasurable.’

All this reads far too much into the text. Porphyry *says* nothing at all about the creation of our Aristotelian treatises—he does not say that Andronicus invented *Top.* or put together *EN* or cobbled up *Met.* Nor does he imply such creative activity. His own work on Plotinus’ manuscripts did not involve the creation of ‘new’ works: Porphyry did not take an essay here and a squib there and unite them into a tract or treatise. On the contrary, he found fifty-four essays and he left fifty-four essays. He found the fifty-four essays in no order other than the order of their writing, and he left the same fifty-four essays in what he took to be a more satisfactory and a more philosophical order. The constituent essays of the *Enneads* are more or less as Plotinus left them—certainly, they are not Porphyrian inventions.

No doubt scholars have tacitly supposed that Porphyry thought of an *Ennead* as comparable to a treatise; and that just as he created *Enn. I* from nine separate elements, so Andronicus created *Top.* from eight disparate essays. But this supposition is not to be dug out of Porphyry’s report. We might better regard *groups* of treatises as comparable to *Enneads*—after all, the nine essays in *Enn. I* do not make up a single work, whereas the eight elements in *Top.* do: it is the *Organon*, not *Top.*, which is analogous to an *Ennead*. Yet I do not want to insist on this second analogy. Recall that Porphyry cites both Apollodorus and Andronicus, Apollodorus for the arranging into books and Andronicus for the ordering by subject. There is *no* implicit comparison between *Enn. I*

and any Aristotelian unit—the *Enneads* correspond to the books of Apollodorus' Epicharmus; the principle of ordering within the *Enneads* corresponds to Andronicus' principle of ordering within the body of Aristotle's works.

Thus Porphyry does not hint that Andronicus invented the treatises. But there are more texts to consider; for the surviving catalogues of Aristotle's books have been thought to shed brilliant light on Andronicus' achievement as an organizer and arranger. Three catalogues exist:<sup>166</sup> one in Diogenes Laertius, 5. 22–7; a second in the anonymous *Vita Menagiana*, which derives from the *Onomatologos* of Hesychius of Miletus;<sup>167</sup> and the third in Ptolemy.<sup>168</sup>

The catalogues have different origins and different natures. The anonymous list is composite: one part derives from the same tradition as the list in Diogenes; a second part is a later addition. Its very existence serves to show that Andronicus' *Πίναξ* did not monopolize all later accounts of Aristotle's *œuvre*; but in the present context it contributes little, and I shall largely ignore its offerings.

The list in Ptolemy, as I have already observed, is most probably based—at an uncertain remove—on the list of works in Andronicus' *Πίναξ*: it represents a catalogue, systematically organized, of all the known works of Aristotle. The list in Diogenes is generally taken to derive from Hermippus, and hence from Callimachus' *Πίνακες* and the catalogue of the Alexandrian library.<sup>169</sup> The list is commonly referred to as a library catalogue; but the notion of a library catalogue is not precise: such a catalogue might, for example, list all the library's Aristotelian holdings (including duplicate copies), or it might list all the works of Aristotle represented in the library, or it might even list (or purport to list) all the known works of Aristotle, whether they were in the library or not.<sup>170</sup> The large gaps in Diogenes' catalogue suggest that it was not intended to represent a complete listing of Aristotle's known works;<sup>171</sup> and the 'doublets', or

apparent doublets, in the list suggest that it was perhaps a list of library holdings. At any rate, it had an earlier origin than Ptolemy's list, and a different nature.

Ptolemy's catalogue included most—if not all of the items in what I have called the modern canon of Aristotle's writings.<sup>172</sup> Of these thirty canonical writings, thirteen appear to be present in Diogenes' catalogue, namely: *Cat.* (no. 141), *Int.* (142), *APr.* (49), *APst.* (50), *Top.* (55b), *SEI* (28), *Phys.* (120), *An.* (13), *Met.*, *Pol.* (75), *Rhet.* (78), *Poet.* (83), and an *Ethics* (38).<sup>173</sup> There is already a striking difference from Ptolemy; and the difference increases when we look at Diogenes' catalogue with a penetrating eye. For most of the thirteen modern items are dubious in one way or another.

Thus *Cat.* and *Int.* occur at the very end of the list, and look like a later addition to an existing catalogue. *Top.* and *Met.* are not found in our MSS of Diogenes Laertius: editors sometimes add them on the grounds that they appear in the first part of the anonymous list, where they are items 52 and III. But it is far from certain that careless scribes dropped them from Diogenes—perhaps, rather, officious readers added them to the anonymous.<sup>174</sup>

In any case, the *Top.* and *Met.* of the anonymous list are not to be identified straightforwardly with our *Top.* and *Met.*; for in the anonymous list they number respectively seven and ten books whereas our *Top.* has eight books and our *Met.* fourteen.<sup>175</sup> Similarly, a three-book *Rhet.* is found only in the anonymous list (as item 72): Diogenes Laertius has a *Rhet.* in two books. And his one-volume *Περὶ ψυχῆς* cannot be conflated with our three-volume *An.* Again, for *APr.* Diogenes has *Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν θ'*—a nine-book work the relation of which to our two-volume *APr.* is anyone's guess;<sup>176</sup> nor can the four volumes of *Λύσεις ἐριστικάι* be reduced to our *SEI*. The thirty-eight books of *Φυσικά κατὰ στοιχείον*—an alphabetical list of topics—have nothing to do with our *Phys.*

The five books of *Ethics* are a puzzle. But plainly it would be rash to identify, without ado, any of the three ethical works in our *corpus* with the item in Diogenes' catalogue. As for *APst.*, Diogenes refers to Ἀναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων μεγάλων β'—the book number is right, but the epithet μεγάλων implies that someone knew of another *APst.*,<sup>177</sup> and it is therefore uncertain that the *APst.* in Diogenes' list is the work we read today. The title of *Pol.* is given as: Πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου ἡ. It is usually supposed that this corresponds to our eight-book *Pol.*; but the reference to Theophrastus is puzzling,<sup>178</sup> and the structure of our *Pol.* and the order of its books are notoriously problematical.

There remains only *Poet.*<sup>179</sup> Of the thirteen modern titles apparently found in Diogenes' catalogue, four are probable intruders and a further eight are sensibly different from anything which we read today. And as for *Poet.*, we read at best half the text which Diogenes designated.

And yet the missing items are perhaps not completely absent from the catalogue. For in some cases at least we can find entries which appear to answer to parts of one or other of our familiar treatises. The simplest example concerns the spurious *MXG*: no work of this name figures in Diogenes' list; but we do find three separate entries—*On Melissus*, *On Xenophanes*, *On Gorgias*. It is a reasonable bet that these three items were at some time united into our *MXG*. Again, the list contains an entry *Περὶ ζώων θ'* and also a *Περὶ τοῦ μή γεννᾶν α'*: perhaps they represent *HA* 1 9 and *HA* 10. Other cases are more complex. Thus it has been suggested that our *Phys.* was 'built up' from seven distinct essays or groups of essays: *Phys.* 1 is the *Περὶ ἀρχῶν α'* (Diogenes' item 41); *Phys.* 2 is the *Περὶ φύσεως α'* (Anonymus, item 81); *Phys.* 3. 1–3 is *Περὶ κινήσεως α'* (Diogenes, 45); *Phys.* 3. 4–4. 9 is a *Περὶ ἀπείρου καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ* which did not make its mark on the catalogues; *Phys.* 4. 10–14 is the *Περὶ χρόνου α'* (Anonymus, 170); *Phys.* 5, 6, and 8 are a *Περὶ κινήσεως γ'*,



again not known from the catalogues; and *Phys* 7 is the *Περὶ κινήσεως α'* (Diogenes, 115). The *Περὶ φύσεως γ'* (Diogenes, 90) represents a first consolidation of *Phys.* 2–4. And our eight-volume *Phys.* is found in Ptolemy's catalogue as item 34 (and perhaps also as item 17).<sup>180</sup> Similar stories can be told for *Top.*, *Met.*, *EN*, and so on.

Thus there is a mismatch between the catalogue in Diogenes and the Ptolemaic catalogue; in particular, Diogenes' catalogue fails to list, in their modern form, the works which compose the Ptolemaic canon. How is the mismatch to be explained? One explanation is this: the mismatch gives us a measure of the work done by Andronicus. Diogenes' catalogue represents the state of things before Andronicus had got to work on the texts. Ptolemy's catalogue is a partial representation of the state of things after Andronicus. The difference is precisely the work of Andronicus. The canonical *Met.* is unknown to Diogenes. It is part of Ptolemy's canon. It was invented by Andronicus.

The explanation is seductive. Should we fall?

## 16. CICERO

Andronicus' contribution to Aristotelian studies cannot be measured by appeal to the catalogue in Diogenes Laertius unless the catalogue is assumed to represent the general state of the Aristotelian corpus in the period before Andronicus.

Have we any reason to think that it does not? Or, to put the same question in a different form, is there any evidence for the existence of 'Andronican' works in the period before Andronicus: does anyone writing before about 40 BC know, say, *GA* or *Met.* or *Top.*? There is evidence aplenty—as I have already indicated—that Aristotle's 'esoteric' thought was to some degree known throughout the Hellenistic period; and there is abundant evidence that various people were acquainted with 'the Peripatetic system'. But none of this evidence in itself provides an answer to my question.



It is not enough to show that, say, Epicurus knew and criticized some of the views which Aristotle expresses in our *De caelo*. Perhaps he did. Perhaps he had read an Aristotelian work on astronomy. But we may not infer that the work was our *Cael*—it might, for example, have been the 'Ἀστρονομικόν α' which we find in Diogenes' catalogue. Equally, the fact that Epicurus explicitly refers to an *Analytics* and an *On Nature* does not show that he had read our *Analytics* or our *Physics*: it shows only that he had read Aristotelian works entitled '*Analytics*' and '*On Nature*'—perhaps he read the nine-volume *APr.* and the three-volume *Περὶ φύσεως* which appear in the catalogue. (And perhaps there were other *Analytics* and other works on nature which have left no trace in our thin records.) These remarks eliminate, in advance of the case, most of the texts which might have been deemed admissible evidence. What remains is meagre, and none of it is firm. Of course, we should not antecedently expect there to be much pertinent evidence: Aristotle was never widely read—certainly, he was not known in the way in which Plato was known. (An indication: there exist some 250 Platonic papyri, dating from the third century BC to the fifth AD; for Aristotle we have—the *Alh. Pol* apart—a bare half-dozen fragments.<sup>[181](#)</sup>) An anonymous but *doctissimus*—rhetor told Trebatius that he was ignorant of matters Aristotelian; on which Cicero observed: 'I am not at all surprised that this philosopher is not known to a rhetor—after all, he is unfamiliar to the philosophers themselves, apart from a very few' (*Top.* 1. 3). Any educated man would no doubt have been able to give you a rough summary of 'the Peripatetic philosophy'; but few had read Aristotle's own works. This commonplace has nothing to do with the story of the Tunnel or the scarcity of Aristotle's books: it has everything to do with the style and the difficulty of Aristotle's esoteric works—a difficulty famously signalled in the spurious correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander.

Where might we nevertheless look for evidence? What texts, dating from before about 40 BC, might usefully be combed for references to the Aristotelian treatises? There is very little worth considering. Demetrius—the author of *On Style*—is an attractive case: his work is Peripatetic in spirit, and he includes several verbatim quotations from Aristotle, some from lost works and some from one or other of the treatises.<sup>182</sup> But Demetrius is also a vexing case inasmuch as his dates are quite uncertain—he appears to slide about from the third century BC to the second AD.<sup>183</sup> Another enticement is Philodemus; but although his works contain several allusions to Aristotle,<sup>184</sup> thus far no Andronican title has been found.

Our best bet is Cicero, and the next pages will consider briefly Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle. Cicero, as I have already remarked, never adverts to Boethus or to Andronicus; and although he knew Tyrannio well, he does not hint at Tyrannio's work on the Aristotelian manuscripts. It remains possible that, despite all this, he knew and used Andronicus' edition; but the balance of probability has it that Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle was not dependent on Andronicus, and hence that any evidence he offers us is evidence for a pre-Andronican state of affairs.<sup>185</sup>

Cicero professed admiration for Aristode;<sup>186</sup> and one of the two gymnasia at his Tusculan villa he named the Lyceum.<sup>187</sup> He was capable of reproducing a decent summary of Peripatetic philosophy (e.g. *Fin* 5. 4. 9–5. 14).<sup>188</sup> He purports to have read at least some of Aristotle's works<sup>189</sup>—indeed, at *Fin* 1. 3. 7 he implies that he had thought of translating some of them (as he had translated some Plato). Admittedly, he observes that Aristotle is thunderingly difficult to understand (*Hort.* fr. 43 Grilli<sup>190</sup>); and he is not surprised to discover that an eminent rhetor is ignorant of Aristotle.<sup>191</sup> But such remarks are not covert hints that Cicero himself was not *au fait* with his texts. On the contrary, they are covert boasts;

and Cicero certainly means to give the impression that he knows his Aristotle well.

It is rarely doubted that he knew the 'exoteric' works. He alludes to them generally (*Att.* 4. 16. 2) and he alludes specifically to the exoteric writings on ethics (*Fin* 5. 5. 12). He claims to own a symbouleutic work addressed to Alexander the Great.<sup>192</sup> He refers explicitly to the four books of the *De justitia*,<sup>193</sup> and to *On Philosophy*;<sup>194</sup> and he refers implicitly to the *Eudemus*,<sup>195</sup> and perhaps to *On Wealth*.<sup>196</sup> His own *Hortensius* stands in some fairly close relation to the *Protrepticus*.<sup>197</sup>

Yet even here the ground is treacherous. At *ND* 1. 3. 33 Cicero makes a precise reference to the third book of the *De philosophia*: 'Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro'; and the following paragraph is generally—and no doubt rightly—taken to be a paraphrase, if not a translation, of Aristotle's work.<sup>198</sup> Hence we may infer that Cicero had read the *De philosophia*. Or may we? The paraphrase of Aristotle is embedded in a long 'doxography' which runs from 10. 25 to 15. 41. There are the closest correspondences between this passage and a doxographical passage in Philodemus' *De pietate* which happens to be conserved among the Herculaneum papyri.<sup>199</sup> In particular, the precise reference to the third book of the *De philosophia* is found in Philodemus as well as in Cicero: *παρ' Ἀριστοτέλει δ' ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. . . Perhaps Cicero is borrowing from Philodemus' essay, or from an epitome of that essay,<sup>200</sup> or—more plausibly—from the doxo-graphical handbook which Philodemus had also used. In any case, he is borrowing. The reference to the *De philosophia*, and the long passage which it introduces, are alien learning.

It does not follow that Cicero had *not* read the *De philosophia*. It does follow that the reference in *ND* is no proof that he *had* done so; and in the light of this we should

be wary of the other evidence that Cicero had read the exoteric works.

What of the 'esoteric' works? Cicero was certainly aware of their existence. *Fin.* 3 is set in the library of the young Lucullus in 52 BC. Cicero had gone to the villa to consult some books, and he found Cato already installed there, surrounded by a heap of Stoic texts (3. 2. 7).

Cato said: 'But you own so many books yourself—what are you looking for here?'

'some *commentarii* of Aristotle,' I replied, 'which I knew were here—I came to borrow them so that I might read them when I had a moment of leisure'. (3. 3. 10) And in *Fin.* 5 Cicero has Piso explain that 'about the highest good there are two types of book < written by Aristotle and Theophrastus >: one, written in a popular style, they called 'exoteric'; the other, more elaborated, they left in the form of *commentarii*' 5. 5. 12). The distinction was traditional, going back to Aristotle himself.<sup>201</sup> Cicero indicates that he knows about Aristotle's 'esoteric' works; and although, strictly speaking, he does not claim in *Fin.* 3 to have read them, he gives the impression—and evidently means to give the impression—that he was familiar with at least some of Aristotle's more recherché writings. (He also implies that he did not himself possess copies of these works.) We might wonder where the books in Lucullus' library had come from. The younger Lucullus had presumably inherited them from his father, whose library was celebrated (Plutarch, *Luc.* 42. 1–2). According to Isidore, 'the first man to bring a library of books to Rome was Aemilius Paulus, when he had defeated Perseus, king of Macedon; then Lucullus *e Pontica praeda*' (6. 5. i). Lucullus will have brought the books to Rome in 65 BC. If his Aristotelian holdings formed part of this booty,<sup>202</sup> then he possessed—and Cicero perhaps read—certain Aristotelian *commentarii* in a text which indubitably preceded Andronicus.

However that may be, several Ciceronian texts might easily be taken to contain covert allusions to passages in the esoteric works. Is not *Div* 2. 59. 121 calqued on *Div. somn.* 463<sup>b</sup>20? Does not *Tuse.* 1. 10. 22 allude to *GA* 736<sup>b</sup>29 737<sup>a</sup>9? And surely *Fin.* 2. 6. 19 is a reference to *EN* 1096<sup>a</sup>18? Again, certain explicit but unspecified references to Aristotle find a clear echo in our Aristotelian texts: at *Tusc.* 1. 33. 80, Aristotle is said to have affirmed that men of genius are melancholic: we find just such a text at *Probl.* 953<sup>a</sup>10-12;<sup>203</sup> *Tusc.* 1. 39. 94 cites Aristotle for a remark about ephemeral insects in the Pontus: exactly such a remark is found at *HA* 552<sup>b</sup>17-23;<sup>204</sup> at *Div* 2. 62. 128 Cicero invokes Aristotle for an account of what dreams are made on: such an account appears at *Insomn.* 461<sup>b</sup>21-2. And so on.

But none of this evidence withstands scrutiny. What appear to be covert allusions may be chance parallels. Genuine allusions, whether covert or overt, may derive from handbooks or from other sources. And the word ‘may’ here does not mark a gratuitous scepticism. You might reasonably ask whence came Cicero’s knowledge of Aristotle’s views on ephemeral insects if not from his reading of *HA*; and the reasonable question has a reasonable answer; the knowledge perhaps came through one of the many Hellenistic zoological compilations, among them anthologies of *mirabilia*;<sup>205</sup> or perhaps it came from the rhetorical tradition—for Demetrius twice invokes passages from *HA* <sup>206</sup> and he will hardly have taken them from his own reading of Aristotle.

Allusions of this sort do not establish that Cicero had read the Aristotelian works to which he alludes—let alone that he had read the works with which we are now familiar.<sup>207</sup> If we look for more solid evidence, there are only three Aristotelian treatises to consider: *Rhet.*, *Top.*, and *EN*.<sup>208</sup>

## 17. RHETORIC

There is most information about *Rhet.* The catalogue in Diogenes Laertius lists a *Τέχνη ῥητορική* in two books (item 78), and also a two-volume work entitled *Περὶ λέξεως* (item 87).<sup>209</sup> Ptolemy's catalogue contains a three-volume *Rhetoric* (item 39).<sup>210</sup> It is widely supposed that Diogenes' *Τέχνη* corresponds to the first two books of our *Rhet.* and that his *Περὶλέξεως* answers to the third book. Ptolemy's three-volume work is identical with our *Rhet.* Andronicus found the two separate items listed by Diogenes and united them into the single item listed by Ptolemy.<sup>211</sup>

Dionysius of Halicarnassus cites Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at first hand. His *Letter to Ammaeus* is designed to show that Demosthenes did not owe his skill to a perusal of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (as certain philosophers had falsely alleged); for the *Rhetoric* was demonstrably written *after* Demosthenes' great speeches had been delivered. In the course of his argument, Dionysius quotes five paragraphs from *Rhet.*: at *Ad. Amm.* 6 he cites *Rhet.* 1355<sup>a</sup>20-9, 'in the first book'; at 7 he cites 1356<sup>a</sup>35-<sup>b</sup>20; at 8 he cites 1410<sup>b</sup>36-1411<sup>a</sup>8, 'in the third book'; at 11 he cites 1379<sup>b</sup>27-1398<sup>a</sup>3, 'in the second book'; at 12 he cites 1397<sup>a</sup>23-<sup>b</sup>8.<sup>212</sup> Dionysius certainly purports to have worked through the *Rhetoric*; and there is no reason to disbelieve him—it is hardly likely that the passages which he cites and which are particularly apt to his peculiar needs should have been preserved for his use in the rhetorical tradition.<sup>213</sup>

It is worth noting that the text of Aristotle cited by Dionysius often disagrees with the text known to our manuscript tradition. None the less, it is plain that Dionysius had read something which was, at the very least, a close relative of our three-volume *Rhet.* The *Letter to Ammaeus* is generally dated to the early 20s.<sup>214</sup> And it is generally supposed that in this work we find the earliest unequivocal reference to any of our 'modern' Aristotelian treatises.



Andronicus had done his work, and Dionysius was one of the first to profit from it.<sup>[215](#)</sup>

With this in mind, let us turn to Cicero. In the *De Oratore* (55 BC) Cicero presents Catulus as some sort of Peripatetic (3. 47. 182) and has him say that it is ‘plausible’ that Antonius had read a work of Aristotle’s on *τόποι* (*De orat.* 2. 36. 152). He no doubt means a rhetorical work (Aristotle discusses *τόποι* in our *Rhetoric*);<sup>[216](#)</sup> for a little later, at 2. 38. 160, Antonius is made to state that he has read both the work in which Aristotle collects the views of his predecessors (presumably the lost *Τεχνών συναγωγή*<sup>[217](#)</sup>) and also the work in which he expounds his own views on the art of rhetoric. We may doubt that, by 91 BC (the dramatic date of *De orat.*), Antonius himself had actually read these works. But it cannot have seemed absurd to Cicero to imply that a Roman had read Aristotle’s rhetorical works in the first decade of the century; and this in itself strongly suggests that such works were then available to the interested reader. It also and incidentally insinuates that by 55 Cicero himself had read the works.<sup>[218](#)</sup>

There is further evidence that Cicero had read the *Συναγωγή*; for two paragraphs in the *Brutus* (46 BC) purportedly rehearse Aristotle’s account of the early history of rhetoric—and the *Συναγωγή* is the only plausible source.<sup>[219](#)</sup> As for *Rhet.*, the *Orator*, written in the same year as *Brutus*, contains a virtual translation of its opening sentence: ‘And even before Zeno Aristotle, at the beginning of his *Art of Rhetoric*, had said that this art so to speak corresponds to dialectic’ (*Orat.* 32. 114). The *Orator* also contains several allusions to Aristotle’s remarks on prose rhythm,<sup>[220](#)</sup> remarks which occur in chapter 8 of Book 3 of our *Rhet.* Vexingly, Cicero does not refer specifically to any Aristotelian work in these passages. But it is natural to suppose that he is thinking of the *Art of Rhetoric*, the work which he explicitly names at *Orat.* 32. 114. And the



supposition is reinforced by a passage in the earlier *De orat.* at 3. 47. 182 Cicero refers briefly to Aristotle's views on prose rhythm; again, he names no work, but again in an earlier passage he has clearly referred to the *Art of Rhetoric*,<sup>[221](#)</sup>

Thus Cicero knew an Aristotelian *Art of Rhetoric* which began with the opening sentence of our *Rhet.* I and which contained at least some of the material which occurs in our *Rhet.* 3. It is natural to infer that Cicero knew of a three-volume *Rhetoric*, or at any rate a *Rhetoric* which contained the material which our *Rhetoric* divides among three books. Now it would offend Master Occam to postulate a pair of three-volume *Rhetorics*. Hence our three-volume *Rhetoric* was known to Cicero and must have been put together before Andronicus' time.

This is an unorthodox contention. Many scholars have denied that Cicero knew the *Rhetoric* in any form: he cannot—they say—have read the original, since he shows so little knowledge of what it contains.<sup>[222](#)</sup> His citation of the opening sentence of *Rhet.* at *Orat.* 32. 114 can only have been lifted from a handbook;<sup>[223](#)</sup> for he explains the 'correspondence' between rhetoric and dialectic in a way wholly different from Aristotle—in fact he gives the first sentence of *Rhet.* an alien Stoic gloss.<sup>[224](#)</sup> And a handbook was no doubt the source of his knowledge of Aristotle's views on prose rhythm. For it is clear that the sections of our *Rhet.* on prose rhythm had aroused some interest, independently of the rest of the work, in the rhetorical tradition; thus in *On Style* Demetrius cites from these sections,<sup>[225](#)</sup> and his knowledge surely did not derive from first-hand reading of Aristotle.<sup>[226](#)</sup>

I confess that I can find no text or argument which firmly refutes the pessimistic conclusion that, despite his implicit pretension, Cicero had never read a word of *Rhet.* Yet the orthodox pessimism does not confute my heterodox contention. It is one question whether Cicero consulted,

himself, a three-volume *Rhetoric*. It is another question whether Cicero knew—directly or indirectly—of such a text, whether there was or had been such a text available in or before Cicero’s lifetime. The Ciceronian passages which I have rehearsed suggest that the answer to the first question is affirmative; but the suggestion is countered by the plausible appeal to handbooks as intermediate sources. The texts which I have rehearsed also and *a fortiori* suggest that the answer to the second question is affirmative; and against this suggestion the existence of handbooks has no force. But an affirmative answer to the *second* question is all that my unorthodox contention requires; for it implies that a three-volume *Rhetoric*—something fairly like our three-volume *Rhetoric*—was known and used before the time of Andronicus.

This contention is at least as probable, given the state of our evidence, as the orthodox view that Andronicus was the first scholar to produce a three-volume *Rhetoric*. It is, to be sure, a fairly unexciting contention; in particular, it does not hint at any thesis about Aristotle’s other treatises; for it is clear that some knowledge of Peripatetic rhetorical theory—and some interest in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*—was preserved by a tradition which had no concern to reach the other parts of Aristotle’s philosophy.

## 18. TOPICS

What, next, of the *Topics*? Here the evidence of the catalogues is uncertain.<sup>227</sup> Diogenes’ list, in the form in which it is transmitted, does not contain *Top*. But it does contain the following items, each of which could conceivably have become a part of our *Top*.: *Περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν α'* (item 31 = *Top*. 4), *Περὶ ἰδίῳν α'* (item 32 = *Top*. 5), *Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως β'* (item 44 = *Top*. 8), *Ὅροι πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν ζ'* (item 55 = *Top*.1),<sup>228</sup> *Περὶ τοῦ αἵρετοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος* (item 58 = *Top*. 3), *Τοπικῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὅρους β'* (item 60 = *Top*. 6–7). Ptolemy’s list contains a *Topics* in

eight books.<sup>229</sup> Again, the guess lies near: Andronicus found some related but separate essays—those listed by Diogenes—and united them into a treatise: he invented the *Topics*.

There are two obstacles which this guess must overleap. First, the anonymous catalogue contains items which correspond to Diogenes' items 31, 44, and 58.<sup>230</sup> In addition it lists as item 51 and 52: "Ὅρων βιβλίον α', Τοπικῶν ζ'. These two entries have been construed as corresponding to our *Top.* 1 and our *Top.* 2-8. And in the light of this it has been supposed that item 55 in Diogenes is a conflation of the anonymous 51 and 52. Perhaps the text originally read: "Ὅροι πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν < α', Τοπικῶν > ζ'. Our *Top.*—virtually our *Top.* was once listed in the old catalogue and hence known before Andronicus.<sup>231</sup>

Secondly, there is the presence in Diogenes' catalogue of a Μεθοδικά in eight books. Although a text in Simplicius suggests that this ought to be a distinct work from our *Top.*,<sup>232</sup> some scholars have been tempted to identify the works.<sup>233</sup> Perhaps, then, the catalogue in its present state contains our *Top.*—under a pseudonym.

Cicero may seem to solve the problem. But the pertinent text is notoriously baffling. At the beginning of his *Topica* Cicero reminds Trebatius that when they were both reading in his Tusculan library, 'you happened upon certain *Topics* of Aristotle, which he has set out in several books' (1. 1). Trebatius, intrigued, asked Cicero to translate the work for him; but Cicero was too busy and in any case Trebatius would do better to read the works himself or else to consult a learned rhetor. Trebatius found the obscurity of the work repellent, and the learned rhetor confessed himself ignorant of Aristotelian matters. Cicero was unsurprised since Aristotle 'is unknown to the philosophers themselves, with a very few exceptions. And this is all the less to be forgiven inasmuch as they ought to have been attracted not only by the matter which he described and discovered but also by the

extraordinary abundance and grace of his style [*dicendi ... incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitatem*] (1. 3–4). Cicero eventually realized that he must cede to Trebatius' request; and, away from his books during a crossing of the Adriatic, he wrote his *Topical*.<sup>234</sup>

We are not obliged—and presumably not expected to believe every detail of this prefatory story.<sup>235</sup> But most scholars have inferred that Cicero possessed a copy of Aristotle's *Topics*,<sup>236</sup> and that it was a work in several volumes. Occamists will then quickly identify it with our *Top*.

Yet Cicero's *Topica* is utterly removed from anything in our *Top*.—and indeed from anything which can ever have been in any Aristotelian work.<sup>237</sup> Cicero, it is true, does not explicitly claim to be *translating* the *Topics*: although Trebatius at first asked him to *tradere* the work, what he offers is a version of the material purportedly done from memory. None the less, he plainly claims to be transmitting the remembered contents of his copy of Aristotle's *Topics*;<sup>238</sup> and no one could read Aristotle's *Top*. and then 'remember' it in the form of Cicero's *Topical*.<sup>239</sup> Moreover, it is difficult to believe that anyone who had read Aristotle's *Top*. could refer to it and then at once remark on Aristotle's *dicendi incredibilis copia et suavitas*: stylistically speaking, the *Topics* is—to be charitable—flat.<sup>240</sup>

It must be concluded that Cicero had not read Aristotle's *Topics*; and it seems reasonable to conclude that he did not own a copy of Aristotle's *Topics*. What, then, was going on? Unless the whole story is an elaborate joke, we must suppose that Cicero's *Topica* was based—at any rate loosely—on a Greek text which Cicero possessed and which bore the title Aristotle's *Topics*'.<sup>241</sup> Perhaps the work was a rank forgery? Perhaps a *sillubos* had fallen off a genuine copy of Aristotle's *Topics* and been stuck back on the wrong roll? Or perhaps ...

However, that may be, at least the *title* 'Aristotle's *Topics*' was known in Cicero's day.<sup>242</sup> And if there was a title, then perhaps somewhere there had been a *Topics*. This flimsy probability may be added to the flimsy probability that Diogenes' catalogue contains or originally contained a reference to a seven- or eight-volume *Top*. All in all, it is plausible to think that when Andronicus came to arrange and order his Aristotelian material, there was already a *Topics* in existence: he may have enlarged and embellished (he *Topics*—but he did not invent the thing).

## 19. ETHICS

Finally, the *Ethics*. The state of the catalogues is confusing.<sup>243</sup> Diogenes has as item 38 the entry: 'Ἠθικῶν ε' (there is a variant δ' for the volume number ε'). In addition there are other ethical titles, among them items 24 (Περὶ φιλίας α'), 37 (Περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς<sup>244</sup>), 68 (Περὶ ἐκουσίου α') and 76 (Περὶ δικαίων β'). Ptolemy offers a two-volume work called 'Ἠθικῶν μεγάλων β' (item 35), and an eight-volume work called 'Ἠθικῶν Εὐδημείων (item 36); and perhaps he originally listed *EN*.<sup>245</sup> The anonymous list, in its first part, has items corresponding to items 24, 37, 68, and 76 in Diogenes;<sup>246</sup> and in addition item 39 reads: 'Ἠθικῶν κ'. The second part of the anonymous list includes, as item 174, Περὶ ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων. It is probable that something is awry with the texts the differences between the anonymous list and the other two are more likely to have been caused by careless scribal work than by genuine differences of information. If that is so, we have no serious hope of restoring the true readings, and there there is not much to be said about the matter. Except this: the entry in Diogenes' list is enough to show that, before Andronicus, there was at least one consolidated tract on ethics—a work in five, or perhaps four, volumes. This conclusion may be confirmed and extended by a glance at Cicero.

There is a single pertinent text. In *Fin.* 5, Piso remarks that, according to Theophrastus, happiness is to some considerable extent at the mercy of luck; but this view seems to me to be—if I may so put it—softer and more delicate than the power and weight of virtue demand.<sup>247</sup> So let us keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus—whose carefully written books on character are indeed ascribed to Aristotle, although I do not see why the son could not have been like his father. (5. 5. 12) The second sentence proves that Cicero knew of (at least) *two* Aristotelian works *de moribus*, at least two Aristotelian *ἠθικά*.<sup>248</sup> One of them he—or rather Piso—is inclined to attribute to Nicomachus, Aristotle's son, even though it is generally ascribed to Aristotle himself. The other, it seems, was uncontroversially ascribed to Aristotle. What were the two works?

Evidently the work which Piso ascribes to Nicomachus must have borne the title '*Nicomachean Ethics*'; for why else should anyone have thought of ascribing it to Nicomachus? And in fact we hear of a quirky tradition which interpreted this title as meaning 'written by' (rather than 'dedicated to' or 'edited by') Nicomachus.<sup>249</sup> So Cicero knew a *Nicomachean Ethics*. (Or at any rate, he knew of a *Nicomachean Ethics*—even if he had never read it, or even come across it, himself.<sup>250</sup>) Was this 'our' ten-book *EN*? Perhaps it was; but there are at least two grounds for doubt. First, the earliest explicit evidence for a ten-book *Ethics* is late—it is the evidence of the anonymous catalogue.<sup>251</sup> Secondly, our *EN* is an absurdity, surely put together by a desperate scribe or an unscrupulous bookseller and not united by an author or an editor.<sup>252</sup> But these grounds are not as solid as the rock.

And the other work? There are two easy guesses: it was a *Eudemian Ethics*, or else it was a *Magna moralia*—it was one of the works which later appear in Ptolemy's catalogue. If we must choose one of these, then let us prefer the latter.



Anyone who inclined to construe the title '*EN*' as indicating Nicomachean authorship would surely have inclined to take the title '*EE*' as pointing to Eudemian authorship. (Some ancient scholars, like some modern scholars, did indeed ascribe the work to Eudemus.<sup>253</sup>) Since Cicero does not let Piso hint that the second work *de moribus* might have been by Eudemus, it was probably not called '*EE*'; and hence perhaps it was called '*MM*'.

However that may be, it is reasonable to infer from this text that by 45 bc (the date of *Fin.*) at least two Aristotelian treatises on ethics were in circulation, one of them called '*EN*' and the other perhaps called '*MAT*'. Cicero's *MM* may well have been much the same as the spurious treatise which we read under that name; his *EN*, I suspect I hope was sensibly different from our pushmepullyou volume. In any case, there were ethical *treatises* before Andronicus. If Andronicus did some combinatory work on the ethical material, he was not inventing but enlarging.

## 20. PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS

I have been cutting Andronicus down to size—but by now he may seem too dwarfish to be credible. After all, Porphyry plainly implies that Andronicus made an invaluable contribution to Aristotelian scholarship, a contribution parallel to his own contribution to future Plotinian studies. If we assume that Porphyry was relying on Andronicus' own *Πίναξ* as his authority, then my argument seems to insinuate an infelicitous disjunction: either Porphyry was misreporting Andronicus' claim or else Andronicus was shading the truth.

Well, I do not say that Andronicus was lying; but I do suppose that either he was exaggerating pretty steeply or else Porphyry was simplifying pretty drastically. For although we possess dismally little evidence on the matter, what we do possess points consistently in one direction: Andronicus did not invent the *Rhet.*, he did not invent the *Top.*, he did



not invent the ethical treatises. And it may now be urged that he did not invent the *Physics* or the *Metaphysics* either.

As for *Phys.*,<sup>254</sup> he cannot even have claimed to have put it together, if (as most of his admirers suppose) he cited the letter from Theophrastus to Eudemus in order to show that the old Peripatetics knew a five-volume *Φυσικά*.<sup>255</sup> But we may forget the letter. Eudemus himself wrote a *Physics*, in which he ‘closely imitated’ Aristotle (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 924. 18), ‘following the main topics of pretty well the whole treatise’ (ibid. 1036. 18). From the surviving fragments and *testimonia* it is plain that Eudemus’ *Physics* followed the pattern of the Aristotelian *Physics* which we read. The conclusion is evident: Eudemus’ text of Aristotle’s *Physics* did not differ very much from ours.

Or did it differ in one not insignificant respect? Book 7 of our *Phys.* is generally regarded as odd—and perhaps as misplaced. And—or so it is said—we happen to know that Eudemus did not find Book 7 in *his* text of Aristotle. Hence it must have been added to the text of *Phys.* at some later date; and why not point the finger at Andronicus?<sup>256</sup> As a bonus, we can now explain the curious fact that a majority of ancient scholars supposed, against all the odds, that the *Physics* divides at the end of Book 5.<sup>257</sup> The explanation runs thus: Andronicus constructed an eight-volume *Physics* and observed (truly enough) that Eudemus had supposed that the last *three* books of *Phys.* were *περί κινήσεως*. Eudemus, knowing only a seven-volume *Phys.*, had of course divided the work at the end of Book 4; Andronicus and his successors, ignoring or forgetting this fact, took him to have divided it at the end of Book 5—and also thought that the authority of Eudemus on such a matter could scarcely be challenged. Hence the absurd majority view, which depended on nothing but a misunderstanding of Eudemus.

Thus we may after all give Andronicus a hand in the construction of our *Phys.*

Yet I doubt if we may even ascribe this amount of activity to Andronicus. It is not uncontroversially evident that Book 7 is misplaced.<sup>258</sup> If Book 7 was indeed added by a later editor, there is no particular reason to think that Andronicus was the man.<sup>259</sup> And, finally, it is far from plain that Eudemus did not find Book 7 in his copy of Aristotle. Two texts are appealed to in evidence. One is the severed phrase from Damas, ‘and of the three books about motion from Aristotle’s treatise on nature<sup>260</sup> This is transmitted without the context needed to make it intelligible. The second text is this: ‘Hence some people thought that this book [i.e. Book 7] is redundant in the treatise ... and as for Eudemus, having followed the main topics of pretty well the whole treatise up to this point, he passed over this book, implying that it is superfluous [*ὥς περιττόν*], and moved on to the matters contained in the last book’ (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 1036. 18–22). This hardly implies that Eudemus’ text of *Phys.* lacked Book 7: on the contrary, Simplicius supposed that Eudemus’ text of *Phys.* contained Book 7 and that Eudemus decided to ignore the book in his own *Phys.* Simplicius may be wrong. But there is no evidence that he was wrong—and in any event his text cannot be used as evidence for the very opposite of what it plainly implies.<sup>261</sup> It implies that his text contained Book 7.

In short, there is no reason to think that Andronicus did anything for the *Physics*.

What, then, of the *Metaphysics*? It was clear to scholars in antiquity that the fourteen-volume *Met.* is a farrago.

The present treatise is not as well organized as Aristotle’s other works, nor does it seem to possess orderliness and continuity. Rather, some things are missing which would make for continuity of expression, certain items have been imported wholesale from other treatises, and he often repeats himself. (Asclepius, *In Met.* 4. 4–8) There was an explanation for this wretched state of affairs: They defend him—and defend him well—by saying that after he had

written the present treatise he sent it to Eudemus of Rhodes, his associate, who deemed that it was not right that such a treatise should be made casually available to the general public. Now in the mean-while he died and parts of the book were destroyed. His followers, not daring to add anything of their own inasmuch as they fell far short of Aristotle's genius, imported the missing parts from his other treatises, harmonizing things as well as they could. (Ibid. 4. 8–15) The whole treatise had been sent to Eudemus to vet. Bits were lost. Aristotle died. His followers weren't up to replacing the missing parts. They botched something up.

Asclepius does not say—but perhaps he suggests—that Eudemus *edited* the first edition of *Met.* A text in Alexander hints more definitely at a Eudemian edition. Referring to an apparent inconcinnity in the arrangement of *Met. Z* 11, Alexander concludes: 'But perhaps these items were put next to one another by Aristotle (in none of his other treatises do we find him doing what he appears to have done here) and were separated by Eudemus' (Alexander, *In Met.* 515. 9–11). The general 'defence of Aristotle' essayed by Asclepius is here applied to a particular text—and Eudemus is fingered.

The story of a Eudemian edition is generally dismissed by scholars. There is no evidence for it apart from the two passages I have just cited; and it is easy to suppose that it was invented to explain the puzzling state of Aristotle's text. Then who did put the *Met.* together? The thing was done by the time of Nicolaus;<sup>[262](#)</sup> and his text of the work included one of the most 'detachable' of its books, 'little alpha'.<sup>[263](#)</sup> Perhaps, then, it was Andronicus who first produced the *Metaphysics*. Even if this was his only serious piece of ordering and arranging, it is enough to earn him an honourable place in the history of Aristotelianism.

Yet there is not a word of positive evidence in favour of the suggestion. No text associates Andronicus' name with the creation of the *Metaphysics*. And something tells against it.

The story of Eudemus' edition of *Met.* doubtless found its justification and explanation in the purported correspondence between Eudemus and Aristotle. I suspect that this correspondence was known to Andronicus, and accepted by him as genuine. In that case Andronicus will have supposed that *Eudemus* had edited a text of *Met.*, a text which Aristotle himself had prepared; and then Andronicus cannot have claimed to have invented the treatise himself<sup>264</sup>

This last point may be generalized. In a celebrated epistolary exchange, Alexander the Great reproached Aristotle for 'publishing the texts of your lectures<sup>265</sup>—for how shall we differ from *hoi polloi* if the texts by which we were educated are common property for all?' And Aristotle replied that Alexander need have no such worries: 'They are both published and not published for they are only intelligible to those who heard my lectures.' The letters are quoted in full by Aulus Gellius,<sup>266</sup> who says that he took them 'ex Andronici philosophi libro'—probably from the *Πίνακες*.<sup>267</sup> The works to which Alexander and Aristotle allegedly refer are evidently the treatises the esoteric writings.

Of course, the correspondence is spurious, and we shall not infer that the treatises had been published in Alexander's lifetime. But Andronicus took the letters to be genuine—or at any rate, he published them (so far as we can tell) as though they were genuine. *He* must therefore have supposed, or at any rate have expected his readers to suppose, that Aristotle's treatises had been published centuries earlier. And he cannot, in the same work, have claimed to be publishing the treatises for the first time. Whatever claim he actually made, whether it was true or whether it was false, it must have been—or at least have seemed to be—compatible with the thesis that the treatises had been published in Aristotle's lifetime, long before Andronicus got to them.

## 21. THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS

While rejecting these informative letters, we may yet incline to the view that some at least of Aristotle's treatises were 'put together' at an early stage, and that the corpus gradually evolved.<sup>268</sup> Some consolidation evidently came from Aristotle's own hand: he did not regard his esoteric work as a collection of separate essays. Even if we regard most cross-references as later editorial additions, and even if we regard such programmatic texts as *Sens.* 436<sup>a</sup>1-18 and *Meteor.* 338<sup>a</sup>20-339<sup>a</sup>10 as referring exclusively to Aristotle's uttered lectures, none the less *SEI* 183<sup>a</sup>36-184<sup>a</sup>9 proves that, at least in logic, Aristotle thought of himself as having produced a fairly substantial and continuous piece of work.<sup>269</sup> Aristotle's immediate successors will have carried the consolidatory work further—hence the titles '*Eudemian Ethics*', '*Nicomachean Ethics*', which are in the end best explained on the supposition that Eudemus and Nicomachus were their editors.<sup>270</sup> And perhaps, too, there was a Theophrastan edition of *Pol.*<sup>271</sup>

It should not be thought that Diogenes' catalogue stands against this suggestion. The catalogue is a fascinating document; but it has misled. Scholars have taken it to indicate the state of Aristotle's *œuvre* in the third or second century BC.<sup>272</sup> But there is no reason on earth so to read it.

The catalogue shows, *inter alia*, that some library held a copy of a short work by Aristotle entitled *Περὶ ἰδίων*. It is surely reasonable to guess that this short work corresponded fairly closely to the essay which forms Book 5 of our *Topics*. The catalogue does not show that the library held a complete *Top.*—and no doubt the absence of *Top.* from the list<sup>273</sup> suggests that the library did not hold a complete *Top.* But it patently does not follow from this that no complete *Top.* existed when the library was catalogued or that the constituent books of our *Top.* were then available only as separate essays.

But if the catalogues do not help us to chart the gradual consolidation of the Aristotelian treatise's, we are left with no evidence at all for the modes and methods by which the consolidation was gradually achieved. Indeed, we are left with no reason apart from Porphyry's remark about Andronicus for supposing that there was any process of consolidation, gradual or sudden. Rather, we have reason to believe, first, that some at least of Aristotle's major treatises were put together in something like their present form by Aristotle himself; secondly, that some of the treatises were known in something like their present form to Aristotle's immediate successors; and thirdly, that some of the treatises were available in some consolidated versions in Cicero's time. There is no single treatise of which we can say, with confidence, that it did *not* exist in its present version before the time of Andronicus.

Then what did Andronicus do? Not much. Perhaps he added bits and pieces here and there—paragraphs, or chapters, or even (in some cases) whole books? Perhaps he added some cross-references and generally tidied up the overall structure of the treatises? Perhaps he was responsible for some titles, and for some of the book-divisions? Perhaps and perhaps: here there is nothing but guessing. However that may be, Andronicus' Πίναξ was surely his *chef d'œuvre*: his edition of Aristotle had little value, and his 'arrangement' of Aristotle's works unlike Porphyry's arrangements of Plotinus' works—was at best amateur tinkering rather than genial construction.<sup>[274](#)</sup>

Here is a recent summary of the orthodox line on Andronicus. I cite it precisely because it does not purport to be a piece of innovatory scholarship but a rehearsal of received wisdom.

Our own texts probably go back to an edition which was made by Andronicus of Rhodes before the middle of the first century BC. It is virtually certain that he undertook to edit a

substantial set of Aristotle's own manuscripts which had been out of circulation from the death of Theophrastus (288/4) until they were recovered by an Athenian bibliophile, Apellicon, in the early first century BC. This is not important simply as bibliographical history. To Andronicus can be assigned the ultimate responsibility for the present arrangement of Aristotle's works, including the division into books and at least some titles, and his own philosophical preconceptions probably led him to give a more systematic organisation to the material than Aristotle would have used himself. Furthermore there is good reason to think that at least some of the texts in Andronicus' edition had not been available even in libraries after being taken to Asia Minor by Neleus of Scepsis in the early third century BC.<sup>[275](#)</sup>

Much of this I am fairly sure is false. Almost all of it certainly goes far beyond the evidence.

Aristotle reached Rome in the first century BC if not earlier.<sup>[276](#)</sup> Nothing suggests that his arrival made a splash, either in amateur or in professional circles. Nothing suggests that the 'Roman edition', done by Andronicus of Rhodes, revolutionized Aristotelian studies. His text of Aristotle left little mark on posterity. His work as orderer and arranger of the treatises was not epoch-making.

It is true that there was a renaissance of Peripatetic philosophy at the end of the first century BC. But Aristotle was reborn shortly after Plato. The Platonic renaissance did not depend on a new edition of his dialogues or on an innovatory rearrangement of his *œuvre*. There is no reason to think that the Peripatetic renaissance was any more dependent on books; and there is no reason to think that Andronicus played midwife at the rebirth.

No libations.<sup>[277](#)</sup>

## APPENDIX



The Appendix contains an annotated translation of Simplicius, *In Phys.* 923. 3 925. 2, the proem to the commentary on *Phys.* 6. It is an important text, and a difficult one. I have used it in more than one context; and it seems best to present the thing as a whole, inasmuch as any selection of extracts is likely to insinuate a disputable interpretation.

**5** The Peripatetics normally entitle the books in order by the letters of the alphabet in order—alpha, beta, gamma, etc; and so of course they entitle the sixth book of the *lecture on Physics* ‘Zeta’, which in the number system indicates the seventh number but in the alphabet holds the sixth place.[278](#)

**10** I have said before that they call the five books before this one *Physics* and the following three *On Motion*.[279](#) This is how Anclronicus[280](#) arranges them in the third of his books on Aristotle.[281](#) Theophrastus[282](#) too[283](#) gives evidence for the first books, when Eudemus wrote to him about one of his corrupt manuscripts in connection with the fifth book (he says:[284](#) ‘as for the passage in the *Physics* about which in your letter you asked me to write and reply either I do not understand it[285](#) or else it hardly differs from[286](#) “only of immobile items do I say that they are at rest; for rest is

**15** contrary to motion, so that it is a privation in what can receive it”, [287](#)); so that Theophrastus thinks that the fifth book too is from the *Physics*.

Aristotle himself at the beginning of the eighth book  
**924** says: ‘Let us start first from the items which we have already discussed in the *Physics*: we say that motion is an actuality of the movable item *qua* movable’[288](#)—he said this in the third book.[289](#) And again: ‘We laid

down in the *Physics* that nature is a principle of motion and rest'<sup>290</sup>—he said this in the second book.<sup>291</sup> At the end of the eighth book he says: 'That it is not possible for there to be an infinite magnitude has

**5** already been proved in the *Physics*'<sup>292</sup>—he talked about this too in the third book.<sup>293</sup>

**10** That they called the five *Physics* is clear from all this. That the last three are called *On Motion* is plainly indicated by Aristotle in the first book of *On the Heavens*, where he says: 'It is evident that it is impossible to traverse an infinite extent in a finite time: hence in an infinite time—we have already proved this in *On Motion*'.<sup>294</sup> And again: 'It is argued in *On Motion* that nothing finite has an infinite capacity and nothing infinite a finite.'<sup>295</sup> He discussed these things in the three books.<sup>296</sup>

**15** That the three are *On Motion* and the five *Physics* is also evidenced by Damas,<sup>297</sup> who wrote the life of Eudemus.<sup>298</sup> He says: 'And of the books in Aristotle's treatise *On Nature*, the three *On Motion*..<sup>299</sup>

They called *Physics* not only the eight books but also *On the Heavens* and *On the Soul* and many more; but in the narrow sense the five of the *Lecture on Physics*.

**20** That the book now before us comes in order after the fifth in order is shown by Eudemus,<sup>300</sup> who follows Aristotle very closely and who connects to what is said in the fifth book the thesis that nothing continuous is put together out of partless items. Andronicus too gives this order to these books. And indeed at the very beginning of this book Aristotle

makes use of the items which he has expounded in the fifth book—continuity, touching, contiguity.

**25** That this comes before the seventh book is clear from the fact that, having proved at the end of this book that nothing partless moves and that no change is infinite, in Book Eta, which follows this and is the seventh book, he uses these theses as something proved.

**925** Similarly with the thesis that there is no infinite motion in a finite time, whether the item moved is infinite or finite—he proves it here and uses it there as something proved.

<sup>1</sup> The texts are conveniently found in Düring [132], Gigon [133], and in Fortenbaugh *et al.* [13] i. 90–4. Of recent discussions the fullest are Düring, [135] 46–54; id. [136] cols. 190–203; Moraux [76] i. 3–94; Blum [149] 109–34; Gottschalk [114] 1083–97; Richardson [152] 7–28; Irigoin [137] 50–3. Of the older literature, I mention Stahr [138] 117–34; id. [115] 23–32. The romantic will read L. Canfora, *La biblioteca scomparsa* (Palermo, 1986), 34–7, 59–66, 181–90.

<sup>2</sup> Gigon [133] 60 excises the parenthetical sentence.

<sup>3</sup> ἐν διώρυγί τιμι: not a cave (though some scholars refer to the Cave at Scepsis); perhaps a passage-way (some refer to the Cellar at Scepsis); or perhaps they simply dug a trench in the back garden, as Pepys did for his cheese.

<sup>4</sup> The MSS read τὰ πολλά εἰκότα λέγειν, which the Loeb translates as ‘to call most of their statements probabilities’. I do not think that the Greek can mean this or anything else which is pertinent. Gigon [133] 60 prints εἰκότως for εἰκότα, which is little better. I wonder if we should not read εἰκῆ: εἰκῆ λέγειν is a standard way of describing how philosophers should not talk: e.g. Aristotle, *Met.* 984<sup>b</sup>17.

<sup>5</sup> The verb is ἐντυγχάνειν, which is also used in the sense of ‘read’.

<sup>6</sup> Reading ἀκριβῶς < γεγραμμένοις > (Reiske): see below, n. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Reading δια < το > τον Νηλέως τοῦ Σκηψί ου κλ ἥροι· ... παραγενέσθαι (τὸ add Musuriis: κλ ἥρον Reiske (κληρονόμον codd.); παραγέσθαι codd. (περιγασέσθαι Reiske)).

<sup>8</sup> The passage is quoted in part by the Suda, s.v. Σύλλας

<sup>9</sup> On this see below, p. 22.

<sup>10</sup> ‘Toge (her with Andronicus and Boethus he [i.e. Strabo] heard Tyrannio, and through Andronicus he became interested in Aristotle’s works’: During [132] 413 a garbled invention.

[11](#) See Moraux [76] i. 21 4; below, pp. 9, 19–20.

[12](#) On the will see Gottschalk [147]; below, n. 121.

[13](#) All to be cited below.

[14](#) See Athenaeus, 3ab (below, p. 6). Aristotle paid a fortune for Speusippus' books: Diogenes Laertius, 4. 5; Gellius, 3. 17. 3. Others knew of earlier book-collectors, even if Strabo did not: see e.g. K. Dziatzko, 'Bibliotheken', *RE* iii (1899), cols. 405–24, at cols. 408–9.

[15](#) I note an odd remark in A. Laks and G. W. Most, *Theophraste: Métaphysique* (Paris, 1993), p. xiii: 'Rien ne suggère en effet que le corpus théophrastien, ou une partie de ce corpus, ait subi une éclipse analogue à celle que l'on suppose parfois ... pour le corpus aristotélicien.' There is no evidence for an Aristotelian eclipse which is not also and at the same time evidence for a Theophrastan eclipse.

[16](#) Probably between 288 and 286: see e.g. Sollenberger [148] 206–7.

[17](#) Note that Strato later left to Lyco both the school and 'all the books except those which I have written myself' (Diogenes Laertius, 5. 62); and that Lyco left to his freed slave Chares, 'those of my books which have been read—and to Callinus the unpublished ones, so that he may publish them carefully' (ibid. 5. 73: for attempts at elucidation see e.g. T. Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen* (Berlin, 1882), 437 n. 2; Jaeger [143] 146–7; Moraux [76] i. 17). Epicurus left his books to Hermarchus (Diogenes Laertius, 10. 21).

[18](#) Lucian, *Parasit.* 34, says that 'Aristoxenus was Nelms' parasite'; but it is hard to decide what, if anything, lies behind this *canard*. (Aristotle), *MM* 1205<sup>a</sup>23, probably refers to Neleus (the MSS offer either *Νηλεί* or *Ιλε* ἰ); but the text in any case tells us nothing of substance about our man (see F. Dirlmeier, *Ans to teles: Magna Moralia* (Berlin, 1983), 404–5).

[19](#) Strabo's word is *διαδεγμένος*: *διαδέχομαι* is not normally used to indicate inheritance or the receipt of a gift; it is the *mot juste* for succeeding to a scholarchate.

[20](#) So e.g. Moraux [76] i. 12 (with further references). Leo Franc Holford-Strevens reminds me that Aristoxenus allegedly attacked Aristotle out of pique because he had left the school to Theophrastus (Suda, s.v. 'Αριστόξενος).

[21](#) Erastus also wrote a memoir of Plato: Philodemus, *Ind. Acad.* 6. 10. Coriscus and Erastus, together with Hermias, are the addressees of the spurious sixth Platonic *letter*. Texts collected in Lasserre [5] 104–9 (commentary, 539–42).

[22](#) Didymus, *In Dem.* 5. 53 4 (text in Gaiser [8] 380).

[23](#) See H. Bonitz, *Index Aristoteficus* (Berlin, 1870), s.v. *Κορισκός*.

[24](#) Lasserre [5] 540 tentatively puts Coriscus' birth in about 385.

[25](#) No need to make them into illiterates, as the Budé Plutarch does. For the contrast between *ιδιώτης* and philosopher, see e.g. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1266<sup>a</sup>31.

[26](#) Adding < *καὶ θζόφραστον* > (Wilamowitz) after *φιλόσοφον*. The received text is defended, unimpressively, by Littig [159] i. 11.

[27](#) See Fraser [150] i. 114–15; Richardson [152] 12–14. Demetrius of Phaleron may well have advised Ptolemy Soter on the setting up of the library ([Aristeas], *Ep. Phil.* 9, with Fraser [150] i. 696–704; Blum [149] 141–50). Such facts may explain Strabo's remark which, taken literally, is merely false—that Aristotle 'taught the kings of Egypt how to put a library together' (so Moraux [76] i. 5).

[28](#) Pace Gottschalk [114] 1085, who states that the story is 'self-contradictory' (see below, n. 38.).

[29](#) Text in Fortenbaugh, *et al.* [13] 94.

[30](#) On the eventual fate of the books see below, pp. 20–1.

[31](#) Thus e.g. Moraux [76] i. 12, says that, according to Athenaeus, Ploternus bought 'a substantial part' of Neleus' library. Athenaeus does not say 'a substantial part': he writes πάντα.

[32](#) Pace Fraser [150] ii. 473, who asserts that Athenaeus has 'evidently misunderstood' Strabo's remark that Aristode taught the kings of Egypt how to collect books. I do not see how even the most careless of readers could so misunderstand the remark.

[33](#) See F. Jacoby, 'Kallixeinos', *RE* x (1919), cols. 1751–4.

[34](#) So Blum [149] 122, who accepts Athenaeus' account against Strabo.

[35](#) See Dedouzes [146] 244.

[36](#) See further below, pp. 28–9.

[37](#) Below, pp. 9 and 10 11.

[38](#) So Gottschalk [114] 1084, who again falsely claims that Strabo's story is 'selfcontradictory' (above, n. 28).

[39](#) Strabo frequently cites Posidonius. A garbled text (Athenaeus, 657e = T 8 EK) suggests that Strabo knew him personally; the chronology is virtually impossible: see Kidd [49] II (i). 11–12.

[40](#) See I. G. Kidd, 'Posidonius as Philosopher-Historian', in Griffin and Barnes [92].

[41](#) Below, pp. 10–11.

[42](#) See Kidd [49] 11 (ii), 277–80.

[43](#) What was Posidonius' source? He names none in the passage, and it is (I think) generally supposed that he was relying on eye-witnesses or at least on oral sources.

[44](#) On Apellicon see R. Goulet, 'Apellicon de Téos', in Goulet [131] 1. 2664–7.

<sup>45</sup> See D. M. Lewis, 'The Chronology of the Athenian New Style Coinage', *The Numismatic Chronicle*, 2 (1962), 275–300, at 278; E. Badian, 'Rome, Athens and Mithridates', *American Journal of Ancient History*, 1 (1976), 105–28, at 117–19; Ferrary [81] 475 n. 131.

<sup>46</sup> Aristocles, *apud* Eusebius, *PE* 15. 2. 13. Aristocles refers to the book but reports virtually nothing of its contents (unless we choose to ascribe to Apellicon the reference in 15. 2. 14 to one of Aristotle's letters to Antipater).—Düring [132] 393, must have been reading a richer text than the one we now possess.

<sup>47</sup> This is perhaps suggested by the odd position, at the end of the sentence, of the phrase *τά τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία*—unless, indeed, this phrase should be deleted as an intrusive gloss.

<sup>48</sup> See below, p. 25.

<sup>49</sup> The Arabic is reported to transcribe the name as 'Almikun' or 'Ablikun' or 'Atlikun'. Leofranc Holford-Strevens tells me that the correct version Ἀπελλικῶν is 'Ablīkūn or 'Aflīkūn.

<sup>50</sup> So Blum [149] 119, who asserts, with engaging perversity, that the entry in Ptolemy is 'the only reliable evidence' for Apellicon's bibliophilic activities.

<sup>51</sup> See Düring [132] 245; Baffiori [166]; and references in Moraux [76] i. 26 n. 61.

<sup>52</sup> But Athenaeus says that Ptolemy bought *all* the books.

<sup>53</sup> Below, p. 26.

<sup>54</sup> So e.g. Ferrary [81] 474, after Düring [132] 393—who also, and gratuitously, ascribes to Strabo's 'lively imagination' the claim that the new copies were full of errors. Contrast e.g. Stahr [138] 26: Apellicon took the manuscripts to Athens, 'where, with the help of other Peripatetics, he tried to complete and correct the lacunae and the errors insofar as a comparison with other available manuscripts allowed'.

<sup>55</sup> For *ληκυθίζειν* see Callimachus, fr. 215 Pf<sup>2</sup>, with Pfeiffer's notes. The word *θείσις* presumably has its rhetorical sense.

<sup>56</sup> The text is uncertain: in the clause *τῶν δ' Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου γραμμάτων* [codd.: *συγγραμμάτων* Robbe] *οὔτε πολλοῖς οὔτ' ἀκριβῶς ἐντετυχηκότες* ... either *ἀκριβῶς* is corrupt or there is a lacuna in its vicinity. (Fortenbaugh *et al.* [13] i. 93, retains the transmitted text, and Englishes it as: '... neither to have read many of the writings of Aristode and Theophrastus nor (to have done so) with care'. But the Greek cannot mean this.)

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. Lynch [75] 135 62. The decline is also sketched by Cicero: *Fin.* 5. 5. 13.

<sup>58</sup> See below, p. 60.

<sup>59</sup> Diogenes Laertius 5. 62; above, n. 17.

<sup>60</sup> See Moraux [154] 248–9.

[61](#) PHerc. 1005 fr. in Angeli: 'Αριστοτέ[λονς τὰ] 'Αναλυτικὰ καὶ [τὰ Περὶ] φύσεως (see below, p. 45.)

[62](#) See A. Angeli, *Filodemo: Agli amid di scuola*, La scuola di Epicuro, 7 (Naples, 1988), 233–40.

[63](#) For which see Düring [132] 385.

[64](#) The relevant text, a short essay by Alexander on ἀντιστροφή, is printed in A. Badawi, *Commentaires sur Aristote perdus en grec* (Beirut, 1971); see J. Barnes, S. Bobzien, K. Flannery, and K. Ierodiakonou, *Alexander of Aphrodisias: Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics* i. 1–7 (London, 1990), 85 nn. 11–12.

[65](#) The evidence comes from 'Ocellus Lucanus', §§20–35; see Moraux [76] ii. 606; id. [155] 133–4.

[66](#) See Kidd [49] 11 (i)..84 6.

[67](#) See Athenaeus, 656b = *FGrH* 328 F 173. The report, which is not accurate, merely says ὥς φησιν 'Αριστοτέλης.

[68](#) E.g. Athenaeus, 389b (= fr. 415 Pf<sup>2</sup>); Σ Aristophanes, *An* 302 (= fr. 421 Pf<sup>2</sup>); Σ B //10. 274 (= fr. 427 Pf<sup>2</sup>).

[69](#) See e.g. Artemidorus, 2. 14" fr. 332 R<sup>3</sup> = 284 G; and the Byzantine text published in *CIAG* suppl. I. i and reprinted in Gigon [133] 442 64. (Add PBrLibr inv. 2242, now re-edited in [56] I. 1. 338 45.) Note that Theophrastus had already done an epitome of Aristotle's *Περὶ ζώων* in six books: Diogenes Laertius, 5. 49.

[70](#) See Düring [141] 61–2; Keaney [144]. See below, p. 49.

[71](#) See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 7. 22–31: forty books of *Analytics*, two of *Categories* (pace Plezia [161] 49, there is no reason to derive this report from Adrastus on whom see below, p.33).

[72](#) See e.g. Ptolemy, no. 93 (Düring [132] 230) (see below, p. 27); Olympiodorus, *In Cat.* 6.12

[73](#) On whom see R. Goulet, 'Artémon', in Goulet [131] 1. 6154–16.

[74](#) See below, p. 41. For Aristotle's influence on Alexandria, see in general Richardson [152]. A list—or rather, a sequence of lists—of Theophrastus' writings is also preserved; and scholars are content to ascribe this to Hermippus, and hence to Alexandria: see e.g. Sollenberger [148] 25–34.

[75](#) The fact is alluded to by Lucian, *Adv. Indoctum* 4 (102). Düring [135] 51, says that 'Cicero attests that Sulla brought works of Aristotle to Rome'; but I have been unable to find the pertinent text.

[76](#) I owe this thought to Leofranc Holford-Strevens.

[77](#) So e.g. Moraux [76] i. 37, who refers to F. Münzer, 'Cornelius (377)', *RE* iv (1901), cols. 1515–17.

[78](#) So D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 3–9 (Cambridge, 1965–1970), ii. 195; cf. Haas [134]. Münzer, 'Cornelius', col. 1516, asserts that Faustus 'had to auction a large part of



his property, including the library which his father had left him'. But none of the three texts which Münzer cites in support of his assertion mentions the library.

<sup>79</sup> See J. H. d'Arms, *Romans on the Bay of Naples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 177.

<sup>80</sup> Appian, *Bell. ciu* 1. 104; see d'Arms, *Bay of Naples*, 314–2.

<sup>81</sup> Düring [135] 49 n. 248, states that Cicero found the Aristotelian manuscripts there.

<sup>82</sup> On Tyrannio see Haas [134]; also Wendel [156]; Moraux [76] i. 454–6.

<sup>83</sup> See Shackleton-Bailey, *Atticus*, v. 352 (cf. Sergius, *In Donat.* 1 = Tyrannio, fr. 59 Haas).

<sup>84</sup> I derive the argument from Düring [141] 38, who states that 'H. Rabe and Usener have shown' that in 46 Tyrannio did not yet know *Rhet.* A footnote refers to H. Rabe, *De Theophrasti libris Περὶ λέξεως* (Bonn, 1890), 27, and to H. Usener, *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig, 1912–13) ii. 206 (= 'Ein altes Lehrgebäude der Philologie', *Sitzungsberichte der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil. hist. Klasse 4 (1892), 582–648, at 636). Usener states that 'the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* ... was not then known to' Tyrannio. He offers no evidence or argument; but he refers to Rabe, 27 (ff. Neither here nor elsewhere in his monograph does Rabe mention Tyrannio. Rather, he argues (see below, p. 50) that the three-volume *Rhet.* was put together by Andronicus from two separate works. Even if Rabe is right, his conclusion does nothing to establish Usener's thesis.

<sup>85</sup> *Att.* 4. 4a. 1; 8. 2.

<sup>86</sup> See below, p. 46.

<sup>87</sup> Tyrannio's dates are uncertain. Badian, 'Mithridates', 126 n. 42, puts his birth at c. 110; for he was already famous in 71, and he had studied with Dionysius Thrax, who himself had studied with Aristarchus. A plausible emendation in the *Suda*, s.v. *Τυραννίων* (*ρπη'* for *ριη'*) has him die in 25. See Haas [134] 95.

<sup>88</sup> The librarian has been identified as Sulla's freedman, Cornelius Epicadus (see Suetonius, *De gramm.* 12)—an ungrounded guess.

<sup>89</sup>  
... Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς διεχειρίσατο . . . καὶ βιβλιοπῳλαὶ τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες. According to Moraux [76] i. 34, βιβλιοπῳλαὶ τινες is a 'second subject' to διεχειρίσατο. Perhaps this is grammatically possible but it gives a false sense (for the booksellers did not manage the library). If the text is to be preserved, then we should suppose (hat the participles, χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ, stand for indicatives. (Hence my translation.) The nearest parallels to this which I have so far found come in the New Testament: see e.g. K Blass and A. Debrunner, *Grammatik der neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (Göttingen, 19437), § 468. (The closest things noticed by Kühner-Gerth-ii. 2, 100. (§ 490. 4) are not very close.)

<sup>90</sup> In the following sentence in *Sulla*, Plutarch actually cites Strabo but not the *Geography*.

<sup>91</sup> Düring [132] 421, asserts that 'Sulla's son was killed in 46, and after this time his library was in Tyrannio's charge': an invention. (Repeated at [135] 50; [136] col. 195. See [141] 67, where we also learn that Tyrannio 'seems to have advised Atticus to publish works of Aristode'.)

<sup>92</sup> [Caesar], *B. afr.* 45. 3, says that Faustus and Afranius were put to death but that 'Pompeiae [Faustus' wife and Pompey's daughter] cum Fausti liberis Caesar incolumitatem suaque omnia concessit'. Similarly Appian, *Bell. ciu* 2. 100. Florus, 2 13. 90, and Orosius, 6. 16. 5, affirm that Pompeia and the children were killed along with Faustus.

<sup>93</sup> Save in the paragraph from al-Farabi, quoted above (p. 6). But if I am right, this is a romance.

<sup>94</sup> For which see Suda, s.v. *Τυραννίων*.

<sup>95</sup> Manuscripts are perishable goods. Here is a paragraph from John Aubrey: 'In my grandfather's dayes, the Manuscripts flew about like Butter-flies. All Musick bookes, Account bookes, Copie bookes etc, were covered with old Manuscripts, as wee cover them now with blew Paper, or Marbled Paper. And the Clovers of Malmesbury made great Havock of them, and Gloves were wrapt up no doubt in many good pieces of Antiquity.—About 1647, I went to see Parson Stump out of curiosity to see his Manuscripts, whereof I had seen some in my child-hood, but by that time they were lost and disperst; His sonnes were gunners and souldiers, and scoured their gunnes with them.'

<sup>96</sup> In *Int.* 5. 28–9; repeated by Elias (= David), in *Cat.* 113. 17; 117. 22; ΣAristotle, 94<sup>a</sup>21–3. On Andronicus see Littig [159]; Plezia (161); Brink (158) cols. 938 45; Moraux [76] i. 45–142; Gottschalk [114] 1089 97; R. Goulet, 'Andronicus de Rhodes', in id. (131) i. 200–2; Donini [222] 5032 n. 10.

<sup>97</sup> Düring [132] 417: 'we cannot attach any importance at all to this late tradition'; cf. Lynch [75] 203–5.

<sup>98</sup> *δωδέκατος* for *ένδέκατος*: so Littig [159] i. 5. Other explanations have been proposed.

<sup>99</sup> On Boethus see Moraux [76] i. 143–79; J.-P. Schneider, 'Boéthos de Sidon', in Goulet [131] ii. 126–30. He was a figure of considerable importance in the revival of Peripatetic philosophy at the end of the millennium more important, to judge from our surviving evidence, than Andronicus.

<sup>100</sup> e.g. Diogenes Laertius, 10. 3; Plutarch, *Cic.* 24 (873a). See Moraux [76] i. 64 n. 25. (Moraux claims that 'niemals bezeichnet der Dativ den Studiengenossen'; but, as Ferrary [81] observes, the claim is refuted by Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 1. 7.)

<sup>101</sup> See e.g. W. Aly, 'Strabo (3)', *RE* iv (1932), cols. 76–155, at cols. 76–7.

<sup>102</sup> Or so scholars argue. But of course it is strictly consistent with what we know about Boethus that Andronicus was born before 120 BC or after 70.

[103](#) *Tim.* 1. 1; *Off.* 1. 1. 2; 3. 2. 5: see Gottschalk [114] 1096–7; and on Cratippus in general, see Moraux [76] i. 223–56; T. Dorandi, ‘Cratippos de Pergame’, in Goulet [131] ii. 501–3.

[104](#) ‘Wem solch ein Stillschweigen kein redendes ist, für den sind auch unsere Worte umsonst’ (Stahr [115] 31).

[105](#) See Strabo 14. 2. 13 (655): Eudemus, his brother Boethus, and Boethus’ son Pasicles; Hieronymus and Praxiphanes; and the ‘Aristotelizing’ Stoic Posidonius (Strabo, 2. 3. 8 (104)).

[106](#) See 14. 3. 4 (670); but Strabo reports that Xenarchus taught in Athens and at Rome as well as in Alexandria, and he does not specify where (or when) he heard him. Alexander, *Mant.* 151. 8, couples the names of Xenarchus and Boethus (Σεναρχον ... και Βοηθόν); but we cannot squeeze anything out of this.

[107](#) Since there he saw P. Servilius Isauricus (12. 6. 2 (568)) who died in the summer of 44 BC (F. Münzer, ‘Servilius (93)’ *RE* iia (1923), cols. 1812–17, at col. 1816).

[108](#) Moraux rejects Plutarch; and his discussion of the dating problem, [76] i. 45–58, is therefore no more than a tissue of speculation.

[109](#) See below, p. 46.

[110](#) Boethius, *Diu* 875 D 877 A (Boethius blows the work only through Porphyry): see Plezia [161] 10–15, 44 6; Moraux [76] i. 120–32. Littig [159] ii. 12 15, argues that Boethius’ *Div* was closely modelled on Andronicus (he is followed by Plezia) and if you find Stoic elements in Boethius’ essay, you may suppose that Andronicus had been influenced by Posidonius (see [159] iii. 10).

[111](#) Or so one might infer from Simplicius, *In Cat.* 270. 2; 347. 19.

[112](#) Listed in Plezia [161] 6–10. Simplicius does not mention the work in his initial roll of honour, *In Cat.* 1. 3 2. 29 (where Andronicus’ pupil figures as ὁ θαυμάσιος Βοηθός: 1. 18), and when Andronicus is cited together with other authorities he is never given first place (see 63. 21, 159. 32, 202. 1 5, 203. 4). Simplicius calls the work a παράφρασις (*In Cat.* 26. 17–20; cf. 30. 3–5, where ἐξηγούμενος ὁ Βοηθός contrasts with ὁ Ἀνδρόνικος παραφράζων). Presumably the commentary did not cover the ‘postpredicaments’, which according to Andronicus did not form part of *Cat.*: see below, p. 34.

[113](#) See Plezia [161] 364–44; Moraux [76] i. 1134–16; below, p. 60.

[114](#) Galen, *An corp.* 4. 782 Kühn (for the text see Moraux [76] i. 134 n. 9); Aspasius, *In EN* 44. 204–4 (on the definition of πάθος: see Becchi [157]; Themistius, *In An.* 31. 14; 32. 22–31 (defending Xenocrates’ account of the soul from Aristotle’s criticisms). It would be odd to infer a *commentary* on *An.* from these texts.

[115](#) See Ptolemy, no. 97 (Düring [132] 230): ‘Again, memorials [i.e. ὑπομνήματα]: you will find the number of their lines and their incipits in the fifth book of Andronicus’ work on the Catalogue of Aristotle’s Writings’. (But Baffiori [166] 101 gives a different version of the text.) On the Πίνακες see Littig [159] ii. 184–25 (an imaginative reconstruction); Plezia [161] 164–35; Regenbogen (151)

cols. 1442–4; Düring [136] cols. 1874–90; Blum [149] 267–71; Moraux [76] i. 584–94.

[116](#) The complete text survives in a single MS dating from the 18th c.: discovery of the MS was announced a quarter of a century ago (see Düring [167]); and the thing has still not been published. Substantial parts of it were earlier known from three Arabic *Lives* of Aristotle. For details of the Arabic tradition, see Gutas [168]. There is an English translation of the material in Düring [132] 221–31 (supplemented by [167]).

[117](#) On Ptolemy see Plezia [161] 2–6; Moraux [169] 60 n. 6 (on his catalogue, *ibid.*, 85–94); Düring [167]; Plezia [170]; Balliori [166]; Plezia [171]; *id.* [172]; Gottschalk [114] 1089 n. 48; M. Aouad, ‘Aristote de Stagire prosopographie’, in Goulet [131] i. 416–17.

[118](#) Whom Plezia [170] 39–40, fancifully identifies as the brother of the emperor Julian, therefore dating the work to the 350s.

[119](#) The dedicatory letter can be found in English in Düring [167], and in Latin in Plezia [171].

[120](#) See Plezia [172]; below, p. 56.

[121](#) So the *Vita Marciana* 43 and the *Vita Latina* 46 (both printed in Düring [132]). The will was also transcribed in Ptolemy’s *Life*, and in Diogenes Laertius, 5. 11–16. (Diogenes says: ‘I myself [ἡμεῖς] came across his will’—presumably in Hcrmippus’ *On Aristotle* (see Athenaeus, 589c).) [122](#) Ptolemy says that Andronicus listed 1,000 works (see also *Vita Marciana* 45; Elias (= David), *In Cat.* 113. 17–19; cf. 107. 11–13, where the same report is ascribed in the MSS to Ptolemy Philadelphus—a mistake, presumably, for Ptolemy the Unknown). The report, if we construe it *au pied de la lettre*, is incredible.

[123](#) See Ptolemy, cited in n. 115; for Callimachus see Athenaeus 244a (= fr. 434 Pf<sup>2</sup>); 585b (= fr. 433 Pf<sup>2</sup>)

[124](#) See below, p. 39.

[125](#) Two scholia advert to it, one on Theophrastus’ *Met.* (on which see H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Nicolaus Damascenus on the Philosophy of Aristotle.*, Philosophia Antiqua, 13 (Leiden, 1969<sup>2</sup>), 274–34; and Most, *Théophraste*, pp. xi–xviii), the other on *HP* (text in Düring [132] 414; see J. J. Keaney, ‘The Early Tradition of Theophrastus’ *Historia Plantarum*’, *Hermes*, 96 (1968), 293–8).

[126](#) For the spurious commentary on *EN*(—‘Heliodorus’) see Moraux [76] i. 136–8; for the spurious *Περὶ παθῶν* see Glibcrt-Thirry [163] 30–4; for the spurious *Περὶ πάξεωσποιητῶν* (text in Bokker [164].1461) see Koster [165].

[127](#) *repertor*, not ‘discoverer’ (*pace* Düring [136] col. 196).

[128](#) *In Int2* 11. 16–17; cf. *Div* 875D: *diligentissimus senex*.

[129](#) *In An.* 32. 22–4 the remark is surely stolen from Porphyry.

[130](#) Düring [132] 425.

[131](#) So Plezia [161] 21–6 i.e. a biography in the ‘grammatical’ rather than the ‘rhetorical’ tradition (for the Leonine distinction see Blum [149] 259).

[132](#) For his Πίναξ τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν βιβλίων see Strabo, 16. 2. 24 (757); cf R. Goulet, ‘Apollonius de Tyr’, in Goulet [131] i. 294. As far as we can tell (which is not far), the bibliographical part of Apollonius’ Πίναξ was simply an ordered list of writings.

[133](#) See Alexander, *In Apr.* 160. 29 161. 2; Ammonius, *In Int.* 5. 28 6. 4; Philoponus, *In An.* 27. 21 9; 45. 8–14; Boethius, *In Int.* 2 11. 13 12. 28; ΣAristotle, 94<sup>a</sup> 21 47; cf. Moraux [76] i. 117–19.

[134](#) If we may trust the remark in Ptolemy’s catalogue (no. 96), Andronicus ‘found’ these letters himself; but e.g. Olympiodorus, *In Cat.* 6. 11 13, simply says that ‘Andronicus and Artemon collected [συνήγαγον]’ the letters.

[135](#) See below, p. 63.

[136](#) See e.g. Littig [159] ii. to n. 3: ‘Besides the bad edition of Apellicon, Andronicus had many other ἀντίγραφα at his disposal.’

[137](#) Gottschalk, [147] 338–9, in the course of a generally sceptical account of the Tunnel story, remarks that, according to Strabo and Plutarch, ‘certain booksellers made poor copies of Aristotle’s papers for sale; and ... Tyrannio made copies (good ones, presumably) which he gave to Andronicus’. Even if the copies which Tyrannio handed over to Andronicus were distinct from the mangled products of the booksellers (above, p. 19), there is no reason to believe that they were, or could have been, *good* versions of Aristotle’s texts.

[138](#) See esp. Diels [140]; cf. Moraux [155] 135–7.

[139](#) Pace Littig [159] iii. 30.

[140](#) ‘The Andronicean edition does not seem to have been well known outside a narrow circle of specialists. Authors like Seneca, Quintilian, Plutarch and Lucian betray very little, if any, knowledge of this edition, epoch-making in the history of Western civilization’ (Düring [141] 40–1). Plutarch does indeed betray a very little knowledge of the edition. Apart from him, no non-specialist betrays any knowledge of it at all and (with one exception) no specialist either.

[141](#) If you count *SEI* as distinct from *Top.*, and if the ‘*Parva Naturalia*’ are divided into seven distinct essays.

[142](#) The canon is a set, not an ordered sequence.

[143](#) Recall that Ptolemy himself purportedly asserted that Andronicus listed 1,000 works: above, n. 122.

[144](#) Düring’s presentation is to this extent misleading.

[145](#) But the Arabic text is uncertain: Baffiori [166] 93.

[146](#) See Hadot [26] 63–93.

[147](#) Ptolemy presents the constituents of the *Organon* in the order *Cat.*, *Int.*, *Top.*, *Apr.*, *APst.*, *SEE*: should we infer that Andronicus placed *Top.* after *Cat.* and before *Apr.*? So e.g. Plezia [161] 5; Düring [132] 244. Both scholars refer to

Simplicius, *In Cat.* 379. 9, and Boethius, *In Cat.* 263 B: neither text supports their contention; indeed, the fact that Andronicus dismisses the view of those who called *Cat.* τὰ πρὸ τῶν τόπων suggests the opposite.

[148](#) See Simplicius, *In Cat.* 16. 2; 18. 16; *In Phys.* 4. 12. No fragments of the work survive. On Adrastus see Moraux [76] ii. 294–332; R. Goulet, ‘Adraste d’Aphrodisce’, in id. (131) i. 56–7. Littig, [159] i. 26–34 makes a fanciful attempt to recover the order of items in Andronicus’ catalogue, which he took to differ significantly from Ptolemy’s.

[149](#) In the passage from Simplicius, *In Phys.*, discussed below, p. 35.

[150](#) See Moraux [154] 267–8.

[151](#) See above, n. 133.

[152](#) See Frede [142].

[153](#) *In Cat.* 263 B, on which see Pfligersdorffer [160]; Shiel [162] (with a corrected text). Boethius and Simplicius are paraphrasing the same text, no doubt from Porphyry’s lost *In Cat.*

[154](#) See Appendix.

[155](#) On the issue see Brunschwig [139] 28–31. Brunschwig suggests that the ultimate justification for such a bipartition was given by the programmatic text at *Meteor.* 338<sup>a</sup>20 339<sup>a</sup>7, and in particular by 338. 20–1: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῶς φύσεως [= *Phys.* pt. 1] καὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς [= *Phys.* pt. 2]. Note that neither Alexander (*In Meteor.* 1. 5–12) nor Philoponus (*In Meteor.* 2. 17–18; 3. 26–30) reads a bipartition into the text. Olympiodorus, *In Meteor.* 7. 4–21, associates ‘the first causes’ with *Phys.* 1 2 and ‘all natural motion’ with *Phys.* 5–8 and he suggests that *Phys.* 3–4 should be regarded as a sort of preface to 5–8.

[156](#) See Simplicius, *In Phys.* 802. 7–13 [= Porphyry, fr. 159 Smith]. The same view is upheld explicitly by Philoponus, *In Phys.* 2. 16 17, who does not hint that the four four division was controversial.

[157](#) Earlier, in *In Cael.* 226. 19 23, he had adopted the other position, giving no indication of any doubt or dispute. Why did he change his mind? Had he read Andronicus in the meanwhile?

[158](#) See Plezia [161] 33–5 (923. 7 924. 20 is a fragment); Düring [132] 417 (following Plezia); Moraux [76] i. 115–16 (at least based on Andronicus).

[159](#) *On the Philosophy of Aristotle* 1, fr. 15: see Drossaart Lulofs, *Nicolaus*, 130–1. For the date of Nicolaus’ work (probably about the turn of the millennium) see *ibid.* 4–5.

[160](#) Note that Andronicus’ *corpus Theophrasteum* was certainly not canonical: it did not include *Met.* (so the scholium, printed in Lax and Most, *Théophraste*, pp. xi–xii).

[161](#) For this order see *Vit. Plot.* 4–6.

[162](#) Apollodorus is a grand and familiar figure, but we know next to nothing about his activities on Epicharmus—certainly nothing which might illuminate



Andronicus' comparable work: see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1968), 264–5.

[163](#) Dedoues [146] 246–7, compares Tribonian's work on the *Digest*. This is all that Porphyry ascribes to Andronicus. In particular, he does not ascribe to him anything which we should call a critical or textual edition of the Aristotelian works which he assembled. Porphyry himself had been charged with 'arranging and correcting' Plotinus' works, *τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων*. He cites Andronicus as a model for his *διάταξις*. He does not cite him as a model for the *διόρθωσις*.

[164](#) He maintained that 'we should start with logic, which is concerned with proof' (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 5. 18–23; cf Elias (= David), *In Cat.* 117. 22–4). Note that his pupil Boethus disagreed: physics is the right starting-place, being 'more familiar to us' (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 5. 16–18).

[165](#) See above, p. 28.

[166](#) All three printed in Düring [132]; see also R. Goulet, 'Aristote de Stagire—œuvres', in id. [131] i. 424–34. The Arabic texts also contain a further catalogue, mostly of pseudepigrapha—but including *Met.* (see Baffiori [166] 101–5; Gutas [168]). On everything to do with the catalogues the fundamental work is Moraux [169].

[167](#) On which see Blum [149] 284–302.

[168](#) The original Greek titles are often difficult to recover, even where the Arabic contains a transliteration of the Greek; and different scholars have printed surprisingly different versions of the text. Note that according to Baffiori [166], Ptolemy's catalogue ends at item 91 (in Düring's enumeration), and items 93–9 constitute the catalogue of Apellicon. But see the text cited by Düring [132] 231.

[169](#) Moraux [169], urged that it came rather from Athens that it was a catalogue of the Lyceum library done by Ariston of Geos in the 3rd c. Moraux was vigorously supported by Keaney [144] 58–63; but few other scholars rallied- and later Moraux himself lapsed into a scepticism ([154] 251–2; [155] 128–31). Note that, *pace* Düring 1136) col. 184, no ancient text ascribes the catalogue to Hermippus.

[170](#) Callimachus' *Πίνακες* are often taken to be 'library catalogues' of the third type.

[171](#) Blum [149] 130, insists that the list, which is not in the best of textual health, *may* originally have contained all those works which we now miss in it.

[172](#) See above, p. 32.

[173](#) Of the spurious works in the modern corpus, four appear to be found in Diogenes' list: *Physiog.* (109), *Plant.* (108), *Mech.* (123), and *Oec.* (23). Whether, under these titles, the Alexandrian library held the texts which we now read is, of course, a further question the answer to which, in the case of *Plant.*, at least, is certainly No.

[174](#) On *Top.* and *Met.* see further, below pp. 54 and 59.



[175](#) But in connection with this and other similar remarks it must be observed, first, that numerals in ancient text are always liable to corruption; and secondly, that confusion easily arose from the fact that, say, the letter zeta might indicate either the sixth book (in the alphabetical system) or the seventh book (in the alphanumerical system)—see e.g. Simplicius, *In Phys.* 923. 3–7 (below, p. 67).

[176](#) The anonymous list contains both a nine-book *APr.* (item 43) and a two-book version (item 134). It cannot be supposed that our current text was ever divided into nine separate rolls (*pace* Moraux [169] 87).

[177](#) Compare the *Magna Moralia*.

[178](#) See below, 11. 271.

[179](#) Which is given *two* books: i.e. our *Poet*, plus the lost second book on comedy?

[180](#) So W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1955<sup>2</sup>), 6. I should add that Ross apparently supposes that the process of 'building up' was supervised by Aristotle himself, the only tampering with *Phys.* after his death being the insertion of Book 7. See further below, p. 60.

[181](#) The Aristotelian papyri are all republished in [56] I 1\* 251–95. There are sixty-eight texts in all, but items 10–68 are *testimonia* rather than fragments. Items 7–9 concern the *Ath. Pol.* For all the rest of the corpus there are merely items 1–6, the earliest of which dates from the end of the 1st c. A.D. Evidence that some libraries at least had copies of Aristotle's works: Gellius, 19. 5. 4; Apulcius, *Apol.* 41.

[182](#) He cites by name *On Justice* (*Eloc.* 28 = fr. 82 R<sup>3</sup> = 8 G) and a letter to Antipater (225 = fr. 665 R<sup>3</sup>). *HA* is twice cited, without explicit title (*Eloc.* 97 = *HA* 497<sup>b</sup>27–8; *Eloc.* 157 = *HA* 619<sup>a</sup>18–20); and *Rhet.* four times (*Eloc.* 11 = *Rhet.* 1409<sup>a</sup>35 6; *Eloc.* 34 = *Rhet.* 1409<sup>b</sup>16; *Eloc.* 26 = *Rhet.* 1410<sup>a</sup>34–5; see also *Eloc.* 116 with *Rhet.* 1405<sup>b</sup>34; and note P. Chiron (ed.), *Démétrius: Du Style* (Paris, 1993), pp. xxv–xxvii). Other citations: *Eloc.* 29 = fr. 669 R<sup>3</sup> = 9. 1 G; 97 = fr. 668 R<sup>3</sup> = 10 G; 144 = fr. 668 R<sup>3</sup> = 11. 1 G; 154 = fr. 669 R<sup>3</sup> = 9. 2G; 164 = 668R<sup>3</sup> = 11. 2G; 230 = fr. 670R<sup>3</sup>; 233 = fr. 656R<sup>3</sup>.

[183](#) See Goulet, 'Artémon'; Chiron, *Démétrius*, pp. xiii–xl; K. Pafienroth, 'A Note on the Dating of Demetrius' *On Style*', *Classical Quarterly*, 44 (1994), 280–1.

[184](#) See T. Dorandi, in [56], I 1\* 24–5.

[185](#) On the question of Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle, see esp. Pahnke [127] (a list of all Ciceronian references to Aristotle: 147–8); Moraux [126]; Long [124]. Among the superabundant earlier literature, Madvig's little essay shines out: J. N. Madvig, *Cicero: De finibus* (Copenhagen, 18763), 837–48. The essays in Fortenbaugh and Steinmetz [123] contribute nothing new to the particular issues which here concern me.

[186](#) e.g. *Acad.* 4. 18; *Diu* 1. 25. 53; 2. 1. 4; *Luc.* 43. 132; *Oral.* 51. 172; *Tusc.* 1. 10. 22: see Pahnke [127] 91–4.

[187](#) See *Diu* 1. 5. 8.

[188](#) But he can make curious mistakes: see, notoriously, the remark at *Fat.* 17. 39.

[189](#) See Stahr [115] 47–54, who takes Cicero at more than his word.

[190](#) But the text, from Nonius, is disputed: ‘magna enim animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotelem si leges’ (*Aristotelem*, Plasherg; *Aristotele*, codd.). Nonius cites the sentence to illustrate the use of *contendere* in the sense of *intendere*.

[191](#) *Top.* 1. 3.—above, p. 45.

[192](#) *Att.* 12. 40. 1 (cf. 13. 28. 2) the date is May 45.

[193](#) *Rep.* 3. 8. 12—the reference, in our lacunose text, is anonymous; but there is no real doubt that Aristode is referred to by the word ‘*alter*’. See also *Tusc.* 5. 35. 101 = *Fin.* 2. 32. 106 = fr. 90 R<sup>3</sup> = 5G; *Rep.* 2. 11. 22; 3. 8. 12; *Leg.* 3. 6. 14; *Ad Q. fr.* 3. 5. 1. An exhaustive discussion in Pahnke [127] 9–76.

[194](#) *ND* 1. 13. 33 = fr. 26R<sup>3</sup> = 839 G; cf. 1. 38. 107 = fr. 7 R<sup>3</sup> = 227 G; 2. 15. 42 = fr. 23 R<sup>3</sup> = 835 G; 2. 16. 44 = fr. 24 R<sup>3</sup> = 836 G; 2. 38. 95 = fr. 12 R<sup>3</sup> = 838 G.

[195](#) See *Diu* 1. 25. 53 = fr. 37 R<sup>3</sup> = 56 G.

[196](#) *Off.* 2. 16. 56–7 = fr. 89 R<sup>3</sup> = 839 G. R<sup>3</sup> makes this a fragment of *Just.*: R<sup>1</sup> and R<sup>2</sup> had ascribed it to *On Wealth* (and others emend ‘*Aristoteles*’ to *Aristo Ceius*); see P. Thillet, in Schuhl [145] 13–17. The case for the *Politicus* is even thinner: see Pahnke [127] 76–7.

[197](#) *Hort.* fr. 112 Grilli (= Augustine, (*C. Iul.* 4. 15. 78) is printed as fr. 60 R<sup>3</sup>, from *Protr.* (= 823 G, unattributed). Some assign *Tusc.* 3. 28. 69 = fr. 53 R<sup>3</sup> = 833 G to *Protr.*

[198](#) It appears as fr. 26 R<sup>3</sup> = 25. 1 G.

[199](#) PHerc. 1428: the correspondence was noted in 1833 by C. Petersen (according to Madvig, *De finibus*, 844); the texts are printed in parallel in H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879), 529–50.

[200](#) So e.g. R. Philippon, ‘Die Quelle der epikureischen Götterlehre in Ciceros erstem Ruche de natura deorum’, *Symbolae Osloenses*, 19 (1939), 15–40 (reprinted in id. *Studien zu Epikur und den Epikureern* (Hildesheim, 1983)).

[201](#) All the relevant texts are assembled in Gigon [133] 154–200.

[202](#) Of course, they might have come from another source, e.g. Lucullus might have bought the Sullan library. (Note that in his will Sulla appointed Lucullus guardian of Faustus: Plutarch, *Luc.* 4. 6 (494c).)

[203](#) Compare *Div* 1. 38. 81, which apparently alludes to the same chapter in *Probl.*

[204](#) Note also *ND* 2. 49. 125 = fr. 342 R<sup>3</sup> = 279 G (Aristotle on cranes). Most of the animal lore rehearsed in *ND* 2. 48-51. 123-6 corresponds closely with texts in *HA* 9: Moraux [126] 91 n. 28.

[205](#) See Moraux [126] 92. On these compilations see esp. Düring [141]; Keaney [144] 52-8—see above, p. 15.

[206](#) See above, n. 182.

[207](#) In the case of Plato, apparent allusions (e.g. *Rep.* 1. 2. 2 to *Gorg.* 483d) do not *establish* anything. But inasmuch as we know from other, and impeccable, evidence that Cicero had read his Plato pretty thoroughly, we may properly treat such things as genuine reflections of Cicero's knowledge of the texts.

[208](#) What of the lost *Constitutions*? Cicero refers to them at *Fin.* 5. 4. 11, but does not explicitly say how many (if any) he has read. In *Att.* 2. 2. 2, written at Antium at the end of 60 BC, he says that he has a *Constitution* of Pellene with him and thinks ('puto') that at Rome he has *Constitutions* of Corinth and Athens. But these are said to be works of Dicaearchus; and although such works are not otherwise attested, it is not clear that we should suppose that Cicero has simply got the author wrong. See further Pahnke [127] 38-9.

[209](#) There are also several other rhetorical items, including the *Τεχνῶν συναγωγή*.

[210](#) And also earlier, as item 3(a). The first part of the anonymous list has a three-volume *Τεχνῆς ρητορικῆς* (item 72) and a one-volume *Περὶ λέξεως καθαρᾶς* (item 79); the second part has a *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* without specification of book number (item 153).

[211](#) So first Rabe, *De Theophrasti* 27-36. Note that our *Rhet.*, according to marginal notes in some manuscripts, was sometimes divided into *four* books (Book 2 consisting of our 1. 10-15).

[212](#) He also refers, without book-numbers or citations, to *τάς τε τοπικάς συντάξεις καὶ τὰς ἀναλυτικάς καὶ τὰς μεθοδικὰς* (*Ad Amm.* 6).

[213](#) There are other specific references to *Rhet.* outside the *Letter*; see e.g. *Comp. verb.* 25: *ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βύβλῳ τῶν ῥητορικῶν τεχνῶν*.

[214](#) On grounds which seem pretty slender. But the *approximate* date is not in doubt.

[215](#) See Düring [132] 258-9.

[216](#) Düring [141] 39, and Moraux [126] 83, wrongly suppose an allusion to *Top.*

[217](#) But see Düring [141] 39-11. 1.

[218](#) At *Fam.* 1.9. 23 he claims that his three books *de orat omnem antiquorum et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam complectuntur*.

[219](#) *Brut* 12. 46-8 = fr. 137 R<sup>3</sup> = 125 G. Cf. *Inu* 2. 2. 6. Note that even Moraux, who is highly sceptical of Cicero's acquaintance with Aristotle's works, allows that he had probably read the *Συναγωγή*: [76] i. 42; [126] 96.

[220](#) See *Orat.* 51. 172; 57. 192; 63. 214; 68. 228.

[221](#) *De orat* 2. 38. 160. Note also 2. 9. 32, a close paraphrase of *Rhet.* 1354<sup>a</sup>6–11. The early *De inu* refers to Aristotle at 1. 5. 7 (reporting *Rhet.* 1358<sup>b</sup>8–9), and at 2. 51. 156 (reporting *Rhet.* 1358<sup>b</sup>20–9). [Cicero], *Ad Her.* 13. 11. 19, is tacitly modelled on *Rhet.* 1403<sup>b</sup>21–2. Numerous other, less striking, parallels can be found, most of them recorded in the *apparatus* to Kassel's edition of *Rhet.*

[222](#) See esp. Rabe, *De Theophrasti*, 14–16. Note that Cicero's references and allusions are virtually confined to the opening chapters of *Rhet.* 1 and (hr sections on prose rhythm in *Rhet.* 3: contrast the broad familiarity with *Rhet.* shown by, say, Quintilian.

[223](#) On rhetorical handbooks see e.g. W. Kroll, 'Rhetorik', *RE* suppl. vii (1940), cols. 1039–1138, at cols. 1096–1100.

[224](#) Later authors similarly 'cite' Aristotle from handbooks: see, e.g., Diogenes Laertius, 5. 33, which 'cites' *An.* 412<sup>a</sup>27 8 (commentary in Moraux [154] 282–8); Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* 7. 19. 5; 24. 1, citing *An.* 412<sup>a</sup> 19–21; 7. 19. 7, citing *Met.* 1074<sup>b</sup>34 (see M. J. Edwards, 'Hippolytus of Rome on Aristotle', *Eranos*, 88 (1990), 25–9; J. Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy*, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 56 (Leiden, 1992), 134–52).

[225](#) See above, n. 182.

[226](#) See e.g. Radermacher, on *Eloc.* 34.

[227](#) See J. Brunschwig, *Aristote: les Topiques I-IV* (Paris, 1967), p. lxxiii n. 2.

[228](#) But the identification is wildly implausible: how could our *Top.* I have been divided into seven books?

[229](#) It also contains two other items which refer to 'topics' (nos. 70 and 71) and which perhaps correspond to items 55 and 60 in Diogenes.

[230](#) Namely *Περὶ εἰδῶν* (item 28), *Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως* (item 43), and *Περὶ αἰρεῖοῦ καὶ συμβαίνοντος* (item 56)—all three in one volume apiece.

[231](#) See Jaeger [143] 149–52; Moraux [169] 58–65

[232](#) *In Cat.* 65. 2–13: an explicit reference to the *Methodica* which does not answer to anything in our text of *Top.* See also Diogenes Laertius, 5. 29; Dionysius, *Ad Amm.* 6 (cited above, n. 212).

[233](#) See Moraux [169] 66–8; [154] 271 n. 75.

[234](#) See also *Fam.* 8. 19. 1.

[235](#) See Immisch [173]. The story gives Cicero a pretext for writing *Top.* Compare e.g. *Tusc.* 1. 11. 24: Cicero says that he need not present arguments for the immortality of the soul, since this has been done so well in Plato's *Phaedo*; his interlocutor says that he has read the *Phaedo*, often, but finds it hard to sustain his belief in immortality; Cicero is therefore 'obliged' to go through the arguments himself.

[236](#) See e.g. Rawson [105] 290: 'He owned the *Topica*, and probably also the *Rhetorica*, but he certainly studied these more closely than most of his contemporaries.'

[237](#) Cicero's *Top.* is as close to Aristotle's (or to anything Aristotelian) as his *Laws* is to Plato's (or to anything Platonic).

[238](#) Note also *Fam.* 7. 19. 1: *institui Topica Aristotelea conscribere*.

[239](#) Plezia [172], believes that Cicero possessed our *Top.*, probably in Tyrannio's edition, and later wrote his own *Topica* from memory. Plezia offers this as a parallel to Ptolemy's puzzling remarks about Andronicus (above, p. 26): were the parallel just, then we should be obliged to conclude that Ptolemy's work was not in the least like that of Andronicus.

[240](#) For Cicero's assessment of Aristotle's style, see esp. *Luc.* 38. 119, the *flumen aureum*; parallels in Reid's note *ad loc.* Compare e.g. Quintilian, 1. 10. 83 ('eloquendi vis et suavitas'); Augustine, *CD* 8. 12 ('eloquio Platoni quidem impar sed multos facile superans'). It would be an error to refer these judgements exclusively to Aristotle's exoteric work—see the remarks in Stahr [115] 45–7 (with a splendid quotation from Schlegel).

[241](#) Immisch [173] 116–18, supposes that Cicero wrote from notes which he had taken from an eclectic handbook on τόποι.

[242](#) The word *inscriptione* at i. i shows that 'Aristotelis Topica quaedam', despite the *quaedam*, is intended as a title.

[243](#) See in general A.J. P. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford, 1978), 39–46).

[244](#) Various emended by editors.

[245](#) See above, p. 32. Note also three volumes on friendship (item 28).

[246](#) Namely 24 (Περὶ φιλίας γ'), 30 (Περὶ παθοῦς ὀργῆς α'), 58 (Περὶ ἐκουσίων α'), 64 (Περὶ δικαίων β').

[247](#) Cf. e.g. *Tusc.* 5. 9. 25.

[248](#) So Kenny, *Ethics*, 15–17.

[249](#) See Diogenes Laertius, 8. 88. It would no doubt be absurd to believe that Nicomachus—who died in battle as a μειρακίσκος (Aristocles, *apud* Eusebius, *PE* 15. 2. 15) had written the *EN*; but from a linguistic point of view, the tradition is on firm ground: 'Ἠθικά Νικομάχεια/Εὐδήμεια should mean 'Ethics written by Nicomachus/Eudemus'—just as the ('Ἰατρικά) Μενωνεία, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, were written by Menon (Galen, *In Hipp. nat. horn.* 15. 24 Kiihn), just as the Προβλήματα Δημοκρίτεια in the anonymous catalogue (item 116) were problems taken from and hence written by Democritus (the corresponding title in Diogenes' list is Προβλήματα ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου'. item 124), just as the 'Αναλυτικά Εὐδήμεια (Alexander, *In Top.* 131. 15–16) were the *Analytics* of Eudemus ...

[250](#) As Moraux [126] 93–4 urges.

[251](#) Stobaeus, *Ed.* 2. 7. 3h, cites Aristotle ἐν τῷ ὅτι κάτω τῶν Νικομαχείων. The passage is generally attributed to Arius Didymus. But Kenny, *Ethics*, 21–2,

rightly argues that there is no good reason to ascribe the text to Arius.

[252](#) That our *KM* is not a unity is beyond controversy the existence of two treatments of pleasure is enough to prove the fact. The only questions concern who invented our text, and when, and from what materials, and for what motives.

[253](#) See e.g. Aspasius, *In EM* 151. 24–6.

[254](#) On which see Brunschwig [139].

[255](#) But see above, p. 36.

[256](#) Certainly the book was added before Nicolaus: above, n. 159.

[257](#) See above, p. 35.

[258](#) See most recently R. Wardy, *The Chain of Change* (Cambridge, 1990), for a defence.

[259](#) Thus Ross, *Physics*, 18, opines that Book 7 was in place by the 3rd c. BC.

[260](#) See below, p. 69.

[261](#) See Brunschwig [139] 27.

[262](#) See the rubrics to Books 2 and 3 of *On the Philosophy of Aristotle*. The scholiast to Theophrastus' *Met.* (above, n. 125) says that Nicolaus mentioned Theophrastus' work ἐντ θεωρία τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους μετὰ τὰ φυσικά: i.e. 'in his study of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*'—but, *pace* Drossaart Lulofs (*Nicolaus*, 29), this does not in itself establish that Nicolaus knew and used the title τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά for Aristotle's work. Note too that some version of *Met.* was known to Strabo's contemporary (17. 1. 5. (790)) Eudorus, who emended the text: Alexander, *In Met.* 58. 31–59. 8 (see e.g. Donini [222] 5075–80).

[263](#) See Drossaart Lulofs, *Nicolaus*, 139.

[264](#) Note that Jaeger, on different grounds, denies Andronicus a formative role in the making of *Met.*: rather, Andronicus inherited a ten-volume *Met.*, consisting of ΑΒΓΕΖΗ ΘΙΜΝ, and he interpolated α, Δ, Κ, and Α ([143] 174, 180). Thus our fourteen volume *Met.* results from risibly incompetent editorial work by Andronicus.

[265](#) ἐκδούς τούς ἀ κροατικούς τῶν λόγων.

[266](#) 20. 5.11–12 (Gellius' Latin translation precedes, in §§ 8–9); see also Plutarch, *Alex.* 7 (668bc); Simplicius, *In Phys.* 8. 21–29.

[267](#) Where they might have appeared in the *Life* of Aristotle.

[268](#) Thus e.g. Jaeger [143] 152, speaks of 'the gradually developing process of consolidation'. But see below, n. 272.

[269](#) See e.g. Düring [135] 45.

[270](#) See above, p. 58.

[271](#) So Jaeger [143] 157: with the title (item 74 in Diogenes' catalogue) πολιτικής ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου η' Jaeger understands the noun ἐκδοσις.

[272](#) So even Jaeger [143] 152: 'Diogenes' list, which goes back to the third century BC, is evidence for the gradually developing process of consolidation.'



But if the list shows what Aristode looked like in the 3rd c., then much of what Jaeger himself says about the development of the treatises is false.

[273](#) If indeed it was absent: above p. 55.

[274](#) And what did he do for Theophrastus? We have two miserable bits of evidence. One bears on *Met.*, and assures us that Andronicus was unaware of its existence. The second bears on *HP* the best guess here (see Keaney, 'Theophrastus'), is that Andronicus (a) divided one long book into the two we now call *HP* 6 and 7, (b) perhaps gave the work a new title, and (c) or ... that's it.

[275](#) A. A. Long, in P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical literature* (Cambridge, 1985), 1. 530. Similar remarks may be found in Barnes [58].

[276](#) Why not believe that Critolaus brought a copy of *Rhet.* with him on the embassy of 155?

[277](#) I received stimulating comments from many members of the Oxford seminar for which this paper was originally written. I am greatly indebted to Charles Brittain, Sylvie Germain, and Marek Winiarczyk, who each gave me invaluable bibliographical help; and to Miriam Griffin, Leofranc Holford-Strevens, Andrew Lintott, and David Sedley, who sent me quantities of written criticism. I warmly thank Maddalena Bonelli and Ben Morison for their sharp critical comments on a penultimate draft of the paper—and also for a long and enjoyable discussion of Simplicius, *In Phys.* 923–25.

[278](#) Cf. e.g. 1117. 3–5.

[279](#) Simplicius has actually said several rather different things. At 4. 11. if) he reports that 'Adrastus, in his work *On the Order of Aristotle's Writings*, recounts that the treatise is entitled *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* by some and *Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις* by others; and he says that some, again, entitle the first five books *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* and the remaining three *Περὶ κινήσεως*'; at 6. 9–10 Simplicius says that 'Aristotle usually calls the first five *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* and the rest *Περὶ κινήσεως*'; at 801. 14–16 Simplicius affirms that 'Aristotle and Aristotle's companions count the fifth book among those called *τὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν φυσικά* just as they usually call the following three *Περὶ κινήσεως*'; and at 802. 10 he reports that 'everyone calls the five *Φυσικά* and the three *Περὶ κινήσεως*'.

[280](#) καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος: καί is often used in front of proper names without any semantic force; but of course it sometimes means 'also' or 'even' or the like. I incline to take it in the sense of 'also' at 9–23. 10, 924. 13, and 924. 17; whereas here and at 924. 18 I judge it to have no semantic force. But I have little confidence in these judgements—which in some cases make a significant difference to the overall sense of the text.

[281](#) The text is uncertain: I read < περὶ > Ἀριστοτέλους (Düring)—but there is no reason to construe this as a title.

[282](#) Fr. 157 Fortenbaugh = Eudemus, fr. 6 Wehrli. The sentence from 'Theophrastus too ...' to '... from the *Physics*' is, in the (i)reek, a genitive absolute hanging on its predecessor: is Simplicius citing evidence in support of



Andronicus, or is he reproducing evidence which Andronicus cited in his own support? The text is indeterminate; but I incline to the former view (see next note). In any case, it is plain that Simplicius is speaking *in propria persona* at the latest by line ib ('Aristotle himself ...').

[283](#) καὶ Θεοφράστου ...: here I take καί to mean 'also' and hence favour the view that Simplicius is supporting rather than citing Andronicus.

[284](#) It is generally assumed that when Theophrastus became scholarch Eudemus retired to Rhodes, and that he took his books including his copy of the *Physics* with him: why should Eudemus have *written* to Theophrastus if they were both still living in Athens? But how trustworthy is the evidence? Surviving ancient letters are more often forged than authentic.

[285](#) Or perhaps '... understand (your point)' (so Fortenbaugh *et al.* [13] 319).

[286](#) ἢ μικρόν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον: I do not understand the Greek and suspect corruption.

[287](#) *Phys.* 226<sup>b</sup>14-16: it is not clear whether this is the passage which Eudemus thought was corrupt in his MS (our MSS show no variant readings), or whether Theophrastus means: 'Your text is correct—compare it to 226<sup>b</sup>14-16.'

[288](#) 251<sup>a</sup>8-10.

[289](#) See e.g. 202<sup>a</sup>7 8.

[290](#) 253<sup>b</sup>7-9: our modern text is slightly different.

[291](#) 192<sup>b</sup>20-2.

[292](#) 267<sup>b</sup>20-2.

[293](#) 204<sup>a</sup>34-206<sup>a</sup>8.

[294](#) 272<sup>a</sup>28-31

[295](#) 275<sup>b</sup>21-3.

[296](#) e.g. 233<sup>a</sup>31 4; 266<sup>b</sup> 7.

[297](#) Unknown—so that his name, which is common enough, has been uselessly emended to 'Damascius' or 'Damasius' or the like.

[298](#) Eudemus, fr. I Wehrli.

[299](#) Reading τὰ περὶ κινήσεως (suggested by Diels) for τῶν ττ.κ.

[300](#) Fr. 98 Wehrli.

# **CICERO AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY\***

GISELA STRIKER

TO speak about Cicero and Greek philosophy is to speak about Cicero and philosophy, period. Philosophy, for the Romans of Cicero's age, was a Greek thing, and there was no other philosophy around. Philosophy was one of the disciplines the Romans of the first century B.C. took over from the Greeks as a part of higher education. It was both a prestigious and a suspect branch of Greek culture—prestigious because it was intellectually demanding, suspect because philosophical argument could be seen as subversive; witness the notorious story of the futile attempt by Cato the Censor in the second century to banish philosophers from the city in order to safeguard the morals of Rome's young men.

To judge from Cicero's prefaces, the suspicions never quite went away, although Stoicism, at least, turned out to be highly respectable. Cicero tried with varying success to raise the status of philosophy by introducing famous Roman statesmen as speakers in his dialogues,<sup>1</sup> while assuring his readers that the affairs of the state would of course take precedence over philosophical pursuits.<sup>2</sup> But the prejudice remained that professional philosophers, at any rate, were engaged in hairsplitting and endless debates about obscure points, to the detriment of more important concerns like politics.<sup>3</sup> In short, the Roman upper class displayed the same attitudes as the Athenian contemporaries of Socrates and the Sophists, so amusingly described in some of Plato's earlier dialogues.

Cicero seems to have been the first educated Roman who developed a real flair for philosophy and a serious attachment to it, considering it not just as an intellectual hobby or a kind of spiritual support in times of personal or political turmoil, and attempting in earnest to make it a part of Roman culture. I do not mean, of course, to overlook the great poet Lucretius. But Lucretius, perhaps precisely because he was a great poet, but

also because he adopted the tone of a fervent missionary, seems to have remained an isolated figure, at least as far as philosophy was concerned. It was Cicero who gained a lasting place in the history of European philosophy by creating a vocabulary in which Romans could debate philosophical questions; not just read, but write and discuss philosophy. No doubt Cicero's own *auctoritas* helped here, too. Not quite a century later, in the works of Seneca, the "poverty of the Latin tongue" (Lucr. 1.139, 832; 3.260) so eloquently lamented by Lucretius seems to have been overcome.

What I have said so far is familiar and, I take it, uncontroversial. Cicero's role as a mediator probably also explains why he remained a respected philosophical author so long as Latin, alongside Greek, was one of the main languages of philosophy. Until the end of the eighteenth century at least some of Cicero's philosophical books were part of a standard education, and indeed, before the Renaissance, Cicero was seen as a philosopher rather than a politician or an orator. But over the last two hundred years, Cicero as a philosophical writer has pretty much vanished from the philosophical curriculum. I cannot here rehearse all the various reasons for Cicero's loss of prestige, which have to do as much with philosophical and intellectual fashion as with historians' varying assessments of his role as a politician. Some of the prejudices—as we would now say—that became prevalent in the nineteenth century with regard not just to Cicero, but to the Hellenistic period in general have, I think, been overcome in the last few decades. For example, we no longer consider the "post-Aristotelian" period as an era of sad decline that ended only with Plotinus and the emergence of Neoplatonism. There is also now a concerted effort to get rid of the invidious label "eclecticism," used to describe the philosophers of the late Hellenistic period.<sup>4</sup> It is not entirely clear what was meant by this term, but one suggestion seems to have been that an "eclectic" philosopher's views would lack rigor and coherence. If he picked up the most attractive bits of doctrine from various incompatible systems, one might expect the results to be

inconsistent—if not on the surface, then at least as far as the theoretical foundations are concerned. Different schools started from different principles, and so one could hardly expect a consistent set of arguments behind a philosophical view that combines heterogeneous elements. If this was behind the derogatory use of “eclecticism,” it must be pointed out that the argument is not compelling. True, a philosopher who tries to bring together plausible theses from different theories cannot embrace all those systems at the same time. But the same philosophical theses can be supported by different arguments, and it is surely legitimate to try and produce a theory that combines, as it were, the best of all available views by introducing new or modified arguments for old doctrines. This is, in fact, what Cicero’s teacher Antiochus seems to have done in ethics, as one can see from *De Finibus* 5.<sup>5</sup>

Sometimes the term “eclecticism” also seems to carry the suggestion that the eclectic philosopher has no comprehensive system at all, so that his views, consistent or not, are not solidly supported. This is an objection that could be raised against Cicero’s other teacher, Philo of Larissa. But the objection fails against a philosopher who holds, by explicit appeal to skeptical arguments, that there is very little knowledge to be had, and that we must therefore be content with trying to find the most plausible or probable view, case by case. As a student of Philo, Cicero may have had some fairly strong convictions, but no overarching *Welt anschauung*. If skepticism or anti-dogmatism is what accounts for the label “eclectic,” we need not find it damaging.

Philo and Antiochus are now treated with greater respect,<sup>6</sup> but Cicero still does not seem to be taken seriously. It may be true, of course, that Cicero, who was not a professional philosopher, was even less of an original thinker than his teachers. But originality was not an issue at a time when philosophers, far from advertising their own innovations, were anxious to show that their doctrines went back to the great founding fathers—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle or even

Pythagoras.<sup>7</sup> If we for our part wish to insist that some degree of originality or independence is crucial, we should admit that we are in no position to form an accurate judgment of Cicero in this respect, given that most of his sources are lost. The two works most likely to give us an impression of Cicero working on his own would no doubt be the *De Republica* and the *De Legibus*, in which he set out to produce a Roman—not just a Latin—version of political and legal philosophy. But we have only fragments of the *De Republica*, and the first book of the *De Legibus*, which contains the philosophical discussion of natural law and of the objective foundations of justice, has a number of lacunae that make it difficult to follow the course of the exposition. A lot of work still needs to be done to reconstruct these arguments, as opposed to identifying the Greek authorities allegedly behind them. In *De Officiis* 3 (4. 19–20), Cicero tells us that he is trying to fill a gap in Panaetius’ theory. He offers a “formula” to deal with apparent conflicts between moral duty and expediency—a topic that Panaetius had promised to discuss, but failed to treat in his *Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*.<sup>8</sup> Cicero’s solution is not entirely convincing, but it does cohere, as he says, with Stoic doctrine. But as I said, it would be a mistake to judge Cicero’s competence and achievements primarily by reference to standards of originality.

A different aspect has been emphasized by A. E. Douglas,<sup>9</sup> who points out that some of Cicero’s treatises belong to a genre that is not much in fashion among philosophers today—consolation and moral advice for everyday life. In this group fall the *Tusculan Disputations*, the *Cato Maior (De Senectute)*, the *Laelius (De Amicitia)* and to some extent also the *De Officiis*. This is a genre in which eloquence has a larger role to play than in other philosophical works, since the aim is not so much instruction or explanation as psychological guidance and moral education. It seems that some philosophers are beginning to be less dismissive about this kind of “applied philosophy,” and in any case it is an interesting feature of Hellenistic philosophy in general that is well worth investigating.<sup>10</sup> But I think it is still fair to say that few

philosophers today would subscribe to Cicero's famous little "hymn to philosophy" (*Tusc.* 5.2.5): *o vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum*. ... Most of us would probably rather agree with Aristotle, who thought that philosophy may indeed help us to clarify our moral ideas, but that it cannot replace a good upbringing.

There remains the group of dialogues in which Cicero, toward the end of his life, attempted to provide a kind of philosophical encyclopedia in Latin:<sup>11</sup> the *Academici libri*, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*, *De Fato*. I suspect that what lies behind the lack of respect on the part of philosophers for these treatises is not an argument at all, but the habit of reading Cicero as a "source." When philosophical scholars began to rediscover the Hellenistic schools as a serious subject in the last two decades or so, they naturally also began to read Cicero in order to find out about Epicurus, Zeno, Chrysippus, Arcesilaus, and so on. Although we have finally left behind the excesses of *Quellenforschung*, according to which Cicero's works were just a patchwork of paraphrases and Greek passages in translation, it is still tempting to try to discern, for example, the arguments of Panaetius behind Cicero's admittedly briefer version in the *De Officiis*, and I would not wish to claim that I can always resist the temptation. The interests of present-day readers attempting to understand Stoicism or Academic Skepticism do not always coincide with Cicero's own intentions. More often than not, such readers would find Cicero frustrating. His outlines of philosophical doctrines are sketchy; they often seem to skip details that might be crucial for a proper understanding of the relevant arguments, and the very elegance of his Latin may compound the difficulties by making him less faithful to the terminology of the schools. Occasionally one also suspects that Cicero has misunderstood or missed a philosophical point. Add to this that he has the annoying habit of indulging in rhetorical flourishes from time to time and of interrupting or inflating an argument by more or less irrelevant stories from Rome's glorious past or deplorable present, and

you will easily understand why a philosophical reader might lose patience. Finally, there are those who never find the time to read one of Cicero's books from beginning to end. This tendency will be reinforced by the use of collections like von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* or Usener's *Epicurea*, which present us with excerpts from Cicero's reports of a school doctrine, leaving out his comments or placing the following paragraph in a different section because it introduces a different topic. In these collections, Cicero is treated on a par with authors like Diogenes Laertius or Stobaeus, whose books would indeed be of merely antiquarian interest if the literature of the Hellenistic period had not been lost. Cicero thus comes to look like a not entirely reliable and sometimes misleading witness—and why should we take such an author seriously?

This way of looking at Cicero's books, however, is grossly unfair because it takes his treatises to be what their author never intended. In berating Cicero for superficiality or lack of detail, we overlook a crucial fact that is obvious upon a moment's reflection, but rarely taken into account: he could not possibly foresee that all the works, not only of his own teachers, but of their Hellenistic predecessors as well, would be lost. He wrote what might today be called introductory surveys of major fields in philosophy—epistemology, ethics, philosophical theology—trying to give an outline of the main positions, highlighting what he saw as their most important strengths and weaknesses. Because he was following the Academic practice of presenting all sides of a debate, he purported at least to be fair to each school's doctrine, offering the reader a set of interesting problems to think about, but leaving the final judgment open. But of course he assumed that a reader whose curiosity had been awakened by his outline would easily be able to pursue particular points of detail by getting the relevant Greek books. The educated Romans for whom he was writing could be expected to be bilingual or at least able to read Greek. This is, after all, why Cicero himself has Varro object that the entire project of translating or putting philosophical doctrines into Latin is



superfluous—why seek out mere rivulets when you can drink from the sources? (*Acad.* 1.2.8: *sed meos amicos in quibus est studium in Graeciam mitto id est ad Graecos ire iubeo, ut ex fontibus potius hauriant quam rivulos consetentur*). Cicero never intended his books to replace the more technical Greek ones.

But apart from the fact that he realized, unlike some of his friends, how important it is to be able to talk philosophy, not just to read it, Cicero may have been quite right to think that his books fulfilled a function that the more technical and austere works of the Greeks might have neglected, or did not fulfill as well. On this point we are of course reduced to guessing; we do not know how well the genre “introductory survey” was represented in the Greek literature of Cicero’s time. The books to which Cicero himself explicitly refers do not seem to have been of this kind.<sup>12</sup> In fact, it is clear that Cicero’s literary models came from the early Academy—Plato, Aristotle, from whom Cicero claims to have taken the form of his dialogues,<sup>13</sup> Theophrastus, Polemo and so on. For surveys, we might compare Epicurus’ letters, which do purport to offer simplified summaries—and here, I would say, the comparison would be in favor of Cicero. And while we do not have enough from an earlier period, we do know that the books we now describe, after Diels, as “doxographical” tend to leave out what Cicero, on the contrary, tends to emphasize—the theoretical framework and the arguments behind the theses, not to mention other philosophers’ objections. What Cicero offers us is a framework in which to place more technical considerations, and a guide to the fundamental doctrines of each school. His books provide orientation and incentive to further study, and in this they seem to me to be quite successful. Cicero is surely right to think that a clear and fluent style will appeal to inexperienced readers, and the presentation of conflicting views in the form of a debate is an effective pedagogical device to get readers involved in thinking about the problems for themselves. On the other hand, one cannot overburden a conversation, even an

imaginary one, with too much detail without defeating the dialogue's purpose. Some lines of argument will have to be abbreviated or condensed and Cicero, to his credit, often points this out himself. There is no reason to believe that he left out the details because he regarded them as superfluous. I cannot think of a modern introductory book that would not be open to the kind of complaints some scholars have made about Cicero—sketchiness, lack of detail and occasional misrepresentation. Nobody expects an encyclopedia article about Aristotle to give a full and adequate picture of his philosophy. Still, such books or articles are useful in setting their readers on the right track, as it were, but they are not meant to be the last word about anything. If we sometimes end up thinking that Cicero must have misunderstood an argument, we should not forget that it was often Cicero himself who enabled us to see that something went wrong.

We have every reason to think that the loss of the works of the major Hellenistic philosophers is among the more regrettable calamities of our fragmentary tradition, and it would be ridiculous to pretend that Cicero can make up for it. But I suspect that even if we had much more, we might still find ourselves turning to Cicero's judicious and lively little surveys to help us find our way, for example, through the laborious volumes of a Chrysippus, who was famous for his dreadful style.<sup>14</sup>

When Cicero had finished his *Academici libri*, he wrote to Atticus (13.13.1): “the books have turned out—unless I am deceived by that common failing, *amour-propre*—better than anything of their kind, even in Greek” (tr. J. Barnes, *libri quidem ita exierunt, nisi forte me communis φιλαυτία decipit, ut in tali genere ne apud Graecos quidem simile quicquam*). Nobody seems to have taken this remark seriously, given that Cicero is well known to have been particularly prone to the “common failing.” But in this case I am inclined to think that he may well have been right.

\* I am grateful to Zeph Stewart for encouragement and stylistic advice. This short piece was written for the conference, with no intention of developing it into a larger project. It is merely an attempt to put Cicero's philosophical writings in perspective, as it were, in the hope of attracting the attention of those students of antiquity who still take a dim view of Cicero's achievement on the grounds that he was neither original nor a great philosopher.

<sup>1</sup> With varying success: the "Scipionic Circle" of the *Rep.* was apparently a success, but Cicero gave up on the attempt to present some of his own older contemporaries as involved in a technical philosophical debate; see *Att.* 13.16.1 *Illam ἀκαδημικὴν σύνταξιν totam ad Varronem traduximus. Primo fudit Catuli, Luculli, Hortensi; deinde, quia παρὰ τὸ πρέπον videbatur, quod erat hominibus nota non illa quidem ἀπαιδευσία sed in his rebus ἀτριψία, simul ac veni ad villam, eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli.*

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., *Div.* 2.2.6 *Ac mihi quidem explicandae philosophiae causam adtulit casus gravis civitatis, cum in armis civilibus nec tueri meo more rem p. nec nihil agere poteram nec quid potius, quod quidem me dignum esset, agerem reperiebam.*

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., *Luc.* 2.5 *Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim minuat etiam gloriam, sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, reliqui qui etiam si haec non inproben tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putent.*

<sup>4</sup> See the collection of essays in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long eds., *The Question of "Eclecticism"* (Berkeley 1988), in particular the opening chapter by F. Donini.

<sup>5</sup> For this point see J. Barnes, "Antiochus of Áscalon," in M. Griffin and J. Barnes eds., *Philosophia Togata* (Oxford 1989) 51-96, and for Antiochus' ethics, J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford 1993) chapters 2.6 and 4.20.3.

<sup>6</sup> For Philo, see H. Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy* (Cambridge 1985); for Antiochus, see J. Gucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978 [Hypomnemata 56]).

<sup>7</sup> For this point see D. Sedley, "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World," in Griffin (above, n. 5) 97-119.

<sup>8</sup> See *Off.* 3.2.7 *Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et consultare de officio solerent, uno cum dubitarent, honestumne id esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile, tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile videretur, quomodo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. Ibid. 3.4.19-20 Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile, formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ah officio numquam recedemus. erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinæque maxime consentanea ...*

<sup>9</sup> "Cicero the Philosopher" in T. A. Dorey ed., *Cicero* (London 1965) 135-170.

<sup>10</sup> See Martha Nussbaum's recent book, *The Therapy of Desire* (Princeton 1994).

<sup>11</sup> For this project see *Div.* 2.2.4 *Adhuc haec erant; ad reliqua alacri tendebamus animo, sic parati ut nisi quae causa gravior obstitisset nullum philosophiae locum esse pateremur qui non Latinis litteris inlustratus pateret, quod enim munus rei p. adferre maius meliusve possumus quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem ...*

<sup>12</sup> Although Cicero tells us that Panaetius used ordinary language when writing about everyday subjects (*Off.* 2.10.35), he clearly still finds it necessary to abbreviate what Panaetius had treated “with great precision” (*accuratissime*; *Off.* 3.2.7). In the *Acad. libri* he claims to have combined Antiochus’ *acumen* with his own stylistic elegance (*nitor*; *Att.* 13.19.5). Philo of Larissa taught rhetoric as well as philosophy, and Cicero says that he used to quote lines from the poets, as Cicero himself likes to do (*Tusc.* 2.11.26). But the “Roman books” mentioned in the *Luc.* (4.11) belonged to a rather esoteric epistemological dispute and can hardly have been intended for beginners.

<sup>13</sup> See *Att.* 13.19.4 *quae autem his temporibus scripsi*’ Αριστοτέλειον *morem habent in quo ita sermo inducitur ceterorum ut apud ipsum sit principatus.*

<sup>14</sup> For Chrysippus’ style, see Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 4. 30–31 (p. 21 Us.-Rad., SVF II 28)  
ὅπουγε καὶ οἱ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι καὶ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς ἐκφέροντες  
τέχνας οὕτως εἰσὶν ἄθλιοι περὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὥστ’ αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ  
λέγειν; ἀπόχρη δὲ τεκμηρίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ Χρυσίππου τοῦ Στωικοῦ· περαιτέρω  
γὰρ οὐκ ἂν προβαίην. τούτου γὰρ οὐτ’ ἄμεινον οὐδεὶς τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας  
ἠκρίβωσεν, οὔτε χείροني ἀρμονία συνταχθέντας ἐξήνεγκε λόγους τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ  
δόξης ἀξιωθέντων.

## THE LYRA OF ORPHEUS.

PROFESSOR J. J. SAVAGE has recently drawn attention to a number of unpublished scholia on Virgil contained in Parisinus lat. 7930, and has brought to light from them one new fragment of Naevius, one of Sallust, and one of Varro.<sup>1</sup> The last deserves particular attention.

The note on *Aen.* VI. 119, after in effect reproducing what Servius says, adds: *dicunt tamen quidam liram Orphei cum VII cordis fuisse, et caelum habet VII zonas, unde teologia assignatur. Varro autem dicit librum Orfei de uocanda anima liram nominari, et negantur animae sine cithara posse ascendere.* 'Some people, however, say that the lyre of Orpheus had seven strings, and the sky has seven zones, and hence a theological explanation is given.'<sup>2</sup> But Varro says that a book of Orpheus on the summoning of the soul is called *Lyra*, and it is denied that souls can ascend without a lyre.'<sup>3</sup> It is not likely that this note is a pure figment; the other new material quoted by Savage certainly looks genuine. We have in it a direct mention of an Orphic treatise *Λύρα*, which seems to be otherwise unknown, and a somewhat obscure reference to its contents.

The words *et ... ascendere* need not be part of Varro's statement or directly concerned with the Orphic treatise in question; it is a habit of scholiasts to set side by side a medley of facts and fancies illustrative of their texts. The words in themselves are most naturally interpreted as referring to the soul's ascent after death through the seven planetary spheres. According to a widespread belief the soul came from heaven and returned to heaven. In its earthward descent it gained a sin on passing each sphere: *cum descendunt animae, trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, libidinem Veneris, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, louis regni desiderium.*<sup>1</sup> In its heavenward ascent it lost a sin at each sphere: οὕτως ὁρμᾷ λοιπὸν ἄνω ὁ ἄνθρωπος διὰ

τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ζώνῃ δίδωσι τὴν αὐξητικὴν ἐνέργειαν κ.τ.λ.<sup>2</sup> The lyre corresponds to the world order, its seven strings to the seven planets, each of which has its voice in the music of the spheres; the lyre's harmony is an imitation of the harmony of the spheres, music has a purifying effect, and the man who has no music in his soul cannot rise to heaven, for only like can comprehend like.<sup>3</sup> These ideas, commonplaces of the Pythagorean revival and not confined to it, explain *et negantur animae sine cithara posse ascendere*, although *sine cithara* remains a little vague.<sup>4</sup>

Was the *Λύρα* concerned with this topic? To suppose that it was requires a forced interpretation of the phrase *de uocanda anima*. It is just possible that a Christian redactor, paraphrasing his source, used the phrase in the sense of 'God's summoning of the soul from the body,' though in such examples as *caelesti sorte uocatus* and *pro factis ad alta uocaris*<sup>5</sup> the sense is made clear by the context. If, however, we bear in mind that the line of Virgil being explained refers to the quest of Eurydice, we may think not of the soul's ascent to bliss but of 'the invoking or summoning (*i.e.* raising) of spirits,' which is a much easier sense to give the phrase. Orpheus entered Hell, *ἡμετέρῃ πίσυνος κίθάρῃ*, as he is made to say, *Arg.* 42, and raised Eurydice. This could be a prototype for spirit-raising, which was a common magical enterprise. The connexion between mythical and contemporary spirit-raising is emphasised by an enlarged version of part of the Homeric *nekyomanteia* given by Julius Africanus in his *Κεστοί*;<sup>6</sup> Africanus pleasantly leaves it an open question whether Homer himself or the Pisistratidae deleted the additional verses. Such a work as this *Λύρα* might be composed in the Neopythagorean circles to which not a few of our later Orphica are with reason assigned. In them necromancy seems to have been practised; we may recall Cicero's taunt to Valerius: *tu qui te*



*Pythagoreum soles dicere ... cum inferorum animas elicere, cum puerorum extis deos manes mactare soleas.*<sup>1</sup> That is the sense we want. *uocanda* will bear the meaning 'invoke' (cf Seneca, *Oed.* 559, *uocat inde manes teque qui manes regis*, and the claim of Orpheus, *Arg.* 39, to have taught ἱλασμούς τε θεῶν φθιμένων τ' ἐπινήχυστα δῶρα), and may imply conjuration. It would, however, be preferable to read *euocanda*. *euoco* is a technical term in this sense, like *excieo*, *elicio*, *excito*. *De euocanda anima* might render *περὶ ψυχα-γωγίας*.

*Ascendere* might also be interpreted of the ascent of souls when conjured. It seems, however, better to assume, as I have said, that the clause *et ... ascendere* is independent of *Varro ... nominari*, and it is possible that in an earlier version the note ran: '*unde teologia assignatur, et negantur animae sine cithara posse ascendere; Varro autem dicit librum Orfei de uocanda anima liram nominari.*'

In any case we have to thank Professor Savage for the name of a new Orphic treatise and for a *terminus ad quem* for it in the citation by Varro. In which of his works it occurred, whether in his religious writings or in one of the Menippean satires, the *Περὶ ἐξαγωγῆς* (which probably included a Nekyia) or the *Ὅνος λύρας*, we cannot say.

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<sup>1</sup> *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.* LVI. (1925) 229 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kern, *Orphica*, 143, No. 60, ἐν ταῖς φερομέναις ῥαψωδαῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἡ θεολογία ἦδε. Orpheus is repeatedly classed among *theologi poetae* in S. Aug. *Ciu. d.* XVIII., and Marius Plotius Sacerdos, *Art. gramm.* III. 3 (VI. 502, Keil), mentions that the hexameter was called *metrum theologicum* from its use by Orpheus and Musaeus. VT *caelum habet* is possible, but not necessary.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between *cithara* and *lyra* is here as commonly ignored.

<sup>1</sup> Serv. *ad Aen.* VI. 714; cf. his note on XI. 50 and Arnob. II. 16, 28 (both perhaps drawing upon Labeo), and Macrobius. *In Somn. Scip.* I. II. 12 (drawing on Numenius, according to Cumont, *Revue de philologie*, 1920, 231). On the idea in general cf. Bousset, *Arch. f. Rel.* XVIII. 145 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Corp. Herm.* I. 25. The first zone is the Moon's. The qualities lost at the later spheres are sins.



[3](#) For the voices of the planets *cf.* Cumont, *Rev. phil.* 1919, 78 ff.; for the cathartic power of music, A. Delatte, *Étude sur la littérature pythagoricienne*, 262 f.; for the lyre's harmony as an imitation of the harmony of the universe, Serv. *in Aen.* VI. 645 and Cumont, *Rev. arch.* 1918, 67. Hippolytus, *Ref.* IV. 48. 2, p. 70. 20 Wendland remarks that the constellation *Lyra* has seven strings signifying the whole harmony of the universe.

[4](#) A possible parallel is the representation in the stuccos of the apse of the Basilica near the Porta Maggiore of Sappho holding a lyre as a type of the blessed soul (*cf.* now J. Carcopino, *Études Romaines*, 1. 372 ff.).

[5](#) Diehl, *Inscr. chr. lat.* 1644, 3359.

[6](#) *P. Oxy.* 412. *Cf.* on it Th. Hopfner, *Griechisch-ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber*, II. 150 ff., §§ 334 ff.; Hopfner gives a full treatment of the whole subject.

[7](#) *In Vatinium* 14 (*cum* means 'though' in reference to words here omitted). For Varro's interest in thaumaturgy *cf.* Apul. *Apol.* 42 (his record of a prophecy about the result of the Mithridatic war made by a boy of Tralles who looked at a reflection of a Hermes in water).

## VARRO AND ORPHEUS.

*The Lyra of Orpheus*, which appeared in *C.R.* 1927, 169 ff., needs some supplement. First, the possibility that the new fragment of Varro comes from his Menippean satire 'Ὀνοῦς λύρας receives some support from two known fragments of that work. Fr. 351 Buecheler, *quam mobilem diuom lyram sol harmoge / quadam gubernans motibus diis ueget*, refers to a similar theory of the universe as a musical instrument,<sup>1</sup> while fr. 360, *tuus autem ipse frater cibarius fuit Aristoxenus*, certainly suggests a conversation in which Pythagorean ideas had a place.

It is in fact clear from other fragments that the 'Ὀνοῦς λύρας contained a discussion between a champion and a despiser of music, and that the former referred to the power of music over man and beast, alluding, for instance, to the story of the taming of a lion by *galli* with their timbrels. A reference to the use of music in the evocation of spirits would therefore be relevant. Such evocation was associated with the revival of Pythagoreanism.<sup>2</sup> Varro's personal interest in Pythagorean ideas appear clearly in a fact recorded by the elder Pliny, *quin et defunctos sese multi fictilibus soliis condi maluere, sicut M. Varro, Pythagoreo modo, in myrti et oleae atque populi nigrae foliis*,<sup>3</sup> possibly also in the importance which in the preface and in the structure of his *Hebdomades* he attached to the number seven.<sup>1</sup> In view of this we may remark that the title 'Ὀνοῦς λύρας, though a proverb, can bear a special sense; the Pythagoreans theorised about the supposed fact of the insensibility of the ass to music, and concluded that it alone of animals was 'not made in accordance with harmony.'<sup>2</sup> The attribution of the fragment remains a conjecture (we cannot, for instance, exclude Varro's *Tubero* from consideration), but it seems an attractive conjecture.

Secondly, while *ascendere* may refer to the ascent through the seven planetary spheres, there is the alternative possibility that it refers to another idea, that certain select souls rise to the moon's sphere. It is to this level that Pompey's soul rises in Lucan IX. 1-17; *elysium est ... secundum theologos circa lunarem circulum*, says Servius on *Aen.* V. 735. The doctrine of an ascent was widely held, and took a variety of forms. According to Alexander Polyhistor, Pythagoras said that pure souls were conducted ἐπὶ τὸν ὕψιστον, an ambiguous phrase which perhaps requires Rohde's τὸ for τον, or Cobet's insertion of τόπον after ὕψιστον, 'to the highest part';<sup>3</sup> according to Iamblichus, Pythagoras spoke of the sun and moon as being the isles of the blessed, and is himself one of the daemones who dwell in the moon.<sup>4</sup> Again, the soul may pass to the sun, sometimes after an intermediate sojourn in the lunar sphere, and on reaching the sun may be absorbed in it; <sup>5</sup> or the moon may be the abode of souls which are fortunate, while there is an even better place for some, presumably the sun. The thought of our text is clearly that man's soul returns to the region of that celestial music of which he has retained something, *persuasione hac qua post corpus animae ad originem dulcedinis musicae, id est ad caelum redire credantur.*<sup>7</sup>

Thirdly, as Miss J. R. Bacon has kindly remarked to me, the variation between the words *cithara* and *lyra* perhaps confirms my supposition of two sources for the note. It would, of course, be unsafe to deny that it might be wholly based on Varro; it should in any case be noted that both lyre and cithara are said by Aristides Quintilianus to be the correct instruments for those whose hearts are set on the pure and etherial region which lies above the sublunary world.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf Aristides Quintilianus *De musica* III. 25, p. 94. 12 Jahn *ἱερόν τε θεοῦ ὄν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι πλῆκτρον ὃ τῶν σοφωτέρων ἀποφαίνεται λόγος*.. The form which this takes here is known to us as Stoic (Cleanthes, fr. 502, von Amim). The metaphor of a god as a πλῆκτρον is elsewhere applied to prophetic inspiration (Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, 203 f.). In Nicomach. Geras. *Enchirid.* 3 the sun is compared with the μέση of the lyre.

<sup>2</sup> C.R., 1927, 170: cf. the contemptuous way in which Artemidorus, *Onirocr.* II. 69, dismisses as untrustworthy Πυθαγορισται θυσιογ-νωμικοί ἀστραγαλομάντεις τυρομάντεις κοσκίνο-μάντεις μορφοσκόποι χειροσκόποι λεκανομάντεις νεκρομάντεις, and for evocation cf the story of Theanor in Plut. *De gen. Socr.* 16, p. 585 F.

<sup>3</sup> N.H. XXXV. 160; on the details cf. G. Méautis, *Recherches sur le Pythagorisme*, 33 f. Serv. on *Aen.* X. 175 compares Nigidius Figulus and Varro, saying *licet Varro praecellat in theologia*.

<sup>1</sup> O. Weinreich, *Triskaidekadische Studien*, 91 ff. Varro in his *Tubero* stated a Pythagorean view of embryology (Censorin. *De die natali*, 9). It may be remarked that in *De re rustica* III. 17. 4 he tells a story of the power of music over fishes; and Martianus Capella IX. 929 credits him with telling of islands that move to music.

<sup>2</sup> Aelian, *Nat. anim.* X. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Ap. Diog. Laert. VIII. 31; cf. A. Delatte, *La vie de Pythagore* 226 f. The alternative is to supply θεόν 'to the highest god,' a term commonly but not exclusively applied to Jehovah; it may be that Alexander's interest in Judaism explains his use of it, if he did use it here. (He employs it in an etymology, *F.H.G.* III. 212.)

<sup>4</sup> *Vita Pythagorae* 18 § 82, 6 § 30.

<sup>5</sup> Cumont, *Etudes Syriennes*, 61 f., 102, 106: for the moon as an intermediate stage [Augustine] *Quaest. uet. et noui test.* 127. 18, p. 407. 2 Souter. The variant in Dracontius, *Romulea* X 538 *Sol Persice Mithra ... accipe Sol radians animas, tu corpora Luna, nutrimenta*

# Greek Drama in the Roman Empire

C.P. Jones

It can be imagined that a social historian two thousand years hence, wishing to reconstruct the stage history of Shakespeare in the twentieth century, might have nothing to go on except scraps of newspapers and allusions in literature.<sup>1</sup> He might note more or less classic productions in a theatrical style that has evolved continuously since the sixteenth century; anthological productions like the *Hollow Crown*, which the Royal Shakespeare Company mounted in the sixties; recitals by one or more readers of whole plays, such as those given by the Viennese Karl Kraus in the twenties, or of speeches or scenes; Shakespearean operas, such as those of Verdi and Henze; ballets such as Prokofiev's *Romeo and Juliet*, so that the historian might read of a baritone singing Macbeth or a ballerina dancing Juliet; he might also come across musicals, such as *Kiss Me Kate* and *The Boys from Syracuse*; and he might chance, for example, on a performance of the *Tempest* given by a single actor with "masks, dolls, and special effects."<sup>2</sup>

Scholars of the twentieth century who look back on the stage at the beginning of the Christian era tend to suppose that traditional drama had been, or was soon to be, driven out of existence by the competition. The most influential holder of this view was Ludwig Friedländer in his *Sittengeschichte*. In an often quoted paragraph, which goes back at least as far as the sixth edition of 1889, he says in connection with the mime: "Whereas the theatrical tastes of the masses were satisfied by these farces, the participation of the smaller circle of the educated scarcely sufficed to keep artistic drama on the stage, since it had not much attraction for the uneducated. ... The age of productivity in the area of tragedy and comedy, even though it was only

the reproduction of Greek models, had long since ended; their last, solitary stragglers do not seem to go beyond the first century. ... The very limited need of the stage for artistic plays was doubtless more than met by the large number of old comedies and tragedies, which were presumably put on in more or less modernized productions.”<sup>3</sup>

There can be no doubt that alternative forms of theater such as mime and pantomime grew in popularity in the imperial period. There is also no doubt that, for tragedy at least, it had long been customary to put on single scenes; as for comedy, Paul Veyne has recently shown that when Dio Chrysostom (32.94) talks of *diaskeuai* as familiar to Alexandrian audiences, he means remakes of classic comedies.<sup>4</sup> It is time, though, to assess the evidence on the other side, for the writing of new dramas and the continued production of full plays in the period of the Roman empire. In the present study I begin by considering a speech of Aelius Aristides which indicates that original comedies were still being written and performed in second-century Smyrna. I next take a literary text which has often been cited to show that traditional drama had ceased to be written at any rate by about 180. I then look at some of the archaeological evidence for the revival of classical drama in the imperial and Byzantine periods. Lastly, I try to synthesize the evidence of literary texts, inscriptions and archaeology for the writing and production of new plays, mainly Greek, in the period of the Roman empire.

A speech of Aelius Aristides, written approximately in the third quarter of the second century, is addressed to the citizens of Smyrna, where the author was a resident teacher of oratory. The manuscripts title it “Against Comic Mockery” (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν κωμῳδεῖν). Aristides attempts to persuade the Smyrnaeans to put a stop to what he considers a deplorable nuisance. “I say we should celebrate the feast

(ἔορτή) in honor of Dionysos and indeed of Aphrodite and the other gods, ... not omitting anything conducive to piety; but there is one feature which, while it gives pleasure to the majority, gives very great distress to the respectable, and this we should do away with altogether: I mean these slanders, these daytime revels (κῶμοι), and for that matter the revels that accompany the night-festivities (παννυχίδες), and we should be neither poets nor competitors in such things, nor do in play what ought not to be done at all" (29.4).<sup>5</sup>

Aristides calls this indecent exhibition "comedy" (25-28), and makes clear that the setting is the city theater, where young and old congregate (13, 22-26). There are choruses and songs: "We readily watch all the postures of the choruses, and readily take in all their sounds; if one of the singers sings off key we eject him, but if the whole chorus sings this unmusical melody we consider that our gain" (14, cf. 28). These songs are sung later "in the baths, in the alleyways, in the market-place, by women and slaves at home" (30). Prizes are awarded, and the occasion is a competition (ἀγών, 4, 24).<sup>6</sup> Those who defend the practice claim to be improving the morals of the city, and appeal to the comedy of Athens, the mother-city of Smyrna, but there is all the difference in the world between "the present trumpery and the admonishment and education which there were in the so-called *parabaseis*" (28).

Aristides thus seems to attest that comedy was still being written and performed in competition at the Dionysia of Smyrna in the mid-second century. Though this comedy was evidently scurrilous, we need not suppose that it closely resembled the Old Comedy of classical Athens; at the very least we know that it did not contain *parabaseis*. To get an idea of what it might have looked like, we can invoke Aristides' contemporary, Lucian. Among his works are found two short comedies, *Gout* (Ποδάγρα) and *Ocypous*; both of



them are often thought spurious. The first, far the better of the two, is in fact a mock tragedy, and this merry little piece, with choral songs in such unusual meters as the Sotadean and the meioric hexameter, might easily have been staged. Without writing anything that resembles either Old or New Comedy, the author makes incidental fun of certain doctors from Damascus, and it can easily be imagined how a similar skit, making fun of eminent sophists at Smyrna, might have roused the indignation of Aristides.<sup>7</sup>

Though several texts are cited to show the decline of traditional drama in the first two centuries of our era, one in particular has been so used: thus a recent study of actors and acting in the ancient world quotes it to show that new productions at the Athenian Dionysia were “suppressed in the middle of the second century.”<sup>8</sup> The passage in question is from a dialogue ascribed to Lucian, the *Encomium of Demosthenes*, in which one of the speakers observes that “it is no longer the practice to write new poetry in honor of Dionysos, but works composed by others give no less pleasure to those who put them on in public nowadays” ([Luc.] *Demosth. Enc.* 27). If the work were authentic, it could not be much later than 180, the approximate date of Lucian’s death. We have seen, however, that by the testimony of Aelius Aristides, a close contemporary of Lucian, comedy was being both written and performed in the Smyrna of his day; and we shall be considering inscriptions which show unequivocally that new dramas were still being put on at Thespiai in Boeotia under Marcus Aurelius and at Aphrodisias in Caria under Commodus, though at Thespiai they may have ceased by the beginning of the third century. It so happens that the authenticity of the *Encomium of Demosthenes* has many times been doubted on grounds of its structure and language.<sup>9</sup> The passage we are discussing here seems not to have been

adduced in this connection, but it would not be circular to say that it furnishes another reason to deny the work to Lucian and to date it after his lifetime.

That the established classics continued to be performed, whether or not in the modernized performances postulated by Friedländer, is well known from references in literature, most of them long since assembled by Friedländer himself.<sup>10</sup> Since he wrote, more and more evidence of dramatic productions in the Roman period has been provided by archaeology; most of it, it is true, illustrates the performance of revivals, and even for these this testimony has to be used with caution. Wall paintings recently published from Ephesos show scenes from Euripides and Menander and are dated to the later second century: other paintings from the same site show a scene from tragedy, and are ascribed to the fifth century.<sup>11</sup> A mosaic of Menander's *Achaioi* from Oescus in Moesia is now dated to the third century.<sup>12</sup> More recently, Mytilene has yielded a famous series of mosaics, dated to the second half of the same century and showing scenes from eleven different plays of Menander, with the number of the act given in all but one.<sup>13</sup> A consular diptych shows a scene from tragedy as late as 517.<sup>14</sup>

A difficulty of this evidence, as my Toronto colleague Eric Csapo has pointed out to me, is that it does not point unequivocally to contemporary performance. Certain of the representations can be shown to derive from early Hellenistic models: the best example is the illustration of Menander's *Synaristosai* in Mytilene, which can be compared with a mosaic of Dioscourides in Pompeii. It might then be supposed that patrons liked to have scenes from Euripides or Menander on their walls or their floors without bothering, or being able, to see them on the stage. On the other hand, it has recently, and surely correctly, been

observed in a study of such representations that “the constant revision of the style of the costumes and masks in the terracottas and ivories gives evidence of interest in the performance (as opposed to the reading) of Early Hellenistic comedy over a long period and among a wider cross-section of the public than one might have expected from the literary sources.”<sup>15</sup>

Other evidence, though it again concerns revivals and not new plays, is less ambiguous. A recently published papyrus of Menander’s *Epitrepontes*, from the second century, has marks above the lines which the editor, Sir Eric Turner, understands as helping actors in delivery; but a holder of the traditional view might argue that this need point only to readings, and not to full, staged performances.<sup>16</sup> Lead tokens from Athens, dated to the third century, carry the title of Menander’s *Theophoroumene*, and have been interpreted as admission-tickets: if that is right, they must refer to full performances.<sup>17</sup>

The archaeological evidence we have been considering, mainly pictorial, shows then that comedy and tragedy continued to be revived at least into the third century. Archaeological evidence of another kind, that of epigraphy, shows with equal clarity that original comedies and tragedies were both composed and performed well into the lifetimes of Aristides and Lucian.

The best type of such evidence, rarer in the imperial period than earlier, is provided by the inscribed catalogs which record the winners at dramatic competitions. The most famous sets of these are from Athens, and give a record, albeit discontinuous and fragmentary, that goes from the early fifth century to about the middle of the second before the Christian era.<sup>18</sup> These catalogs distinguish between the production of old plays and of newly written ones; at Athens the epigraphical record gives

a precise date for the introduction of revivals, 387/86 for tragedy and 340/39 for comedy.<sup>19</sup> Verbally, the distinction is between an “old” play (παλαιὸν δράμα, παλαιά) and a “new” one (καινή), so that what is now called “New Comedy” can from the ancient point of view be “old” (παλαιά): for example, Menander’s *Misogynist* is an “old” play in an entry from the early second century b.c. For Old and New Comedy, Greek usually uses a different pair of adjectives, ἀρχαία and νέα.<sup>20</sup>

The Athenian catalogs break off in the middle of the second century B.C., and it is estimated that they ceased to be inscribed after about 120. By this date, however, documents from cities other than Athens begin to take up the story. In the first half of the next century there is particularly abundant evidence from Boeotia. Revivals and new productions are attested for tragedy, comedy and satyr-plays at Tanagra, Orchomenos, Oropos, and at a city that is very rich in such documents, Thespiai; unlike the Athenian records, however, these and later ones do not give the titles of any of the plays put on.<sup>21</sup> Five of the poets are from Athens, five from Thebes, and one each from Chalcis, Oropos, Tanagra (these last four all cities of Boeotia or Euboea), and Miletos. This shows that Athens continued to be a source of new dramas well after its inscribed records cease.

When we come to the imperial period, we have to reckon with the role of emperors as patrons of literature. It happens that, beginning with Augustus, the literary evidence for Greek and Roman drama starts to resume, and from this point on I shall try to interweave literature and epigraphy. Among the emperors Augustus seems to have given a decisive turn to the fortunes of Greek drama. Suetonius, discussing the emperor’s fondness for Greek literature, reports that “he loved Old Comedy and often had it put on at public spectacles” (*delectabatur comoedia veteri et*

*saepe eam exhibuit spectaculis publicis*). It has been doubted whether the biographer can really refer to Greek Old Comedy, in part because he goes on to discuss the emperor's habit of combing both Greek and Latin literature for "precepts and examples that were salubrious in the public and private spheres."<sup>22</sup> Surprising as it may seem, several writers of the imperial period commend Greek Old Comedy for this very reason. The imperial tutor Quintilian talks of it as "excellent in excoriating faults" (*in insectandis vitiis praecipua*, *Inst.* 10.1.65), and even Aristides is prepared to allow that the *parabaseis* contained "admonishment and education" (νουθεσία καὶ παιδευσίς, 29.28). The best witness is another emperor, Marcus Aurelius, who praises Old Comedy for its "educational frankness" (παιδαγωγική παρρησία), its warnings against pride, and its "straight talk" (εὐθυρημοσύνη) (*Med.* 11.6).

In Latin literature, the beginning of the reign of Augustus is notable for the last great triumph of an original tragedy on the stage; in 29, at the games held in Rome to celebrate Actium, Varius Rufus received a prize of a million sesterces for his *Thyestes*, which remained a classic of Roman drama.<sup>23</sup> While there is no equivalent success in Greek, there are signs that the Augustan era favored the composition of new dramas. An inscription from Delphi usually dated to the beginning of the reign shows an Athenian poet called Thrasycles who won at the Dionysia with a new tragedy. It has plausibly been suggested that Thrasycles' play had a Delphic subject, like Euripides' *Ion*.<sup>24</sup>

In the early imperial period, as in the late Hellenistic, Athens again appears to be a center for new drama. A fragmentary inscription dated by the script to the first century records a man who produced a new tragedy at the Great Panathenaia: this is all the more surprising in that there had been no drama at the Great Panathenaia of the classical period, though it is now known that there had been

already in 162 B.C., so that this may not represent an Augustan innovation.<sup>25</sup> At the end of the first century, Plutarch refers to a Stoic friend, Sarapion, who had been a victorious *chorodidaskalos* at the Dionysia in a year when the wealthy expatriate king, Philopappos of Commagene, was *choregos* for all the tribes. Now we know from quotations in Stobaeos that Sarapion wrote tragedies; and we also know from a monument in the Athenian Asclepieion that on some occasion he dedicated a tripod there. We may reasonably conclude that he had won the tripod as a victor at some celebration of the Dionysia, perhaps the very one to which Plutarch refers, and that the Dionysia were being celebrated about the year 100 in traditional style, with *choregoi*, *chorodidaskaloi*, and tripods as prizes for the victors.<sup>26</sup>

There is no evidence for the production of drama in Asia Minor in the same period, but it continued to be written. A notable text of Hierapolis-Castabala in Cilicia, of the first or perhaps the early second century of our era, describes a certain Onesicles as “a poet of epic and of the iambs of New Comedy, an author of encomiastic speeches, a lawyer among the best” ((ἐπῶν καὶ κωμωδίας τῶς νέας ἰάμβων ποιητὴν καὶ λόγων ἐγκωμιαστικῶν συγγραφέα, νομικὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις).<sup>27</sup> The claim is curious, since New Comedy rarely uses meters other than iambics, but whatever the explanation, Onesicles’ efforts show that new drama was not confined to Italy and Greece.<sup>28</sup>

For the hundred years following the death of Augustus, not much is heard about the emperors as patrons of new or revived drama, though it may be surmised that some encouragement came from Nero’s shortlived Neronia and Domitian’s much more successful Capitolia.<sup>29</sup> A decisive moment, however, came with the accession of Hadrian. “Over dinner,” so his biographer reports, “he put on tragedies, comedies, Atellan farces, harp-recitals

(*sambucae*), readers, poets, always as the occasion demanded”: he also “gave plays of every kind in the ancient fashion on the stage” (*fabulas omnis generis more antiquo in theatro dedit*).<sup>30</sup> It is unclear whether the plays were new or revived, in Greek or in Latin, and whether “the ancient fashion” refers to the nature of the productions, to competitions, or to something else. This lover of antiquity might be expected to have had a taste for revivals, and Athenaeus mentions a certain Aristomenes of Athens, “an actor of Old Comedy, a freedman of the most artistic emperor Hadrian, who called him ‘Attic Partridge’” (Ἀττικοπέρδιξ): the adjective ἀρχαία makes clear that this actor specialized in performances of Attic Old Comedy, whether these were given privately, on the public stage, or both.<sup>31</sup>

The archaism of the age, of which Hadrian was as much a symptom as a cause, may also have induced a change in taste which is notable in discussions of Attic comedy. In the late first century Menander had been in the ascendant: Quintilian, though he extols Old Comedy as a training ground for orators, is much more eloquent on the utility of Menander; Plutarch rates Menander well above Aristophanes, and Dio Chrysostom has a similar view. Fifty years later, however, Marcus Aurelius sees Middle and New Comedy as degenerate after the hearty frankness of the Old; the grammarian Phrynichos praises the language of Aristophanes and his contemporary writers of comedy, but has nothing good to say about their followers, especially Menander, “who applies no discrimination to his vocabulary, but jumbles everything together.”<sup>32</sup>

As it happens, it is in Hadrian’s reign that records of Greek theatrical competitions resume. A long inscription recently published from Oenoanda in northwestern Lycia records the establishment of a new *agon* there in 124, the Demostheneia. The most valuable prizes are, in descending



order, for *citharoedoi*, *tragoedoi*, and *comoedoi*. In post-classical Greek, these last two terms are not used of authors but of actors, and usually actors in revivals, so that the founder of this *agon* seems only to have anticipated revivals.<sup>33</sup> Three years later, a catalog of the Caesarea of Corinth includes among its dramatic categories writers of comedies, painters (perhaps scene-painters), *comoedoi* and *tragoedoi*. This seems to imply the production of revived comedies and tragedies and of newly written comedies, but not of new tragedies.<sup>34</sup>

At a date around the middle of the second century, catalogs of the Museia of Thespiai begin to reappear.<sup>35</sup> In one of them, the president of the competition probably belongs to a well-known and cultured family of the city which had strong ties to Athens, and it can be assumed that the program reflects prevailing Greek taste.<sup>36</sup> The order of the catalogs is unclear. One of them records performances of both comedy and tragedy, both revived and newly written; the winning actors and poets for the new plays are all Athenians, the comedian being an actor in one of his own plays; the winning actor for revived tragedy is from Aspendos, and it is hard not to think of the great theater of Aspendos, the most perfectly preserved from the Greek world, which perhaps dates from the reign of Antoninus Pius.<sup>37</sup> In another list, the same range of plays is represented, but the origins of the winners are more varied; the comic poet, who happens also to be the winning actor in a new tragedy, is from Corinth, and the tragic poet is the same Aspendian who appeared in the other list as a comic actor.<sup>38</sup> A third list, dated between 161 and 169, is fragmentary. There seems to have been no competition, or at least no victor, in the category of revived comedy, but only of revived tragedy; there are entries for new tragedy and comedy, both won by the same Athenian.<sup>39</sup> In the last such catalog, probably from the early third century, there

are no longer new plays, but only entries for *comoedoi* and *tragoedoi*, and so probably for revivals.<sup>[40](#)</sup>

That the vogue for drama was not confined to the Greek mainland is attested by inscriptions, close in time and place to Aristides' Smyrna, which show that at Aphrodisias in Caria, during the reign of Commodus, a new contest was instituted in accordance with the will of a benefactor called Claudius Lysimachos.<sup>[41](#)</sup> A list survives showing the various categories of entry and the value of the prizes, and so gives a curious insight into the cultural priorities of the time. Among dramatic performers, the most generously funded categories are for *tragoedoi* and *comoedoi*, presumably actors in revivals; there are awards in the middle range for original tragedies and comedies; there are low ones, though both a first and second prize, for the producers of revived comedy, but nothing for revived tragedy; there is a middling prize for a tragic chorus, and low ones for the "general prizes" for tragic and comic actors. Here ancient comedy is not called παλαιά but ἀρχαία, the term usually applied to Old Comedy, so that either the adjective is being used loosely or in this contest only revivals of Old Comedy were allowed.<sup>[42](#)</sup>

The catalogs from Thespiai and Aphrodisias belong to the period which saw the apogee of the Second Sophistic movement, and are not far from its major centers—Athens, Ephesus, and Smyrna. There are several persons in this movement, or in various ways on its fringes, who are known to have written tragedy or comedy. The eldest of the three sophists called Philostratos, the father of the biographer, is said to have written forty-three tragedies and fourteen comedies, and his son singles out among the distinguished pupils of Chrestos of Byzantium "Isagoras the tragic poet." All of these men were connected with Athens, which, as has been seen, was still producing poets of acted comedy and

tragedy in the mid-second century, so that these plays were not necessarily recital or cabinet-dramas.<sup>[43](#)</sup>

This study has been concerned with Greek drama in the imperial period, looking both at the continued performance of complete, revived plays and at the staging of complete new ones. Athens, as might be expected, emerges as the chief center for both, but especially for the second. Athenian playwrights appear in the dramatic catalogs of Boeotia in the last century before our era; they continue to appear in Athens itself during the century after that; they are also strongly represented in the catalogs from Thespiai of the mid-second century. An impulse to both writing and production seems to have been given by the archaizing tendencies of the second century, most clearly embodied in the emperor Hadrian, and by the literary flowering of the Second Sophistic. Athens was one of the capitals of this movement; another was its supposed daughter-city, Smyrna, and it is easy to imagine these two rivaling and imitating each other somewhat as London and New York do today. From the evidence of Aelius Aristides and the inscriptions, new plays were still staged in the later second century, but may have ceased to be in the early third: however, classical dramas, particularly Menander, continued to be staged, and the writing of plays for the study or the recital hall persisted throughout antiquity, and in different forms into the middle ages.

If there was in any sense rivalry between legitimate theater and such forms as mime and pantomime, it led to no clear-cut victories, no clean sweep of the less popular forms from the stage; and if the other forms were more popular, it does not follow that they were necessarily vulgar or uneducated. A social historian of the year 4000 would be unwise to infer that *Kiss Me Kate* had driven *The Taming of the Shrew* from the stage; that Verdi's *Otello* and *Falstaff* represented an unmistakable decline in taste; or that only

the “small circle of the educated” watched Shakespeare in the Park.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I have used the following special abbreviations: Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*- L. Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*<sup>9-10</sup>, ed. G. Wissowa (Leipzig, 1922); Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches* = P. Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches sur les acteurs dans la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1976); Mette, *Urkunden* = H.J. Mette, *Urkunden dramatischer Aufführungen in Griechenland*, Texte und Kommentare 8 (Berlin and New York, 1977); O'Connor, *Actors and Acting*- J.B. O'Connor, *Chapters in the History of Actors and Acting in Greece* (Chicago, 1908); PCG = R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin and New York, 1983-); *TrGF*<sup>2</sup> 1 = B. Snell and R. Kannicht, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (TrGF<sup>2</sup>)* vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1986); Webster, *Monuments*<sup>2</sup> = T.B.L. Webster, *Monuments Illustrating New Comedy*<sup>2</sup>, Bull. Inst. Class. Stud., Suppl. 24 (London, 1969). I am grateful to Eric Csapo for reading a draft of this paper and giving me valuable advice, and I have also profited from comments made at the Michigan Conference. Other debts are recorded in their place.

<sup>2</sup> “Going on in the Northeast,” *New York Times*, Sunday, July 13, 1986.

<sup>3</sup> Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, 2<sup>10</sup>: 118-119 (in the sixth edition [1889], 2: 443-44).

<sup>4</sup> A. Dihle, *Der Prolog der ‘Bacchen’*, SHAW 65 (Heidelberg, 1981), 28-38; P. Veyne, *REG* 102 (1989): 341-45.

<sup>5</sup> Behr, *Aelius Aristides: The Complete Works* (Leiden, 1981), 2: 140, translates the penultimate phrase, “I ask that there be neither poets nor actors of these works”; but since the Smyrnaeans are the implied subjects of the other infinitives in the sentence (ποιεῖν, ἀνελεῖν, παίζειν), they should also be the subject of εἶναι.

<sup>6</sup> No doubt the Dionysia are also “the agon of the poets” at Smyrna which Aristides discussed with the poet Metrodoros (47.42).

<sup>7</sup> Editions of both the *Podagra* and the *Ocypous* by J. Zimmermann (1909: *non vidi*), who defends the authenticity of the first; followed by M.D. Macleod in the Loeb *Lucian*, vol. 8 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968-79), 319-22.

<sup>8</sup> Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches*, 78. Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. Gr. Litt.* 2, no. 16 (1920): 336, more cautiously say, “Für das 2. Jahrhundert oder später bezeugt Ps. Lucian,” etc.

<sup>9</sup> Thus Helm, *RE* XIII (1927): 1735-36, M.D. Macleod, Loeb *Lucian* 8 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968-79), 237. The authenticity is defended by B. Baldwin, *Antichthon* 3 (1969): 54-62, J.A. Hall, *Lucian’s satire* (New York, 1981), 324-31.

<sup>10</sup> For comedy, Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte* 2: 120 n. 1, for tragedy, id. 122 n. 3; note also Synes, 128 C-D, 130-31 Terzaghi (I owe this reference to Alan Cameron). Among authors, the latest tragedian in *TrGF*<sup>2</sup> vol. 1 is Timotheos of Gaza under Anastasios I (no. 200), the latest author of comedy in Austin, *ZPE* 14 (1974): 201-25 is Synesios (*PCG* VII 666).

<sup>11</sup> V.M. Strocka, "Die Wandmalerei der Hanghäuser in Ephesos," *Forschungen in Ephesos* 8, no. 1 (1977): 45-56 ("Theaterzimmer"); id., 126-37 ("Sapphozimmer"). Note Strocka's comments, 137, on the significance of these latter paintings for drama in the Byzantine period.

<sup>12</sup> Oescus: *IGBulg.* II no. 597 bis; Webster, *Monuments*<sup>2</sup>, 168; S. Charitonidis, L. Kahil, R. Ginouvès, *Les mosaïques de la maison du Ménandre à Mytilène*, *Antike Kunst Beiheft* 6 (Bern, 1970), 98-99, with pi. 27, 1.

<sup>13</sup> Webster, *Monuments*<sup>2</sup>, 299-301; Charitonidis et al., op. cit. Other Menander mosaics are known from Antioch (Webster, *Monuments*<sup>2</sup>, 171) and now Chania in Crete (unpublished: information kindly supplied by Katherine Dunbabin and Eric Csapo).

<sup>14</sup> M. Bieber, *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater*<sup>2</sup> (Princeton, 1951), 251; J.R. Green, *AJA* 89 (1985): 471-72.

<sup>15</sup> Generally, Green, (previous n.), 465-72; the quotation in the text is from 472.

<sup>16</sup> *POxy.* L (1983) no. 3533; note Turner's introduction referring to "reading marks" in other papyri.

<sup>17</sup> M. Lang, M. Crosby, *The Athenian Agora X: Weights, Measures and Tokens* (Princeton, 1964), 122 no. L329; Webster, *Monuments*<sup>2</sup>, 159.

<sup>18</sup> These have twice been edited in recent years, by Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches* and by Mette, *Urkunden*. Mette's edition will be used here, since it includes records from other cities than Athens and from the imperial period.

<sup>19</sup> Mette, *Urkunden*, 27, 35.

<sup>20</sup> Mette, 125; the Athenian catalogs, however, do not use *καὶνὴ*, but only note when a play is a revival.

<sup>21</sup> Texts and bibliographies now in Mette, *Urkunden*, 53-61; on the chronology of these texts, A.J. Gossage, *ABSA* 70 (1975): 115-34.

<sup>22</sup> Suet. *Aug.* 89. 1-2; thus R.E. Fantham, *TAPA* 114 (1984): 304, inclines to think that Roman comedy is meant.

<sup>23</sup> Testimonia in E. Lefèvre, *Der Thyestes des Lucius Varius Rufus* (AAWM, 1976), 9, 7-8.

<sup>24</sup> *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 772; *FDelphes* III, 2, no. 67; Mette, *Urkunden* 199, no. 3; *TrGF*<sup>2</sup> 1.2 no. 177. For this conjecture, P. Graindor, *Athènes sous Auguste* (Cairo, 1927), 176, approved by L. Robert, *RPh* 41 (1967): 20.

<sup>25</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3157; A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens<sup>2</sup>* (Oxford, 1968), 56; *TrGF<sup>2</sup>* 1.2 p. 42 no. 14. Not in Mette, *Urkunden*. The evidence for the Panathenaea of 162 B.C. is now published by S.V. Tracy and Ch. Habicht in *Hesperia* 60 (1991), 203–4; I am very grateful to them for giving me advance notice of this important document.

<sup>26</sup> Sarapion's victory: Plut., *Quaest. conviv.* 628 A. Fragments: *TrGF<sup>2</sup>* 1.2 no. 185, cf. Wilamowitz, *Kleine Schriften* 2: 217–18. Tripod: C.P. Jones, *Phoenix* 32 (1978): 229–31. For a different reconstruction, see now Sara B. Aleshire, *Asclepius at Athens* (Amsterdam, 1991).

<sup>27</sup> E.L. Hicks, *JHS* 11 (1890): 249 no. 23; Mette, *Urkunden*, p. 199 no. 6; *PCG* VII, 96; cf. L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques* (Paris, 1938), 21 n. 5 (on 22). I have followed Hicks' punctuation: E. Rohde, *Der Griechische Roman<sup>3</sup>* (Leipzig, 1914), 270 n. 2, followed by the authors of *PCG*, proposes a comma after νέας, "of New Comedy (and) of iambs," but this seems very difficult. Rohde more plausibly adduces the claim of Antonius Diogenes, the author of the *Wonders beyond Thule*, to be a "poet of ancient comedy" (ποιητής ... κωμωδίας παλαιάς, Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 166, 111 A); this surely does not refer to "Aristophanic elements" in the *Wonders*, as understood by J.R. Morgan, *CQ* 35 (1985): 483. Hans Taeuber, who is preparing a corpus of the inscriptions of Hierapolis, informs me that the stone is still extant; I am very grateful to him for discussing it with me.

<sup>28</sup> I leave out of account the Pergamene poet Q. Pompeius Capito, also probably of the first century, who "in every meter and rhythm displayed the magnificent excellence of his poetry by means of improvised (?) recitals" (παντί μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ τὴν μεγαλοφυῆ τῆς ποιήσεως ἀρετὴν ἐπιδειξάμενον καιρικῶς ἀπανγελίας, *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 3800, *TrGF<sup>2</sup>* 1.2 no. 186), since the nature of his poetry is not assured. Similarly Fabius (?) Secundus of Phrygian Hierapolis (T. Ritti, *Hierapolis I: Fonti letterarie ed epigrafiche* [Rome, 1985], 96 no. 10).

<sup>29</sup> Under Claudius, Pomponius Secundus wrote for the stage (Tac. *Ann.* 11. 13). Titus wrote Greek tragedies (Eutrop. 7.21.1, Suda T 691; *TrGF I<sup>2</sup>* no. 183). The Latin tragedian Scaevius Memor was crowned at the Capitolia (Mart. 11.9).

<sup>30</sup> HA *Hadr.* 26.4, 19.6; cf. Christ-Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. Gr. Litt.* 2, 26 (1924), 685.

<sup>31</sup> Athen. 3, 115 B. Cf. O'Connor, *Actors and acting*, 68; Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches*, 302 n. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.66, 69–72; Plut. *Quaest. conviv.* 711 E–712 D; id., *Comp. Arist. et Men.* 853 A–854 D; Dio Chr. 18.6–7; M. Aur. Med. 11.6; Phryn. (ed. Fischer) 292, 346, al. (Aristophanes), 392 (Menander).

<sup>33</sup> Excellently published by M. Wörrle, *Stadt und Fest im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien* (Munich, 1988), 8 lines 41–43, cf 234. On this restriction of the words κωμῳδοί and τραγωδοί, J. Frei, *De certaminibus thymelicis* (Basel, 1900), 22–23; O'Connor, *Actors and acting*, 15.



<sup>34</sup> W.R. Biers and D.J. Geagan, *Hesperia* 39 (1970): 79–93, with the discussion of J. and L. Robert in *Bull. épigr.* 1971: 307 (proposing ἀπεγράψατο in lines 39, 41, 52); Mette, *Urkunden*, 62, no. 7.

<sup>35</sup> Jamot, *BCH* 19 (1895): 340–46, nos. 15–18 (the bottom half of no. 16 was found later: for the full text, *SEG* 3:334); the dramatic parts of nos. 15–17 in Mette, *Urkunden*, 59–61. On the dating, Jamot, 357–60, putting nos. 15 and 16 shortly before 161 or after 169, no. 17 in 161/69, no. 18 after 212; generally followed by P. Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (Paris, 1982), 181–82, and by A. Schachter, *Cults of Boeotia II*, *BICS Suppl.* 38, 2 (London, 1986): 176–79.

<sup>36</sup> I.e., T. Flavius Aristo, no. 16 line 6; the name Aristo recurs in the family studied by C.P. Jones, *HSCP* 74 (1970): 223–55, with supplements and corrections in *GRBS* 21 (1980): 377–79, Roesch (previous n.), 171–72.

<sup>37</sup> Jamot, no. 15 (Mette, *Urkunden*, 59–60). Theatre of Aspendos: D. de Bernardi Ferrero, *Teatri Classici in Asia minore* III (Rome, 1970), 161–74; cf. M. Gallina in Bernardi Ferrero IV (Rome, 1974), 231. The phrase *domus Augustorum* need not indicate a date in the joint rule of Marcus Aurelius and L. Verus, as sometimes supposed: for many counter-examples, E. Meyer, *Chiron* 5 (1975): 400–401.

<sup>38</sup> Jamot, no. 16 (Mette, *Urkunden*, 60–61); the dramatic part is contained in the new fragment.

<sup>39</sup> Jamot, no. 17 (Mette, *Urkunden*, 61).

<sup>40</sup> Jamot, no. 18 (not in Mette, *Urkunden*).

<sup>41</sup> *OGIS* 509 (cf. Robert, *RPh* sér. 3, 4 [1930]: 30–31 [*Opera Minora Selecta* II 1130–31]), a letter of the corrector M. Ulpius Appuleius Eurycles to Aphrodisias concerning the foundation; *MAMA* 8, 420 (cf. Robert, *Hellenica* 13, 125 n. 1; translation by T.R.S. Broughton in T. Frank, ed., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome* 4 [Baltimore, 1938], 856–57), a list of cash prizes to be awarded at the competition: see below.

<sup>42</sup> *MAMA* 8, 420 (see previous n.). On the prize κοινή τραγωδῶν (κωμωδῶν), L. Moretti on *Inscriptiones Graecae Urbis Romae*, 261; Ghiron-Bistagne, *Recherches*, 123–24.

<sup>43</sup> *Suda* Φ 422 (*TGrF*<sup>2</sup> 1.2 no. 194; *PCG* 7, 373); Philostr. *VS* 2.11.1, 95 K. (*TGrF*<sup>2</sup> 1.2, no. 195).



## The Concept of **τῶμα τῶν γραφῶν** in Alexandrian Theology

Annewies VAN DEN HOEK Nijmegen It is basic to any allegorical or typological interpretation of the Bible that a story, precept or proverb has both a literal meaning, which is obvious to any reader, and a hidden sense, which is revealed either through special insight or through instruction.

Different terms have been used by the fathers of the Early Church to describe this overlay of meanings; the literal sense is denoted by words like letter, history or body and the deeper sense by words like allegory, symbol, figure or soul.<sup>1</sup>

The last pair of terms is based on a common philosophical distinction of Platonic origin; the distinction articulates a human being into a sensible component, which is formed by the body, and a noetic component, which is located in the soul and which is opposed to the body. When this frame of reference is applied to the interpretation of the Bible, σῶμα equals the letter of Scripture, and ψυχή covers the underlying meaning.

These concepts have been heavily used by Origen, but he gives them a rather new content by putting the imagery in the broad context of salvation. He parallels the letter of the biblical word with the incarnation of Christ. "Sicut Christus celatus venit in corpore ... sic est omnis scriptura divina incorporata". Since Origen, the concept and the terminology have had a wide diffusion and are inextricably linked to the history of the interpretation of Scripture.<sup>2</sup>

Applying the image of body and soul to the interpretation of the Bible, however, is not as obvious an approach as it seems from the perspective of later times. Before Origen, it is done only rarely; a look in the dictionaries makes the situation quite clear. Liddell and Scott does not mention σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν, nor do Stephanus or Bauer; it also is missing

in Moulton and Milligan.<sup>3</sup> The meaning of σώμα, of course, is given either connected with ψυχή or opposed to it, but then in a more general sense unrelated to this particular usage. The *TWNT*, in an article by Schweizer, is one of the few dictionaries that gives the meaning that interests us here, but in the briefest fashion.<sup>4</sup> Schweizer refers to two passages in Philo: *Vita Cont.* 78; *Migr.* 93. Lampe<sup>5</sup> cites Clement as the first example within the Christian realm: *Sir.* VI 132, 2-3.

The apparent absence of the concept in other ancient Greek writers arouses one's curiosity and leads to the following questions. Are other traces to be found outside the above-mentioned Jewish and Christian writers? How did the concept function in its early occurrences? Is it possible to retrace the original formulation of the concept and the related terminology? The answers to these questions should identify the originator of a concept and a line of thought that was to have considerable significance for the Middle Ages and later times.

In looking for other examples of our concept, the metaphorical or allegorical meanings of σῶμα should be reviewed in greater detail. Closest to the first meaning of σῶμα—namely that of the body of a living being—is the designation of a person. Σῶμα is also used to signify a slave in a somewhat dehumanized sense, as a working power, almost an appliance. As has been reported to me, a modern-day equivalent to σῶμα in this sense is used in the English-speaking world, in particular in the American army; a superior can call for so many “warm bodies” for a certain job. The expanded term has a special logic in a military setting since armies also have to deal with bodies that are no longer warm.

Σῶμα may be used for body in a general sense: that is, any corporeal substance,<sup>6</sup> element or even a mathematical figure. Then σῶμα may stand for the whole of a thing, like a corpus of books. Cicero gave this meaning, and because he used the Greek word σῶμα in his Latin text, we can infer that

it was a foreign borrowing that had not passed into standard Latin usage in the first century B.C. Papyri offer a similar meaning in a narrow, concrete sense: namely, σῶμα signifies the text of a document or will.<sup>7</sup>

Σῶμα can also refer in a less physical sense to the organic whole of something, as ἰὸ σῶμα τῆς ἱστορίας, the organic whole of history.<sup>8</sup> In an even broader sense, the cosmos in its entirety can be designated τό σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου.<sup>9</sup> In a philosophical dispute, τό σῶμα τῆς πίστεως may occur with the meaning of the body (or totality) of proof.<sup>10</sup> In the Christian realm, τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἀληθείας is used to represent the whole or the unity of truth in which all parts like creation and scripture connect in a coherent way.<sup>11</sup> Σῶμα may also be used in the sense of kernel or essential point, as in τό σῶμα τοῦ ὅλου λόγου or τό σῶμα καί τὸ ὕφος τῆς προφητείας.<sup>12</sup>

While many of these meanings refer metaphorically to conceptual entities and even to written material, they do not do so in the sense we are looking for; the σῶμα is never opposed in a Platonic way to the ψυχή of writings, and above all, σῶμα does not refer to the meaning of writings. A closer examination of the definitions collected in the dictionaries, confirms that the concept of σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν does not exist outside the Jewish and Early Christian tradition. In answer to our first question then, the concept must have originated in the former, and did not spread to the pagan realm.

To answer our next question—how' the concept works in the known examples—let us first go one step back in time to Origen's immediate predecessor, Clement of Alexandria. The passage in which σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν occurs is a rather curious one. *Str.* VI 132,2-3; "Rightly, therefore, Jesus of Nave saw Moses doubly when he was taken up: one (Moses) with the angels, and another (Moses) being honored with burial on the mountains around the ravines. Jesus saw this spectacle below, being elevated by the spirit, together with Caleb; but both do not see similarly. But the one descended with

greater speed, as if the weight he carried was great, while the other, on descending after him, subsequently described the glory that he saw, being able to perceive more than the other as having grown purer; the narrative, in my opinion, shows that knowledge is not the privilege of all since some look at the body of the Scriptures, the letters and the words, as at the body of Moses, while others perceive the thoughts and the meanings that lie under the words, being inquisitive about the Moses who is with the angels".<sup>12a</sup>

Thus Clement starts with a double presentation of Moses's earthly end as an assumption and a burial, a concept whose source must have been the *Assumptio Moysis*. The book itself has been lost and is known only through scattered references in later authors.<sup>13</sup> The basic edition, translation and commentary by R.H. Charles in 1897 has gathered most of the evidence and is still the best available.<sup>14</sup> In his oblique approach, Clement refers to two concepts, the one is the σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν, that is the external story of letters and words, and the other is the underlying meaning. Only the latter attracts people who are able to see through things (διοράω); they are said to be in the company of the angels of the story of Moses. Origen has taken over this allegory of Moses's end in a similar way in the *Horn. Jos.* 2,1, as is noted in the french edition.<sup>15</sup>

The combination of this curious story and the rare reference to the σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν must have been invented by Clement and taken over by Origen if only on one occasion; later on an allusion to the story occurs in a letter to St. Augustine<sup>16</sup> and in Hilary of Poitiers.<sup>14</sup> The adaptation of the Platonic distinction between body and soul to a biblical text was not, however, Clement's invention; to find the earliest occurrence we must go back one step further to his Jewish predecessor in Alexandria, Philo.

Philo refers to the image twice. Once it comes up in a description of the so-called Therapeutae in *De Vita*

*Contemplativa*. He gives an account of a festive meeting of this religious community in which the members pray, take food and sing. In the course of these activities, the chairman of the group brings up a Scriptural passage for discussion. The following text is taken from *Vita Cont.* 78; “The interpretations of the Sacred Scriptures are given figuratively in allegories. For to these people, the whole law seems to resemble a living creature with the literal ordinances for its body and the invisible meaning for its soul stored up in the words; by this, the rational soul begins to contemplate especially the things that are akin to itself and viewing through the words as through a mirror sees the marvelous beauties of the conception, unfolds and reveals the symbolic meanings and brings forth the thoughts naked to the light for those who need but little reminding to enable them to discern the hidden through the visible”.[16a](#)

Philo takes the trouble to make the allegory of σῶμα explicit, saying that the law resembles a living creature (ζῷον). It appears that the metaphor is still close to the literal meaning of the word σῶμα and that an explanation is necessary. The allegory may be evoked by the way in which the Therapeutae interpret the Scriptures and may reflect their views. On the other hand, it fits surprisingly well into Philo’s own way of interpreting. Since the whole discussion, after all, comes through Philo, it is very difficult to determine who was the originator.

The other text *Migr.* 93 reflects the concept very briefly; “we should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body and their inner meanings as resembling the soul. It follows that exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay attention to the letter of the laws. If we keep and observe these, we shall gain a clearer conception of those things of which these are the symbols ...”.[16b](#)

In answer to our third question—whether it is possible to retrace the original formulation of the concept of σῶμα τῶν

γραφῶν—one can say that the concept turns up for the first time in Philo, either invented by him or by the people he observed in *De Vita Contemplativa*. The lack of other sources for this usage is not the only argument; there is also some internal evidence. His comparison of σῶμα with ζῶον has the quality of freshness; it offers a clarification necessary when an idea is still unfamiliar.

The line of filiation is then clear; it is highly probable that Clement took the concept from Philo directly<sup>17</sup>. The story of the double presentation of Moses' earthly end presupposes that Clement knew about Philo's double image. In Clement's formulation, σῶμα is composed of the λέξεις and the ὀνόματα, which are opposed to the διάνοιαι. In Philo, the basic idea is presented in terms of the opposition between the σῶμα that is composed of τάς ῥητάς διατάξεις and the ψυχή that is its invisible comprehension. This interpretive structure is passed on by Origen to later periods and goes on to play an important role in hermeneutics.

<sup>1</sup> W. den Boer, *De allegor ese in hei werk van Clemens van Alexandrië* (Leiden, 1940), p. 23-34; H. de Lubac, "'Typologie' et 'Allégorisme'", in *RSR* 34(1947), p. 180-226; J. Daniélou, "Typologie et allégorie chez Clément d'Alexandrie", in *St Pair*. IV (1961), p. 50-57.

<sup>2</sup> For the interpretative distinction in Scripture, cf. e.g. Orig. *LevHo.* 5,1; *Prine.* IV 2,4; for the concept of incarnation, cf. e.g. Orig. *MtCoSer.* 27; *Princ.* IV 2,4. M. Harl, *Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné* (Paris, 1958); H. De Lubac, "A propos de l'allégorie chrétienne", in *RSR* XLVII (1959), p. 5-43; R. Gögler, *Zur Theologie des biblischen Wortes bei Origenes* (Düsseldorf, 1963), p. 299-307.

<sup>3</sup> H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (9th ed., Oxford, 1966); H. Stephanus, *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* (Paris, 1831-1865); W. Bauer, *Wörterbuch zu den Schriften* ψυχή or opposed to it, but then in a more general sense unrelated to this particular usage. The *TWNT*, in an article by Schweizer, is one of the few dictionaries that gives the meaning that interests us here, but in the briefest fashion.<sup>4</sup> Schweizer refers to two passages in Philo: *Vita Cont.* 78; *Migr.* 93. Lampe<sup>5</sup> cites Clement as the first example within the Christian realm: *Str.* VI 132, 2-3. *des Seuen Testaments* (5th ed., Berlin-New York, 1971); J.H. Moulton and G. Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*



illustrated from the papyri and other non-literary sources (London. 1930. repr. 1949).

<sup>4</sup> E. Schweizer, in *TWNT* VII (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 1024–1091.

<sup>5</sup> G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1961).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. e.g. Philo *Migr.* 12; *Conf.* 190; *Dec.* 82.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* 2,1,4; *Ep. ad Luceium*; for the papyri cf. PFay 34 20; PLond 1132b.

<sup>8</sup> Polyb. I 3,4; Flav. Jos. *Bell. Jud.* 1,15.

<sup>9</sup> Plato. *Tim.* 31b, 32c.

<sup>10</sup> Arist. *Rhet.* 1354a 15.

<sup>11</sup> Iren. *Adv. Haer.* I 9,4; Orig. *JoCo.* XIII 303.

<sup>12</sup> Orig. *JoCo.* VI 11; Clem. Al. *Str.* VII 96,2.

<sup>12a</sup> Clemens Al. *Str.* VI, 132, 2–3, Stählin-Frühtel p. 498:  
εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ τὸν Μωυσέα

ἀναλαμβανόμενον διττὸν εἶδεν Ἰησοῦς ὁ τοῦ Ναυῆ, καὶ τὸν μὲν μετ’ ἀγγέλων, τὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη περὶ τὰς φάραγγας κηδεῖας ἀξιούμενον. εἶδεν δὲ Ἰησοῦς τὴν θεὰν ταύτην κάτω πνεύματι ἐπαρθεὶς σὺν καὶ τῷ Χαλέβ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἄμφω θεῶνται, | ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν καὶ θάττον κατήλθεν, πολὺ τὸ βρῖθον ἐπαγόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἐπικατελθὼν ὕστερον τὴν δόξαν διηγεῖτο ἣν ἐθεᾶτο, διαθρῆσαι δυνηθεὶς μᾶλλον θατέρου, ἅτε καὶ καθαρώτερος γενόμενος, δηλούσης, οἶμαι, τῆς ἱστορίας | μὴ πάντων εἶναι τὴν γνῶσιν, ἐπεὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ σῶμα τῶν γραφῶν, τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, καθάπερ τὸ σῶμα τὸ Μωυσέως, προσβλέπουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων δηλούμενα διορῶσι, τὸν μετὰ ἀγγέλων Μωυσέα πολυπραγμονοῦντες.

<sup>13</sup> R.H. Charles. *The Assumption of Moses translated from the Latin Sixth Century MS.* (London, 1897). p. 105–110: Idem, “The Assumption of Moses”, in *APOT* 2 (1913). p. 407–424; cf. J.J. Collins, in *Jewish Writings of the second Temple Period* (Comp. Rer. Iudaic. ad NT, section II vol. 2, ed. M.E. Stone: Assen-Philadelphia, 1984), p. 344f.

<sup>14</sup> A passage of Hilary of Poitiers. *In Mt.* 20.10,19–25 refers to a writing in which the death and burial of Moses are discussed. Hilary says, that this writing is not obligatory but that it has authority. He assumes that his readers understand to which writing he is referring. It appears from this passage that the writing was the Assumption of Moses which, therefore, must have been known in Gaule round 350. Charles does not mention Hilary’s text in his edition. Cf. P. Smulders, “En marge de l’*In Matthaeum* de S. Hilaire de Poitiers: principes et méthodes herméneutiques”, in *Cahiers de Biblia Patristica* I (1987), p. 217–252, esp. note 18.

<sup>15</sup> Orig. *JosHo.* 2,1 (SChr. 71: ed. A. Jaubert). p. 118–119.

<sup>16</sup> Evodius *Ep. ad August.* (inter *Ep. Augustini* 158.6).



[16a](#) Philo, *Vita Contempl.*, 78, Colson IX, p. 160:

αἱ δὲ ἐξηγήσεις τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων

γίνονται δι' ὑπονοιῶν ἐν ἀλληγορίαις· ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ νομοθεσία δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις εἰκέναι ζῶν καὶ σῶμα μὲν ἔχειν τὰς ῥητὰς διατάξεις, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐναποκείμενον ταῖς λέξεσιν ἀόρατον νοῦν, ἐν ᾧ ἤρξατο ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ διαφερόντως τὰ οἰκεῖα θεωρεῖν, ὥσπερ διὰ κατόπτρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξαίσια κάλλη νοημάτων | ἐμφαινόμενα κατιδοῦσα καὶ τὰ μὲν σύμβολα διαπτύξασα καὶ διακαλύψασα, γυμνά δὲ εἰς φῶς προαγαγοῦσα τὰ ἐνθύμια τοῖς δυναμένοις ἐκ μικρᾶς ὑπομνήσεως τὰ ἀφανῆ διὰ τῶν φανερῶν θεωρεῖν.

[16b](#) Philo, *Migr. Abr.*, 93, Colson IV, p. 184:

ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα μὲν σώματι εἰκέναι νομίζειν.

ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα· ὥσπερ οὖν σώματος, ἐπειδὴ | ψυχῆς ἐστὶν οἶκος, προνοητέον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν νόμων ἐπιμελητέον· φυλαττομένων γὰρ τούτων ἀριδηλότερον κάκεῖνα γνωρισθήσεται, ὧν εἰσιν οὗτοι σύμβολα, πρὸς τῷ καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέμψεις καὶ κατηγορίας ἀποδιδράσκειν.

[17](#) Cf. *Clement of Alexandria and his use of Philo in the Stromateis* (Leiden, 1988), p. 200.

# *Hubris In Josephus' Jewish Antiquities* 1-4

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This paper argues: 1) that Josephus uses Classical notions of *hubris* 'outra-geous behavior'—also attested in Philo—to introduce the term into Pentateuchal material; 2) that he often associates marriage and sexual impropriety with the term; and 3) that there are possible apologetic reasons for Josephus' use of *hubris* in *Antiquities* 1-4.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The Greek concept of *hubris* is as old as European literature; it first appears in the Homeric poems. Lyric poetry, history, drama, and rhetoric all use the term, refining and redefining it for their own contexts. The Jewish historian Josephus (b. Jerusalem, c. 37 CE; d. Rome, after 100 CE) was heir to a seven-century Classical tradition. In his paraphrase of the Hebrew Torah (*Antiquities* 1-4), he uses Classical Greek notions of *hubris* to make his own points about Jewish history, law and society. Josephus is thoroughly acquainted with the authors of the Classical canon: their language, themes, and importance.<sup>1</sup>

Many of the ideas implicit in the concept of *hubris*—e.g., the notion of excess and disobedience leading to punishment—are not alien to the Torah; indeed this is one of its major themes. Deuteronomy 32:15 shows that satiety leads to forsaking God. However, the Greek of the Septuagint does not use the word *hubris* here. In fact, the LXX uses the word only twice in the first five books (Gen.

49:4 ἐξύβρισας; Lev. 26:19 ὑβριν), while Josephus, by contrast, uses the word (or words based on the same stem) over 232 times in his works (and five times in variant readings), and 184 times in *Antiquities* (and three variant readings). He uses this term 46 times in his paraphrase of the Pentateuch (plus one variant reading), but nowhere does he use it where the LXX employs the term. He does not even paraphrase Gen. 49.4 or Lev. 26.19.<sup>2</sup>

This paper will argue that Josephus follows a classical tradition (also attested in Philo) that introduces the term *hubris* into Pentateuchal material, that his writings often associate marriage and sexual impropriety with *hubris* and that there are possible apologetic reasons for using the term in the way he does. Discussion will proceed in the order that the passages occur in the Torah, as much as possible. We shall discover that in the first four books of Josephus' *Antiquities of the Jews*,<sup>3</sup> *hubris* shows a wide range of meanings, from the kind of sin that arises from satiety, to sexual impropriety (a major category), to damage by rain. It also can mean 'harm', as when Joseph in Egypt tells his brothers to leave one of their number with him as a hostage, and assures them that the brother who remains will suffer nothing ὑβριστικόν (*Ant.* 2:106).<sup>4</sup>

The variety of meanings implicit in the term as employed by Josephus should be no surprise; we do not expect strict consistency in his usage for two reasons: first, the wide range of meanings for *hubris* itself, and second, because Josephus is not known for his consistency in his use of other terms, such as those relating to prophecy or slavery.<sup>5</sup>

In order to understand what his audience brought to their reading of his text, we first offer a brief discussion of *hubris*. This will include ancient definitions and uses of the term and what some modern scholars have concluded about it.

## **ANCIENT DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES OF YBPIΣ**

The pseudo-Platonic *Definitioris* gives this brief definition: “Υβρις ἀδικία πρὸς ἀτιμίαν φέρουσα ‘injustice leading to dishonor’ (41561 γ)<sup>6</sup> In this explanation, *hubris* harms a persons sense of worth (τιμή). Similarly, Aristotle defines it thus in *Rhetoric* 1378b 23–35:

The one committing ὕβρις also slights; for ὕβρις is to do and to say things which make the victim incur shame (αἰσχύνη), not so that he would get something which he did not get before, but so that he would enjoy himself (ἡσθῆι). For the ones who act in return for something do not commit ὕβρις but take vengeance (τιμωροῦνται). And the cause of pleasure for those committing ὕβρις is that they think that they themselves, doing badly to others, are more superior (for which reason the young and the rich are ὕβριστάι, for when they commit ὕβρις they think that they are superior). Dishonor (ἀτιμία) is characteristic of ὕβρις, and the one who dishonors (ὁ ἀτιμάζων), slights someone; for the worthless thing has no honor (τιμήν), neither for good or bad, wherefore Achilles—in anger—says:

“He dishonored (ἡτίμησεν) me—for having seized my prize, he holds it” [*Iliad* 1:356] and, “As if I were some vagabond without honor” (ἀτίμητον) [*Iliad* 9:648 = 17:59]. Thus did he speak, angered because of this.

This rhetorical treatment of *hubris* stresses its intentional nature, and how it diminishes its victims’ sense of self-worth. Aristotle chooses two examples from the *Iliad* to show how Achilles was the victim of Agamemnon’s hubristic words and actions.

*Hubris* in Classical literature is common and well-studied. A few examples follow. Achilles says that Agamemnon committed *hubris* against him, and he will receive his punishment (*Iliad* 1:203); likewise, Odysseus charges Penelope’s suitor, Eurymakhos, with *hubris* (*Odyssey*

18:381). Hesiod's *Works and Days* is a call for δίκη 'justice' to overcome the world's *hubris* (213-239); the Theognidea states that God gives *hubris* first to a wicked man, whose place he is about to destroy (151-152); Pindar adds to the list some familiar mythical figures: Bellerophon, who attempted to fly to heaven (*Olympian Odes* 13:10),<sup>7</sup> Pelias, who brutally usurped Jason's kingdom (*Pythian Odes* 4:112), and Ixion, who attacked Hera (*Pythian Odes* 2:28).

Outrage against females is classically called *hubris*. Another example is in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*, where the Danaids flee marriage with their hubristic suitors (30, 81, 102, 426, 528, 845, 884). Aeschylus' *Persians* focuses on the *hubris* of Xerxes, whose insolence brought about his doom (808, 821). The hubristic Creon in Sophocles' *Antigone* has the temerity to accuse Antigone of *hubris* (480-483). Sophocles' chorus in *Oedipus the King* proclaims that *hubris* breeds a tyrant when it provides an abundance for a man (873). The divine spirits (δαίμονες) do not love *hubris* (Sophocles, *Trachiniae* 280). Like Sophocles' Creon, Euripides' Pentheus, in his arrogance against Dionysos' godhead, accuses his adversaries of *hubris* (*Bacchae* 247, 779). The chorus of the same play recognizes Pentheus' blasphemy as *hubris* (375), as does Dionysos (516), who in turn commits it against Pentheus as his punishment (616), for he had been the object of Pentheus' *hubris* (1347). The Nurse in Euripides' *Hippolytos* tells Phaedra, "This is nothing other than *hubris*, to want to be better than the δαίμονες 'divinities' (474-475). Xerxes' uncle Artabanos correctly tells his nephew that his *hubris* will lead the Persians to destruction (Herodotus, *Histories* 7.16.2). Croesus tells Cyrus that the Persians are hubristic, and warns him of the dangers of that behavior (Herodotus, *Histories* 1.89.2). Demosthenes points out the *hubris* of his guardians' behavior, by depriving him of his inheritance. (27. 65). In

fact, in Athenian law it was possible to prosecute someone in court for *hubris*, as K.J. Dover notes

Anyone who struck, pushed/pulled, or restrained another person might put himself in danger of a prosecution for *hubris*. This prosecution was not a private lawsuit for damages, but an indictment for an offense against the community as a whole, and it was open to a jury to concur in a prosecutor's demand for the infliction of the death penalty.<sup>8</sup>

The notion of dangerous violence inherent in *hubris* was often seen as a result of abundant, excessive wealth or fullness (κόρος, ὀλβος, πλοῦτος)<sup>9</sup> that engenders a blind folly (ἄτη, ἀτασθαλίη) which in turn results in abusive behavior characteristic of *hubris*. Those who display such outrageous behavior often provoke righteous indignation in their fellow mortals, or receive punishment from the gods (νέμεσις, τίσις). The first section of this paper will address this almost formulaic use of crime and punishment in *Antiquities* 1-4.

Solon and others see the relationship between satiety and violence as a parent engendering a child, a hereditary relationship: "For κόρος gives birth to ὕβρις when much ὀλβος comes upon people in whom the mind is unstable" (Solon, in Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 12). The Theognidea renders the same notion thus: "Indeed, κόρος gives birth to ὕβρις, when wealth comes upon a base person whose mind is unstable" (153-154). Pindar, on the other hand, has *hubris* as the mother of κόρος (*Olympian Odes* 13:9-10).<sup>10</sup>

The other great Hellenistic Jewish writer, Philo, has thoroughly internalized this notion, and even quotes and adapts the Solonian equation numerous times, as we shall see below. It is curious however, that Josephus specifically ties *hubris* to *koros* in only one instance.



## MODERN INTERPRETATIONS

Modern scholars translate *hubris* in many ways. It is 'arrogance, wanton violence, insolence.'<sup>11</sup> It is 'inuria, contumelia, insultatio, fastus, superbia, insolentia.'<sup>12</sup> Richmond Lattimore summarizes the range of *hubris* and related words in Greek tragedy. In this genre alone, as he demonstrates, the range is large. Such words may signify:

... assault and battery, rape, foul play, or plain physical disaster without motivation; the activity of wild animal spirits, rapacity, and greed, sexual lust; in general, violence; violent or *criminal* behavior ...; bullying, the abuse of superior strength to humiliate the helpless living or outrage the helpless dead; or the mockery of the sorrowful; conversely, mutiny or rebelliousness in an inferior toward a superior; and so, rather rarely, ordinary insolence.<sup>13</sup>

More recent articulations of the Classical Greek ramifications of *hubris* include those of Douglas M. MacDowell,<sup>14</sup> N.R.E. Fisher,<sup>15</sup> Ann Michelini,<sup>16</sup> and K.J. Dover.<sup>17</sup> MacDowell discusses the range of meanings of the term in Greek literature, and observes that causes include "youthfulness, having plenty to eat and drink, and wealth." The results include "further eating and drinking, sexual activity, larking about, hitting and killing, taking other people's property and privileges, jeering at people, and disobeying authority both human and divine." As a definition he offers "having energy or power and misusing it self-indulgently."<sup>18</sup> He then offers five general observations:

1. *hubris* is always bad;
2. it is always voluntary;
3. sometimes it is not caused by one of the aforementioned causes;



4. *hubris* is not, as a rule a religious matter. It must be so only if someone treats a god with *hubris*, or, since gods punish all wrongdoing, and since this is a wrongdoing, a god will punish it;

5. *hubris* often involves a victim, and is more serious when it does so.<sup>[19](#)</sup>

Arguing partly from the definitions of Pseudo-Plato and Aristotle, N.R.E. Fisher stresses the importance of *hubris* in diminishing the honor (τιμή) of its victims: “one would expect to find implicit in almost all instances of *hubris* the notion of injured honour; and that is in fact what I believe one does find.”<sup>[20](#)</sup> Michelini reminds us that *hubris* is also found in the non-human world of plants, animals, and natural phenomena. Plants show *hubris* when they grow too many leaves because of a “superabundance of nurture” and consequently need pruning.<sup>[21](#)</sup> She shows that “the plant as a model of *hubris* provided a clear illustration of the paradox that enjoyment of a πλῆθος ἀγαθῶν can have bad effects, and that robust health can give way readily to aberrancy and even illness.”<sup>[22](#)</sup>

K.J. Dover’s definition is succinct and inclusive: *hubris* is a term applied to any kind of behavior in which one:

... treats other people just as one pleases, with an arrogant confidence that one will escape paying any penalty for violating their rights and disobeying any law or moral rule accepted by society, whether or not such a law or rule is regarded as resting ultimately on divine sanctions ... In a wider context, *hubris* is over-confident violation of universal or divine laws, and so characteristic of successful kings and conquerors.<sup>[23](#)</sup>

It is clear that *hubris* has a wide range of uses. Josephus had a deep well of associations from which to draw. Georg Bertram’s survey of the usage in Greek literature, the

Septuagint, Philo, Josephus, and the New Testament is a good brief introduction to the subject, with abundant bibliography.<sup>24</sup> He finds that Josephus shows “kinship with the hubris-concept of antiquity,”<sup>25</sup> and cites W. Weber, who has found that hubris is “the key to the author’s understanding of history.”<sup>26</sup> This paper will discuss Josephus’ use of *hubris* words under two main rubrics: 1) the notion of satiety that leads to crime and punishment, and 2) the associations between *hubris* and sexual/conjugal relations. We note that these categories are not mutually exclusive.

The Classical notion that an excess of good things leads to satiety (κόρος), which in turn makes one commit acts of insolence (ὕβρις) is evident in *Antiquities* 1–4, although only at Ant. 4:136 are the two words actually used together. Philo, however, took pains to show his readers that *kotos* gives birth to *hubris*, often quoting or paraphrasing Solon’s dictum (*Legum Allegoriarum* 2:29, 2:70; *De Posteritate Caini* 145; *De Agricultura* 32–34, 48; *De Abrahamo* 228; *De Vita Mosis* 2:164; *De Virtutibus* 162 (quotation); *In Flaccum* 91; implied in *De Specialibus Legibus* 3:186).

Nevertheless, Josephus goes to some length to supplement the Biblical narrative in order to stress this notion, which applies both to Hebrews and Gentiles. Josephus changes his Biblical material to add the *hubris* concept, which his audience would easily understand. The idea exists in the text of the Bible, but Josephus makes it intelligible and concrete for his readers, who are familiar with the concept of *hubris* in Greek literature.

### **SEX, MARRIAGE, AND HUBRIS**

A number of the examples of *hubris* in this paper deal with sex and conjugal matters. One reason for this association, I believe, is Josephus’ desire to mark the erotic element in his work.<sup>27</sup> The Hellenistic romance as a genre was coming into its own at the end of the first century, and interest in sexual

relations was probably high about the Greek-speaking audience to whom Josephus was pitching his work. As Martin Braun states: "subjects of erotic interest ... form the subject-matter par excellence of ancient novels and short stories. ..." <sup>28</sup> Another reason is that the use of *hubris* in sexual/conjugal matters was an already established tradition in Jewish circles, as is evidenced by Philo's frequent use of the term *hubris* in these contexts. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the classical Greek tradition already had provided a pattern that associated sex crimes with *hubris*. K.J. Dover writes about orators in Athenian trials:

When an offense contains a sexual ingredient, or when some aspect of the sexual life of a man prosecuted for a non-sexual offense can be exploited maliciously, the hubris-group of words can be applied by an adversary both generically and specifically, in order to create a profitable confusion in the jurors' minds. A man of strong sexual appetites, more shameless, importunate and headstrong in pursuit of satisfaction than society regarded as acceptable, was *hubristes* ... <sup>29</sup>

N.R.E. Fisher also discusses the description of sexual acts as *hubris* in Classical literature and concludes:

The commonest usage is probably of sexual acts committed against women, girls, or boys, when the point is that act brings shame and dishonour on the victim, and on the whole family and particularly on the *kyrios*. The act may be rape, seduction, forced marriage, or marriage between those of unequal status. The use of *hubris* indicates that the act has produced, and probably was intended to produce, dishonour or humiliation as well as, or instead of, sexual pleasure. <sup>30</sup>

The Septuagint does not use *hubris* words in the Torah to refer to illicit sex acts, or in actions related to

marriage. Josephus and Philo, on the other hand, often use it, where the LXX text uses other less “loaded” words. Josephus feels free to add it to other passages where the notions of sex and marriage are implicit or explicit.<sup>31</sup>

## **HUBRIS IN JOSEPHUS’ TORAH: THE EVIDENCE**

*Cain and His Seed: Marked by Hubris (Genesis 4:16)* Genesis 4:16 tells of the descendants of Cain, but includes nothing further of his wickedness or the character of his descendants. Josephus augments the Biblical account with an excursus on the nature of Cain’s wickedness, as well as that of his progeny, showing that *hubris* marks both the beginning and end of this section (*Ant.* 1:60–66). Josephus follows the Septuagint account in telling that Cain was marked with a σαμείον ‘sign’, departed with his wife, and settled in Nais (Nod; *Ant.* 1:59–60). There follows the extra-Biblical tale of his depravity:

His punishment, however, far from being taken as a warning, only served to increase his vice (κακίας). He indulged in every bodily pleasure (ἡδονήν), even if it entailed outraging his companions (καὶ μεθ’ ὕβρεως τῶν συνόντων): he increased his substance with wealth (πληῖθει χρημάτων) amassed by rapine and violence; he incited to luxury and pillage (ἡδονήν καὶ ληιστείαν) all whom he met, and became their instructor in wicked practices (πονηρῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων). He put an end to that simplicity in which men lived before by the invention of weights and measures: the guileless and generous existence which they had enjoyed in ignorance of these things he converted into a life of craftiness.

(*Ant.* 1:60–61, Thackeray) We note that here, as elsewhere in his account, *hubris* and its attendant evils are juxtaposed

with wealth. This correspondence matches the classical scheme of the evils attendant on the rise of civilization and the decline of human morality.<sup>32</sup>

After a summary of the activities of Cain's descendants (*Ant.* 1: 62–65), Josephus concludes with a summary of their depravity, which is again characterized by *hubris* and a desire for gain (πλεονεξία):

... the descendants of Cain went to the depths of depravity, and, inheriting and imitating one another's vices, each ended worse than the last. They rushed incontinently into battle and plunged into brigandage; or if anyone was too timid for slaughter, he would display other forms of mad recklessness by insolence and greed (ὕβριζων καὶ πλεονεκτῶν).

(*Ant.* 1:66, Thackeray) In his vilification of the generations of Cain, Josephus intertwines the themes of the evils of wealth and its attendant insolence. Philo, in *De Posteritate Cami*, discussing Cain's posterity, twice ties *koros* with *hubris* (98, 145), in one case specifically making *hubris* the daughter of both satiety (χόρος) and greediness (ἀπληστιά, 98). Perhaps here—as elsewhere—Josephus dips into the same well as Philo, or uses Philo himself in discussing this subject.<sup>33</sup>

In an addition to the Biblical narrative, Josephus mentions in the same section that one of the examples of Cain's wickedness was his indulgence in every bodily pleasure (ἡδονὴν μὲν πᾶσαν ἐκπορίζων αὐτοῦ τῷ σώματι, *Ant.* 60). Although the Biblical account does not specifically refer to the descendants' sexual behavior, he only implies it. Nothing prevents the reader from believing that these bodily pleasures include the sexual, and that the depravity of his descendants (*Ant.* 1:66) could well have been the same. In addition, we recall that in Josephus' account the insolent Sodomites (ὕβρισταί, *Ant.* 1:194) desire to commit sexual outrage (ὕβριν) on Lot's guests (*Ant.* 1:200). The Septuagint

account (Gen. 19) shows the Sodomites as specifically desiring to have intercourse with the guests (ἵνα συγγενώμεθα αὐτοῖς, Gen. 19:5). Josephus equates this illicit sex act with *hubris*. Philo does not comment on Gen. 19:5, perhaps because it did not suit his philosophical and/or apologetic purposes to do so.

*Noah and the Tower of Babel (Genesis 6-11)* Two of the clearest cases of human pride leading to divine retribution are the tales of the Flood (*Ant.* 1:72-103) and the Tower of Babel (*Ant.* 1:111,-113). Louis H. Feldman has commented on these presentations as Josephus' intentional representation of Biblical tales in terms familiar to his classically-educated audience.<sup>34</sup>

In the Noah episode, *hubris* characterizes the children born to angels and women (ὕβριστάς παῖδας, *Ant.* 1:73), since it was insolence for the divine and mortal to presume to mate. Josephus actually defines their *hubris*: they are too confident in their own powers (διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ δυνάμει πεποίθησιν, *Ant.* 1:73). The Greek-educated audience is not disappointed in its expectations of punishment, as God in fact tells Noah (in a speech composed by Josephus) that He had punished mankind because, when He had presented mortals with εὐσεβεία and ἀρετή, he was met with the *hubris* of the wicked (ἐξύβριζον, *Ant.* 1:100).

In the Tower of Babel pericope, the *hubris* against God characterizes the attempt to build the tower (*Ant.* 1:113). In an extra-Biblical detail, Nebrodes (Nimrod) urges the people on: "Nebrodes incited them to both ὕβρις and contempt of God" (*Ant.* 1:113). Josephus then gives a good definition of *hubris* similar to the one he gave in 1:73:

He persuaded them to attribute their prosperity (εὐδαιμονεῖν) not to God but to their own valor (τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετήν) ... He threatened to have his revenge on God if He wished to inundate the earth again; for he

would build a tower higher than the water could reach and avenge the destruction of their forefathers.

(*Ant.* 1. 113-114, Thackeray)<sup>35</sup>

The Bible has no such connection with the flood and the tower as a place of safe refuge. By connecting the two stories, Josephus takes the opportunity to tie together the *hubris* displayed by humans in both cases, and to show how God punishes such presumption. It is interesting that the late antique table of contents for books 1-4 includes the notation that one section of book 1 (4) is concerned with the *hubris* against God inspiring the Lower of Babel episode. The centrality of *hubris* here was obviously clear to the compiler of the table of contents.

The people building the tower are so intoxicated by their insolence that they were, in God's view, out of their minds (μεμηνότας *Ant.* 1:116), and, since the Flood's destruction had not taught them any permanent lesson, God decided to divide and scatter mankind by the introduction of many languages (*Ant.* 1:1 17-120). Thus, Josephus ties two tales in Genesis together thematically by using the concept of *hubris*. In addition, he emphasizes the theme of human pride and its punishment by God in ways that the Bible does not.

Philo's treatment of the Tower of Babel story also speaks of the crimes of these early peoples as *hulms* (*De Confusione Linguarum* 47, 117). In one passage he twins the crime with βία, and includes in his list violence with murder, seductions, adultery, lust and pleasure (ἡδονή), desperation, foolhardiness, injustice, knavery, theft, robbery, perjury, falsehood, impiety, lawbreaking (117; *hubris* often appears in lists of crimes in Philo).<sup>36</sup> Rather than tie the Tower of Babel to the Flood, Philo ties it to the offspring of Cain: "But all these are descended from the depravity which is ever dying and never dead, whose name is Cain" (122, Colson).



Philo and Josephus both characterize the arrogance that contributed to construction of the Tower of Babel as *hubris*, and thus Josephus was probably not innovative in his use of the term in this context.

The angels who have intercourse with the antediluvian “daughters of men” (Gen. 6:1) engender “hubristic children” (*Ant.* 1:73). Thus, Josephus associates improper sex acts with their resulting *hubris*. Philo does not mention the offspring at all, and thus Josephus adds the concept independently. Philo is concerned (*De Gigantibus* 5) with the ἀδικία ‘injustice’ associated with the females, as opposed to Noah’s off-spring—males—who follow τέλειον καὶ ὀρθὸν λόγον καὶ ἄρρενα ὄντως μετιών (5, “the perfect and truly masculine reason,” Colson). Thus, Philo’s moralistic program is not the same as Josephus’ here. Josephus is more concerned with the *hubris* resulting from improper sexual relations.

*Egyptian Abundance.. and Pharaoh’s Hubris (Genesis 12)*  
Abram left a (amine in Canaan to live in Egypt (Genesis 12:10). The Biblical account says nothing about the state of affairs in Egypt, simply implying that there was 110 dearth by the Nile. Josephus begins his account (*Ant.* 1:161) by stressing the prosperity (εὐδαιμονεῖν) and abundance (ἁφθονία) of their land. Why this addition? I suggest that Josephus adds this detail to the Biblical story because it is congenial to the pattern he is establishing of “Wealth Leads to *Hubris*, which Leads to Punishment.” Sarai, pretending to be Abram’s sister, arouses Pharaoh’s passions, and God sends disease (νόσος) and civil strife (στάσις) to punish the king’s lust (Gen. 12:11-17; Jos. *Ant.* 1.162-163). In the Biblical account, the king says that he took Sarai to wife (Gen. 12:19), but discovering that she was Abram’s sister, he urges husband and wife to leave his land.

Josephus then recounts Pharaoh’s priests’ revelation that the plague had come about because the king had wanted to

commit *hubris* (ἠθέλησεν ὑβρίσαι) against another man's wife (*Ant.* 1.164). Pharaoh again mentions *hubris* in his explanation to Abram: he had not known that Sarai was his wife, and had not intended to outrage her (ἐνυβρίσαι). He then gives Abram abundant riches (πολλοῖς χρήμασι) and sends him away. (*Ant.* 1:165).

Josephus adds to the account of Genesis an emphasis on the wealth of Egypt, stressing it at the beginning and end of the story. The plague was a result of Pharaoh's *hubris*, despite his explicit denial.<sup>[37](#)</sup>

Philo also calls the attempted injustice *hubris* (*De Abrahamo* 98), but only indirectly, by saying that Sarai was saved by God from Pharaoh's outrage: she was ἀνύβριστον 'not dishonored', thus also stressing the sexual element involved in the potentially illicit sexual relation, which is only implied in the Biblical story. Both authors choose to make explicit the sexual misconduct in a matrix of *hubris*.

*Wealth, Sodomites, and Hubris (Genesis 14)* Although the Torah itself does not mention the great wealth of the Sodomites, their prosperity was a Biblical tradition (Ezekiel 16:48–52). Genesis 14:23 indirectly implies this status: Abram does not want the King of Sodom to say that he had made him rich. Aside from this allusion, the text is silent. Philo (*De Abrahamo* 228) makes explicit what Genesis implies, drawing on later tradition: he speaks of Sodom as exceedingly prosperous (πάνυ γὰρ οὔσης εὐδαίμονος), endowed with agricultural resources and good soil. In Philo's account *koros* leads—explicitly—to *hubris*:

But when they had been surfeited with good things (ἐχορέσθησαν ἀγαθῶν), and as so often happens satiety had begotten insolence (κόρος ὑβριν ἐγέννησε), they grew ambitious beyond their powers and first shook off the yoke and then, like bad slaves, attacked their masters, trusting to sedition (στάσις) or violence.

*De Abrahamo* 228 (Colson) Josephus chooses to stress the Sodomites' wealth and outrageousness, and only implies *koros* without specifically using the term. He concentrates on the punishment for the *hubris* which their wealth made inevitable.

Genesis 14 describes the war of the four against the five. When Josephus tells the same story, he prefaces it with a non-Biblical detail: the Sodomites were very wealthy and had a great number of young men (ἦνθαι τά πράγματα εἰς τε πλοῦτον αὐτῶν ἐπιδεδωκότων καί νεότητα πολλήν *Ant.* 1:171). Josephus might have added the "surfeit" motif to help explain the coming punishment.

Continuing the Sodomite saga, Josephus again emphasizes the wealth of the Sodomites, and adds that they were hubristic and impious:

Now about this time the Sodomites, overweeningly proud of their numbers (πλήθει) and the extent of their wealth (μεγέθει χρημάτων), showed themselves insolent (ὑβρισταί) to men and impious (ἄσεβεῖς) to the Divinity. *Ant.* 1:194 (Thackeray) Josephus then says that they were xenophobic as well and that God had decided to punish them for their arrogance (τιμωρήσασθαι τῆς ὑπερηφανίσης, *Ant.* 1:195). The excessive amount of good things had caused them to commit *hubris*, which would lead to punishment.

Josephus illustrates the Sodomite contempt of foreigners by describing an act of *hubris*: when the angels come to Lot's home, the Sodomites attempt to use force and insolence (βίαν καὶ ὕβριν) against them (*Ant.* 1:200), but are prevented by God, who then destroys them along with their city.

By stressing the wealth and *hubris* of the inhabitants of Sodom, Josephus justifies their destruction. Their wealth led to their overweening pride and insolence, for which they

were destroyed: *koros* leads to *hubris*, which is inevitably punished.

*Pregnant Hubris: Hagar (Genesis 16)* In Genesis 16, Hagar conceives by Abram and dishonors Sarai, who still remains childless (LXX: ἡτιμάσθη “[Sarai] was dishonored” Gen. 16.4; ἡτιμάσθη Gen. 16:5). As a result, Abram allows Sarai to banish Hagar. Instead of saying that Hagar was ‘in belly’ (ἐν γάστρῳ ἔχει), as the Septuagint describes the pregnancy (Gen. 16:4, 5), Josephus uses the synonymous expression ‘becoming pregnant’ (γενομένη ἔγκυμον *Ant.* 1.188). Instead of saying that Hagar dishonored Sarai, he says that she dared to treat her mistress with *hubris*, acting like a queen over her (ἐξυβρίζειν εἰς τὴν Σάρραν ἐτόλμησε βασιλίζουσα *Ant.* 1:188). The changes relate to Josephus’ program of making his Biblical material conform to his Hellenic paradigm of *hubris*. In fact, the Septuagint text seems to conform almost exactly to the definition given in the Pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* 415e12, discussed above. Josephus gives it its “proper” classical name.<sup>38</sup>

The word “pregnant” in Greek poetry may indicate a fullness that can lead to *hubris*. Literally, ἔγκυμον means ‘Tilled with a swelling’. The notion of being full was a dangerous one, so it was easy for Theognis to say: “This city is pregnant (κύει) Kyrnos, and I am afraid that it will bear a man who will have to tame our wicked *hubris*” (*Theognidea* 39–40).<sup>39</sup>

By choosing the word ἔγκυμον, Josephus calls to mind the fullness that is often an attendant of *hubris*, and he in fact says that pregnant Hagar does commit *hubris*, acting as though she is above her station and destined to be queen over Sarai (βασιλίζουσα). Her overweening arrogance is immediately punished by her banishment. Although Josephus does not change the details of the Hagar story, he shades it with a Hellenic coloring that shows that *koros* leads to *hubris*, which must find punishment. In addition, the

link between sexual relations and *hubris* finds more strength by this juxtaposition.

*Abimelech and Sarah (Genesis 20)* In the story of Abimelech and Sarah, the Septuagint says that the king had not gone near her (οὐχ ἤψατο αὐτῆς Gen. 20. 4). Josephus uses the word *hubris* twice in this connection: he states that God told Abimelech in the dream not to commit the outrage against the woman (μηδέν ὑβρίζειν *Ant.* 1:208); and when Sarah is returned to Abraham, Josephus adds that she had not been affected by the king's wanton acts (ἀνύβριστον *Ant.* 1:208).

Although Philo does not discuss Abimelech's crime, he provides an interesting parallel to the story. Philo uses the word ἀνύβριστον in the parallel story of Sarah and Pharaoh (see *Ant.* 1:164–5), where Abraham pretended that his wife was his sister. Philo says (*De Abrahamo* 98) that Pharaoh returns Sarah to Abraham, so their marriage (γάμον) would be untouched by *hubris* (ἀνύβριστον). By using the same word, Josephus attests to a tradition of using the word *hubris* in stories about the sanctity of marriage.

*Isaac, Moses: Hubris and Marriage Engagement (Gen. 24; Ex. 2)*

Josephus twice adds the word *hubris* in scenes dealing with marriage engagements. First, when seeking a wife for Isaac (Gen. 24), Abraham's servant urges Rebecca's family not to commit outrage by rejecting the marriage offer (μὴ ὑβρίσητε *Ant.* 1:254). This would give added status to Isaac. To accept his offer is to reject *hubris*. Philo gives no account of the speech.

Moses, while a bachelor, overcomes the *hubris* of some wicked shepherds, and is given a daughter of Jethro in marriage (γάμον) as a reward (Exod. 2:16, 21; *Ant.* 2:261–263). Philo (*De Mutatione Nominum* 111–113) allegorizes the struggle between the daughter of the priest of Midian and the wicked shepherds. The shepherds are the

‘comrades of envy and malice, (φθόνου καί βασκανίας 112), and Moses is the virtue-loving mind (πρόπος φιλάρετος 113) who saves them from their persecutors, the mind’s enemies (διανοίας ἐχθρῶν 114). Both Philo and Josephus vilify the shepherds more than does the sparse Biblical account, but only Josephus attaches *hubris* to the shepherds, perhaps again because of the connection he is establishing between *hubris* and the sexes. In addition, in the story of Moses and the shepherds, Josephus seems particularly concerned with adding the notion of *hubris* to the process of marriage-making. This use of the term, besides reinforcing the notion of protecting women against outrage, serves to enhance the status of this Israelite hero: he is, like a Greek hero, a conqueror of others’ *hubris*.

#### *Joseph and Potiphar’s Wife (Gen. 39)*

In the tale of Joseph and Potiphar’s wife (Gen. 39), Josephus terms *hubris* the outrageous proposal of sex between slave and mistress (*Ant.* 2:42, 54, 56), where the Septuagint text uses the phrase ‘wicked word’, and the verbs ἀμαρτάνω ‘do wrong’ and ἐμπαίζω ‘mock, trick, deceive’ (Gen. 39:14, 17).

This story is the longest section in *Antiquities* dealing with the implications of *hubris* relating to illicit sexual connections. Following the Biblical account, Josephus shows how Joseph was given many good things by Pentephres (Potiphar), and in abundance—for a slave: honor, liberal education, a better life than slaves usually get, and control of the household (*Ant.* 2:39–40). In the Greek view, a normal man, having such an abundance of good things, might be expected to fall prey to temptation and become insolent. Josephus seems to make the point that Joseph is an exception. Although Joseph enjoyed a good life, he did not desert his ἀρετή ‘virtue’, but showed how his noble spirit (φρόνημα) was strong. He was not prone to the excess

which normally overcomes those who are prosperous (εὐπραγίας *Ant.* 2:40).

Thus Josephus sets the scene for Joseph to tell Pentephres' wife that it would not be pious (δσιον) for someone in such a position of prosperity (τοσαύτης ἡξιωκότος τιμῆς) to harm his master. Rather, it is iniquity (ἀδικία) and outrage (ὕβρις) (*Ant.* 2:42). In this way Josephus plays on the expectation of his Greek readers: in most cases, *koros* leads to *hubris*; in this case, however, it does not. Thus, Joseph's character becomes more positive. His excellence protects him from temptation.

When his passionate mistress again importunes Joseph, she mentions how his compliance will bring him an increase in his present "good things" (τῶν παρόντων ἀγαθῶν ὀνησιν *Ant.* 2:48). She expects his abundance of good fortune to lead him to sin. When she is disappointed again, she interprets Joseph's act as *hubris*: only someone who wilfully dishonors and humiliates someone else, she thinks, would act as he has (*Ant.* 2:54).

When Potiphar returns, his wife accuses Joseph of trying to outrage (ὕβρισαι) their marriage (γάμον *Ant.* 2:56). She repeats the *koros-hubris* formula in her lie: Joseph received benefits from his master (ὧν ἐκ τῆς σῆς χρηστότητος ἔτυχεν), but was ungrateful (ἀχάριστος *Ant.* 2:56), and consequently sought to commit *hubris* against Pentephres' marriage (ἐπεβούλευσεν ὕβρισαι γάμον τόν σόν *Ant.* 2:56; note again the theme of ingratitude coupled with *hubris*). She attributes his supposed outrage to his prosperity (*Ant.* 2:57: τό παρ' ἀξίαν αὐτόν καί παρ' ἐλπίδας εἰς τιμὴν παρελθεῖν), and says that his position of power brought him to outrage his master's wife (*Ant.* 2:57: τὴν τῆς κτήσεως τῆς σῆς πίστιν καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν).

Joseph, sent to jail by Potiphar, explains his situation to his fellow prisoners in the following terms:



For it was no crime that brought me into these bonds: nay, it was for virtue's sake and for sobriety (ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ σωφροσύνης) that I was condemned to undergo a malefactor's fate, and because even the lure of my own pleasure (ἡδονῆς) would not induce me to dishonour (ὕβρισαι) him who has thus treated me.

*Ant.* 2:68–69 (Thackeray) Joseph here acknowledges his debt to his master, and reinforces the idea that it was his ἀρετή that was outstanding, and that he could not bring himself to commit *hubris* against the man who put him in a position of power, even for the sake of his own pleasure. In a later extra-Biblical eulogy of Joseph, Josephus again emphasizes his virtue, saying that when he ruled in Egypt, Joseph did not take advantage of his wealthy position (τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταμιευόμενος *Ant.* 2:198). The message is clear: others may take advantage of the abundance of good things they encounter, but Joseph was immune from the temptations that lead to *hubris*<sup>40</sup>

*Moses and the Hubris of the Egyptians (Exodus)* In *Antiquities* 1–4, Josephus four times mentions Egyptian *hubris* against the Hebrews (*Ant.* 2:202, 2:268, 4:3, 4:242). The Egyptians, a race devoted to their own pleasure, treat the Hebrews with *hubris* and are punished with plagues and destruction. Again, there is precedent for the characterization in Philo.

When Josephus begins his account of the book of Exodus (*Ant.* 2:201), he adds the extra-Biblical details that the Egyptians were a race addicted to voluptuous pleasures (τρυφεροῖς) with no desire to work; they were slaves to pleasure (ἡδονή) and love of profit (χέρδος); they showed envy (φθόνος) of the Hebrews' prosperity (εὐδαιμονία), which was due to Jewish ἀρετή. This is why the Egyptians treated the Israelites so hubristically (δεινῶς ἐνύβριζον) and made them into slaves (*Ant.* 2:201–202).

The Egyptians fit the pattern of Cain (*Ant.* 1:60-66) or of the promiscuous girl who deserves stoning (*Ant.* 4:251): addicted to pleasure, and preoccupied with profit, they commit *hubris* and need punishment. We have seen that the Hebrew hero Joseph acts in a contrary way, and is a perfect opposite model in Josephus: disdaining ἡδονή, and not taking advantage of the wealth in his care, he refuses to commit an outrageous act against an Egyptian family.

The Burning Bush gives Moses his charge: he is to free the Hebrews from the *hubris* of the Egyptians (*Ant.* 2:268). In fact, Josephus portrays Moses as an opponent of *hubris*: the Egyptians treat the Hebrews hubristically (*Ant.* 2. 202); Moses wins a bride by opposing the *hubris* of the shepherds by the well in the land of Midian (*Ant.* 2:261), and receives his charge from the Burning Bush to return to Egypt as a general and leader of the Hebrew host to abolish the *hubris* practiced there against his people (*Ant.* 2:268). Under Moses' leadership, the Hebrews cross the Red Sea; the Egyptian army perishes in it amidst rain, thunderbolts, and lightning; it was not God's will that these people should escape from their crimes (*Ant.* 2:340). Their destruction (ἀπολείαι *Ant.* 2:345) is followed by Moses' encomium to God (*Ant.* 2:346).<sup>41</sup>

Josephus shows how the Egyptians, preoccupied with their pleasures and jealous that anyone else should prosper in their land, treated their Hebrew guests with *hubris* and paid the price for their presumption. The Septuagint does not characterize the Hebrews' bondage as the *hubris* of the Egyptians, but Philo puts in God's mouth the following:

“For suffering, as they do, prolonged ill-treatment, and subjected to intolerable outrages (ὀβρεῖς ὑπομενόντων), with no relief or pity for their miseries from men, I have taken compassion on them Myself.”

*De Vita Mosis* 1:72 (Colson) It is possible that both Joseph and Philo draw on a tradition that portrayed the Hebrews as victims of Egyptian *hubris*.

*Hubris From Heaven* (Exodus 25) The tabernacle can be threatened by the *hubris* of the rains (*Ant.* 3:133). Josephus adds the extra-Biblical detail that the coverings for the Tabernacle are to shield it from the heat and rain for the protection of the woven work within (*Ant.* 3:132: σκέπη καὶ βοήθεια ταῖς ὑφανταῖς ἐν τε τοῖς καύμασι καὶ ὁπότε ὑετὸς εἴη γεγεννημέναι), and for the protection of the gateway from heat and the *hubris* of the rains (*Ant.* 3:133: τό τε καῦμα καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀμβρῶν ὑβριν ἀπομαχόμεναι). Neither the Hebrew nor the Septuagint contains this detail.

Josephus here draws on the Greek notion of nature committing *hubris*, a concept which would be familiar to Greeks, who knew that besides animals and plants, even natural forces could act in an excessive and destructive manner, sometimes requiring human correction. For instance, Xenophon calls an unmanageable horse ὑβρισχῆς (*Cyropaideia* 7. 5. 62); in Herodotus a horse steps into a river because of its *hubris* (*Histories* 1. 189. 1). The snake in Heracles' cradle possesses *hubris* (Pindar, *Nemean Odes* 1. 50); bulls falling victims to bacchant women are ὑβρισταί (Euripides, *Bacchae* 743); Centaurs possessed *hubris* (Theognis 541–542; Sophocles, *Trachiniai* 1096; Euripides, *Heracles* 181); wild animals in general did also (Archilochos 177 West); there was a river *Hubristes* in the Underworld (Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 717);<sup>42</sup> Typhaon, the monstrous personification of powerful and frightening natural phenomena, is ὑβριστής (Hesiod, *Theogony* 307).<sup>43</sup>

The notion that nature (in Jewish eyes, the creation of God) can commit *hubris* would presumably have been foreign to Jewish readers. The notion of “natural *hubris*” in Josephus, therefore, must come from the classical world.

*Homosexuality* (Leviticus 20) Whereas the Septuagint calls homosexual intercourse βδέλυγμα 'abomination' (Lev. 20:13), Josephus groups that crime with bestiality and sex with a menstruating woman, and calls them all *hubris* (*Ant.* 3:275). This grouping is not original with Josephus, as we note by reading Philo, *De Specialibus Legibus* 3. 43, where satiety leads to sexual desire for animals (but Philo does not include menstruating women):

Even worse than this is the conduct of some who have emulated the lusts of the Sybarites and those of others even more lascivious than they. These persons begin with making themselves experts in dainty feeding (ὀψοφαγίαις), winebibbing (οἶνοφλυγίαις) and the other pleasures (ἡδοναῖς) of the belly and the parts below it. Then sated with these (χορεσθέντες) they reach such a pitch of wantonness (ἐξύβρισαν), the offspring of satiety (ὑβριν γάρ κόρος γεννᾷν πέφυκεν),<sup>44</sup> that losing their senses they conceive a frantic passion, no longer for human beings male *or* female, but even for brute beasts. So according to the story did Pasiphae the wife of king Minos long ago in Crete ...

*De Specialibus Legibus* 3. 43 (Colson) *Korah, Wealth, and Hubris* (Numbers 14) Num. 14 in the Septuagint contains various words for the crimes of the Israelites that were to lead to their defeat against the Amelekites and Canaanites, but does not use *hubris* to describe their presumption. In the Septuagint, the Israelites provoke and irritate God (παροξύνω Num. 14: 11,23); they commit sin and iniquity (ἁμαρτάνω, ἁμαρτία Num. 14:19, 34, 40); they match themselves with God (πειράω) Num. 14:22); they make complaints and mutter against Him (γογγύζω Num. 14:27); and they are wanton (πορνεία Num. 14:33). Still, the LXX does not describe their actions as *hubris*.

In Josephus' account, however, when the people want to attack the Canaanites despite God's command, Moses tells them that such behavior is *hubris* (*Ant.* 3:311) and that God will exact as punishment (τιμωρία) for their wickedness (ἁμαρτημάτων) forty years of desert wanderings. Josephus has picked up the ἁμαρτία 'sin' from the LXX, and tied it to *hubris*. In an extra-Biblical aside, God reminds Moses of the benefits the people had gotten from him (εὐεργεσίμων *Ant.* 3:312), and how ungrateful (ἀχάριστοι 3:312) they were. Their wanderings would be the penalty for their transgression (παρανομίας *Ant.* 3:314). Thus, the people had been given an abundance of good things, but they rebelled against the divine authority, and would consequently be punished. Josephus molds his Biblical material into a Greek matrix, with *hubris* at its center.<sup>45</sup>

When the premature Israelite attack is repulsed by the Canaanites, and the great rebellion (στάσις) against Moses and God begins (*Ant.* 4:11), Josephus reiterates the message that the rebellion was a matter of *hubris* against His commandments (ἐξυβρισάντων καὶ τὰς ἐντολάς *Ant.* 4:13). This is a hint that those responsible for the outrage will meet with punishment.

Ironically, the leader of the rebellion, Korah—a clever speaker—accuses Moses of committing *hubris* against his own people, in a speech composed by Josephus. He accuses Moses of seeking his own glory (δόξα *Ant.* 4:15), illegally appointing Aaron High Priest, showing favoritism, and outraging the people in a clandestine manner (τό λεληθότως ἐξυβρίζειν *Ant.* 4:16) by giving out honors in a despotic fashion. Josephus says that Korah himself was covetous of more glory (τιμή *Ant.* 4:20). By supporting the people's *hubris*, Korah dies with the guilty (*Ant.* 4:56).

Josephus introduces Korah as of high birth and of great wealth (καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ διαφέρων *Ant.* 4:14), affected by jealousy of Moses' position (φθόνος *Ant.* 4:14). Korah

emphasizes his own great wealth in his speech to the people (πλούτῳ *Ant.* 4:19). Moses mentions his wealth in his response (ἐκ πλούτου *Ant.* 4:25), and then urges Korah “do not make yourself greater than God” (τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττονα *Ant.* 4:33), a phrase that is reminiscent of the definition of *hubris* which Phaedra’s nurse gives in Euripides’ *Hippolytos*: ὕβρις τὰδ’ ἐστὶ, κρείσσω δαιμόνων εἶναι θέλειν (Euripides, *Hippolytos* 474) “This is *hubris*: to want to be greater than the gods.”<sup>46</sup>

Korah then, a wealthy man, supports the *hubris* of the Israelites against their divinity and shares their punishment. Even his name in Greek, Κορῆς, is reminiscent of his role as one who has too much prosperity (κόρος). Both LXX and Josephus choose an initial omicron for his name, but the Hebrew Korah has a long *ō*.

This Josephan scene bears some resemblance to Philo’s *De Specialibus Legibus* 2:18, where discussion centers on the man who lives in luxury and who will do anything to keep and increase his wealth and pleasure. He charges with hubristic behavior anyone who opposes him, usually an elder. The description sounds like a characterization of Korah:

But there are others, boastful persons (κομπασταί), of the sort that is puffed up by arrogance (ὕπ’ ἀλαζονείας φουσμένων), who in their craving for high position (λιμοδοξοῦντες) determine to have nothing to do in any way with the frugal, the truly profitable mode of living. Indeed, if any rebuke them in order to rein in the unruliness of their desires, they regard the admonition as an insult (τὴν νοουθεσίαν ὕβριν εἶναι νομίζουσι), and as they press forward to a career of luxury (ἀβροδίαιτον) disregard their correctors and hold the admirable and also highly valuable instructions of wisdom (σωφρονιστῶν) a matter for laughter and mockery (γέλωτα καὶ χλεύην). And if they happen to



have some abundance of resources and means of living on a lavish scale (περιουσία καὶ ἀφθονία τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον), they employ oaths to set the seal on their use and enjoyment of the wealth which enables them to spend so freely. ...

*De Specialibus Legibus* 2:18-19 (Colson) Philo then gives an example: a rich and dissipated man encounters an elder who reprimands him. The younger man resents the reproof and counters the challenge by an oath not to change his ways, relying on his wealth:.. but this is evidently not so much an exhibition of wealth (πλούτου) as of arrogance and intemperance (ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἀκρασίας)."

Philo's example resembles Josephus' presentation of Korah: the intemperate rich man who accuses his older corrector (Moses) of *hubris* in order to further his own special interests. Josephus puts this character into the *koros-hulms* pattern.

*The Newlyweds: Koros and Hubris* (Numbers 25) Josephus describes as *hubris* the sexual relations of the Israelite youths with the maids of Midian (Num. 25; *Ant.* 4:129-155; *hubris* 4:152). Balaam has advised that the Midianites enthrall the Israelites with the charms of their young women. Josephus has added substantially to the story of the Midianite maidens in Num. 25, including two speeches by the women (*Ant.* 4:134-136; 4:137-138), a speech of Moses (*Ant.* 4:142-144), and a speech by Zambrias (*Ant.* 4:145-149).<sup>47</sup>

As bride-price, the maids convince the youths to abandon the monotheism of their ancestors and to worship the gods of Midian. The idea of *koros* then follows, as the youths fill themselves with the foreign food (ξενικοῖς βρώμασιν ἔχαιρον *Ant.* 4:139) and, having tasted (γευσάμενον) the foreign customs, insatiably take their fill (ἀπλήστως



ἐνεφορεῖτο *Ant.* 4:140). The vocabulary of eating and filling up describes the satiety that precedes *hubris*.

When Moses addresses himself to the problem, he reiterates this theme. He reminds the youths that they “are in the midst of good things” (νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὄντας *Ant.* 4:44), and warns them that in such a situation it is dangerous to act as if they had drunk too much (παροινεῖν *Ant.* 4:144), and lose their gains (τά κτηθέντα *Ant.* 4:144) because of their wealth (εὐπορία *Ant.* 4:144). Josephus’ Moses stresses the theme that “too much prosperity leads to disaster.” After Zambrias’ insolent speech (*Ant.* 4:145–149), Phinees (Phinehas), the son of the high priest, takes action “before his [Zambrias’] *hubris* grew stronger” (*Ant.* 4:152). Phinees kills the first couple, and the other guilty Israelites are slaughtered by their outraged companions and the plague sent from God (*Ant.* 4:154–155). Again Josephus enters Hebrew variables into the Greek equation: young men, endowed with an abundance of good things, cannot control themselves, commit *hubris*, and find terrible punishment for their insolence.

Philo uses the same tradition that termed their act *hubris*, and couples it with an abhorrence of ἡδονή:

It was in abhorrence of pleasure that there uprose the priest and minister of Him Who alone is Beautiful, Phinehas the controller of the inlets and outlets of the body, who takes care that none of them act amiss and break out in insolence (ἐξυβυρίζειν), his very name meaning ‘Mouth-muzzle’. Seizing his spear, ... he thrust through and destroyed by reason the creature that hates virtue and loves pleasure (φιλήδονον), and the parts out of which brew those base counterfeits, softness and voluptuousness.

*De Postentate Caini* 182 (Colson) Within this story is the only place in *Antiquities* 1–4 where *koros* is tied specifically to *hubris*. The Midianite women tell their potential husbands

that they must marry them, and not just fulfill their sexual desires: “For we are afraid that if you take your fill (χόρον λαβόντες) of our company, you will then treat us with *hubris* (ὕβριση) and send us dishonored (ἄτίμους) back to our parents” (*Ant.* 4:136). Deprivation of τιμή might indicate Josephus’ use of the Pseudo-Platonic definition of *hubris*. The classical and commonplace formula of *koros* leading to *hubris* is here placed in the mouths of the gentile women. Only marriage (γαμεταί *Ant.* 4:135), they say, will provide insurance against what is acknowledged as a universal law of nature. Both Philo and Josephus couple *hubris* with improper sexual relations in retelling this account.

*Moses’ Warning About Wealth and Hubris (Deut. 4)* We note the collocation of *hubris* and wealth elsewhere in *Antiquities* 1–4. When Moses gives the command to Joshua and Eleazar, he reminds the Israelites that they have up until then been so rebellious that they considered their freedom of speech (παρρησίαν) to consist in treating their benefactors with *hubris* (τούς εὐεργέτας ὑβρίζειν *Ant.* 4:187). He tells them that this behavior is unacceptable. Continuing, he warns them not to commit *hubris* on account of the wealth which they will find in the land of Canaan:

“I say this with no intent to reproach you ... but rather that ye may learn moderation for the future ... and to prevent you from breaking out into anv violence against those set over you, by reason of that wealth which will come to you in abundance (ἐξυβρίσαι διά πλοῦτον, ὃς ὑμῖν πλούς) when ye have crossed the Jordan and conquered Canaan (διαβᾶσι τὸν Ἰόρδανον καὶ τὴν Χαναναίαν κτησαμένοις).”

*Ant.* 4:189 (Thackeray) Josephus reinforces the relationship between *hubris* and wealth by the compact phrase ἐξυβρίσαι διά πλοῦτον; the excessive nature of the wealth by πολύς; and the accumulation of possessions by the word

κτησαμένοις, better translated taken possession of. Continuing, Moses warns his people that if they succumb to their baser instincts, God will punish them: they will lose their land, be defeated, dispersed, and enslaved. This will be the consequence of their *hubris* (*Ant.* 4:190–191). The pattern of excess-crime-punishment prevails, and it is *hubris* which characterizes it.

Josephus' account is not composed from whole cloth, but his introduction of the term *hubris* is an innovation. The notion that wealth can lead to insolence is present in the Biblical account in Deuteronomy. The wealth of Canaan is mentioned (Deut. 3:25; 6:1; 6:10), and that it is a potential cause of Hebrew insolence is hinted at in Deut. 8:12: "When you eat your fill there (LXX ἐμπλησθεῖς), be careful not to forget the Lord ...", and at Deut. 8:12–14: "When you have plenty to eat (LXX ἐμπλησθεῖς) and live in fine houses of your own building, when your herds and flocks increase (LXX πληθυνέντων twice), and your silver and gold and all your possessions increase too (LXX πληθυνέντος), do not become proud (LXX ὑψωθῆις) and forget the Lord your God ..."

Josephus takes the notion of "fullness" leading to insolence, and summarizes it with the concept of *hubris*, thus making the message clear and immediate to his classically-educated readers. Here he might be using the same tradition which Philo attests (*De Virtutibus* 162) when, in a discussion of Deuteronomy 8:11–14 (quoted above), he tells of Moses' warning about arrogance, which can destroy all, for, says Philo, "satiety begets insolence (τίχτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν). We note that Philo specifically adds the word *koros* a discussion of the same passage, where Josephus only implies it.

### *Hubristic Children Must Die (Deut. 21)*

In reinforcing the commandment that children should obey their parents or face stoning, Josephus paraphrases

the Deuteronomic passage closely (Deut. 21:18), but instead of the Septuagint's child who is ἀπειθής καὶ ἐρεθιστής 'disobedient and rebellious', he says that such children scorn their parents (περιφροῦνσι), grant them no honor (τιμήν; possibly associated with the Pseudo-Platonic *Definitions*), and commit *hubris* against them (ἐξυβρίζοντες εἰς αὐτούς *Ant.* 4:260). These children, who give no gratitude for their upbringing,<sup>48</sup> and refuse to be rehabilitated, are to be stoned to death (*Ant.* 4:264). By adding *hubris* to the list of crimes, Josephus makes more explicable this law—which might seem cruel to his Hellenic readers (although the Roman Twelve Tables were no less severe)—by using a concept which makes the punishment appear more acceptable.

Again, the use of *hubris* in this context probably was not original with Josephus, for we find that Philo uses ὕβρις, ὑβρίζω, and ὑβριστής when discussing respect for parents in the context of the Biblical death penalty injunction (*De Specialibus Legibus* 245: ὕβριν, ὑβρισταί; 254: ὑβριζομένου). Thus, the tradition of presenting this sin as *hubris* was not a Josephan introduction.

*Hubris, Sex, and the Single Girl* (*Deut.* 22) Deut. 22:23–29 sets the punishment for illicit intercourse with a betrothed maiden: she and her lover are to be stoned to death if the liaison was voluntary. The Septuagint translates the Hebrew *ʿinnah* 'to humble, maltreat' with the verb ταπεινῶ 'to cast down, make humble' (Deut. 22:24, 29). Both are transitive verbs with the girl as their object. When Josephus recounts the laws about illicit relations with the betrothed and non-betrothed maids, he describes the act as *hubris* 'outrage' (*Ant.* 4:251, 252). This is in accord with the Classical Greek formulation of *hubris* including sexual offenses.<sup>49</sup>

Summarizing the law on voluntary intercourse with a betrothed girl (*Ant.* 4:251), Josephus adds to the Biblical

account a reason for the death penalty against the maiden: she was persuaded to commit the crime (ὕβρις) either for pleasure (ἡδονή) or for profit (κέρδος). We note two points: 1) the Bible and the LXX describe the crime with verbs that show the man's action against the girl, whereas Josephus uses the noun *hubris*, thus emphasizing *her* outrageous behavior; 2) Josephus adds that the maid had either pleasure or profit as a motive. By manipulating his material, Josephus is able to continue his theme of profit-*hubris*-punishment. The maiden, interested in her own pleasure or money, lent herself to a hubristic act, and is therefore punished with death.<sup>50</sup> In the following section (*Ant.* 4:252), Josephus repeats the law which states that a man who rapes an unbetrothed virgin will either marry her or pay damages to the girl's father for his *hubris*. Here the crime belongs to the man, who has acted for his own pleasure. His punishment is specified. Josephus' innovations are twofold: 1) he includes the non-Biblical rabbinic choice of the male criminal: to marry *or* pay a damage;<sup>51</sup> 2) he uses the word *hubris* to describe the act, instead of the verb ταπεινῶ of the Septuagint. His stress is on the process that results from insolence and leads to punishment. This process is contained in the word *hubris*.

Why does Josephus seem to innovate in using the word in the context of these laws dealing with sexual violation? It is likely that he is following a tradition which Philo shows in the following passages, where the same term is used in similar contexts. In *De Spedalibus Legibus*, Philo calls the rape of a woman *hubris* (3:39, 64, 78), and says that the man who unlawfully lies with a girl commits it (3:76). Men who mistreat their wives are hubristic (3:80); those who falsely accuse women of unchastity must suffer punishment that is the *hubris* of being whipped (3:82). In *De Virtutibus* 113, Philo speaks of the Deuteronomic injunction to treat female captives with respect (Deut. 21:10-13): they should suffer

οὐδέν ὑβριστικόν ‘nothing outrageous’. Elsewhere, in a non-legal context, Philo uses the verb ὑβρίζω to describe the rape of the maiden Virtue personified (*De Mutatione Nominum* 196). Josephus was not original in his application of *hubris* and related concepts to the Biblical laws about sexual violation. Philo and Josephus both follow the classical associations between sexual misconduct and *hubris*.

### *Prostitutes (Deut. 23:18)*

While the Torah prohibits money from a prostitute being used for holy purposes (Deut. 23:18), Josephus changes the LXX’s βδελύγμα ‘abomination’ to *hubris* (*Ant.* 4:206). Whereas the Septuagint says that priests should not marry prostitutes (Lev. 21:7), Josephus makes the prohibition against such a marriage apply to all, and says that God will not accept the marriage sacrifices of such a woman (τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ γάμῳ θυσίας) because of the *hubris* of her body (*Ant.* 4:245). Again, where Deuteronomic laws on unlawful sexual relations use the words πονηρός ‘wicked’ and ἁμαρτήμα ‘wrongdoing’ in the LXX (Deut. 22:24, 25), Josephus prefers *hubris* (*Ant.* 4:251, 252). In this choice he might be following the tradition attested in Philo (*De Specialibus Legibus* 1. 281): as a harlot’s hire cannot be brought into the temple, so the soul’s whoredom is *hubris*.<sup>52</sup>

*The Fruits of the Fields: Abundance, Greed, Hubris and Punishment (Deut. 25:25)* In Deuteronomy, the Law specifies that the fruits of the fields are to be shared with all who come upon them (Deut. 23:25), and that forgotten swathes in the fields should be left for aliens, orphans, and widows (Deut. 24:19). Likewise, gleaning in the vineyard and olive grove is forbidden to the owners, so that the unfortunate should have something to pick up (Deut. 24:20–21). God says that the Israelites should do this because they were once slaves in Egypt (Deut. 24:22; see also Lev. 19:9–10, 23:22).

When Josephus presents these laws, he expands on the Biblical explanation in order to show the danger of having too much, being greedy, and committing *hubris*:

For one must not account as expenditure that which out of liberality one lets men take; since God bestows this abundance of good things not for our enjoyment alone but that we may also share them generously with others, and He is desirous that by these means the special favour that he bears to the people of Israel and the bounty of His gifts may be manifested to others also, when out of all that superabundance of ours (ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος) they too receive their share from us. But let him who acts contrary to these precepts receive forty stripes save one from the public lash, undergoing, free man as he is, this most disgraceful penalty, because through slavery to lucre he has outraged his dignity (ὅτι τῷ κέρδει δουλεύσας ὕβρισε τό ἀξίωμα).<sup>53</sup>

*Ant.* 4:237-239 (Thackeray) Again Josephus—in an extra-Biblical explanation—has yoked profit and insolence (κέρδος and ὕβρις), and tied them to punishment. In fact, he has changed the Deuteronomic flogging regulation from its general application to any case (Deut. 25:1-2) to refer specifically to the punishment of a hubristic man: one who has an excess of wealth and will not share it because of his attachment to his own gain. Philo does not discuss this verse. Josephus' innovation has added significance because he has inserted his *hubris* notion into a matter of Jewish law, where precision was required. It is likely that the original Jewish rabbinic formulation had no *hubris* angle to it.

### *Levirate Marriage (Deut. 25)*

Concerning levirate marriages (Deut. 25:5), the Septuagint simply says that the brother of a deceased man must marry the widow in order that the name not be lost



from Israel (Deut. 25:6 οὐκ ἐξαλειφθήσεται). Josephus' version of the law adds that the reason for the procedure is so that the deceased husband not suffer *hubris* at the hands of his own family (*Ant.* 4:255). If the brother refuses to marry the widow, she is to take off her brother-in-law's sandal, spit in his face, and say "this is the way that we treat the man who will not build up his brother's household" (LXX οὐκ οἰκοδομήσει Deut. 25:9). Josephus renders this pronouncement as "committing *hubris* against his memory" (*Ant.* 4:256). Philo is silent on the subject of levirate marriages, perhaps due to Alexandrian Jewish customs in this regard.<sup>54</sup>

*Moses' Last Words: A Warning About Hubris (Deut. 32)* The end of Deuteronomy is the climax of the Torah, and Moses' last words to the Israelites are their last charge before he leaves them for good. In Deuteronomy 32:46–47—Moses' last speech to Israel—he urges the people one last time to observe the Law; it is not emptiness (LXX κενός Deut. 32:47), he says, but the source of long life for them in their new land. Josephus' version of Moses' last speech to Israel contains the lawgiver's thanks to God and his charge to his people to preserve the Law. His last sentence is his final warning against *hubris*:

"For if even a human legislator is a formidable foe when his laws are outraged (ὕβριζομένων τῶν νόμων) and laid down to no effect, then beware of experiencing the wrath of God (θεοῦ χαλεπαίνοντος) for laws neglected—laws which He, the begetter of them, presented to you Himself."

*Ant.* 4:319 (Thackeray) God, says Moses, has given His people a great boon, but if they commit *hubris* against Him, they will have to face His anger. Moses' last words to the Israelites reiterate the message which Josephus has been

underlining from the start: to obey the laws is to avoid *hubris* and its punishment.

Philo often speaks of the Greater Song of Moses, which encompasses Deut. 32. Most of his references to it and to Deut. 33 and 34 deal with Moses' blessings upon the Israelites, and on the lawgiver's end. Nowhere does Philo emphasize the didactic warning contained in Josephus' account; he does not use the *hubris* motif at all in this regard. Thus, Josephus is exercising his own independent interpretation in warning of *hubris* against God, the supreme lawmaker.

### **SUMMARY**

Expanding on the traditional terms used in the Septuagint, Josephus uses the word *hubris* to summarize the result of excess. Unlike Philo, who often makes use of the classical "*koros-leads-to-hubris*" formula, Josephus refrains from using the term *koros*, but implies it by references to wealth, good fortune, and abundance.

The choice to use *hubris* and related words in the foregoing scenes in the Torah is probably not always Josephus'. Because Philo uses the same terms, Josephus may be seen to reflect a Hellenistic Jewish tradition that expands on the Septuagint's text. Also, it is likely that both authors were influenced directly by their classical educations.

Josephus associates *hubris* and illicit sexuality in much the same way that Philo does, but does it more frequently, adding the concept of *hubris* freely to the Biblical material to suit his purposes. Marriage is closely associated with the notion, and the violation of marriage bonds by force or stealth is characterized by the same word.

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### **HUBRIS AND APOLOGETICS**

Associations between sex and *hubris* in Josephus make sense from both the literary and apologetic point of view. Josephus seems to want to show Jewish awareness of the dangers of *hubris* in all spheres. It is possible that he has an apologetic agenda. He might want to counter some anti-Jewish accusations, and this desire might motivate his presentation of the concept: Jews are *not* hubristic, especially in sexuality.

*The Purity of a Jewish Hero: Joseph in Egypt* We have seen how Josephus is aware of the classical combination of *koros* and *hubris*, and how he has used it in order to enhance appreciation of his work in his Hellenized readers. In addition, from a literary point of view, the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife belongs in the tradition of Hellenistic Romance, and reflects the Hippolytus-Phaedra story. Understanding this background can help explain why Josephus expands the Biblical account with such elaboration. Hellenistic philosophers and historians regularly place erotic psychology in the foreground, and Josephus shared with them an interest in this area, as we have noted above.<sup>55</sup>

Of this Josephan scene, Martin Braun has written: "The paraphrase of Josephus is an excellent example of the extreme Hellenization of a biblical tale."<sup>56</sup> Braun stresses the dramatic construction of the scene, and its rhetorical technique, and notes that Josephus' version of the Potiphar Story is "in the style and psychology of a Greek novel episode, from which all specific Jewish features are removed."<sup>57</sup>

Braun is only partly correct. While it is true that there are no specific Jewish elements in the scene, the reader will not have forgotten that Joseph is the son of Jacob, grandson of Isaac, and great-grandson of Abraham. He is a member of the covenant with the God of the Hebrews. Immediately at

the end of the pericope, when Joseph is accused and sent to prison, Josephus relates that his hero turns his affairs over to God, realizing that God, who knows the truth, would use His providence (πρόνοια) to help him (*Ant.* 2:60–61). Joseph is a Jewish hero who refuses to commit sexual *hubris*, and goes to prison falsely accused of having committed it himself. Still, his virtue and faith in God sustain him, and he eventually emerges triumphant.

The foregoing leads to notions of Jewish sexuality in Josephus' world. It is possible that Josephus was trying to show that Jewish law (νόμος) specifically condemns *hubris* in sexual relations, in answer to anti-Jewish accusations. We have seen how Josephus inserts the notion of *hubris* into laws about sexual morality to show that Jews are scrupulous about their *jHirity* in this sphere. In light of this, we might consider some pagan writings that suggest that Jews were known in the gentile world not to be so scrupulous in their sexual relations.

## **THE CALUMNY OF JEWISH HYPERSEXUALITY**

### *1. Meleager*

Meleager (2nd–1st cent. BCE), is one of the First pagan writers to refer to the Sabbath in the following piece in the Greek Anthology (5. 160):

White-Cheeked Demo, some one hath thee naked next him and is taking his delight, but my own heart groans within me. Thy lover is some Sabbath-keeper, no great wonder! Love burns hot even on cold Sabbaths.

(tr. W.R. Paton, Loeb Library) Meleager implies that his girlfriend has taken a Jewish lover, or someone who was a Jewish sympathizer. At any rate, the “Sabbath keeper” is someone who can satisfy her sexually. The fact that Meleager says that it is no great wonder implies that he thinks Jews to be good lovers. Perhaps Josephus was at

pains to show Jewish scrupulousness in sex codes to counter such beliefs.

## 2. Tacitus

Tacitus, whose *Histories* contain much anti-Jewish material, stresses the notion that Jews are prone to lust: "They sit apart at meals, sleep separately, are a race extremely prone to lust (*proiectissima ad libidinem gens*). They do not go to bed with foreign women, but among themselves nothing is illicit" (*Histories* 5:5:2).

Concerning the statement that the Jews were most prone to lust, Stern comments: "This statement is probably connected with the alleged prolific nature of the Jews ... However, the notion is mostly based on the common typology of the strong sexual passions credited to barbarians, especially to those of the East."<sup>58</sup> Tacitus' comment that Jews will not sleep with foreign women is consonant with Torah, but referred to in Martial and Meleager in humorous contexts, which means that popular imagination allowed that Jews did so. Josephus, in his portrait of Joseph and his treatment of *hubris* associated with illicit sexuality, seems to try to meet the accusations of *libido* and unlawfulness present in Tacitus' account.

## 3. Martial

Martial, a satiric epigrammatist and younger contemporary of Josephus, also refers to Jewish licentiousness. He writes of the woman Caelia that she will grant her favors to one and all, including Parthians, Germans, Dacians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Egyptians, Indians, and Alans. "Nor do you flee from the loin of the circumcised Jews" (*Epigrammata* 7:30). Here Jews are distinguished by their practice of circumcision (*recutiorum*) and their lechery (*mguina* 7:30:4). In the same book (7:35:4), Martial makes reference to a Jewish slave he has,

pointing out that he has *Iudaeum nuda sub cute pondus*, implying virility due to a heavy sex organ.

Elsewhere, Martial writes of a circumcised poet (*verpe poeta*), telling him that he does not mind the malice shown toward his poems, but complains bitterly that this poet from Jerusalem is actively involved with pederasty. What makes matters worse for Martial is that the boy with whom this Jewish poet is having sex (*pedicas*) is Martial's favorite (*Epigrammata* 9:94). Josephus' attribution of *hubris* to crimes of homo-sexuality (*Ant.* 3:275) might be in some way a response to popular accusations such as this.

### **HUBRIS AND ENEMIES OF THE JEWS**

Another apologetic motive that involves Josephus' innovative use of *hubris* might include the attribution of it to the enemies of the Jews. Josephus shows that *hubris* is punished, or is deserving of punishment, whether the offenders are Jews or gentiles, and particularly the enemies of the Jews, such as Egyptians, Amalekites, or Sodomites. We have seen how the Sodomites are characterized by *hubris*, how they attempted to outrage Lot's guests, and how they are destroyed. We also observe that the Egyptians are characterized by the same term. It is possible that Josephus' account makes reference to Egyptian anti-Semites such as Apion and Lysimachus of Alexandria? Could Egyptian jealousy of Jewish success have continued to be an issue in Josephus' time? Such might be implied by *Ant.* 2:201-202, where the lazy Egyptians become harshly disposed toward the Hebrews out of jealousy of their prosperity (κατά φθόνον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας). Philo's *In Flaccum* implies that jealousy was a factor in the uprising against the Alexandrian Jews in 38 CE. The motives given by Josephus (*War* 2:464, 478) for Syrian uprisings against the Jews in 66 are Syrian hatred and fear of their Jewish neighbors (μῖσος, δέος) and greed for plunder (πλεονεξία).

### 1. The Amalekites

It is possible that Josephus attributes *hubris* to Hagar to counter the revulsion a non-Jew might feel at her banishment by Abraham's family. So too he attempts to justify Hebrew resolve to kill the Amalekites. "Do not forget the *hubris* of the Amalekites," Moses tells the children of Israel. He tells them to make war with these enemies after they are established in the Promised Land, and punish them for having attacked the people on the way from Egypt (*Ant.* 4:304).

The attribution of *hubris* to the Amalekites might be Josephus' way of refuting the anti-Jewish slanders that attributed *hubris* to the Israelites when they left Egypt. This is particularly likely in light of Lysimachus' claim (in *Contra Apionem* 1:304-311), that when the Jews left Egypt they crossed the desert and treated with *hubris* the people whom they encountered (τούς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὑβρίζοντας *Ap.* 1:310). These people would have been the Amalekites. Lysimachus further claims that the Jews plundered and burned their holy places (καὶ τὰ ἱερά συλῶντας καὶ ἐμπρήσαντας *Ap.* 1:310). Josephus, by saying that the Amalekites were hubristic, answers those who would say that the Jews mistreated them, and justifies Moses' call for vengeance.<sup>59</sup>

Philo writes about anti-Jewish Greek authors who have written denigrating accounts of the Jewish lawgiver Moses. These enemies of the Jews have committed *hubris* against themselves:

Most of these authors have abused the powers which education gave them (τὰς δυνάμεις ... ὑβρίσαν), by composing in verse or prose comedies and pieces of voluptuous license, to their widespread disgrace, when they should have used their natural gifts to the full. ...



*De Vita Mosis* 1:3 (Colson) The attribution of *hubris* to the enemies of the Jews is a commonplace, as we have seen with Egyptian bondage so described. Philo also cites the *hubris* of the Amorites, who sin against the Israelites and are then defeated (*De Vita Mosis* 1:258), and makes it a point to say that *koros* and *hubris* characterize the way other peoples react to their own laws, and not the way in which the Jews treat their own (*De Vita Mosis* 2:13). Philo elsewhere attacks the Greek θίᾱσοι ‘societies, clubs’ in Alexandria. He attributes *hubris* to these gatherings, again in a context of excess:

In the city there are clubs (θίᾱσοι) with a large membership, whose fellowship is founded on no sound principle but on strong liquor and drunkenness and sottish carousing and their offspring, wantonness (ἄκρατος καὶ μέθη καὶ παροινίαί καὶ ἡ τούτων ἔκγονος ὕβρις)."

*In Flaccum* 136 (Colson) Philo, more overtly than Josephus, uses *hubris* to characterize enemies of the Jews and to defend his own people. The fact that anti-Semitism was more evident and deep-seated in Alexandria than in Rome probably accounts for Philo's more overt use of this theme. Also, judging from his leadership of a delegation to Rome, he was probably the head of the Jewish community in Alexandria. Josephus is writing in this tradition, but with a less strong apologetic imperative.

## 2. Leprosy

One of the calumnies against the Jews was that they had leprosy, and for that reason they were expelled from Egypt. This is mentioned in *Contra Apionem* (1:390), Tacitus (*Histories* 5:3), and *Antiquities of the Jews* (3:265). Josephus answers the charge in the latter work by saying that Moses would not have made laws against leprosy if he himself had been stricken with it. Indeed, Josephus continues, leprosy is

no hindrance to some among other peoples, who not only escape *hubris* and exile, but even conduct military campaigns, hold public office, and discharge religious duties (*Ant.* 3:266). The mention of leprosy as being devoid of *hubris* seems in this context to be apologetic. Josephus is as much as say-ing: it is absurd to charge Moses with having leprosy, but even if the Israelites *did* have it, they could still be a mighty and holy nation.

### **GODLESSNESS: PLINY THE ELDER**

Finally, we consider an interesting aside about Jews in the thirteenth book of the *Naturalis Histona* by Pliny the Elder, a contemporary of Josephus (d. 79 CE):

Suum genus e sicciore turba dactylis, praelonga gracilitate curvatis interim. Nam quos ex his honori deorum damus, chydaeos appellavit Iudea gens contumelia numinum insignis.

(*NH* 13:46)

Of the many drier dates the finger-date forms a class of its own: it is a very long slender date, sometimes of a curved shape. The variety of this class, which we offer to honor the gods is called chydaeus by the Jews, a race remarkable for their contempt for the divine powers.

*NH* 13:46 (H. Rackman) Pliny's characterization of the Jews as *gens contumelia numinum insignis* might represent an important calumny of which Josephus was aware. *Contumelia* is a regular Latin translation of *hubris*. Josephus' frequent use of *hubris* in Jewish contexts to show Hebrew piety and the wickedness of their enemies could well be answering the charge of *contumelia* reflected in Pliny's statement.<sup>[60](#)</sup>

### **SUMMARY**

In light of several ancient calumnies against the Jews, it seems that Josephus (and in a more limited sense Philo before him) used *hubris* terminology in an apologetic way: to counter charges of Jewish sexual impropriety, to defend the lawgiver, and to legitimate Jewish law (νόμος) and piety (εὐσέβεια).

## CONCLUSIONS

Josephus builds on the ideas of the Torah that have to do with crime and punishment, and often summarizes those notions by the Greek term *hubris*. Since Philo often uses the same terms in the same contexts, we might conclude that both made free use of the Classical Greek term in order to reach their readers more easily. In a sense, they participated in a Hellenistic Jewish literary tradition which adapted the common terms related to *hubris* for Biblical exegesis.

Josephus often uses Greek concepts in order to put Jewish history in terms his gentile audience will immediately understand, and to stress that his people are aware of the dangers of *hubris* generally, both among themselves and among their enemies. He associates *hubris* with improper sexual relations and with conjugal situations, as does Philo. In doing so, he both remains within the classical tradition and shows any potential detractors of his faith that his people have a history of chaste behavior, and that unchastity, if it occurs, meets with proper punishment. By showing that Jews are acutely aware of the dangers of *hubris* in *Ant.* 1-4 Josephus blunts anti-Jewish accusations of Hebrew lasciviousness, uncleanness, and lawlessness.

Josephus' use of the *hubris* theme goes beyond his summary of the Torah, as can be seen by an examination of *Ant.* 5. As an introduction to Judges (*Ant.* 5:132-135), Josephus points out that the 'good life' in the new land led to πλοῦτος 'riches', τρυφή 'luxury', ἡδονή 'voluptuousness', κερδαίνειν 'lucre', and ἄδειαν 'listlessness' that led in turn to civil discord (στάσις). This programmatic statement is

summarized later in Book 5: the Israelites lost their direction and lost the 'ordered course of their constitution' (τοῦ κόσμου τῆς πολιτείας), clue to their ἡδονή. Their prosperity (εὐδαιμονία) was lost due to their luxury (τρυφή).

I have shown that κέρδος, εὐδαιμονία, and ἡδονή are part of the satiety theme that Josephus has established in the first four books of *Jewish Antiquities*, where excess leads to *hubris*. Reading the first programmatic statement in Book 5, with its "loaded" words, we are trained to expect that Josephus will introduce the word *hubris* to describe the sexual outrage of the youths, as indeed he does repeatedly (*Ant.* 5:143, 145, 146, 148). In addition, Josephus places the story of the Levite and his wife who suffered the *hubris* of the Benjamites between two statements that point out the dangers of ἡδονή. The structure looks like this: 1 Dangers of ἡδονή and τρυφή 5:132-135

2 ὕβρις of Benjamite youths 5:136-149

3 Dangers of ἡδονή and τρυφή 5:179-180.

This ring composition focuses the message on the outrageous behavior of the men against the Levite's wife, and makes it a showcase of the dangers of prosperity. Josephus chooses *hubris* intentionally because of its classical ring. The Septuagint does not use the term in these sections. Further study of *hubris* in the rest of Josephus' *Antiquities* will, it seems likely, show the same results as the present examination.<sup>61</sup>

(1) Josephus' debt to classical writers is vast and well-documented. See Louis H. Feldman's work, including: "Josephus' Portrait of Saul," *HUCA* 53(1982)45-99; *Josephus and Modern Scholarship* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 392-419; "Josephus as a Biblical Interpreter: The 'Aqedah,'" *JQR* 75(1985)212-252.

(2) If Josephus is so taken with the concept, it is surprising that he should pass over an opportunity to capitalize on what the Septuagint offered him. Possibly these passages did not offer sufficient apologetic material, and were either not sufficiently interesting for his gentile audiences, or did not fit into his narrative.

(3) I choose the first four books of the *Antiquities* because they recount the Torah, of which he mentions in *Against Apion* 1.38-39 that there were five books.

He himself singles out this material as one *corpus*: “the books of Moses, comprising the laws and the traditional history from the birth of man down to the death of the lawgiver. This period falls only a little short of three thousand years.” We thus find justification in examining in this paper Josephus’ treatment of this material, which he obviously regards as an integral whole. A second justification is that the end of Book 4 coincides with the end of the Pentateuch.

(4) See Philo *De tosepho* 210, where Joseph’s brothers are glad that they could return to Jacob with their youngest brother unharmed: ἀνύβριστον.

(5) Louis H. Feldman, “Prophets and Prophecy in Josephus,” *Journal of Theological Studies* NS 14.2 (1990)394; Louis H. Feldman and John G. Gibbs, “Josephus’ Vocabulary for Slavery,” *JQR* 76 (1985–86) (281)–310.

(6) No model n scholars consider this short 300 lines) document to be by Plato himself. Its spurious nature has recently been re-affirmed by Gerald R. Ledger in *Re-Counting Plato, A Computer Analysis of Plato’s Style* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 71. The work, entitled “Οποι in the manuscript tradition, is a collection of 180 definitions taken from various authors resembling texts of Plain and Aristotle. Sliorey conjectures that the work could be of Aristotle’s Academy or later, but certainly before Thrasyllus, in whose *Tetralogies* they were probably included in the first century CK: Paul Sliorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933) 443. On the *Definitioris*, see R. Adam, “Ucbr cine unter Platos Namen erhaltene Satnrnhing von Dcfinitionen,” *Philologus* 80(1925)366–376. For conjectures on the origins of doubtful and spurious works attributed to Plato, see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) vol. 5, 383–384.

(7) Bellerophon is thus trying to assert an unnatural superiority, and harm the honor of I lie gods Cf. Aristotle’s “those committing ὕβρις ... think that they themselves, doing hiidly to others, are more superior” (quoted above).

(8) K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1989) 35.

(9) In Iad, it was early associated with the preposition ὑπέρ ‘more, above’; cf. *fliad* itv. 17–18; *Odyssey* 22:64; 11368: ὑπέρβιον ὕβριν; cf. R.E. Doyle, “ΟΛΒΟΣ, ΚΟΡΟΣ, ΥΒΡΙΣ,, md ATM from Hesiod to Aeschvlus.” *Traditio* 26(1970)293–303.

(10) Greene remarks “there is so strong a family resemblance between *hubris* and *koros* that they are almost interchangeable”: William Chase Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963 [1944]) 76 n. 157.; cf., D.H. Abel, “Genealogies of Ethical Concepts,” *TAPA* 74(1943)92.

(11) reene (above, note 10) 18.

(12) *Novm Thesaurus Philologuo-Gnticus, sive Lexicon in LXX et Reliquos Interpretes Graecos ac Scriptores Apocryphos Veteris Testamenti*, Ioh. Frieder. Schleusner (Lipsiae: Weichnan, Teubner, 1820) s.v. ὕβρις.

(13) Richmond Lattimore, *Story Patterns m Greek Tragedy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965) 23.

(14) Douglas M. MacDowell, “HYBRIS in Athens,” *G&R* N.S. 23(1976)14–31.

(15) N. E. Fisher “HYBRIS and Dishonour: I,” *G&R* N.S. 26(1976)177–193.

(16) Ann Michelini “YBPIΣ and Plants,” *HSCPh* 82(1978)35–44.

(17) Dover (above, note 8) 34–39.

(18) MacDowell (above, note 14) 21.

(19) MacDowell (above, note 14) 21–23.

(20) Fisher (above, note 15) 180.

- (21) Michelini (above, note 16) 38.
- (22) Milhelini (above, note 16) 11.
- (23) K.J. Dover (above, note 8) 34, 35 11. 15.
- (24) Georg Bertram, *Theological Dichotomy of the New Testament* [ed. Gerhard Friedrich, tr. by G.W. Bromiley] (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972) vol. 8, 295-305.
- (25) Bertram (above, note 24) 303-304.
- (26) Wilhelm Weber, *Josephus mid Vespasian. Untersuchungen zur dem jüdischen Krieg des Flavius Josephus* (1921) 24-25, 66-79; Bertram (above, note 24) 304 n. 61.
- (27) On Josephus' interest in erotic tales, see Horst R. Moehring, "Novelistic Elements in the Writings of Flavius Josephus (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1957); and Louis H. Feldman, "Hellenizations in Josephus' Version of Esther," *TAPA* 101(1970)143-170.
- (28) Martin Braun, *History and Romance in Graeco-Romental Literature* (New York: Garland, 1987 [1938]) 44-45.
- (29) K.J. Dover (above, note 8) 35-36; also, K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) 110-116, 119-23.
- (30) Fisher (above, note 15) 186.
- (31) General passages in Philo where illicit sexual relations are characterized by *hubris* include: *De Praemiis et Poenis* 139, 140 (rape); *De Decalogo* 126 (adultery); *De Specialibus Legibus* 3173-174—four times (on modesty required of a wife even when her husband suffers *hubris* from another); *Hypothetica* (viii 7,3): wives must serve their husbands, and not suffer *hubris* from their mate.
- (32) Louis H. Feldman, "Hellenizations in Josephus' Portrayal of Man's Decline" in Jacob Neusner (ed.), *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (Studies in the History of Religions, 14; Leiden: Brill, 1968) 336-353.
- (33) On Josephus' use of Philo, see Louis H. Feldman, *Josephus and Modern Scholarship* (1937-1980), (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1984) 410-418, 936-937; Stuart D. Robertson, "The Account of the Ancient Israelite Tabernacle and First Priesthood in the *Jewish Antiquities* of Flavius Josephus" (PhD diss., Annenberg Research Institute, Philadelphia, 1991).
- (34) Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Commentary on Genesis," *JQR* 72(1981-82)129-30; "Josephus' Portrait of Noah and its Parallels in Philo, Pseudo-Philo's *Hibhecal Antiquities*, and Rabbinic Midrashim," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 55(1988)36-38.
- (35) On the connection between prosperity and insolence and punishment here, see L.H. Feldman, *ibid.*, 55(1988)37, n. 13.
- (36) Lists like this might have been a classical commonplace: see Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1:128-142. a similar grouping of human crimes, for which Jupiter will flood the earth.
- (37) Philo characterizes the Pharaoh of Moses' time by *hubris* (*De Vita Mosis* 1. 88).
- (38) Philo (*De Specialibus Legibus* 3. 108) characterizes violence against a pregnant woman as *hubris*. Neither Josephus nor Philo would accuse Sarai of this.

(39) On *hubris* in Theognis, see Gregory Nagy, "Theognis and Megara: A Poet's Vision of His City" in *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*, ed. by Thomas J. Figueira and Gregory Nagy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1985) 22–81.

(40) For more on Joseph in Josephus, see Maren Niehoff, *The Figure of Joseph in Post-Biblical Jewish Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), and Louis Fl. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Joseph," *Revue Rihlique* 99(1992)379–417, 504–528.

(41) On Moses in Josephus, see Louis Il. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Moses, *JQF* 82(1991)–92) 285–328; 83(1992–93)7–50.

(42) This is one case of nature (as opposed to a creature of nature) being hubristic, but it is only the river's name.

(43) See Fisher (above, note 15) 189–191, 193 n. 50; Michelini (above, note 16).

(44) Note the classical formulation: "*koros* gives birth to *hubris*".

(45) Louis Feldman comments: "I suspect that in his attention to *hubris* Josephus is thinking of the contemporary situation in which the revolutionaries, whom he so despised, showed ingratitude to the *pax Romana* and rebelled against Roman authority. In fact, in the *War* 2.390, Josephus, speaking through the mouth of Agrippa II, says that God himself is on the side of Rome." (private correspondence, 24 August, 1992).

(46) Josephus often adds wealth to his characters. Rabbinic tradition enlarges on Korah's wealth, and perhaps Josephus is following such a source here. See Louis Ginzberg, *The legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, »911) volume 3, 286–303. I am grateful to L.H. Feldman for this insight.

(47) W.C. Van Ilnnik has explicated the expansion of the Biblical account and speculated on the reasons for the fear of apostasy in Josephus' time: "Josephus' Account of the Story of Israel's Sin with Alien Women in the Country of Midian (Num. 25: iff.)," in *Travels in the World of the Old Testament: Studies Presented to Professor M.A. Beeck on the Occasion of his 64th Birthday*, eds. M.S.H.G. Meerma Van Voss, Ph. H.J. Houwink Ten Cate, N.A. Van Uchelen (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co. 1974) 241–261.

(48) See above note 45, on a possible contemporary message about ingratitude associated with *hubris*.

(49) See Dover, (above, note 8) 35–36.

(50) On Josephus' misogyny, see Louis Il. Feldman's Deborah article in A. Caquot et al., *Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky* (Leuven-Paris: Editions Peeters, 1986) i 15–128, and Cheryl Anne Brown, *No Longer Silent: First Century Portraits of biblical Women* (Louisville: Westminster, 1992).

(51) See *Ant.* 4:280, where Josephus similarly gives the one whose eye has been lost the choice of either "an eye for an eye", or receipt of a damage. This passage also has 110 Biblical or rabbinic parallel. I am indebted to Louis Feldman for this observation.

(52) On Josephus' and Philo's discussions of prostitutes and the law, see Samuel Belkin, *Philo and the Oral Law: The Philonic Interpretation of Biblical Law in Relation to the Palestinian Halakah* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940) 235–238.

(53) Josephus' words here again recall the Pseudo-Platonic "loss of honor" definition of *hubris*.

(54) See Belkin (αἰκνῆ, note 52) 251–252.



(55) See Braun (above, note 28) 44-5, 104; Feldman (above, note 27); Moehring (above, note 27).

(56) Braun (above, note 28) 92.

(57) *Ibid.*, For a more recent evaluation of the Josephan scene, see "Josephus and Women" in NiehoH (above, note 40) 101-107.

(58) Mcnahem Stern, *Greek and Latm Writers on Jews and Judaism* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976) vol. 2. p. 40.

(59) Stern (above, note 58), vol. 1, p. 386 notes: "The tale of atrocities committed by Jews, especially in regard to pagan temples, echoes the indignation that arose as a consequence of the religious polity adopted by the Hasmonean conquerors of Palestine."

(60) The Latin version of Josephus (6th century) is not consistent in its translation of *hubris* words in *Antiquities* 1-4. It uses *iniuna* or a form of it in thirty examples of *hubris* in *Ant* 1-4, *contumelia* is employed eight times for the term, and other periphrases make up the other examples. *The Latin Josephus. Introduction and Text*, ed. Franz Blatt (Copenhagen: Universitets-forlaget I Aarhus, 1958).

(61) A grant from the National Endowment for the Humunties allowed me to complete most of the research for this project at Yeshiva University in a Summer Seminar for College Teachers, directed by Louis H. Feldman. I am gratef ul to Professor Feldman for his help, as well as to another *HUCA* referee. This article is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Dr. Sheldon II. Blank.

## **CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO**

### **Who Read Ancient Novels?**

*Susan A. Stephens*

Those who write about the ancient novel make assumptions, often implicit and often unconscious, about its intended audience and its relationship to those texts perceived to belong to the ancient high culture. From these assumptions they frequently draw conclusions about the novel's origins, its cultural impact, and its ultimate significance as a literary artifact. Answers to the question "Who read ancient novels?" have tended to take a common form. Novel readers are somehow perceived to have been *qualitatively* different from the readers of other ancient books: they have been identified as the newly literate, a bourgeois class that supposedly flourished in the imperial period in the eastern Mediterranean, or they have been viewed as the sort of readers who reflect characters within the novels themselves, women or young men approaching adulthood.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Tomas Hägg combines these categorizing models and adds a third, those in need of religion, when he describes the novel audience as "rootless, at a loss, restlessly searching—the people who needed and welcomed the novel are the same as those who were attracted by mystery religions and Christianity: the people of Alexandria and other big cities around the eastern Mediterranean. But a prerequisite for the genesis and flourishing of this genre, here as in eighteenth-century England, was of course an increased level of literacy in the population ...The population outside the big cities, the women, people looking for romanticism and idealism—all now had the opportunity to have their wishes fulfilled."<sup>2</sup>

Teasing substance out of the debris of the ancient world is a delicate process. More delicate still is learning to recognize the cultural biases and a priori assumptions that we bring to the project. In attempting to imagine an audience for the ancient novel we need to ask ourselves whether evidence for a widespread and popular readership really exists, or whether the tenacious belief in such a readership results from the instinct, deeply rooted in classical scholarship, that only such fifth- and fourth-century canons and genres as epic, lyric, tragedy, history, and philosophical dialogue (carefully purged of their less-than-distinguished representatives) could have merited attention from intellectuals and the serious readers of the ancient world. Such an ideal ancient reader is one whom we would be hard-pressed to find today—someone who happily reads Gibbon or Nietzsche, but eschews *Lolita* or *Tristram Shandy*. We also need to ask to what extent our notion of the popular audience is dependent on an assessment of the books themselves. It is widely assumed that the development of the ancient novel entailed a linear progression of increasing narrative complexity. The typical paradigm assembles the five extant Greek novels on a continuum with Chariton, who is perceived as simple and straightforward, at its beginning, and the admittedly complex and sophisticated Heliodorus at its end.<sup>3</sup> And for the simple Chariton we assume that there must have been a simple audience.

Central to this vision of a popular audience, as Hägg's remark illustrates, is the insidious model of the rise of the novel in the eighteenth century. While the analogy comes readily enough to mind, closer consideration reveals its inappropriateness for antiquity. The eighteenth-century phenomenon was dependent on the invention of the printing press, which permitted the cheap dissemination of texts, and a growing middle class who came to read privately for entertainment. The development of the latter

seems to have been the product of a Protestantism that actively encouraged the private reading of the Bible, as well as a newly industrializing Europe that required a more literate work force.<sup>4</sup> But neither of these phenomena has an ancient analogue.

First, the technology of book production remained laborious and time-consuming; books were costly. Egypt maintained a monopoly on the production and marketing of papyrus from which the majority of the ancient book rolls were made, and though papyrus was likely a cheaper commodity than animal hides, estimates of the price of the blank roll range from one to two days' wages for a common laborer up to as much as that of five or six days.<sup>5</sup> Add to this the cost of a skilled copyist's labor and it is obvious that owning ancient books would have fallen outside the experience of all but the well-to-do. Nor did circulating libraries (which may serve to defray the costs of books for the literate poor in the modern world) or anything remotely similar yet exist. Furthermore, ancient books were normally written without punctuation or word breaks, and private copies are usually found in a crabbed cursive style that must have placed greater demands on a reader's skills. Neither of these circumstances seems consistent with the view that reading was likely to have been a widespread pastime.

Second, the rise of an ancient middle class is a myth. The bulk of the ancient Mediterranean population lived a rural, subsistence-level existence. The urban population consisted mainly of poor people. At the top of the social pyramid would have been Roman senators and knights, estimated at no more than 1 percent of the population;<sup>6</sup> below them were the urban aristocracies of the smaller cities within the empire. The absolute numbers of Greek-reading elites of the empire, as compared to those of fifth-century Athens, were undoubtedly on the increase in the first two centuries A.D., due in no small measure to the greater stability of Roman

imperial rule, which permitted local aristocracies to flourish in the service of imperial administration, and increased travel and exchange between urban centers. But such literacy as existed even within elite groups was on the decline by the third century A.D.<sup>7</sup>

In order to understand the nature of ancient readers, it is crucial not to lose sight of the causal link between wealth and education. Aristotle tells us that leisure is necessary for education, and indeed for the ability to lead the good life in general. This is not snobbery so much as practical reality: to acquire enough literacy to read a text of Xenophon the Athenian—about the minimum necessary for anyone who wanted to read novels—would have taken several years. Plato in the *Laws* supposes that three years would be sufficient for schoolboys to read and write at an adequate level.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, it is appropriate to ask how a populace, in the main at subsistence level or slightly above, would acquire sufficient free time for education. This is not to say that the odds were insurmountable for any who truly needed or desired to learn how to read, but without a demonstrable functional need for literacy there can hardly have been incentives for much of the populace to acquire the skill. William Harris, for example, estimates that “the overall level of literacy [during the first through the third centuries A.D.] is likely to have been below 15%.”<sup>9</sup>

But is there a qualitatively different reading public, however large or small, to be distinguished either from or within these urban elites? The notion of subsidized and universal elementary education seems to have been in the main the dream of the philosopher, rather than the practical reality of ancient cities.<sup>10</sup> We cannot therefore attribute the putative growth of a new literate class to better public education. Ancient education consisted of the grammar school, which taught the basics of reading and writing, followed by advanced rhetorical training for the few.<sup>11</sup> So

Harris's "under 15%," which includes both groups, would in fact be considerably smaller if only those who received the more advanced education were counted, perhaps as few as 5 percent of the total population. In theory this division between grammatical and rhetorical education might account for the two different sets of readers—elite and popular—of which scholars are fond. But this two-tiered system was a stable feature of Greek and later Roman education from its inception and cannot be shown to have produced anything like an identifiably popular readership before it is postulated as a formative influence in the writing of ancient novels. Furthermore, it does appear that the novelists themselves rather expected from their readers the sophistication gained from at least some rhetorical education.<sup>12</sup> In addition to those who received a grammatical or rhetorical education, there would undoubtedly have been some who procured moderate wealth from trade, as well as slaves from well-to-do households who would have learned to read as part of their duties.<sup>13</sup> But, again, there is no evidence either that these latter two groups were very populous or that they could constitute a distinctive class of readers whose sufficiently homogeneous tastes succeeded in shaping the literary marketplace.

Hägg would identify as unique to this period the sort of persons to whom Christianity and the mystery religions appealed. But this is unsatisfactory on a number of grounds. While scholars have identified many of the earliest Christians as urban in origin, ranking well below Roman or municipal aristocracies in social status and often linked to wealth from trade, it has yet to be demonstrated that such people were substantial in number or even identifiable as a discrete segment of the population before the experience of conversion marked them as a separate group. In fact, Christians seem to have consisted of individuals from many

different groups. W. Meeks, in *The first Urban Christians*, remarks that “not only was there a mixture of social levels in each congregation; but also, in each individual category that we are able to identify there is evidence of divergent rankings in the different dimensions of status.”<sup>14</sup> Indeed, it is this inconsistency, that is, the movement of individuals either above or below the social rank into which they were born, that Meeks and others would point to as *the* characteristic feature of early Christians, the feature that led them to find satisfaction and a sense of belonging in a new communal religious experience. But this trait is psychological; it is an internalized sense of belonging that could not have marked off a segment of the population *before* it manifested itself in an overt action like conversion to Christianity. Those who were potentially Christian were not a sufficiently distinct group for an ancient-novel writer to regard their “visible yearnings and spiritual restlessness” as a target of opportunity. When Christians did become a distinct group, it was well after the first novels would have been written.<sup>15</sup>

Nor were the earliest urban Christians necessarily literate. Those who were could only have received the same education as their non-Christian social equals—the grammatical and the more advanced rhetorical training that flourished in the cities and towns of the empire—access to which was dictated by wealth and class. Certainly Christians, after their conversion, seem not to have constituted much of an audience for anything beyond conversion literature—that is, the books of the Old and New Testament, homilies, and martyr tales—a literature that in technical finesse ranks well below even the least sophisticated of the Greek novels. But even in this respect it is not clear what proportion of the converted could actually read or were read to in community worship.



However, the small size of the ancient population of readers would not preclude ancient novels from being a popular source of entertainment. Novels might have been read aloud to those who could not read them (as Christian texts undoubtedly were read for the benefit of an illiterate congregation). But were they? Ancient sources attest to many kinds of public performance. Rhetoricians declaimed extempore on themes proposed by their audiences; theaters produced tragedies and comedies as well as pantomime and burlesque; festivals provided occasions for poetic competitions as well as the recitation of Homer, and authors so desiring might give public readings of their works. But nothing is said of novel readings, and even the shortest surviving novels are too long for convenient public recitation. Lucian mentions female impersonators in soft garments who dance or mime the stories of love-stricken women—Phaedra, Parthenope, and Rhodope (*De saltatione* 2)—and, in another dialogue, he mentions those who take the roles of Metiochus or Ninus or Achilles (*Pseudologista* 25). But although it is possible for street performers or mime artists to have popularized novel characters or plot lines, what such performances could have transmitted was an exciting story, not the novels themselves. Therefore, it is scarcely credible that these opportunities to excerpt and condense complex stories would have served as an impetus for the emergence of the genre or sustained its growth.

I have been arguing, in a general way, that the most popular and most persistent view of the readership for ancient novels is not really tenable, given what we know about the social structure of the ancient world. I would now like to descend from that theoretical high road to examine the physical remains of ancient novels themselves to see what, if anything, they tell us about their ancient owners.

The discoveries of fragments of Greek novels on papyrus, some extending to several columns, began in 1896 with the

publication of *Ninus*. Currently, we have, in addition to the five complete Greek novels, tantalizing glimpses of at least seven others (*Ninus*, *Metiochus and Parthenope*, *Calligone*, *Anthia*, *Chione*, *Sesonchosis*, and Lollianus's *Phoenicica*), two to four fragments of Antonius Diogenes, and scraps of a number of others that look to us like novels, although of these too little has survived for certitude. Novel fragments range in date—assigned on the basis of handwriting and format—from the first century A.D. (*Ninus*) to the early sixth century A.D. (Heliodorus).

All of them are now in very fragmentary condition; they were discovered in the refuse heaps and abandoned foundations of the larger towns and urban centers of Greco-Roman Egypt, where thanks to the aridity of the climate, more than five thousand fragmentary rolls and codices of Greek literature have survived in the sands. Finds are not distributed evenly over the eight hundred years of Greco-Roman occupation: most of these literary fragments were copied between the second and fourth centuries A.D. and were excavated from only a limited number of sites. About 75 percent of the novel fragments whose provenance is known have come from Oxy-Hynchus, and most of the remainder from the Faiyum. Though they are now only a tiny sample of what the whole must have been,<sup>16</sup> these papyrus fragments of abandoned or worn-out books, thus preserved, may in their sheer numbers serve as a kind of laboratory to study ancient literary tastes before the winnowing effects of time, taste, and classical scholarship. Relative numbers of surviving authors give some hint, however crude, of their overall significance (or popularity), and an examination of the physical presentation of ancient manuscripts may provide useful clues about the social milieu of their owners.

When the number of fragments of discrete manuscripts of narrative fiction is compared to the number of those of other authors or genres, an interesting picture emerges.

Taken in the aggregate, the number of fragments of this allegedly popular material is surprisingly small. I count forty-two discrete manuscripts of ancient novels. This includes the twenty-eight fragments (ten of which are very dubious) included in *Ancient Greek Novels: The Fragments*,<sup>17</sup> four of Chariton, six of Achilles Tatius, two of Dictys of Crete, one of Heliodorus, and a scrap from Lucian's *Asinus*. No papyri of Xenophon of Ephesus or of Longus, nor of the Latin novels, have as yet been found. Because all these novel fragments were copied between the first and sixth centuries A.D., I have limited my *comparanda* to manuscripts of other authors that were copied during these same six centuries. Using a disinterested tally by Orsolina Montevicchi in *La papirologia*, published in 1973,<sup>18</sup> which is conveniently broken into fifty-year periods, I find that within this same six-century time frame, there are almost four times as many fragments of lyric (161), three times as many of tragedy (131), and slightly more New Comedy and Menander (56).<sup>19</sup> This is a count only of manuscripts copied during this period; texts of canonical authors that were made in earlier periods and continued to be used would increase the numbers of the actual texts available to read.

Nor does comparison with other types of literature taken in the aggregate suggest that novels were any more popular: there are twenty-nine surviving fragments of the *Acts of the Alexandrians*, which was anti-Roman and often anti-Semitic protest literature, written by Alexandrian Greeks and circulated during the first through the third centuries A.D.; forty-three fragments of anonymous philosophical prose; and thirty-four fragments from grammatical or metrical works. However, texts of the Old and New Testament, now including only those copied in the period from the second to the fourth century A.D., readers of which were, by Hägg's assessment, the same as those to whom romance would have appealed, are considerably

more numerous (172). A comparison of individual works produces a similar pattern—Montevecchi lists four manuscripts of Chariton, but eighteen of the *Aetia* of Callimachus, not including the scholia, fifteen of Hermas's *Shepherd* (a second-century Christian homilistic), thirty-seven of Thucydides, and eighty-eight fragments of Demosthenes. A table of further comparisons appears below.

Comparison with the number of fragments of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* provides an even more dramatic contrast. Montevecchi lists 432 texts for the *Iliad* and 122 for the *Odyssey* (and by 1993 the numbers for both were considerably higher). Since both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were employed in schools in the earliest stages of reading, they come as close to popular literature as any ancient text can. However, the survival patterns for manuscripts, even for the *Iliad*, provide an interesting insight into readers' habits. Conventionally one book of the *Iliad* would have been copied onto one papyrus roll. Therefore, if a reader possessed the whole of the *Iliad*, he would have twenty-four discrete rolls. Yet there are twice as many fragments of books 1 and 2 surviving than of books 3 and 4, and the numbers of fragments of the remaining books diminish consistently—fragments from book 24 are one-sixth the total for book 1. This suggests that large numbers of copies of books 1 and 2 owe their existence to their use as school texts, and that the bulk of such readers did not go on to purchase, have copied, or copy for themselves the entire poem.

If I update Montevecchi's data to the present writing, the disparity in number becomes even greater; there are now over 1,000 fragments of Homer published, 120 fragments of Demosthenes, and 77 of Thucydides. With this last author the fiction of popularity is difficult to maintain—Thucydides' Greek can never have been easy to read, nor was he, as Homer was, studied and copied in the grammar schools,

which served to increase the number of copies of an ancient author in circulation; yet on a statistical basis, Thucydides seems to have been among the most widely read prose writers in the ancient world. It is unlikely that the number of his manuscripts is this large only because it reflects a desire to own or display a manuscript with overtly intellectual connotations for purposes of status enhancement. Thucydides began to enjoy a certain vogue from the first century B.C., and his influence among the literary elite can be observed during the Second Sophistic. It is evident in an anonymous rhetorical exercise as early as the first century A.D.,<sup>20</sup> in the extant Greek novelists themselves, and in a writer as late as Procopius. Further, the number of rhetorical themes based on material from his history indicates that he was familiar to the rhetorical theorists and compilers of handbooks, if not to their students in general.<sup>21</sup>

Disparate as the numbers of fragments of novelists and texts of Homer, Demosthenes, and Thucydides are, continuing papyrological publication is likely to increase the gap, because there has been a tendency in all collections to stockpile the fragments of known authors who have well-established texts and are well represented by published fragments for students' dissertations or for collective publication (as the numbers below demonstrate), while editors tend to publish more promptly new and unusual material that expands our understanding of the dimensions of ancient literature. This is not to say that all fragments of ancient novels have already been published, or even correctly identified, but rather to emphasize that they do not exist in current collections in sufficient quantities to alter radically the picture I have set out above. In fact, the relative proportion of novel fragments to those of the canonical writers of antiquity is likely to shrink. A graphic illustration of this can be seen in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, which have published respectively seven fragments of

Theocritus (vol. 50), twelve of Plato (vol. 52), eight of Euripides (vol. 53), ten of Demosthenes (vol. 55), and twenty-one of Thucydides (vol. 57). During this same period, only one new manuscript of Achilles Tatius (or indeed any other novel fragment) has appeared (vol. 55).

It is possible to interpret the statistics I have set out above in a somewhat different way, to argue that they demonstrate that the novels were *more* popular than any other nonreligious or school texts written during or after the period of the Second Sophistic. There are six fragments of Achilles Tatius in total; only four published fragments of Plutarch, although each is from a different work; only two of Strabo, one of Lucian, and one of Libanius. But with such a low statistical sample (1-2-4-6), are we justified in concluding that Achilles Tatius was six times as popular as Lucian, or only that neither Achilles Tatius nor Lucian was much read in comparison to Plato, Demosthenes, or Thucydides?<sup>22</sup> Looking at the material in the aggregate tends to suggest the latter assumption: there are after all about the same number of fragments of philosophical prose (43) as there are of novels (42).

Besides considering the sheer number of manuscripts, it may be possible to conjecture something about the social milieu of owners of ancient manuscripts by examining the formats and writing styles of the novel fragments, and comparing them with material from three distinctly recognizable groups: (1) standard works of the high culture, tragedy, comedy, history, and their commentaries, (2) writings that can be identified as Christian, and (3) works of the not-quite-literate, or the inexperienced, writer. The handwriting of the first group varies from elegant and carefully executed calligraphy to competent but not necessarily attractive writing, to—for commentaries especially—rapidly formed and idiosyncratic cursives. For the second group, C. H. Roberts, in analyzing manuscripts of

the Old and New Testaments, has argued cogently that Christian manuscripts do look rather different in style and format from the works of classical literature. I have dubbed the Christian writing style “reform documentary,” linking it to type to documentary recordkeeping, rather than an elite education or training in the schools of professional copyists.<sup>23</sup> Those who wrote it seem to have adapted a documentary style to literary texts, and sometimes betray their origins with certain linguistic and technical features, the most significant of which is that Christians preferred the codex form to the roll. Often these texts have lettering slightly larger than is usual in non-Christian books, one supposes either to facilitate public reading or to aid those not quite so skilled in private reading. In addition to these, there is a third readily identifiable class—semiliterate productions that have been carelessly copied, full of spelling and other errors. A good number of these are thought to have been the work of schoolboys—writing exercises, word lists, copies of a few lines of Homer; others may have been the exercises of those learning in the scribal schools, or those who wrote inexpertly and therefore, one assumes, infrequently. Inexperienced writers, however, might be able to read quite easily, and if novels were truly popular, we should expect such people occasionally to have copied lines, or even whole texts, from novels. Just as the trade-educated Christians copied sacred books, and schoolboys wrote Homeric word lists, at least a few novel readers should have left a few manuscripts (though by no means the majority) that would betray their origins.

However, in style and layout novel fragments in the aggregate look different both from the early New Testament material and from unskilled productions. I find them to be indistinguishable from rolls or codices of classical authors such as Sappho, Thucydides, Demosthenes, and Plato, not written in the semidocumentary or indeed in the



semiliterate style one might expect. A few of the texts have the look of coffee-table books, handsomely set-out rolls with wide margins written in graceful and calligraphic hands, which might suggest the well-to-do buying the latest literary fad for its social cachet, not necessarily for its intellectual content. But then a number of manuscripts of 1 Iomer or Hesiod or the lyric poets could also fall into this class. A few have the look of scholarly books, like commentaries or the *Constitution of Athens*,<sup>24</sup> that could have been copied by individuals for their own use. But most fall between; they appear to have been competent, professionally copied books, indistinguishable from a run-of-the-mill copy of Demosthenes or Plato. All but a few have been corrected, and apart from such familiar errors in the long tradition of hand copying of manuscripts as haplography, dittography, omission, or miscopying of the exemplar, novel texts are in remarkably good shape.

Some, to be sure, were copied on the backs of previously used rolls, either other literary texts or documents, but this practice is found also in texts we regularly assume to have been the possessions of an intellectual elite; for example, the *Constitution of Athens* was written on the back of a document; Didymus's *Commentary on Demosthenes* was written on one side of a roll,<sup>25</sup> Hierocles' *Stoic Elements* on the other<sup>26</sup>—three texts no one would link with a popular reader or a bourgeois audience. Unfortunately, the habit of recycling allows us to make no deductions about the intellectual or social milieu of the reader.<sup>27</sup> The practice may indicate nothing beyond ancient habits of thrift. Or it may mean that such texts were difficult to acquire from a local bookseller and that interested parties were forced to have private copies made. A letter from the third century A.D. from Oxyrhynchus gives us a glimpse into this process in which one man asks another to procure for him a copy of Hypsicrates's *Kômôdoumenoi* (Those who are subjects for

comedy), indicating its probable location in another man's library.<sup>28</sup> If this inference is correct for novels, then they may have actually been difficult to procure, rather than popular.

That some of the novel fragments are written in the codex, which is a form patently preferred, if not popularized, by Christian copyists, seems to me of little consequence in forging a link between audience and text, although others have tried to do so.<sup>29</sup> While certainly the vast majority of New Testament manuscripts and other Christian literature was written in the codex form as early as the second century A.D., by the fourth century A.D. 90 percent of all books, even those of non-Christian high culture, are found to have been copied in codices. At issue are only those written in the second and third centuries A.D. Thirty-four novel fragments fall between these dates. Of these, only three are in the codex form, or about 9 percent. Seven percent is reported as the average for the non-Christian codices copied during this period,<sup>30</sup> and a variation of 2 percent is surely too small to be deemed significant.

The conclusion seems to me inescapable that the novels were not popular with the denizens of Greco-Roman Egypt—Christian or otherwise. It is possible to dismiss this statistical sampling as atypical, on the ground that reading patterns in the big cities would have been vastly different from the smaller urban centers of the Egyptian countryside. But perhaps this is unwise. Surely Greek towns like Oxyrhynchus would have contained fewer intellectuals than the big cities like Alexandria, and a rather higher percentage of the sort of readers who may be characterized as members of a bourgeois or popular audience. Further, there is a surprising lack of testimony about novels and novel writers in other ancient sources, and apart from a small number of references to books whose contents might be considered salacious, such as Achilles Tatius, Apuleius, Petronius, or the

*Milesiaca*, little is said about novel reading. Christian polemicists, for example, do not caution their flocks against the evils of novel reading, and while Julian can admonish his priests in Asia Minor not to read “love stories” (*erôtikas hypotheseis*), the tenor of his letter (*Epistulae* 89b) does not allow us to infer that “love stories” were any more commonly circulated than texts of high culture, like the plays of Aristophanes, which he also interdicts. The novelists themselves, unlike their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century counterparts, do not show their own characters reading novels. On balance, it does not appear that novels attracted much attention, so in fact Egypt may be quite typical.

While statistics cannot tell us who read novels, they do suggest that Greco-Egyptian readers owned novels with considerably less frequency than they owned copies of Homer, Demosthenes, or Thucydides. Ancient readers of the latter authors we now think of as belonging to “high culture,” and they were at least an existing reading public—a public that in education and in inclination and ability to read and write matches well with the authors of novels themselves, a public for which their contemporaries were writing. No evidence currently available allows us to construct another set of readers for ancient novels. The need to create a different audience for stories we perceive as romantic or fanciful may simply reflect our own cultural prejudices.

#### *Table of Comparisons*

The list includes the number of fragments of individual manuscripts (papyrus or parchment) found in Egypt that can be assigned to the period between the first and sixth centuries a.d., unless otherwise noted. “ + ” means that the figure given is based on incomplete information, and is in all probability higher (though not lower).

Texts taken in the aggregate:

<i>Acts of the Alexandrians</i>	29 +
Grammatical/metrical treatises	34 +
All novel fragments	42 (10 of which are doubtful)
Anonymous philosophical prose	43+
New Comedy	63+
Tragedy	131 +
Lyric	161 +
OT + NT (2-4 only)	172 +

Individual authors or texts (including a number of authors from the classical and Hellenistic periods, a representative sample of Christian texts, and a number of writers, such as Oppian and Strabo, whose *floruit* coincides with that of the novelists):

Favorinus	1
Lucian, <i>Asinus</i>	1
Oppian	2
Strabo	2
Lycophron	3
Philo	3
Aristoxenus	3
Chariton	4
Plutarch	4
<i>Life of Aesop</i>	5
Aratus	5
Achilles Tatius	6
Euripides, <i>Medea</i>	6
<i>Gospel of John</i> (2-4 only)	12
Euripides, <i>Orestes</i>	13
<i>Genesis</i>	14

Hernias, <i>Shepherd</i>	14
<i>Acts of the Apostles</i>	15
Callimachus, <i>Aetia</i>	18
<i>Psalms</i>	30 +
Herodotus	41 +
Thucydides	75 +
Demosthenes	120+
Homer, <i>Iliad</i>	600 +

## NOTES

1. Proponents of this view include B. Egger, T. Hägg, B. E. Perry, and G. L. Schmeling, though recently there has been some movement away from the notion of a popular audience, e.g., E. L. Bowie's assessment in "The Greek Novel," in *The (Jam-bridge) History of Classical Literature*, vol. I, *Greek Literature*, ed. P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox (Cambridge, 1985), 683-99, or B. Wesseling, "The Audience of the Ancient Novels," in *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel*, vol. 1, ed. H. Hofman (Groningen, 1988). See also W. V. Harris's *Remarks in Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 228-29.

2. T. Hägg, *The Novel in Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 90. While Hägg acknowledges that increased literacy did not mean "the general ability to read and write," he does believe the "stratum of Greek or Hellenized citizens" within the empire required a different kind of reading material than its literate predecessors.

3. See, for example, B. Reardon's introduction to *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989), 9, or Bowie, "Greek Novel," 688ff.

4. L. Stone, "Literacy and Education in England, 1640-1900," *Past and Present* 42 (1969): 69-139. Even if the rise of Christianity can be shown to have similarly encouraged the reading of the New Testament, this cannot have taken place early enough to have stimulated the development and growth of the novel.

5. N. Lewis, *Papyrus in Classical Antiquity*, 2d ed. (Brussels, 1974), 133. See also Lewis's update, *Papyrus in Classical Antiquity: A Supplement*, *Papyrologica Bruxellensia*, no. 23 (Brussels, 1989): 40-41.

6. R. MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations* (New Haven, 1974), 89.

7. R. A. Raster, *Guardians of Language: Ithc Grammarians and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988), 35-50.

8. *Laws* 7.809c-810b. Plato's discussion is instructive. He couples learning letters with learning how to play the lyre as two essential features of education. "For a ten-year-old child three years is appropriate for letters, and for lyre playing it is appropriate to start at thirteen and continue for three years ... They must work at letters sufficiently to be able to write and read." A little further on in this passage, however, it is clear that the bulk of ancient literary learning still consisted not of reading but of memorization (810e-811a).

9. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 267.

[10.](#) Ibid., 129-39.

[11.](#) Raster, *Guardians of Language*, 35-50.

[12.](#) See, for example, S. Bartsch's compelling demonstration in *Decoding the Ancient Novel: The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius* (Princeton, 1989) of the way in which the novelists often adapt techniques of description learned in the schools to the exigencies of narrative, or the more technical analysis of M. Reeve, "Hiatus in the Greek Novelists," *Classical Quarterly*, n.s. 21 (1971): 514-39.

[13.](#) For a discussion of the literacy of slaves in this period, see Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 255-59.

[14.](#) W. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven, 1983), 73.

[15.](#) R. MacMullen argues in *Christianizing the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1984) that the major impetus for conversion was Constantine's example, supported by his preference for Christians in positions of responsibility. Before Constantine their numbers were indeed quite small. See esp. 102ff.

[16.](#) An estimate of the number of Greek books in circulation in Greco-Roman Egypt is impossible to make: unknown variables include the percentage of the population who would own books and the average number of books owned. Even estimates of the total population of Egypt and the number of those who could read Greek vary widely.

[17.](#) S. A. Stephens and J. J. Winkler, eds., *Ancient Greek Novels: The fragments* (Princeton, 1993).

[18.](#) O. Montevecchi, *La papirologia* (Milan, 1973), 360-63. Because the most recent edition of *La papirologia* does not include an updated version of these tables, I have relied on the 1973 edition.

[19.](#) My totals for the fragments of ancient novels are actually higher than Montevecchi's 1973 count of this material (ibid.), but since the higher number would tend to work against my thesis, not reinforce it, I have let the disparity stand.

[20.](#) S. A. Stephens, *Yale Papyri in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library*, 2 vols., American Society of Papyrologists Monograph Series, no. 24 (Chico, Calif., 1985), vol. 2, no. 105.

[21.](#) See R. Kohl, *De scholasticarum declamationum argumentis ex historia petitis*, Rhetorische Studien, no. 4 (Paderborne, Germany, 1915), 26-45, and the index to C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* [1832-36], vol. 9 (reprint, Osnabrück, Germany, 1968).

[22.](#) It is also possible to speculate from these statistics that Heliodorus and Longus being less well represented than Chariton or Achilles Tatius indicates an unsophisticated readership. But again the numbers are so small (6-4-1-0) that, e.g., the discovery of two fragments of Heliodorus could radically alter the conclusion.

[23.](#) C. H. Roberts, *Manuscript, Society, and Belief* (London, 1977), 4.

[24.](#) H. J. M. Milne, *Catalogue of Literary Papyri in the British Museum*, 1st ed. (London, 1927), 110. 108.

[25.](#) *Berliner Klassikertexte herausgegeben von der Generalverwaltung der Königlichen Museen in Berlin*, 1st ed., vol. 1, ed. H. Diels and W. Schubart (Berlin, 1904).

[26.](#) *Berliner Klassikertexte herausgegeben von der Generalverwaltung der Königlichen Museen in Berlin*, 1st ed., vol. 4, ed. W. Schubart and H. von Arnim (Berlin, 1908).

[27.](#) For the novel fragments, there are twenty-two with backs blank, eight codices, and twelve written on the backs of other texts or subsequently reused for other texts. I was able to check the formats of thirty-eight manuscripts of Thucydides as a control, and found twenty-six have backs blank, eight are codices, and four are copied onto recycled paper or themselves reused. The larger number of novel fragments on recycled material may mean that novels, relatively speaking, were harder to acquire, or intrinsically less valuable (which is not the same as being “popular”), or it may mean nothing at all.

[28.](#) *POxy*, vol. 18, no. 2192. The letter has been dated to ca. a.d. 170.

[29.](#) For example, Hägg, *Novel in Antiquity*, 95.

[30.](#) C. H. Roberts and T. C. Skeat, *The Birth of the Codex* (Oxford, 1983), 37.



## **LOLLIANOS AND THE DESPERADOES**

‘WITHOUT exaggeration and oversimplification little progress is made in most fields of humanistic investigation.’ With this disarming quotation from A. D. Nock, Albert Henrichs begins his book-length interpretation of P. Colon, inv. 3328.<sup>1</sup> In the same spirit of humanistic progress, I would like to reconsider some aspects of the text and to offer a different assessment of its place in the history of religion and literature.

The fragments are from three pages of a hitherto unknown Greek novel, Lollianos’ *Phoinikika*. Frags A and B luckily include book-ends, from whose subscriptions we know the author and title of the work. Frag, C is just scraps which yield no continuous sense. Frag, A brokenly and confusedly mentions youths, women dancing, (furniture?) being thrown off the roof, sobriety, kissing, and then, in a slightly more intelligible scene, the male narrator’s loss of virginity with a woman named Persis, her gift to him of a gold necklace which he refuses, the assistance of one Glauketes<sup>2</sup> in taking the necklace elsewhere, and finally what seems to be a confrontation between Persis’ mother and the two lovers. This last is similar to Achilles Tatius ii 23–5. Achilles Tatius also offers the closest parallel to frag, B, a ghastly description of human sacrifice and cannibalism. This scene is the focus of most of Henrichs’ interpretation and I will limit myself to it in the present article.

The central question raised by this new novel fragment is how to assess the relative importance of religious and literary parallels. Is the *Phoinikika* to be regarded as a document in religious or in literary history, or perhaps somewhere on the borderland of both? There has been a lively discussion in the last half century of the thesis that the ancient novels were written and read as religious documents, deriving their basic structure and many details from the myths and cults of particular religions. Henrichs devotes most of his book to arguing that the sacrifice scene in Lollianos is inspired by an actual rite, probably of a Dionysian character, and that the *Phoinikika* serves to illuminate a little-known corner of religious history. His views<sup>3</sup> are based on an extensive collection of liturgical, mythical and ethnological

parallels concerning oath rituals, the sacrifice of children, cannibalism, and face-painting. Of all the parallels cited, the two which are closest in every way to Lollianós are Achilles Tatius iii 15 and Cassius Dio lxxi 4. On the strength of these Henrichs asserts that Lollianós' description of a ritual murder represents, more or less directly, the cultic practice of the Egyptian Boukoloi. Without postulating a religious message for the *Phoinikika* as a whole, Henrichs does claim that this scene yields valuable information about the structure of ancient mystery rituals (78 n. 6) and that these new fragments support the methodological correctness of Kerenyi's and Merkelbach's approach to the ancient novels.<sup>4</sup>

A different approach to the interpretation of the ancient novels, which I will argue for, is that which traces the patterns of narrative, the basic plots and formulae of popular entertainment. In this view the motivation of narrative is fundamentally aesthetic rather than religious—a self-standing delight in stories themselves. Raconteurs will of course refer to gods and conventional rites and religious beliefs as they occur naturally in the texture of daily life—it would be impossible to avoid them—but without intending a religious message. The two scholars who have pioneered the study of the ancient novels as narrative structures formed from a long tradition of conventional motifs are Trenkner and Wehrli.<sup>5</sup> They view the novels as part of a much larger field of narrative art whose standard plots are found in many genres—in epic, tragedy, comedy, fable, mythography, mime, and in folk-narrative as recorded by historians and geographers.

Both approaches try to provide a sensible reconstruction of context for the surviving novels and both are conjecturing in the dark. The great silence of the ancient world which hampers research into mystery cults is also a barrier in the area of popular entertainment. For contrary reasons, both mysteries and popular literature are not well known to us in anything like the extent of their actual existence. The silence of serious reverence enshrined the one, the silence of critical disdain dismissed the other. It is important to emphasise at the outset that these two approaches are not entirely exclusive. There is an overlap

between religious structures and narrative entertainment. On the one hand, myths are stories, and a narrator whose purpose is fundamentally religious may make use of story patterns from popular tales. On the other hand, every narrative from Homer to Nonnos refers at some point to the rites, language and beliefs of ancient religions. The point of our analysis is to assess the interaction of religious information and fictional imagination.<sup>6</sup> Since the new text contains an explicit religious ritual, it is an ideal meeting ground on which to test the respective merits of opposing methods of interpretation. I propose to read fragment B of the *Phoinikika* as closer to the little we know of ancient melodrama, mime and thrilling travel tales than to the little we know of mystery cults. In so doing I will argue that the value of its details for the history of mystery religion is about as great as that of the liturgical details in M. G. Lewis' *The Monk* for the history of Roman Catholic monasticism.

The comparison and analysis of narrative formulae rests on the following premises. Behind the surviving examples of narrative there lies an extensive field of oral narrative, most of which is lost to us. Just as colloquial speech provides us with a great store of verbal clichés, so popular narrative is the extensive substratum of plot clichés for literary fiction. All narrative depends on the use of formulae for contriving effective surprise, humour, pathos, character types and adventures. Even to be novel, a narrator must hit an unexpected variation of an already existing theme: originality is an inherently relational concept. From the known examples in many genres we can recover some recurrent structures of popular narrative, the tool-kit of standard plots which the ancients used, varied, and enjoyed for many centuries. The tales of Odysseus to the Phaiakians and the tales of the old shepherds in Longos ii 32 belong to the class of travellers' tales which could have been heard in many inns and harbours of the ancient world. With small variations the same subjects recur, the same types of narrator's exaggeration are found, and the most exciting and outlandish adventures turn out to be members of the same family.

To make the claim of interdependence clearer, let me distinguish three kinds of connection which may be posited among various instances of the same narrative pattern: (1) First, there is sometimes a direct literary dependence, e.g. Euripides' *Kyklops* and *Odyssey* ix. Clearly the ancient novelists show some interdependence of this kind—they read their predecessors. But the fact that this dependence in particular cases eludes proof of priority is very suggestive. This should caution us not only to be careful of such hypotheses but to rethink our notion of such literary dependence. It seems sure that Heliodoros' brigands are as they are in some measure because Heliodoros read Achilles Tatius, yet he read him not as a unique model for direct one-to-one imitation, but rather as an instance or family-member of a wider pattern. To put it crudely: knowing that heroines are regularly captured by brigands in popular fiction and that Leukippe had been captured by Egyptian Boukoloï who lived in a marsh-city, Heliodoros writes a version of that standard plot which uses some of Achilles Tatius' more effective elements (the marsh-city, the destruction of the Boukoloï by the forces of law and order) but does not repeat it as a carbon copy. Narrative formulae group themselves in families like a fairy-ring of mushrooms: Heliodoros, drawn to a particular circle, takes up a new position in the ring which is complementary to the existing members. Both *imitatio* and *variatio* are conscious phases of direct literary dependence.

(2) The second kind of connection between literary versions is that both may come from oral folk-narrative, or one may come from the other only via such narrative. Stories travel—in particular, travellers' stories travel. Sindbad and Odysseus both drive hot stakes into a giant's eye(s): the specificity of detail seems to demand a connection, but it need not be that Shahrazad read Homer. So too the Charition mime (P. Oxy. 413) reproduces the structure of Euripides' *I. T.*, but that does not entail a direct literary dependence. A remarkable example recently discovered is the Greek version of the wise judgement on two mothers claiming the same child.<sup>7</sup> Philiskos (the author in question) probably did not read the first book of Kings, much less the Indian text which contains the same story. In fact this Greek

text quotes the tale explicitly to make the point that stories travel, and that in making the rounds they are attached first to one name, then another. From Solomon to Solon, from Odysseus to Sindbad, persons anonymous carry the tale. The art of narrative is not a privileged art—either as technique or possession—but a freely circulating system of uncopyrighted themes and combinations. Narrators make free use of what they find effective in capturing an audience.

(3) The third explanatory connector of similar literary tales is that, at some level of fundamental experience, it makes sense to say that two stories are alike because the basic elements of the situation described from real life are alike. For instance, the motif of a shore-landing where the heroes are captured by natives and brought somewhere to be disposed of as slaves or victims, which occurs in Eur. *I. T.* and Xenophon's *Ephesiaka* (iii 12.2) and often elsewhere, is so obvious a turn of events that we need not insist that Xenophon knew Euripides' text. The connection between these two literary texts is that they are rooted in the same circumstances of human society—national isolation and xenophobia—and in the same selective powers of human imagination. I mention this form of narrative interdependence through common social experience because it is a tentative approach to a problem that will be dealt with later, namely, discriminating what is true, false, and plausible in a supposedly historical anecdote of Cassius Dio about the Alexandrian Boukoloï (section III). The similarity of that episode with the text of Lollianos' *Phoinikika* frag. B is remarkable, and demands an explanation. As it happens, this novelistic scene is a perfect representative of a narrative formula which runs through ancient fiction from beginning to end, so powerful a pattern that it conditioned the perceptions of historians in serious reports of actual life.

My point of departure is the masquerade adopted by the band of desperadoes (or whatever they are) after they have sacrificed the *pais* (I). I will then analyse the narrative formula of Desperadoes vs Victim in a rite of human sacrifice, as it occurs in this scene and in the other Greek and Latin novels (II). Finally I

will trace the interaction of fictional patterns and historical reporting in some accounts of the Egyptian Boukoloï (III). This is a lengthy treatment to accord to so small a text, but only an extensive comparative method can begin to flesh out the richness of narrative culture that was once the common knowledge of so many ancient readers or listeners.

## I. THE MASQUERADE

To illustrate the comparative method for interpreting popular narrative let us take a single striking detail from the *Phoinikika*. The villains of this piece, after disposing of some corpses, put on robes—some white, some black—swathe their heads, and paint their faces. Those wearing black robes smear ashy soot on their faces, those wearing white robes smear ceruse (cosmetic white lead) on their faces.

καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα χιτῶνας ἐνδύονται, οἱ μὲν λευκοὺς, οἱ δὲ μέλα[νας] λμῶσιν ὁμοίως τὰς  
κεφαλὰς περιειλήσαντες καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα[· οἱ μὲν τὰ ἱμάτια] μέλανα ἔχοντες ἀσβόλῃ, οἱ δὲ τὰ  
λε]υκὰ ψιμυθίῳ ἐχρίοντο. καὶ οὐ[ . . . . αὐτοῦ]ς κοσμήσαντες ἐξήεσαν ἔξω. <οἱ> μὲν τὰ λευκὰ  
ἔχοντες διὰ το[ῦ] . . [ οἱ δὲ τὰ μέλανα διὰ τῆς σελήνης ἐπορεύοντο.

The collection of parallels assembled by Henrichs (63–6) is meant to suggest that the practice here could well be an item of Dionysiac cult. The collection comprises highly disparate facts and texts: an anti-religious satire in an orator of the fourth century B.C., a hunting superstition of modern primitives, an early Christian tract, and a late pagan epic.<sup>8</sup> This is a method of free association, which is very good for generating possible interpretations, but which can never be more than highly suggestive. We must have a rule of relevance,<sup>9</sup> and for a narrative out of context the first rule is that we must rely not on individual items in isolation but on coherent sequences which can be paralleled in other types of literature. Thus, if we were to find a text which, like the *Phoinikika* frag B., presented us with a group of men, perhaps desperate and villainous as these seem to be, who are marked as resisting authority (whether by oath, as in the *Phoinikika*, or otherwise), who act orgiastically in some fashion and then after an interval of rest dress up and make their way after midnight somewhere else in disguise—*then* we would

have a parallel sequence, a narrative pattern of several events in succession, which would duplicate the masquerade-scene in Lollianos. The individual details may be different: we would expect that an author using a narrative formula would try to vary the details.

There is such a scene. The sequence of events leading to this masquerade is nearly identical with the scene at Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* iv 22. In both cases we find a band of desperate men, sworn to resistance against civil authority, hard-drinking and lusty fellows. After a heavy meal many fall asleep or are ready to do so, but some (in Apuleius, all except the old woman) dress up to go out on their nightly business as brigands. Apuleius does not describe their precise appearance as Lollianos does, but he does tell us what their masquerade meant: they dress up as ghosts—*et ecce nocte promota latrones expergiti castra commovent instructique varie, partim gladiis armati, partim in lemures reformati concito se gradu proripiunt*.

The situations in Lollianos and Apuleius are virtually identical: the time (dead of night), the characters (desperate men), their action (slipping away from their hideout), even the sequence of carousing<sup>10</sup> followed by a time for sleep followed by dressing up to prowl. What is going on here? The brigands intend to frighten travellers at night by appearing to be dangerous spectres. Night is the time of terror, especially for wayfarers, and the dangers are both realistic (brigands are afoot) and superstitious.<sup>11</sup> Ghosts and robbers are equivalent dangers to travellers at night: thus amulets described by Pliny and Kyranides are valid against both—*pedem (sc. hyaenae) e prioribus dextrum pelle hyaenae adalligatum sinistro bracchio contra latrocinia terroresque nocturnos pollere*, N.H. xxviii 115, cf. xxviii 98; *θεύξεται πᾶς δαίμων τὸν φοροῦντα καὶ λησταί καὶ θηρία*, Kyranides iii 3 5 (= de Mély 87.1); *ἀποστρέφει γὰρ κεραννούς, κινδύνους, βασκανίαν, δαίμονας, ληστὰς καὶ νυκτερινὰ συναντήματα* iv 21.3 (= de Mély 121-3).<sup>12</sup> The dangerous phantoms whom one might meet at night are of many kinds: spectral armies, Hekate leading her troop of dogs and spirits, single demons or dead men returned to haunt the living.<sup>13</sup>



Since the association of black night with ill omen and hellish phantoms is so obvious (as Strabo remarks, iii 2.12), Apuleius' bandits can rely on the power of popular superstition to protect themselves. Hence it is a rule (*ex disciplina sectae*, iv 18) for them to travel by night, and a calculated part of their protective discipline is that some<sup>14</sup> are costumed as *lemures*.<sup>15</sup> They are also playing on popular superstitions when they store their booty in a tomb (iv 18, 21). A typical scene of terror is the capture of Charite at the crossroads when the bandits, still disguised as ghosts, surround her and speak thus of the terrors of the night: *quorsum istam festinanti vestigio lucubratiss viam nec noctis intempestae manes larvasque formidatis?* (vi 30 = *Ortos* 24.2). Night is the time, they remind her, when evil ghosts stalk the world—and so do robbers safely disguised as ghosts. But what exactly do Apuleius' desperadoes look like in their ghostly disguise as *lemures* (iv 22), as *manes larvasque* (vi 30)? Could the disguise of the desperadoes in Lollianios be taken as motivated precisely in order to let them pass as ghosts? I shall show that in ancient ghost lore frightening spooks were often described in ways which correspond to the masquerade in Lollianios—as all-black and as all-white.

But first we must examine a supplement to the text at line 30: *διὰ το[ῦ] ἡλίου*. This was proposed by Burkert, accepted by Henrichs, and has been defended by Koenen.<sup>16</sup> The time of the scene is midnight: *ἐπ[ε]ὶ δὲ νύκτε μέσαι ἦσαν*, 23. (The corresponding scene in Apuleius begins: *et ecce nocte promota*, iv 22). The masqueraders first disrobe the corpses, then dress up themselves and go out. The text in line 29 seems clearly to indicate that the entire group left together (*ἐξήεσαν ἕξω*) but followed different paths: the ones in white through the (?), the ones in black through the moonlight. The suggestion that the first group walked in sunlight—preserves the contrasts (white/black::sunlight/moonlight), but at the expense of importing other difficulties. To answer the obvious objection that sunlight and moonlight are not visible at the same time, Henrichs compares the mystical experience of Lucius during initiation: *nocte media vidi solcm candido coruscantem lumine* (*Met.* xi 23). But that is a cosmic journey through the lower and

upper reaches of the universe (*per omnia vectus elementa remeavi ... deos inferos et deos superos accessi coram et adoravi de proximo*, xi 23), whereas the goal of this group journey is merely a goldsmith's workshop (*χρυσοχόου ἐργαστήριον*, 34). Koenen more realistically suggests that the group in white waited some hours till sunrise, but this requires a very awkward inversion ('... having dressed themselves thus they went out. The ones in white [waited for dawn and went out] through the sunlight, the ones in black proceeded [at once] through the moonlight'). It is possible to preserve the obvious sense of line 29, that the entire group departed at once, by imagining the scene as identical to that in Apuleius iv 22—a night-time sortie in bright moonlight. When the full moon is shining, open areas, fields and country roads may be brightly lit while alleyways, woods and ravines are still quite dark. I visualise the black-faced, black-robed robbers stalking through the moonlight trying to look like scary phantoms, and the white-faced, white-robed robbers slithering through the darkness, also ghostlike. If the house is located in a town, the whitened villains make their way along back alleys; if the house is located in the wilder countryside, as Apuleius' cave is (iv 6), they move through the woods or on the dark side of the mountains. A supplement, *exempli gratia*, which gives this sense easily is *διὰ το[ῦ] σκό[τους]*.<sup>17</sup> But whatever non-moonlight shone on the whitened desperadoes, the important point is that their purpose is not religious but criminal and that they rely on popular superstition to terrify. This is achieved in two ways: by their colouring and by the vagueness of their outline, wearing loose robes in conditions of low visibility. To show that Lollian's masqueraders would have seemed terrifying, we must ask what ancient ghosts looked like.<sup>18</sup>

### *The colour of ghosts*

Pictures and descriptions of ghosts are not easy to come by. Each of the following examples which contains an actual ghostly description is a precious fragment and should be taken as a token of the vast substratum of lost literature—tales told by nurses to children, by travellers on a journey, by dinner companions, by professional entertainers. Of course, the evidence submits to no rigid system, in part because ghostly apparitions are amorphous,<sup>19</sup> and in part because the point of the tale is simply to excite pleasurable terror. Of all the appearances which were used to arouse fear in an audience, three are relevant here: pure black, pure white and smoke-like.

Pausanias (vi 6.7–11) reports a picture representing the story at Temesa of the ghost or hero who had been one of Odysseus' sailors, a wicked spirit whose haunting reflected his own wicked life and his violent, untimely death. When Odysseus landed at Temesa, this sailor had raped a maiden, and for that was stoned to death by the natives. In the picture the *daimon* was *δεινὸς μέλας*, scary black, and his entire look was frightening.<sup>20</sup> A *phasma/daimon* haunting a house in one of Lucian's tales is rough and long-haired and blacker than darkness (*αὐχμηρός καὶ κομήτης καὶ μελάντερος τοῦ ζόφου*, *Philops.* 31). In the *Acta Joamiis*<sup>21</sup> a priest's son who is resurrected tells how an 'Ethiopian' rose up from the pool of a bath-house and strangled him. A female demon appears in the *Acts of Peter* 22: 'a woman exceeding foul, in sight like an Ethiopian, not an Egyptian, but altogether black and filthy, clothed in rags, and with an iron collar about her neck and chains upon her hands and feet, dancing.'<sup>22</sup> A demon in the *Passio Bartholomaei* is very hairy, dog-faced,<sup>23</sup> has eyes glowing like coals, and his colour is black: *ὡς Αἰθίοπα μαῦρον ὡς ἡ ἀσβόλη*.<sup>24</sup> Frightening apparitions on this low level of popular superstition in Europe continued to include black persons for a long time. Summarizing the demonology of saints' legends in the 9th to nth centuries, Joannou remarks that after serpents and other beasts, 'la forme humaine la plus fréquente, e'est assurément celle d'un nègre ...',<sup>25</sup>

Not only are demonic beings black but so too are the unquiet dead. Shades in the underworld, itself a place of gloom and darkness where everything is black,<sup>26</sup> may roam the earth at night: *nocte vagae ferimur, nox clausas liberat umbras, errat et abiecta Cerberus ipse sera* (Prop, iv 7.89 f.). A description of such revenants as black, appearing *en masse* like Apuleian desperadoes, is implied in the opening scene of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*. Charikleia, sitting with her wounded lover Theagenes on the beach amidst a litter of dead bodies, is surprised by a group of men who sneak up behind her. When she looks up her first thought is that they are ghosts of the men slain around her (εἶδωλα τῶν κειμένων.). She reaches this conclusion because of the men's black colour and squalid, unkempt look: μέλανας ἰδονσα τὴν χροιάν καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐχμηρούς. In fact they are Egyptian desperadoes.<sup>27</sup> This scene exemplifies all three of the important points that should be made about the Greco-Roman attitudes to actual black persons.<sup>28</sup> (i) In the stories where a black person is taken for a demon or ghost, it is not just the skin colour that is frightening but the ominous circumstances. Charikleia's encounter with the desperadoes is sudden, startling, and in the aftermath of widespread death.<sup>29</sup> (ii) It is not simply black skin colour which is frightening in ominous circumstances but other visible features—unkempt hair, squalor, a ferocious look. Heliodoros' brigands are τὴν ὄψιν αὐχμηρούς; see also the examples quoted earlier.<sup>30</sup> (iii) Sensible persons mark this fear as childish and superstitious.<sup>31</sup> After being caught off guard for an instant, Charikleia realizes that the black men are brigands, not ghosts, and adjusts her attitude to realistic resignation. She is, like Chariton's heroine, a very mature person, not a child or childish-minded adult who is frightened by ghosts or ghost stories.<sup>32</sup>

A second category of frightening appearance is pure white skin—not the olive to pink of Mediterranean men and women but pallid, chalky, bloodless, corpse-like white. The Greek examples of this, for some reason, are rather fewer than the Latin. In Aristophanes' *Ploutos* 422–5 Penia has the look of an Erinyes from the tragic stage—pallid (ὥχρά) and with a manic look, ὥχρός is the bloodless skin colour of corpses (Philostr. *Imag.* ii 10.3), of

sleepers (Plut./r. 178 Sandbach, Loeb XV 320, in a comparison of sleep to death), and of underworld shades (Lucian *Menip.* 21). Apollonios' Argonauts in deep despair lose their colour and look like spectres: *χύτο δὲ χλόος ἀμφί παρειάς / οἶον δ' ἀψύχοισιν ἐοικότες εἰδώλοισιν / ἀνέρες εἰλίσσονται ἀνὰ πτόλιν* (iv 1279 ff.). See also Hdt. viii 27 and Iamblichos *Babyloniaka*, cited below. On the Latin side, at Apul. *Met.* ix 29, a witch summons up a *larva*, the ghost of a woman who had been violently killed. She appears (ix 30) as ghastly pale (*lure buxéo*) and painfully thin (*macie foedata*), virtually a walking corpse. This look of death is just as frightening as pure black skin, and either one can be used to excite superstitious fear. Horace describes the witches Canidia and Sagana: *pallor utrasque / fecerat horrendas aspectu* (*Sat.* i 8.25 f.).<sup>33</sup>

As with blackness, the fright of whiteness lies not simply in the colour but in a certain look, a set of appearances, principally dryness and emaciation, which together suggest the look of a skeleton or withered corpse. Though few firm distinctions can be made in this area, there is evidently in the Latin texts an association of *lemures* with black<sup>34</sup> and of *larvae* with white. *Larva* (*lis*) refers to white skeletons<sup>35</sup> and to bloodless, dried up corpses.<sup>36</sup> We also find the word *larva* without a description,<sup>37</sup> and the living-dead description without the word.<sup>38</sup> To be so frightened by seeing a ghost that one turns white and mindless—like a zombie—is also denoted by *larva*'<sup>39</sup> Just as everything in the underworld can be called black, so it can just as well be called pallid, bloodless, white.<sup>40</sup> Evidently the common denominator of pure black and pure white appearances is that both are unnatural, unhealthy, even death-like conditions for olive-skinned Mediterraneans.<sup>41</sup>

If these two categories go a long way to justifying the interpretation of Lollianos' masquerade as a ghostly disguise, they still fall short in certain ways. For while it is fairly common to find black robes mentioned as frightening, and to encounter a pallid spectre in a black robe, we have no examples of white-faced spectres in white robes.<sup>42</sup> To explain this as a terrifying appearance, we must turn to a third category: the dim outline of

a shimmering spectre seen in conditions of low visibility, in mist, smoke or darkness. I take the point of Lollianos' desperadoes' masquerade to be the phantom look of a moving shape barely discerned—black figures in moonlight, white figures in darkness: *simulacra modis pallentia miris / visa sub obscurum noctis* (Verg. G. i 477 f). The description of revenants, ghosts and demons as smoke, clouds, dream-shapes or shadows is familiar throughout Greek and Latin literature.<sup>43</sup> Scenes of terror are therefore often set in shifting light, like that of a candle flickering.<sup>44</sup> Perhaps the best approach to this phenomenon is by way of Aristotle's analysis of dream-phantoms (*de somniis* 2–3). Beginning with various types of misleading sense impression, Aristotle focuses eventually on depressed states of awareness due to darkness or drowsiness. Minute visual impressions seem in the darkness to be real shapes with life-like movement. In our sleep or half-sleep we over-interpret residual sense-impressions as one sees shapes in the clouds or in the random cracks in a wall. And, as usual, we find the fearful interpretation of these phantoms assigned to children rather than to adults: 'to some young people, even if their eyes are wide open and it is dark, many moving εἰδῶλα appear, so that they often cover their heads in fright' (462a 12–15).<sup>45</sup>

Given this body of folk beliefs about what frightening appearances are associated with ghosts and demons, we may turn now to evidence about frightening masquerades. I include here both the little bit of relevant evidence about stage ghosts and the stories of impersonating a ghost to terrorize someone. For white-faced phantoms in Greek tragedy we have, besides the tragic Erinys at Ar. Pl. 422–4, Pollux' description of a pallid young man's mask: ὁ δ' ὠχρὸς σφριγανός ἐστι ταῖς σαρκὶ καὶ πρίκομος, ὑπόξανθος, νοσώδης τὴν χροιάν, οἷος εἰδῶλῳ ἢ τραυματίᾳ πρόπειν (iv 137). (The association of dry emaciation and pallid white in descriptions of wounded or sick persons and ghosts supports T. B. L. Webster's suggestion φρυγανός, 'withered', 'like dry firewood', in place of the unlikely σφριγανός, 'plump': *Festschr. A. Rumpf* (Krefeld 1952) 145 n. 29.) On the Roman stage, the whitened mask mentioned at juv. iii 175 f. may represent a ghost: *cum personae pallentis hiatum / in gremio*



*matris formidat rusticus infans*. At least it supports the connection between whitened faces and childish fear. For black faces and clothes on stage ghosts, we have the Bobbio scholiast's comment on *pro Sestio* 126 (ed. Hildebrant p. 102): the ghost of Polydorus appears creeping low' along the stage, *sordidatus et lugubri habitu, ut solent qui pro mortuis inducuntur*. The mournful costume is probably black, as for a funeral; the face is at least partially blackened (*sordidatus*). That shades of the dead were acted in black is also indicated by the ominous rehearsal, just before Caligula's death, of a play set in the underworld, acted by Egyptians and Ethiopians (Suet. *Calig.* 57).

We are on much more solid ground in the area of stories about impersonating a phantom in order to frighten someone. Kallimachos *h. Art.* 69: Hermes impersonates a bogey, blackening his face to scare children, *σποδιῇ κεχριμένος αἰθῇ*. To frighten Demokritos, who was spending nights in a tomb, some young men dressed up as black-robed skeletons and performed a *Totentanz* around him: image (This seems to imply that skull masks were available for some theatrical performances, at least by the time of Lucian, who has the tale at *Philops.* 32). Another *Totentanz* is recorded by Cassius Dio lxxvii 9: at Domitian's dinner party the serving boys, naked and painted black like ghosts, *ὥσπερ εἰδῶλα* entered the blackened room and danced to frighten the guests. Plutarch's account of Damon (*Kim.* 1) is complex, including at various stages a black disguise, brigandage and the frightening spectre of one untimely dead. The material is drawn from oral tradition at Chaironeia (*ὥς οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν λέγουσι*). The descendants of Damon there are still known as Asbolomenoi, 'Sootfaces'. Though Damon's appearance as a brigand and as a ghost is not described, he is said to have blackened his face for an assassination. This act inaugurated his life of crime, and we seem to have here a latent image of a black brigand and a black ghost in Chaironeian folklore.<sup>46</sup>

We come still closer to the action of Apuleius' brigands in four stories of *strategemata*, ruses in war, which involve frightening disguises in black or white by large groups of people: Hdt. viii 27



(γυνῴσας ἄνδρας ἑξακοσίους . . . καὶ τὰ ὄπλα αὐτῶν: the attack takes place at night, the Thessalian watchmen take fright, thinking it a supernatural visitation),<sup>47</sup> Tac. *Germ.* 43.5 (black shields and bodies, *atras ad proelia noctes legunt ipsaque formidine atque umbra feralis exercitus terrorem inferunt, nullo hostium sustinente novum ac velut infernum aspectum*), Tac. *Ann.* xiv 30 (women in black robes like Furies, Roman troops paralysed with fear), Dio xlii 11.2 (w omen in black robes and carrying torches, attack by night, thought to be some kind of demons). Three of these scenes, like the masquerades in Apuleius and Lollianós, are set in the night and the major cause of fear is the preternaturally white or black colour of faces and clothes in low visibility.

An excellent, but unplanned, ruse occurs in another Greek novel of the second century a.d. The hero and heroine of Iamblichos' *Babyloniaka* (Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 94 p. 74b 31-41), being chased by the king's soldiers, take refuge in the house of a brigand whose custom it is to slaughter and eat his guests. Though the details are not perfectly clear from Photios' summary, the scene which ensues is one of the best cliff-hangers in all ancient melodrama. While they are being threatened with death and cannibalism inside the house, the king's soldiers arrive and set fire to it to smoke out the brigand. Rhodanes and Sinonís, trapped on every side, manage to escape destruction in the burning house by using the bodies of slaughtered asses to form a bridge (*cf.* Hdt. ii 107, Porph. *Vita Pythag.* 57). When the soldiers catch sight of them and shout 'Who goes there?', they moan in reply—ghosts of those slain by the brigand. The soldiers are convinced of their supernatural reality and are terrified. Fortunately Photios has recorded what they looked like, and it is a fine variation on the principles already outlined. They are pallid (ὠχρότητι) and tenuous (λεπτότητι). Since Rhodanes and Sinonís are not in themselves pale or emaciated persons, what we are to visualize is a night scene, lit by the flickering fire of the burning house or its smouldering embers, which makes them seem to have a deathly pale colour and a shimmering outline.<sup>48</sup>

I have outlined a broad pattern of narrative expectations: night-time is ghost-time; frightening ghosts are regularly achromatic (black, white or smoke-like) and elusive to clear sight; disguise as a band of spectres is a familiar and effective *strategema*. This ruse is used by the desperadoes in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* in a narrative sequence whose structure is parallel to that in Lollianos *fr. B*. I interpret the two texts as complementary: we know from Apuleius what Lollianos' desperadoes were doing in disguise, and from Lollianos what Apuleius' desperadoes may have looked like. The *Phoinikika*'s importance at this point is not as a document in *Religionsgeschichte* supplementing our knowledge of ceremonial dress,<sup>[49](#)</sup> but in *Erzählformgeschichte*, and more precisely in *Gespentergeschichte*.

### *Liturgical considerations*

In addition to these positive parallels, there are negative considerations which tell against a religious-symbolic interpretation of the masquerade in Lollianós. We cannot, of course, successfully rule out a religious sense simply because the motif is widespread in non-religious narrative, for an author might make use of standard thrilling situations from popular narrative and also invest them with a religious meaning. But if the *Phoinikika* is a work of popular fiction, written for persons of no great sophistication,<sup>50</sup> then it is fair to ask what could be the meaning of this ceremonial attire in terms of conventional liturgy. It appears that against the background of ordinary religious practices and taboos the masquerade described in Lollianós is very odd.

First, there is no parallel for the initiation of robed persons *en masse* rather than individually.<sup>51</sup> Second, Lollianós' masquerade includes two elements—face-painting and costume. The only parallel offered which combines both of these is a scholion on Lykophron 1131, according to which maidens may escape their suitors by taking refuge in a sanctuary and anointing their faces with a *pharmakon* and donning black robes. Compared with the parallels from popular narrative, this is weak, obscure, and inappropriate. The most important religious difficulty, however, is the contrast of black and white robes in the same ceremonial context. Not only is there no parallel for this,<sup>52</sup> but it is quite anomalous. The ordinary prescriptions for ceremonial purity often include a requirement of white clothing, and this is not infrequently expanded by a specific ban on black or otherwise dyed clothing. Theodor Wächter<sup>53</sup> gives numerous examples of such ceremonial practice. Note especially Euripides *fr.* 472N<sup>2</sup> concerning Zagreus. The gods involved in Wachter's examples are both celestial (Zeus, Athena, Apollo, Asklepios, Isis, Herakles) and chthonic (Dcmctcr, Persephone, Trophonios). To his list one may add Pausanias ii 35.5 (Argive festival of Demeter Chthonia) and Plutarch *Q. Rom.* 26. Plutarch, commenting in the latter passage on a Roman custom, gives some valuable information about symbolic associations that any Hellene might feel: 'Do

women in mourning wear white robes and white head-dresses perhaps as people say the *magoi* do, in opposition to Hades and the darkness, and likening themselves to what is light-filled and bright?' Evidently the feeling behind such ceremonial restrictions is a primitive one, and therefore likely to occur as a motif in popular narrative as well as in folk-religion.<sup>54</sup>

Finally we must remark that the whole discussion of a possible religious meaning for the black and white costumes arises because the motif occurs near a scene of sacrificial ceremony. But notice how far removed is the masquerade from the sacrifice. It takes place well *after* the murder, not before or during that ceremony; an orgy intervenes between the murder and the masquerade; and finally only some of those involved in the ritual murder stay awake for the masquerade. Also the murder and oath were the dramatic climax of a book, just as the narrator's first sexual experience was the climax of the first book, and what follows in the next book does not seem an integral part of the ceremony. If the masquerade took place before and during the 'infanticide', a reminiscence of the Titans' attack with whitened faces on the infant Zagreus would at least begin to be possible.<sup>55</sup> But its occurrence hours afterward as a preliminary to departure elsewhere rules out the Titans altogether. In looking for the intelligibility of ancient narratives and the context in which they may best be appreciated, we must pay attention in the first place to structural patterns and sequences of events, not isolated details. In this case at least we have a fully satisfying interpretation based on a parallel sequence from Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*.

## II. DESPERADOES AND THEIR VICTIM

Though the masquerade here does not form part of a religious ritual, there is no doubt that the human sacrifice of a *pais*<sup>56</sup> is described with ceremonial exactitude. But in terms of normal religious practice it too is anomalous. I will comment on this scene, as I did the masquerade, both negatively, showing its disharmony with ancient religious practice, and positively, offering parallels from popular, non-religious narrative.

Bloody sacrifices are usually divided into two distinct classes: (1) those in which the flesh is eaten and (2) those in which the whole victim is destroyed and not eaten. Class (1) includes most daily sacrifices offered in thanks, celebration or for the usual requests which people make to divine powers. Class (2), usually called *σφάγια*,<sup>57</sup> includes offerings to the chthonic deities, heroes and other dead persons, sin-offerings, offerings to ratify or confirm an oath and appeasements of divine wrath. These two classes are exclusive. In the rare and highly shocking cases where a human victim is sacrificed, the ritual is not a meal but a *sphagion*.<sup>58</sup> A typical case is Arrian i 5.7: the enemy of Alexander sacrifice three boys, three girls and three black rams; when the Macedonians draw near, the enemy retreat, leaving the *sphagia* behind them. This is a desperate measure, a conscious violation of the normal taboo on human sacrifice. Its purpose is to pollute the Macedonians by forcing them to cross an unhallowed spot. Exactly the same motif is found in Achilles Tatius iii 19: Leukippe is to be sacrificed as a purification of the brigands themselves and her body is to be left in place *ὥς ἂν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στρατόπεδον ὑπερβάλῃ τῆς θυσίας τὸν τόπον*, 'so that the enemy army would pass over the place of the sacrifice'.<sup>59</sup> What is fictional about the liturgy in Achilles Tatius and Lollianios is the violation of two taboos—a human sacrifice (which sometimes occurred) and eating the victim of a *sphagion-sacrifice*. The offerings in Achilles Tatius and Lollianios both belong to the class of *sphagia* (*καθάρσιον τοῦ στρατοῦ*, A.T. iii 12; ratification of an oath<sup>60</sup> in Lollianios). That the victim of such a ceremonial offering should be human is extraordinary and shocking; that this or any *sphagion* should be eaten is a violation of the meaning of the ceremony; that both should occur together marks the description as fiction.

The ceremonial details of this scene (death, removal of the heart, cooking it, cutting it in half, wetting it with oil, dividing it into portions, drinking the blood) are carefully described, but that in itself is not enough to justify regarding it as a report of an *actual* ceremony, any more than its closest parallel, A.T. iii 15, which is also a careful description of most of the same elements. The slow accumulation of authentic-seeming details is also an

effective method for creating an illusion of horror. Such details to be sure are not invented *ex nihilo*; their possible sources and meaning will be discussed below. But first I want to establish that the general structure of this narrative is a formula of popular fiction and is not in essence (though it may be *per accidens*) religious. The formula is that of a victim facing a horrible fate at the hands of villains. There are seven certain and two less certain instances of this formula in ancient novels. Some of these scenes have, like that in Lollianos, a ritual character, and in reviewing them I will particularly note how the role of 'religious' details in the ceremony is optional and variable and how the essential design of the scene is melodramatic.

(i) In A.T. iii 15, Leukippe is sacrificed. The ritual is over-determined: it is a sin-offering, it is a pollution on the enemy, and it is a fulfilment of an oracle which demanded the sacrifice of a virgin (that is, a novel-heroine). The hero Kleitophon and the reader must both observe the hideous ceremony helplessly. Later we learn that it was rigged, and that each of the requirements laid down for the rite happened to be such as to maximize suspense and horror and yet to make possible the heroine's survival.<sup>61</sup> The two bandits who did the actual slaughter turn out to be friends of the hero, who had equipped Leukippe with a false stomach pouch filled with blood and animal guts. By using a conveniently discovered trick sword whose blade collapses into the hilt, they had stage-managed the scene to fool the bandits. The purpose of the ritual description is to make the audience's blood run cold; the various violations of taboo have in common precisely their melodramatic purpose. The entire episode has been composed not to show us the actual religious life of some particular Egyptians but to shock and titillate the average Greek reader by an extravagant Grand Guignol.

(ii) Xenophon of Ephesus uses this narrative formula, as he uses many others, twice in the course of his work. Hippothoos' first gang (ii 13) discover Anthia after she has been shipwrecked and is wandering in a dense wood where they have their lair. She is to be offered as a sacrificial victim to Ares according to a fixed

rite of this group: namely, she is to be suspended from a tree and used as a target for their spears.<sup>62</sup> This makes sense as pure melodrama, but the effect is heightened by underlining the religious meaning of the excruciating and shocking rite: hitting the target is a sign of Ares' favourable response to the individual outlaw. The victims of this religious devotion are sometimes animal, sometimes human. Since in this case the victim is not only human but a novel-heroine, we are not surprised when a law enforcement group arrives in the nick of time to save Anthia. It would seem that here too the invocation of supposedly religious customs is strictly subordinated to the narrative effect (thrilling peril) rather than being used for its independent religious content.

(iii) Anthia is captured again by bandits (iv 5 f.), a different group (iii 3.6, iv 1.3) but also led by Hippothoos. This time their reason for consigning her to a cruel death is to punish her for defending herself against a rapist in the group. Nominally this band is different from the former one, but in terms of dramatic function they are identical. Under the leadership of the same captain, both bands live by ferocious brigandage and both are pursued to the death by the forces of law and order. Each time most are killed, a few taken alive, and Hippothoos alone escapes. There are many such narrative doublets in the *Ephesiaka*, and just as one would not hesitate to group other characters and situations by similar functions<sup>63</sup> or to identify even single episodes as well-known patterns from the field of ancient narrative art,<sup>64</sup> so one should not hesitate to consider Anthia's Death-at-the-Hands-of-Desperadoes as a single narrative ploy. The manner of impending death and the motive are different in the two versions; indeed, there must be some such variation in details or the pattern could not be effectively repeated.

This comparison of Xen. *Eph.* ii 13 and iv 5 f. shows conclusively, I believe, that the essential nexus designed by the author is that of Innocent Heroine vs Unscrupulous Outlaws, and the confrontation between them is a scene of portended, gruesome death. The religious ritual of the former scene has the *same function* as Anthia's act of self-defence in the later scene:



they are two conventionally plausible reasons for tying Anthia to the railroad tracks.

(iv) The same motive—punishment of the heroine because she has resisted the robber band—is found in Apuleius and the *Onos*. The heroine is to be killed in a horrible fashion because she has tried to escape from them (*Met.* vi 31 f. = *Onos* 25 f.). Comparison of the punishments in Apuleius and Xenophon sheds light on another variable element in the formula. Charite is to be sewn up in the eviscerated carcass of Lucius the ass and exposed on a rock, there to suffer the torments of maggots, heat and wild animals devouring her alive. Anthia is to be locked up with two monstrous Egyptian dogs in a covered trench. Both, that is, are to be eaten alive—the one by ravenous dogs, the other by worms, dogs and vultures (*morsus ferarum, cum vermes membra laniabunt ... cum canes et vultures intima protrahent viscera*, vi 32).<sup>65</sup> In the family of tales which place a victim in ultimate peril it is only a small variation to have the victim eaten by wild animals or by wild humans.<sup>66</sup> Both are inhuman enough to be agents of a ‘fate worse than death’, when the God of Melodrama so wills it. The story-pattern is the same, but in the case just cited there is no semblance of religion. This suggests that from the point of view of narrative formulae, the religious or ritual character of the Desperate Situation is an optional enhancement, not a fundamental requirement.

(v) At. T. v 7, Leukippe is kidnapped on the island of Pharos by sailors in the pay of Chaireas, who has fallen in love with her. As they are sailing away, Kleitophon and the police pursuing them in a second boat see the desperadoes decapitate Leukippe and let her body fall into the sea. In the time it takes to recover her headless trunk, the villains have escaped. In terms of popular melodrama, such shocking scenes are evidently much sought after, but they do not occur entirely without plausibility or motivation internal to the requirements of the story. In this case the reason for the desperate men’s action against the heroine is not religion, not punishment, but simply the need to get the authorities off their trail. Part of the motivation of the earlier ‘death’ of Leukippe, (i) above, was similarly to thwart the

pursuing authorities, but that instance was conflated with a religious motive.

(vi) Heliodoros' versions of this situation show small but interesting variants. At the end of Book i, Charikleia is in the hands of Egyptian bandits. She has pretended to agree to marry Thyamis the bandit chief; she has not been threatened with a gruesome death-ritual. At the height of a battle with another group of brigands, it becomes clear to Thyamis that he is destined not to marry Charikleia but to kill her. The oracle in his dream had said 'You will have her but not have her, you will slay her but she will not be slain'. He had earlier decided to take this as a telling metaphor for marriage, now he understands it as an injunction to kill her. The motivation at this point is multiple, for the author comments that barbarians regularly do that sort of thing—kill their loved ones at the height of a battle—perhaps out of their mistaken belief that they will be reunited after death ( τὸ βάρβαρον ἦθος . . . προαναιρεῖν ἅπαν τὸ φίλον εἴωθεν, ἥτοι συνέσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ μετὰ

θάνατον ἀπατῶμενον. i 30.6). If we take only the first motive into account (Thyamis' conscious fulfilment of the oracle), this (apparent) murder is not a group act of many desperadoes against a heroine in the same way as the others. But the second motivation brings it completely into line with the formula: Charikleia has fallen into the hands of desperate men, *the sort who* kill innocent women according to a custom of their tribe, a custom which is connected with a religious belief in personal survival. Both motivations then are connected after a fashion with religion: the first is the enactment of a deceptive oracle, the second is obedience to a mistaken belief. Heliodoros has, like other romancers, invoked a subsidiary religious colouring to heighten the effect of his scene, but he has made it clear that such 'religion' as is involved is a sham.<sup>67</sup>

(vii) At the end of Book ix, Charikleia and Theagenes are captured by the Aithiopians and led off to be sacrificed as the first fruits of the victory. The Aithiopians paradoxically are the most just people on earth and yet they retain a custom of primitive savagery—the rite of human sacrifice—whose abolition is the climax of the novel. That is, they function as menacing strangers just like a bandit gang to the hero and heroine, but

they realize that there is no good reason for that rite and decide to renounce it forever. This a lovely moment of mutual conversion: Charikleia becomes the Aithiopian princess she was born to be and the Aithiopians lay down the one trace of savagery which had cast them in the role of her enemy.

The religiosity which motivates the impending sacrifice is denounced as barbaric, and this denunciation implicitly underlies all the scenes of Desperado vs Victim which happen to contain a religious motif. Such an event is intrinsically shocking: *therefore* we find it rather often in the type of scene I have outlined. But though it marks a heightening of horror and melodramatic tension, a religious motif is not an essential component of the standard narrative pattern.

I put these seven (eight, including Lollianos) episodes side by side because they are generated by the same narrative formula: Innocent Victim vs Cut-throat Gang, culminating in a scene of gruesome execution. The definition could of course be drawn differently, since we can design a net to collect whatever we want. A looser formula which collected all wicked groups who capture a hero(ine) without threatening to kill him/her would not shed light on the variable role of religion in the act of destroying the victim.<sup>68</sup> We do not hear that any of these groups would have killed the hero(ine) but was prevented by a religious scruple. Religious motifs in these scenes are not intended to be informative or descriptive of actual beliefs, otherwise we would be told that desperadoes are sometimes induced by (good) religious beliefs to spare their victim and sometimes induced by (bad) religious beliefs to slay their victim. Rather it is the case that religion becomes significant only when it can be dragged in to reinforce a scene of special terror.

The formula I have outlined also excludes the many perils which come from within the structure and laws of the hero(ine)'s own society, since these do not produce situations of helpless victimization by anti-social forces to whom no appeal is possible.<sup>69</sup> It is essential that the gang in question be outlaws or a foreign tribe, for it is their anti-social existence (from the

perspective of the author and his audience) which provides the inexorability of the heroine's fate.<sup>70</sup>

The two uncertain cases of this motif in the ancient novels, to which I referred above, occur in Antonius Diogenes' *Marvels Beyond Thule*. The summary of this novel by Photios (*Bibl. cod.* 141) does not allow us to be certain that these are examples of our pattern, though they look suspiciously close. At any rate they seem to illustrate a particular brand of inexorability—that contrived by sheer foreignness. The first is quite vague: Derkyllis and her friend Astraios fall in with the Kelts, 'a wild and savage tribe, and they flee from them on horseback' (Phot. p. 109b 23). The second is a little more definite: 'After this he tells what happened to Derkyllis and Keryllos among the tribe of Astyroi, and further what happened individually to Astraios, and how beyond all hope Keryllos with Derkyllis escaped the incessant dangers among the Astyroi, yet he did not escape paying the penalty which he in fact owed for an ancient crime, but contrary to all expectation he was rescued from the perils, butchered though he was.' (Phot. p. 109b 37 ff.) This is not a perspicuous summary, but it does strongly suggest that Keryllos (or Astraios?) was in danger of being cut up and that in some sense he actually was. This is a probable but not certain example of our pattern.

Inexorability can be contrived not only by drawing one's villains from another society (whether outlaws near home or a distant tribe) but by making them observe a rule of life. This is one way for religion to enter the scene as a variable motivation of the impending murder. If the implacable desperadoes are obeying a fixed custom or following the directions of an oracle, the peril is all the more unavoidable. Here a religious injunction has the same effect in the story as the foreignness of the enemies; both make the doom seem inexorable. But there is a paradox in this, and the paradox is a token of how little seriousness can be found in these novelistic religious rites. Such rites serve two functions: they make the victimisation more inexorable (as rule-bound behaviour) and also more shocking. These are contrary qualities. The appeal to a religious requirement should sanction the inevitable, but in these cases

the sanction is precisely unholy and deplorable. This is a highly effective device, so we are not surprised to find it repeated in novel after novel.

Not only are the rites invoked in these scenes a variable which may be omitted in the structural scheme of the formula, they are themselves occasional. Only one example in all that we have surveyed (the rite of stringing up a human victim and throwing spears at her/him, Xen. *Eph.* ii 13) could even appear to be a regular and repeated ritual. The others are mostly *ad hoc* arrangements. The human sacrifice in Achilles Tatius is brought about by an oracle,<sup>71</sup> in Heliodoros by an ambiguous oracular dream, supported by a vaguely religious belief in afterlife. The second example in Heliodoros is occasioned by a victory in war; it is repeated only as often as wars are won, and like all the others it is presented as a primitive barbarism, not as a religious mystery. The occasional nature of these ceremonies in fiction makes it even harder to regard them as reflections of actual rites in real life.<sup>72</sup>

Yet, even given that the fundamental structure of the sacrifice scene in Lollianos is a popular narrative formula, still one might argue that incidental details could have some informative value. To take a modern parallel, a future historian might reconstruct a Christian baptismal liturgy, including actual Latin words of the rite, from a work of popular entertainment—the movie *The Godfather*. Towards the end of that movie occurs a scene of baptism, spliced with scenes of violent murder, the whole designed to shock. This use of ordinary religion to heighten terror for a mass audience is in one sense analogous to the *Phoinikika*; to make the parallel complete we would have to imagine not a conventional baptism but a shocking ceremony, say a Black Mass. Now, without denying that Black Masses occur, we must raise the problem of objectively reporting atrocities. Suppose for the sake of argument that there existed a rite such as is described in the *Phoinikika* somewhere in the murky, unofficial and ill-defined fringes of Mediterranean religion. What plausible connection can we posit between that rite and a popular novel? An eyewitness who escaped and spread the tale?<sup>73</sup> A renegade from the group? A captured member? These very possibilities are

already fiction-types. In the nature of the case there can hardly be such a thing as hard, unbiased information about an event which everyone would have regarded as unspeakable. In order for that scene to be inspired by actual events, as Henrichs claims, what chain of informants could we posit, and to what degree would their information be accurate and undistorted by emotion? As soon as we admit the factors of fear and loathing, the narrator's objectivity in the face of his audience is compromised. An irreligious atrocity of this sort is an event which no one could report objectively.

Still, the individual rubrics of the ceremony must somehow be drawn from the common cultural inventory of religious ideas. Since the scene is a shocking one, the natural place to look for analogues is in the current *prohibitions* of religious groups. For instance, the later Dionysiae mysteries, which were not at all so secret as the older mysteries,<sup>74</sup> are known to have had specific prohibitions. An inscription of the second or third century A.D. from Smyrna lists some of these in verse.<sup>75</sup> Among them is the prohibition on eating the heart of an animal victim at a sacrificial meal.<sup>76</sup> And if the victim in Lollian's is a child, this too could be specifically anti-Dionysian, for children were honoured in those fellowships by initiation at a very early age.<sup>77</sup> We might even chance to find somewhere a continuous series of prohibitions which Lollian's has inverted point-by-point, creating a sort of photographic negative, so that his villains do all the things that some religion has forbidden. In this way it might indeed contain some real information about religious ceremonies, as a Black Mass is some kind of evidence for what a proper Mass was and was not.<sup>78</sup> But an analysis such as this, even if we could pursue it, would be very different from regarding the *Phoinikika* as a representation of actual practices. I seriously doubt, moreover, that Lollian's has done anything else than construct an eclectic horror tableau from various and sundry taboos.



### *Initiation*

There are two further questions about this scene which must be raised: in what sense is it an initiation, and is it a *Scheintod*? Some of the actors in the scene are called 'initiates' *τοῖς μυνονμένοις*, B I recto 14). What are they being initiated into? Evidently not a mystery religion, to which any citizen might apply, but a resistance group. The participants swear not to betray the group even if tortured horribly by the authorities, and they consume the victim's blood and flesh to confirm their oath in this extravagant violation of the usual *Eidopfer*.<sup>79</sup> For those who are just joining the band this oath of initiation makes clear the consequences of their commitment. I think it no accident that the closest parallel, Achilles Tatius iii 15, happens to be not only a sin-offering for the outlaw group but also, for two novice desperadoes (Menelaos and Satyros), an initiation into the society of the outlaw's. There is no mention of a particular religion or myth. It is simply that when a human victim is demanded by the oracle the brigands deem it fitting that new comers show' their courage and commitment by performing the awful deed. The initiation words *πρωτομύστας, μνησθῆναι*, iii 23) refer to the social meaning of the ceremony as an induction of new recruits.<sup>80</sup> This tells us something about the range of meanings for this family of words—that 'initiation' can be used of serious, irreversible transfers of allegiance to a kind of new' society or a new' way of life—but it does not tell us anything about the actual religious belief or practice of a real group.

Certainly 'initiation' cannot have here its usual *connotation* of life-enhancing introduction to a community who hope to share in immortal happiness. Participation in the blessed mysteries and in the awful act described are psychologically and religiously contradictory, and we may apply to Lollianos Dölger's fine analysis of Tertullian on the rumours of Christian infanticide and cannibalism.<sup>81</sup> Such reports were widespread and eventually even documented by the legal testimony of slaves against their masters (Euseb. *HE* v 1.14). If these rumours were so wildly wrong in the case of the Christians, who were a real and populous sect throughout the empire, are they likely to be right



in the case of novel villains? The real character of these stories had already been spotted by Minucius Felix (30.5) and Tertullian (*Apol.* 9.9), who refer them back to Catiline's conspiracy.<sup>82</sup> Enemies of the state, Catilinarian or Christian, were conceived as desperadoes, as a menace to all that is decent, as killers and cannibals who would profane the basic order of religion and society.<sup>83</sup> Other examples of the same political slander are Diod. Sic. xxii 5.1, Plut. *Publ.* 4. The heart of Henrich's reading of Lollianos is that a story which is mere propaganda in the other cases is here for once an actual report, because there are *no polemical distortions* against an enemy but rather a careful and accurate ritual description.<sup>84</sup> In reply I have tried to show that novel villains are conceived as horrific—in this lies the *tendentious perspective*, rather than against a real, political enemy—and that careful description of a ritual is a fictional technique of horror, seen at its best in Achilles Tatius. There is nothing unpredictable in Lollianos' liturgy except the vomiting and farting.

The ritual description in Achilles Tatius does, in a sense, contain a hidden meaning, whose revelation will be my final argument against considering the ceremony as a veridical report. One of Achilles Tatius' regular techniques is to transfer the terminology of mystery cults into the realm of sex, and the entire design of his sacrifice scene contains a *double entendre*. 'Initiation' is used as a metaphor for learning how to conduct an affair (i 9.7) and perform sexual intercourse (ii 19.1). In the prologue Kleitophon's experience of Eros has visibly marked him as an 'initiate', who now agrees to tell the story of his long and highly detoured approach to the actual consummation with his beloved (i 2.2). In the course of this risqué story, the author likes to tease us by juxtaposing literal and metaphorical statements of the same erotic act. Some of these symbolic representations of sexual experience in the novel are fairly obvious. Leukippe's mother dreams that a brigand has pinned her daughter to the ground on her back and plunges his naked sword into her vagina and saws up through her stomach (ii 23.5). This dream occurs at the very moment when Kleitophon is mounting the bed to have sex with Leukippe. No reader can miss the meaning. At ii 1

Leukippe sings a lyric on the blushing petals of the rose, which contains a beautiful genital description. Kleitophon immediately fantasizes an image of Leukippe's own lips as the rose-calyx. The entire poem invites a reading in terms of labia as well as lips. The next time Kleitophon tries to have sex with Leukippe (iv 1.2), he is repulsed first by her and then in a symbolic dream wherein the doors of Aphrodite's temple slam shut when he tries to enter. These examples should suffice to make clear that Achilles Tatius seeks out vivid symbolic representations of sexual acts, often juxtaposing them with more literal versions. The scene of Leukippe's disembowdment contains some of these elements. Her position on the ground and the plunging in of the sword by a brigand (iii 15.4) are probably meant to recall the dream of Leukippe's mother. When Kleitophon and Leukippe are re-united, he stares in fright at the empty hollow (earlier called the mysteries of her stomach, iii 16.3),<sup>85</sup> they embrace, cling together and then faint away in a quick parody of the sexual act (iii 17.7). Thus, the closest parallel to Lollian's 'initiation' scene should serve as a warning not to insist on a properly religious meaning for it.<sup>86</sup> The entire sacrifice in Achilles Tatius is a literary sham. The religious and ceremonial trappings there have about as much to do with the actualities of ancient religion as the trick sword does with the actualities of ancient warfare. If we were to take it seriously as a representation of a mystic ceremony, we would be putting ourselves precisely on the level of understanding of the brigands who are taken in by the trick.

### *Scheintod*

This leads to an inevitable, though ultimately unanswerable, question: could the ritual murder in Lollianós be a *Scheintod*? The solution, if there is one, must contain tricks analogous to those in the pseudo-sacrifice in Achilles Tatius. There are two details in Lollianós which suggest this might be the case. Just as the sacrificers in Achilles, who actually controlled the trick, were introduced by the words ‘I didn’t recognize who they were since they were in full armour’—a clue which may escape many readers but is meant to be remembered—so the sacrificer in Lollianós is marked out from the rest by a scarlet waistband (B I recto

10)

ἐ[ν τοῦ]τῷ παρέρχεται

ἄλλος γυμνὸς περιζ[ωμα] ἰχθῶν φοινίκου[ν]. This is just the sort of detail which is both memorable and apparently insignificant—an ideal clue—and it identifies the anonymous person who kills the *pais*. Second, it was crucial in Achilles Tatius that the brigands be kept away from the altar (iii 15.4, 21.6), so as not to perceive the ruse. There is in Lollianós what may be an effective diversion designed for the same end. The flesh and blood are evidently disagreeable to eat: there is mention of something vomited (B I verso 8, cf. Homer’s Polyphemos after a meal of human flesh, *Od.* ix 373 f.), of indigestible food (9 f.), of belching (11, cf. Euripides’ Polyphemos after a meal of human flesh, *Kyk.* 410) and farting (12). The last-named is so noxious that all the company are overcome: ‘They (no longer: supply οὐκέτι) held out against the unpleasantness of the odour.’ Whether or not it was intentional, the participants seem effectively to be diverted from a closer inspection of the corpse. Conceivably the flesh or blood of the meal was medicated to produce the nausea and flatulence.

*Scheintod* regularly befalls a heroine, so we must wonder if this victim is someone’s beloved. In view of the many similarities between the *Phoinikika* and Petronius’ *Satyrika*, Xenophon’s *Ephesiaka*, and Achilles Tatius, all of which feature romantic affairs between men, it is quite possible that the *pais* is the boyfriend (παιδικά) of another male character. Cf. especially the dramatic endangerment of Giton at *Sat.* 94 and 108. In tragic

subplots the boyfriend sometimes actually dies (Xen. *Eph.* iii 1 f., A.T. i 12, ii 34); this too is possible for the *Phoinikika*. In the narratives of Xenophon and Achilles Tatius, μειράκιον is the more usual word for ‘boyfriend’,<sup>87</sup> but παῖς is used at Xen. *Eph.* iii 2.10 and in other narratives, such as Antonius Liberalis *Met.* 8. The latter is identical in structure with the story of Euthymos (Paus. vi 6.7–11) and suggests the possibility that any of our surviving novels, novellas or their episodes may have circulated as stories about male lovers.

Another possibility, suggested to me by Prof. Susan Stephens, is that the victim is after all a young woman, disguised as a *pais* (whether servant or boyfriend). This is very attractive. It is not often attested in the surviving novels (Xen. *Eph.* v 1.7, Apul. *Met.* vii 6)<sup>88</sup> but is consistent with the courage of many heroines in facing the worst the world has to offer.

If the *pais* is a male and a servant, not a lover, the narrative parallels would suggest that the death is a real one: Xen. *Eph.* i 14.4–6, *cf.* the centurion’s ‘companion’ killed at Dio lxxi 4 (III below).

Note that if the death is a fake, the *pais* is probably not to be reckoned among the corpses who are undressed at B i verso 24. The lack of a wound is not noticed by anyone during the disrobing of the dead bodies, and there are evidently eleven (line 22) guards—too many to all be accomplices. Possibly the sacrificer, whom we have suspected, was one of the group and managed to handle the clothes and corpse of the *pais* himself. Remembering the similar action of a ‘good’ brigand at Apul. *Met.* vii 9, we could imagine that this inside-man even suggested this disposition of the corpses in order to save them from exposure or some worse fate, such as incineration. It was that same ‘good’ brigand who doctored the wine with a sleeping drug to inhibit and capture the rest (*Met.* vii 12). This helper might even turn out to be Glauketes, who is named in all of the other fragments but not in this one, just as the sacrificers in Achilles Tatius turn out to be familiar friends.<sup>89</sup>

One of the fundamental truths of popular entertainment is that no one has to die. Ghosts of the dead may be fakes, multiple deaths may be pretended. If magical power is allowed a role,

resurrection may take place, as it does in numerous Christian romances, beginning with Leukios' *Acts of John* (second century A.D.). A relevant example from the *Acts of Andrew* tells of an infant butchered by its mother, given to a dog to eat, and still brought back to life by the apostle Andrew'.<sup>90</sup> Multiple *Scheintod* occurs in the Jealous Mistress mime (*POxy.* 413). The best example must be quoted in full:

'I believe that I should not pass over at least one educated dog, whom I saw myself in Rome. The dog appeared in a mime with a dramatic story-line and many characters. He gave a fine performance of various actions and emotions required by the plot and in particular, when they experimented on him with a supposedly deadly poison (which in the plot turned out to be merely a sleeping potion), he took the bread soaked in 'poison' and after gulping it down he began in a moment to shudder and misstep and let his head sag down. Finally he lay stretched out on the ground like a corpse and let them drag his body and carry him around as the plot of the drama required. And when he noticed his cue in certain words and movements of the actors, he at first began to stir gently, as if waking up from a deep slumber, and then raising his head he looked around. To the wonder of the audience (or characters) he then got up and went to the right actor and fawned on him, wagging his tail and showing all the signs of canine affection. Everyone was thrilled, even the emperor, for the aged Vespasian was present in the audience in the theatre of Marcellus.'<sup>91</sup>

The theatrical flair of this multiple *Scheintod* (the dog and presumably at least one other person among the 'many characters' of the plot) makes it the finest example I know of the entertainment value of popular fiction and drama.<sup>92</sup> When we are asked to think of *Scheintod* in the novels as a symbolically religious motif, as *Tod und Erweckung*, we should remember Plutarch's canine mime.

### **III. *BOUKOLOI*, THE *BOUKOLOI* AND XENOPHOBIC FANTASIES**

Dio's account of the Boukoloï (lxxi 4)<sup>93</sup> has been the basis of the common belief among historians of literature and politics that there was an actual group of outlaws in lower Egypt who caused a major civil disturbance in A.D. 172<sup>94</sup> and that this group was the model of fictionalized accounts in Achilles Tatius and Heliodoros<sup>95</sup> and now Lollianos.<sup>96</sup> The addition of Lollianos' characters to the list of desperadoes in fiction who reflect the 'historical Boukoloï' does more than emphasize how strongly they caught the imaginations of writers of their time. The coincidence between *two* scenes of ritual murder with cannibalism in novels of the late second century A.D. and one scene of ritual murder with cannibalism in a history of the early third century A.D. may be the result not of fiction taking its text from history but of an historian taking his colour, if not his entire text, from fiction.

The problem of segregating fact from fiction, and bandits from the lore of banditry<sup>97</sup> is a difficult one. Mickwitz, for instance, in dealing with outlawry in the ancient world, treats the *boukoloï* in Achilles Tatius and Heliodoros and the shepherds in Xenophon of Ephesos as actual Egyptian bandits, but gives up hope of determining what might be historically reliable in the bandit-stories of Apuleius and the *Onos*.<sup>98</sup> MacMullen has raised questions about the role of the centurion in Dio's account, which (if it was real) was at least dishonourable.<sup>99</sup> Schwartz has probed the factual plausibility of Dio's account and sees in it the overriding influence of popular legend.<sup>100</sup> In this section I will analyse Cassius Dio lxxi 4 for its formulae of historical reporting and story-telling and then widen the discussion to include an ancient critic of historical fiction whose views were much the same as mine.

καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι δὲ Βουκόλοι κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον κινηθέντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Αἰγυπτίους προσαποστήσαντες ὑπὸ ἱερεὶ τινὶ Ἰσιδώρῳ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν γυναικείοις στολαῖς τὸν ἐκατόνταρχον τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡπατηκότες ὥς δὴ γυναῖκες τῶν Βουκόλων καὶ χρυσία δώσουσαι αὐτῷ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀνδρῶν προσιόντα σφίσι κατέκοψαν, καὶ τὸν συνόντα αὐτῷ καταθύσαντες ἐπὶ τε τῶν σπλάγχχνων αὐτοῦ συνώμοσαν καὶ ἐκεῖνα κατέφαγον. (ἦν δὲ Ἰσίδωρος ἀνδρία πάντων τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἄριστος.) ἔπειτα ἐκ παρατάξεως τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Ῥωμαίους νικήσαντες μικροῦ καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν εἶλον, εἰ μὴ Κάσσιος ἐκ Συρίας πεμφθεὶς ἐπ' αὐτούς, καὶ στρατηγήσας ὥστε τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους σφῶν ὁμόνοιαν λύσαι καὶ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἀποχωρίσαι (διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐθάρρησε συμβαλεῖν ἀθρόοις αὐτοῖς), οὕτω δὴ στασιάζοντας ἐχειρώσατο.

'And also the Boukoloi, as they are called, started an uprising in Egypt and moved the other Egyptians to revolt with them under one Isidoros, a priest. First, in women's clothing they fooled the centurion of the Romans, as if they were wives of the Boukoloi and were going to give him gold for their husbands. When he came close they cut him down, and sacrificing the one with him they swore an oath on his entrails and ate them. (And of all the men of his time Isidoros was the best in courage.) Then in a pitched battle they defeated the Romans in Egypt and within a little they would have captured Alexandria too but that Cassius was dispatched from Syria against them and managed by strategy to break up their agreement with each other and to divide them from each other, for in view of their desperation and their numbers he did not dare to attack them grouped together. Thus when they were at odds with each other he defeated them.' (Cassius Dio lxxi 4)

The entire account is given in two long clauses, marked by *πρῶτον μὲν ... ἔπειτα* and separated by a somewhat intrusive remark on the courage of Isidore, which I have set off in parentheses. The first clause describes the ruse and atrocity of the (so-called) Boukoloi. The gold which is offered may be understood either as a ransom for men who have been captured or as a diplomatic bribe to ward off an impending attack. The parallel in Achilles Tatius (iv 13) favours the latter; there the old men, whose upraised palm branches conceal the spearmen behind them, make a double offer—a private bribe of a hundred talents of silver for the general and a hundred hostages to take back to the satrapy as a spoil of sorts. The *strategema* of putting an enemy



off guard by wearing women's clothing, usually with weapons concealed, is very familiar as a narrative situation in history and fiction.<sup>101</sup> Shall we say that the ruse was repeated so often in history because it worked so well? Or that the story was often told because it was so entertaining? We must at least acknowledge that we are in the presence of the anecdotal and that the well-turned tale may be the end product of actual Boukolic ingenuity (perhaps prompted in turn by a tale) or of some unbeatable Greco-Egyptian *Lust zu fabulieren*.

The second story, however, whether considered as fact or as fiction, is distinctly odd. The centurion is cut down, his companion is made the religious victim. Here both military and narrative strategy cry out against a mistake. The point of killing the comrade must surely be to terrorize the centurion with a proof of their desperation, so that he can take the message back to the authorities. As a fictional narrative, the parallels with Achilles Tatius and Lollianós show us the power of arranging the gruesome death of an associate (beloved heroine, *país*) before the very eyes of a hero. The value of the atrocity is spoiled by killing the centurion, since no one on the enemy side knows what happened.<sup>102</sup> Leaving the bodies for the Romans to find them is less effective since evisceration by itself does not carry the talc of religious sacrifice and cannibalism. If the Boukoloi's design was to kill both horribly as a warning to the Romans, why does Dio represent the comrade and not the centurion as the special victim? We have some reason to suspect that the account is shaped by fictional motives, but it will require further analysis to make the claim a clear one.

There are three categories of data in this passage, and each has a different relation to historical truth: (1) proper names, (2) formulae of historical reporting, (3) anecdotes. First, the proper names: Isidoros, Boukoloi, Cassius, Alexandria, Egypt, Romans. The information provided by these names is unambiguous. They may be untrue or incorrect, but their meaning at least is clear and univocal.

Second, Dio informs us of the Boukoloi's mood (desperation, ἀπόνοια—these are literally Desperadoes) and of Cassius' strategy. This kind of assertion is more abstract, being a

summary or reduction of all the particular details of character and of campaigning. As historical information, their truth or falsity is of a different order than that of proper names, for counter-examples up to a point would show them not to be false but merely incomplete or less than fully adequate generalizations. Further, such statements often have the quality not of fresh observation but of formulaic shorthand. The outlines of the Boukoloï-episode are much the same as those of the Jewish uprising of 131/2 A.D. (Dio Ixix 13): small beginnings, spreading to the rest of the country, atrocities (πολλά κακά) against the Romans, the sending of a special general just in time from another field of operations, the strategy of dividing to conquer, a concerted attack being unadvisable in view of the enemy's numbers and desperation. Compare Ixix 13.3  
ὅς ἄντικρυς μὲν

οὐδαμόθεν ἐτόλμησε τοῖς ἐναντίοις συμβαλεῖν, τό τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν αὐτῶν ὁρῶν  
and Ixxi 4.2

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐθάρρησε συμβαλεῖν ἀθρόοις αὐτοῖς  
.103 These items have the ring of standard formulae in the perception, presentation and (no doubt) actuality of political revolt. To characterise some of Dio's statements as summary and as formulaic is not to dismiss their validity altogether but to reclassify the *kind* of information that is offered. It eludes the simple dichotomy of true or false.

In the same class of formulae fall Dio's standard scenes of battle (Ixxii 2, 10 [*cf* A.T. iv 14], Ixxiv 12 f.) or orgies (Ixxii 15.4-6). These descriptions use available clichés for typical events. And he is well aware of this. Though Dio does not develop or share with us his principles (if any) of source criticism,<sup>104</sup> that does not mean that he regards all of his words as equally and simply true. We are warned in the preface (i 2) that some features of his fine writing might lead us to doubt the plain truth of his history. What this means is that Dio is conscious of allowing several kinds of stylistic overlay, but that he pledges to do so only when it is appropriate<sup>105</sup> and not misleadingly counter-factual. His scenes of the Sabine women (i 5.5-7) and of Caesar and Cleopatra (xlii 34.3-35.1) display the horror and intrigue of those critical, almost mythic, moments. Still another sub-group of standard

patterns are the national character-types, usually pejorative (Egyptians, li 17.1-2; Alexandrians, lxxv 8.7; Gauls, Africans, Syrians, lxxviii 6.1).

This last group of formulae of political reporting brings us to the third class of information in the account of the Boukoloi—the anecdote—because it is assumptions of national prejudice which make plausible the stories of atrocity by a ‘desperate’ people against the Romans. The atrocities Dio records on the part of the Jews in the revolts of a.d. 117 (lxxviii 32.1), which included cannibalism and torture on a massive scale, must be read as propaganda.<sup>106</sup> Similarly the story of the Boukoloi’s atrocity is not an impartial account but must be read from the point of view of Roman fear in Alexandria.<sup>107</sup>

The third category of information in our passage is the anecdotal—the deceptive cross-dressing and the ritual murder. I have displayed above (pp. 167-70; n. 101) the evidence for calling these anecdotes formulae of historical and fictional narrative. Their real truth-elusiveness resides in the nature of the anecdotal as such, rather than their formulaic character. Anecdotes are like proper names (class 1) in being particular, not abstract, but like the formulae of reporting (class 2) in eluding a simple verdict of true or false. An anecdote is that special kind of fact or event which stands out from the ordinary as something memorable and worth retelling for its story-like qualities. In the nature of the case, memorable anecdotes are striking variations from the routinely informative, and are always presented as a special kind of truth, in that they elicit not the simple judgment ‘True’ but rather ‘Extraordinary yet true’. Now Dio does not specialize, as Herodotos did, in reminding us of the variably storied and variably credible nature of his *logoi*.<sup>108</sup> It is part of Dio’s view of history itself that well-turned stories occur and if such a story correctly expresses the tenor of an historical situation, it deserves to be included. Dramatic or fictional qualities are not a disqualification, but a mark or portent of significance. History rises to the occasion, and moments of relative greatness are signalled not only by omens but by what we would call novellas or memorable vignettes. Just as propaganda and racism are a powerful shaping force in Dio’s

historiography and are based on the ordinary formulae of partisan perception and reporting, so too the belief in significant anecdotes is basic and shows his unquestioning acceptance of the ordinary formulae of narrative.

A few examples: a cluster of six marvellous escape stories occurs at xlvii 7–10 to illuminate the proscriptions of the first triumvirate. Worth retelling here is the story of Sextus Condianus (lxxii 6, c. A.D. 182), who when he learned that he was to be killed by order of Commodus, drank the blood of a hare, mounted a horse and purposely fell from it in full view of many. Vomiting the hare's blood as if it were his own, he was carried, apparently on the point of death, to his room. There the body of a ram was placed in a coffin, carried out and burned in his stead. Thereafter he wandered about, constantly altering his appearance and clothing. Sextus, in being a 'real' person, is not thereby insulated from the world of fictional patterns such as *Skeintod*. One can imagine that he had now and again enjoyed hearing such stories and perhaps talking to actors about stage-blood, little knowing that the day would come when he would have to invent a superlative plot along those lines and act it out himself. I have noted above the ruse at Salonai (p. 164, Dio xlii 11. 2) and the romantic bandit stories (p. 175, n. 97, Dio lxxv 2.4, lxxvi 10.1).

If our data were limited to the texts already mentioned, one might at this point be inclined to conjecture that a condensed and slightly rearranged version of the Boukoloï-fictions in A.T. had been transmitted by various tale-bearers until they reached Dio, and that what he records as an interesting anecdote had originated entirely in the melodramatic fantasies of the novelist. But there are other data concerning *boukoloï* and the Boukoloï. A critical review of them leads us to further variations on the theme of history imitating story. By other data I do not mean the well-known passages of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*, which present a pseudo-historiographic account of the Boukoloï which is stitched together out of various literary reminiscences (e.g., i 5.4 = Hdt. v 16.3).<sup>109</sup> Nothing about Heliodoros' Boukoloï can be taken as historical data. I mean rather the references in Eratosthenes and Strabo to *boukoloï* specifically located in the neighbourhood of Pharos before the founding of Alexandria. Dio's late second

century Boukoloι are unlocalized but they are said to threaten Alexandria. A.T.'s Boukoloι infest the entire Delta; their principal operations seem to be located in the regions around Pelousion, the easternmost Nile mouth.<sup>110</sup> (Heliodoros' Boukoloι live in marshes quite specifically near the Herakleotic, westernmost Nile mouth.) The incompleteness of Dio and the contradiction of Heliodoros with A.T. as to the location of the Boukoloι has been solved too hastily and uncritically by reference to Eratosthenes (I v 9 Berger = Strabo xvii 1.19). In a fragment which is more important for the history of travellers' tales than for the geography of Egyptian banditry, Eratosthenes mentions *boukoloι* brigands (*βουκόλοι ληισταί*) who were said to live around the harbour of Pharos and attack ships which tried to land there. Strabo in his description of Alexandria gives a fuller account of the same information (xvii 1.6). When did the *boukoloι*, a fairly secure fragment of pre-Alexandrian local history, become the Boukoloι, a quite specific group of uncertain (or even contradictory) location in the late second century?

### *A critic of fiction*

To answer that we must look first at what Eratosthenes and Strabo actually say about these persons. In a comment on the Bousirite nome, Strabo refers to Eratosthenes' *criticism* of travellers' tales on the theme of hostility in far distant lands:

'Eratosthenes says that though it is a custom common to *all* barbarians to repel strangers from their land, the Egyptians are accused of it (in a special way) through the made-up stories (*μεμυθευμένων*) about Bousiris in the Bousirite nome, told by later writers with the intention of slandering this place by a charge of (earlier) hostility to strangers (*ἄξενίαν*), though there never was, by Zeus, any such king or tyrant named Bousiris. He says they also cite the line "to go to Egypt, a long and painful way" (*Od.* iv 483) which is supported by various points, including (Egypt's) harbourlessness and the inaccessibility of the existing harbour at Pharos and its being protected by *boukoloi* brigands who attack those who land there.' (xvii 1.19)

So far from being a testimony to the existence of *the* Boukoloi, this passage is in the first place a critique of Hellenocentric fictions which exaggerate the actual dangers of travel by tales of monsters. The *boukoloi* here mentioned are simply flock-tenders of the sort who might be found on any shore, as natural a feature of the landscape as harbours or harbourlessness. In the absence of an official shore patrol, the unofficial coast-guard of any country consists of those who happen or choose to live there, for instance, cowherds or shepherds. Eratosthenes' point is that while the dangers to Greeks at Pharos are real, the stories which Greek travellers have told about the place are exaggerated.

Such fairy tale xenophobia can be avoided. Literature contains several fairly realistic versions of a hostile reception on a strange coast. An early case is the meeting of Odysseus, newly landed on an island unknown to him, with a young man who is an *ἐπιβώτωρ μήλων* (*Od.* xiii 222).<sup>[111](#)</sup> We have a more exciting account at Xen. *Eph.* iii 12.2 in which some *local* shepherds (*τῶν ἐκεῖ ποιμένων*) attack the newdy shipwrecked Habrokomes and

lead him to the slave market in Pelousion. The division between herdsmen and highwaymen, also between fishermen and pirates, was never too clear. It seems to have been more a question of opportunity and risk of detection than sheer vocation. Such meetings and attacks are unexceptional and must have occurred frequently. An important case of the motif is Eurip. *I.T.*:<sup>112</sup> the two Greeks, newly landed, are spotted by herdsmen (*βουκόλοι* 254, 305; *βουφορβοί* 237, 265) and the messenger reports their reception of the strangers. Heliodoros seems to have modelled his famous opening scene (i 1–4) on Euripides. Both narratives are from the point of view of native *boukoloι* who witness marvellous sights on the sea shore—battle and slaughter or its aftermath and a wounded man being nursed. There is a division of opinions among the watchers: the naive reaction is to honour the strangers as gods (*I.T.* 267–74, Hld. i 2), the sceptical reaction is to treat them as mere mortals (*I.T.* 275–9, Hld. i 2). The *boukoloι* are frightened by the sudden motion of one of the strangers leaping from a rock, with a shaking of limbs or hair (*I.T.* 281–3, 295 f., Hld. i 2). The strangers are seen in a tableau of wounded man being nursed by his companion (*I.T.* 310–14, Hld. i 2). The strangers are taken prisoner and led off to the king for disposition (*I.T.* 334 f., Hld. i 4–5, cf. i 7 *οἶονεὶ βασιλέα τινά*). In both cases virtually nothing is known about the marvellous couple except that they are Hellenes (*I.T.* 247, Hld. i 3 they do not know the girl's language; i 7 the prisoners are assigned to the care of a Greek who will act as their interpreter).

This is the kind of story which Eratosthenes would approve as a report of the normal, realistic ἀξυνία liable to be found on any foreign shore. The exaggerated stories which he would criticize are much more common, being a staple of travellers' tales in all ages. Eratosthenes pinpoints Egyptophobia as the motive which has caused ordinary *boukoloι* to become notorious ogres like Bousiris. This is a special case of ethnocentrism, the assumption that things at home are normal whereas in distant lands people are likely to be monstrous. The social function of ethnocentric tales is to define the cultural boundaries within which 'we' feel at home, safe and comfortable in our patterns of normal life. The territory outside those boundaries is dangerous, alien, and in the



language of some cultures, 'non-human'. A similar structure underlies nightmares; their meaning is radically egocentric, expressing an individual's deep fears of self-destruction by something monstrous and foreign. Just as nightmares are therapeutic at the moment when the dreamer realizes 'It was only a dream, my waking reality is still safe', so ethnocentric tales reinforce the secure boundaries of cultural identity by temporarily imagining that they have been broken. The constantly recurring crises in this group of tales are cannibalism and human sacrifice. These are the two ultimate violations of Greek *nomos*, and stories which include them show us not so much the ritual practice of savages as the lineaments of a common Greek nightmare, narrated by a traveller who has 'lived to tell the tale'. Considered as actors in popular narrative the Boukoloï inherit the role and manners of the wicked foreigners who with slight modifications had been familiar in Greek narrative from the time of Odysseus. The two important modifications are that earlier stories tend to feature an ogre or monster (Skylla, Küklops, Bousiris) whereas later stories use brigands and pirates; and that later stories tend to introduce a helpless victim whom the hero rescues from the villains' clutches. A nice illustration of the latter development is the story of Euthymos, which we have in two versions: in Strabo (vi 1.5), and, with an added love-interest, in Pausanias (vi 6.7-11).<sup>113</sup>

Eratosthenes' critique of xenophobic narrative reached positive results insofar as he detected behind the desperado Bousiris real life cowherds. I should like to consider one final piece of evidence which may bring my critique of xenophobic narrative to as successful a conclusion. It concerns the motivation of the Egyptian cowherds in pre-Alexandrian days. Strabo (xvii 1.6) explains that their aggressive policy towards foreign ships near Pharos was, from their point of view, quite sensible and understandable. In a clause summarizing Alexandrian history before Alexander, Strabo says that the part of modern Alexandria over the ship-houses was the original village of the site, before Alexander arrived and saw the possibilities for a magnificent city. 'The earlier kings of the Egyptians, because they were well-pleased with what they had and in no particular need of

imported goods and because they were deeply suspicious of all who sailed to them, especially the Greeks (for they were despoilers and coveters of others' land through a lack of their own), established a guard at this place (the harbour of Pharos) with orders to keep away those who tried to come in; and they gave them the area called Rhakotis to live in, which is now the part of Alexandria lying above the ship-houses, and at that time was a village; the area around the village they gave to *boukoloï*, who were similarly able to prevent outsiders from getting in.'

This version makes the defence against strangers a policy of state, quite precisely established at Pharos-Rhakotis, and principally aimed at Greeks. The cowherds are not the originators of the plan; there is no doubt that here too they are ordinary flock-tenders, working alone or in small groups, rather than a wild bunch of outlaws.

It seems clear that there is a fairly large gap between *the* Boukoloï, who are variously located and 'fictionally' described by Dio and A.T., on the one hand, and the cowherds doubling as defenders located at Rhakotis before Alexandria was founded (and presumably not after). The latter are a specific outcropping of social history just at the boundary between the ordinary realities of ancient life and the system of narrative motifs (*Odyssey*, Euripides, Xen. *Eph.*). Also these *boukoloï* actually tend cattle. The former have more in common with horrific fiction, atrocity propaganda, and real-life terrorism. And they have no visible connection with cattle.

Is there any connection at all? Though the two sets of data are distinct, it is tempting to offer a suggestion which associates them. I will do so with the qualification that it is mere hypothesis. Given that there was a known tradition of Alexandrian pre-history which told of the days when foreigners could not land at Pharos because the Pharaohs had posted a resistance body there, and given that *boukoloï* are always mentioned as playing a part in this native resistance, it might be natural enough for a native Egyptian movement of resistance against foreigners to adopt the name Boukoloï as a conscious identification with the oldest story of their forefathers' proud freedom from non-Egyptian control. The appropriation of the word as a proper

name occurred in the later second century A.D.: there is no continuity of an organization or community linking the pre-Alexandrian cowherds and the later resistance fighters, though there is a similarity of ideology and racial identification.

*Something* happened around 171/2 A.D., and Cassius did *something* to restore the order which the Romans preferred. The rest is fiction and anecdotal history, except for the name: *οἱ καλούμενοι Βουκόλοι*. Dio understands that these people are called Herdsmen, and that that is a proper name; they don't just happen to be herdsmen. Antagonism, conflict and hatred among Greeks, Jews, Romans and Egyptians in Alexandria is well known for this period.<sup>114</sup> Egyptian fellahin had at least this fragment of historical precedent for their show of native solidarity against foreign exploitation. Modern American super-patriots may call themselves Minute Men, meaning to invoke the spirit and ideology of a group whom they know mainly by the myth-history of oral tradition. The Boukoloi might have been such, and the name a slogan reminding them and others that their struggle had a long history. If so, it would be a case of fairly ordinary history being taken as the nominal inspiration for a violent and extraordinary movement, which in turn served as a name on which to hang (in Dio and A.T.) some extraordinary tales of Desperadoes.

But whatever the real truth of the herdless Boukoloi, we are at least clearer now about the kinds of history, anecdote, and fiction represented in our texts. It is in the context of narrative patterns and formulae that we most clearly see the meaning of Lollianos' *Phoinikika*. Though we now have less 'historical' knowledge than we thought we did about the Boukoloi, we have gained a better grasp on the writing and telling of partisan history and thrilling fiction in that exciting period.

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<sup>1</sup> A. Henrichs, *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos*, Pap. Textc u. Abh. xiv (Bonn 1972): hereafter 'Henrichs'. See also *ZPE* iv (1969) 205-15, v (1970) 22 [reporting A. Dihle], vi (1970) 42-3 [reporting M. D. Reeve]; 'Pagan ritual and the alleged crimes of the early Christians', in *Kyriakon*, Festchr.J. Quasten, edd. P. Granfield andj. A. Jungmann

(Munster Westf. 1970) 18–35; G. M. Browne, *ZPE* x (1973) 77; I. Cazzaniga, *Vetera Christianorum* x (1973) 305–18; L. Koenen, *Bull. Amer. Soc. Papyrologists* xvi (1979) 109–14; G. Sandy, *AJP* c (1979) 367–76; C. P. Jones, *Phoenix* (forthcoming).

The quotation is from A. D. Nock 'Hellenistic Mysteries and Christian Sacraments', *Mnem.* v (1952) 213, repr. in his *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Z. Stewart (Cambridge Mass. 1972) 820. The sentiment is typical of Nock, especially when he wanted to express courteous disagreement with a work under review (see Stewart's introduction *ibid.* 3, and Nock *ibid.* 175). Prof. Henrichs reminds me that the context continues as follows: 'In reacting against them we must beware of exaggeration in the opposite direction and of any tendency to assume simple relations of cause and effect in an area in which they are very rare.'

<sup>2</sup> The name Glauketes and general considerations of style suggest that P. Oxy. 1368 be assigned to Lollianos (Henrichs 8–10). Prof. Henrichs is scheduled to edit further Oxyrhynchus fragments containing the name Glauketes.

<sup>3</sup> Summarized Henrichs 29 f.

<sup>4</sup> K. Kerényi, *Die griechisch-orientalische Romanliteratur in Religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (Tübingen 1927; revised edn Darmstadt 1962). R. Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike* (Munich/Berlin 1962). 'Damit bestätigt der neue Romanpapyrus die methodische Richtigkeit dieser Interpretationsweise' (Henrichs 78).

<sup>5</sup> S. Trenker, *The Greek Novella in the Classical Period* (Cambridge 1958). F. Wehrli, 'Einheit und Vorgeschichte der griechisch-römischen Romanliteratur', *MH* xxii (1965) 133–54. Wehrli traces the commonness (*Einheit*) of several narrative patterns, underlying and preceding (*Vorgeschichte*) the surviving Greek and Latin novels. Methodological remarks of the same tendency may be found in Karl Bürger, *Studien zur Geschichte des griechischen Romans: i Der Lukiosroman* (Wissens. Beilage zum *Frog*, des Herzoglichen Gymnasiums in Blankenburg am Harz 1902) and B. E. Perry, *The Ancient Romances* (Berkeley/L. A. 1967) 320 f.

<sup>6</sup> Henrichs does not deny that the *Phoinikika* is an engagingly vulgar and entertaining work (7) nor that the described ritual is made to serve the requirements of a literary fiction (28). But he maintains that the scene can in some sense be regarded as reporting an actual rite, whereas I propose that the requirements of Grand Guignol are so paramount that the informative value of the scene is seriously compromised.

<sup>7</sup> P. Oxy. 2944. E. G. Turner, *The Papyrologist at Work, GRBS Monographs* vi (Durham N.C. 1973) 8–14. This story, so far from being unknown to any classical author, is alluded to in a parodic way by Petronius *Sat.* 79–80. Its connection with Roman art has been extensively studied. See H. Lucas, 'Ein Märchen bei Petron' in *Beiträge zur alien Geschichte und griechisch-romischen Alterthumskunde: Festschr. ... Otto Hirschfeld* (Berlin 1903) 257–69. For collections of wise judgements among various peoples, see *ibid.* 262 n. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Other parallels adduced are despised superstitious rituals (Plut. *de superst.* 166a), mourning rituals (Hdt. ii 85), festival joking (Lucian *Sat.* 2, cf. Plaut. *Poen.* 1195, Petr. *Sat.* 22), festival disguise (*FGrH* 396 F 24 = Ath. xiv 622d), and a disguise which is not religious, festive or ritualistic (Heliodoros vi 11.2). Henrichs (64) is close to the truth when he perceives that the villains' disguise is frightening: 'Ein viel praktischerer Zweck dieses Mum-menschans war sicher, die Initianden gründlich zu erschrecken'. The experience of terror may indeed play a part in an initiation (Plut. *fr.* 178 Sandbach). The emotional pattern of a secular melodrama may in abstraction be

identical with that of a religious rite: 'Demeter and Kore and he who is called Iacchos signify ... to the uninitiated some fear or danger first, but afterward they bring about some good'; 'Sarapis and Isis and Anoubis and Harpokrates—the gods themselves and their statues and their mysteries and every account (*logos*) of these gods and also the gods who share the same temples and altars—signify disturbances and dangers and threats and crises. from which they save (the dreamer) contrary to expectation and hope' (Artemidoros *Oneir.* ii 39, 174 f. Pack). But this ambiguous and very general narrative structure of crisis followed by rescue need not be seriously religious, for though most religion is based on fear, it is wrong to infer that all fear is religious.

<sup>9</sup> 'Ein sachliches Ordnungsprinzip', Henrichs 28.

<sup>10</sup> Apuleius' brigands when they first begin to carouse (before the three robber tales are inserted) are compared to Lapiths and Centaurs (iv 8); Lollian's brigands are either compared to Lapiths and Centaurs or use an enormous cup on which is engraved such a scene (v i verso 13–15).

<sup>11</sup> Night is the time of terrors in Apuleius—highwaymen and thieves (i 15, iv 18, viii 17), witches (ii 22), wild young aristocrats (ii 18)—and throughout ancient belief good examples are Ar. *Av.* 1482–93, Eur. *Hel.* 569 f., Xen. *Eph.* v. 7.7., Harmodiosap. Ath. iv 149c, Plut. *Kim.* 6, Babr. *Ixiii*, scenes of necromancy such as Hid. vi 14 f., *tabellae defixionis* (ὀρκίζω σε, νεκυδαίμων, ὅστις ποτέ

εἶ, κατὰ τῆς κυρίας Βριμῶ, προκύνητε νυκτοδόμα  
βιασάνδρα, κτλ

., P. Collart, 'Une nouvelle *Tabella Defixionis* d'Égypte', *RPh* iv [1930] 248–56), and

magical hymns (to Helios πέμψον δαίμονα τοῦτον ἀεὶ μεσάταισιν

ἐν ὥραις / οὐπὲρ ἀπὸ σκήνους κατέχω τάδε λείψανα χερσίν /

νυκτὸς ἐλευσόμενον . . . ; to Selene: κυανέη, ὀφειλόκαμε,

καὶ ζωνοδρακόντι / αἰμοπότι, θανατηγέ, φθορηγόνε,

καρδιόδαιτε / σαρκοφάγε, κοπετόκτυπ', ἄωροβόρ',

οἰστροπλάνεια. . . .

Dilthey, *RhM* xxvii (1872) 375–419. 'And one of the old Greek doctors in fact describes a pathological state into which a man may fall "if he is travelling on a lonely route and terror seizes him as a result of an apparition" (Hippok *Int.* 48 = vii 286 Littré)': E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley/LA 1951) 117. The ghost stories told to frighten children, which Plato mentions in disapproval, are set at night (*Rep.* ii 381e).

It is commonly said that noon too is a time of terror, but some of the texts cited in support have been carelessly read. Some mention ghosts that appear at midday, to be sure, but in a sacred grove so thick and shady that no daylight enters; the point is not that noon is dangerous but that in such places it is always virtually night (Lucan iii 423–5, *cf.* 401; Stat. *Theb.* iv 438–41, *cf.* 420–3; Lucian *Philops.* 22–4). Most of the other references to such a belief are based on the principle that rural deities rest and take their swimming-break or siesta at midday, just as the shepherds do, and that they do not like to be disturbed (Theok. i 15–18. Philostr. *Her.* p. 143 Kayser, Auson. *Mosel.* 178–88). Several of these also refer to sacred, and presumably shady, groves (Kallim. *H.* vi 38, Ov. *Fasti* iv 762, *cf.* 75 i if.). The deities that deliberately appear at that time to mortals are as likely to be helpful as harmful (Herakl. Pont. *fr.* 95 Wehrli; A.R. iv 13 12 f.; Kaibel *Epig. Gr.* 802). But for a ghostly and dangerous army at noon, see n. 43. For an ambiguous attack by either guerrillas or demons, in modern Greek folklore, see R. & E. Blum (n. 25) 107 f.

<sup>12</sup> An interesting explanation of how such amulets are effective against brigands: *'si quis in via tutus ambulare voluerit, latrones timere non curet, quia fugat eos et pro unius viatoris persona multae personae videntur insidiantibus ... si quis item facit in ambulando et in manu portaverit, non sentit laborem itineris, fugat daemonia, prohibet maleficia, venena discutit, avertit oculum malum'* (Cod. Bonn. 218, p. 85r in R. Heim *'Incantamenta Magica Graeca Latina'*, *Neue Jhb.f. Kl. Phil.* Suppl. xix i (1892) 463–576.

<sup>13</sup> Spectral armies: Lucan i 521, 569–83; Paus. i 32.4; Pliny *S.H.* ii 148; specifically black—Stat. *Theb.* iv 438–42; and see the stories of military panic below, p. 164. Hekate's komos: Trag. incert. frag. 375N2; Apuleius *Apol.* 64; magical hymn to Hekate, *RhM* xxvii (1872) 375–419; A. Abt, *Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die antike Zauberei*, RGVL iv 2 (Giessen 1908) 123–30, 229–32; H. Bolkestein, *Theophrastos' Character der Deisi-daimonia als religionsgeschichtliche Urkunde*, RGVL xxi 2 (Giessen 1929) 41; black robed at night, A.R. iii 861 f. Demons and revenants: *δαίμονάς τινας εἶναι καὶ φαντάσματα καὶ νεκρῶν ψυχὰς περιπολεῶν ὑπὲρ γῶς καὶ φαίνεσθαι οἷς ἂν ἐθέλωσιν*, Lucian *Philops.* 29; cf Johanna ten Vrugt-Lentz, *Mors Immatura* (Diss. Rijks-Univ. Leiden 1960, publ. at Groningen).

<sup>14</sup> All modern editors have accepted the conjecture *armati, partim* for the MS *armati*, but the Groningen group in their commentary on Bk iv 1–27 (Groningen 1977) reject this. They find it more reasonable that all of the band look like ghosts as they go off into the night (not wearing any special outfit) but not all are carrying swords. It is quite true that a division into two work-parties with two separate appearances is not functional here; even the earlier separation into two groups who went separate ways (*Met.* iv 8) was really a narrative convenience, so that one group could tell the other their stories. Lollianos' group, who I imagine do go separate ways, may still have a single goal and are following different routes to it.

<sup>15</sup> *Lemures* are ordinarily frightening and dangerous ghosts (Hor. *Epist.* 11 2.209; Pers. 5.185; Schol. Pers. 5.185: *lemures dicuntur dii manes, quos Graeci δαίμονας vocant, velui umbras quasdam divinitatem habentes*). Apuleius in a different mood distinguishes ghosts as good (*lares*), bad (*laruae*), or unspecified (*lemures* and *manes*) (*de deo Soc.* 15); but Augustine, commenting on this very passage of Apuleius, gives the more common usage—*lemures* and *laruae* are both the souls of evil persons (C.D. ix 11).

<sup>16</sup> Cited in n. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Prof. Hagedorn of the Institut für Altertumskunde der Universität zu Köln has kindly examined the papyrus under a microscope and reports that the traces, which are in very poor condition, are somewhat closer to ηλι than to σκοτ. The latter is possible but seems to demand a close spacing of letters and perhaps a running together of οτ. For parallels to the expression, cf. Xen. *Anab.* ii 5.9, *διὰ σκότους ἢ ὁδός* (metaphorical); Plut. *Q.Rom.* 279 f, *μετὰ ὀψιότης ... διὰ σκότους* Thucydides describes the invisibility of soldiers in dark night with the phrase *ἀνὰ τό σκοτεινόν*. Plutarch uses the metaphor of a nerve-wracked traveller wandering through the darkness (*διὰ τοῦ σκότους*) to show the similarity of dying and being initiated (*fr.* 178 Sandbach). Prof. Henrichs informs me that *διὰ τοῦ σκότους* is written in the margin of a transcription in his files, and may perhaps have been a suggestion by one of his students.

<sup>18</sup> P. Wendland, 'Antike Geister-und Gespenstersgeschichten', T. Siebs (ed.), *Festschr. zur Jahrhundertfeier der Universität zu Breslau, im namen der schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* (Breslau 1911) 35–55; L. Collison Morley, *Greek and Roman Ghost Stories* (London 1912); J. Tambornino, *De antiquorum daemonismo*, RGVL



vii 3 (Giessen 1909); G. Ettig, 'Acheruntica, sive descensuum apud veteres enarratio', *Leipz. Stud.*, xiii (1890/1) 249–410; Pfister. s.v. 'Epiphanic' § 19, Schreckend Gcspsnster. *RE Suppi*, iv (1924) 297. When this paper was finished. I finally obtained a copy of F. J Dölger, *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze*, Liturgiegesch. Forsch. xiv (Munster Westf. 1918), which amply documents one type (black) of demonic appearance.

<sup>19</sup> 'Lemures and Manes ... stand for the vague conceptions formed of the shades of the dead who dwelt beneath the ground. These were a nameless crowd, hardly individualized, not distinguishable from the fleeting phantoms who fluttered about the tomb.' F. Cumont, *After Life in Roman Paganism* (New Haven 1923) 72.

<sup>20</sup> J. C. Lawson. *Περὶ Ἀλιβάντων*, *CR* xl (1926) 52–8, 116–21. In another picture which showed Odysseus in the underworld there was depicted a *daimon* named Eurynomos eating the flesh of corpses and tossing aside the bones: *κυανοῦ τήν χροάν μεταξύ ἐστὶ καὶ μέλανος, ὅποῃαι καὶ τῶν μυῖων αἱ πρὸς τὰ κρέα εἰσὶ προσιζάνουσαι* (Paus. χ 28.7).

<sup>21</sup> Ed. Th. Zahn (Erlangen 1880) 122 ff. These are the acts by Prochoros (early fifth century), not those by Leukios (mid-second century).

<sup>22</sup> M. R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford 1924, repr. 1963) 323. The *Acts of Peter* are, like Lollianos, a second century work. See also *Acts of Andrew* 22 (James 345) and the *Apostolic Histories of Abdias* vi 22 (James 466). The woman at Philostr. *VA* iii 3 who frightens Apollonios' companions in India is black to her breasts and white below. They flee from her *ὥς δεῖμα*, but it seems to be the mixture of colours which alarms them, not her blackness or whiteness.

<sup>23</sup> *Daimones* often appear as vicious dogs (*Acts of Andrew* 6–7, James 339; *Arabic Cospel of the Infancy* 3\$, James 82; Proklos in *remp.* ii p. 184.1 Kroll) or as dogfaced (A. Jacoby. 'Der hunds-köpfige Dämon der Unterwelt', *Arch. für Religionswiss.*, xxii (1922) 219–25). Pace LSJ, *προκύνητε* is probably correct in the curse tablet quoted above in n. 11: note that (i) the *daimon* is in the service of Hekate, who is sometimes dog-faced and usually accompanied by dogs, (ii) it runs by night, and (iii) is violent to men. All this makes *προσκύνητε* an inappropriate emendation. For the obvious fear of meeting unfriendly dogs at night; cf Claudius meeting Cereberus: *illum vidit canem nigrum, villosum, sane non quem uelis tibi in tenebris occurrere* (Sen. *Apocol.* 13). Medieval folklore pictured demonic skeletons with dog heads (L. Kretzen-bacher, *Kynokephale Dämonen Südosteuropäischer Volksdichtung*, Beitr. zur Kenntnis Südosteuropas und des Nahen Orients v [Munich 1968]).

<sup>24</sup> Lipsius-Bonnet ii 1.146 (*ingentem Aegyptium nigriorem fuligine*). Cf. also Lucian *Philops.* 16 (an exorcised *phasma/daimon μέλανα καὶ καπνώδη τήν χροάν*); *Pap. Gr. Mag.* VII 349–59, vol. ii P. 16 () Plutarch's description of the evil *daimon* who appeared to Brutus before Philippi is vague (*δεινὴν καὶ ἀλλόκοτον ὄψιν ἐκφύλου σώματος καὶ φοβεράν*. *Brut.* 16), but Florus and Valerius Maximus in retelling the same story draw from the common repertoire of frightening descriptions to specify the *daimoti's* colour as black (*atra quaedam imago*, Flor. ii 17.8; *hominem ingentis magnitudinis, coloris nigri, squalidum barba et capillo inmisso*, Val. Max. i 7.7). Jesus' discourse in the *Pistis Sophia* (364–71) on the five major classes of sublunary demons includes the all-hairy Para-plex, three-faced Hekate, the succubus Typhon (pale-white?, cf. Plut. *de Iside* 33, *πάρωχος*) and Ariouth *Aethiopica, quae est αρχων feminina, nigra penitus* (367, ed. Petermann, trans. Schwartze, Berlin 1851 = 140, ed. C. Schmidt, trans. V. Macdermot, *Nag Hammadi Studies* ix [Leiden 1978]).



<sup>25</sup> P.-P. Joannou *Démonologie populaire—démonologie critique au xi siècle*, Schr. zur Geistesgesch. des öst. Europa v (Wiesbaden 1971) 13. For traces of this belief in modern times, see R. and E. Blum, *The Dangerous Hour: The Lore of Crisis and Mystery in Rural Greece* (London 1970) 72 n. 1, 101, 110, 111, 332.

<sup>26</sup> Death (Stat. *Theb.* iv 528), Charon (Val. Flac. 1814 f.), Cerberus (Hor. *Od.* ii 13.34, Stat. *Theb.* ii 28), Pluto (*ibid.* ii 49), the escort of souls ('A man took me who was hateful to look upon, altogether black, and his raiment exceedingly foul'. *Acts of Thomas* 55, James 390), the buildings (Ap. *Met.* vi 19), even the frogs (Juv. ii 150). Cf. G. Radke, *Die Bedeutung der weissen und der schwarzen Farbe in Kult und Brauch der Griechen und Römer* (diss. Berlin. Jena 1936) 18–20, with further examples of black *eidola*. A physical explanation sometimes given for the blackness of underworld ghosts is that cremation fires have charred the body and bones (Sil. Ital. xiii 447, Stat. *Theb.* viii 5 f.).

<sup>27</sup> The colour of the native Egyptian brigands is not surprising to readers of Achilles Tatius, whose *boukoloï* are black (iii 9.2). Evidently the dead pirates on the shore around Charikleia are not black—at least they are never so described (i 1–4, v 20–33). That an army of ghostly soldiers may be explicitly black is seen from Stat. *Theb.* iv 438–42.

<sup>28</sup> F. M. Snowden, Jr., *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience* (Cambridge Mass./London 1970) J79f.; D. S. Wiesen, 'Juvenal and the Blacks', *Class. et Med.* XXXI (1970) 132–50.

<sup>29</sup> So it is partly because Brutus' soldiers are facing a desperate battle that they are startled when they open the gates and meet a black man (Plut. *Brut.* 48, App. *B.C.* iv 17.134, Florus ii 17.7). Severus was on the lookout for an omen at the moment when an Ethiopian jester met him, carrying a garland of cypress (*HA Sept. Sev.* 22.4–5).

<sup>30</sup> P. 161 and n. 33. P. Oxy 416 (= B. Lavagnini, *Erot. Graec. Fr Pap.* (Leipzig 1922) 35)—a 'god' with a mournful, frightening and squalid look, appearing in the darkness; Plato's torturing demons are ἄγριοι ἄνδρες (*Rep.* x 51 §e); Hecate's dogs are

μέλανες . . . καὶ λάσιοι πιναρὰ καὶ  
αὐχμώση τῇ λάχνη. Luc. *Philops.* 24.

<sup>31</sup> An important testimony to the low level of this fear on a scale of civilized rationality is Agatharchides *de mari Erythraeo* 16 (Müller *GGM*): 'But Ethiopians will terrify Greeks. In what way? By their blackness and difference of form? Such a fear among us does not survive the age of childhood. In battles and the greater struggles, events are not decided by appearance of colour but by valour and leadership.'

<sup>32</sup> The irrational fears of children are a topos of ancient literature: Pl. *Rep.* i 330; [Pl.] *Axioch.* 367a; Lucr. iii 87 f.; Proklos *in remp.* ii 180. 18 f. Kroll.

<sup>33</sup> Ps.-Quint. *Decl.* 10 describes a typical malevolent ghost as pallid (v), funereal and squalid (xvi). Calcidius pictures the visible form of the lower, more material and passionate demons: *exsanguium quoque simulacrorum umbraticas formas induuntur, obesi corporis inluuiem trahentes* (*Comm. in Platonis Timaeum* 134, ed. J. Wroble, Leipzig 1876).

<sup>34</sup> *nigri lemures*, Pers. v 185; *nocturnos lemures*, Hor. *Epist.* ii 2.209 (*nocturnos* does not necessarily mean 'black').

<sup>35</sup> *nemo tam puer est ut Cerberum timeat et tenebras et larvarum habitum nudis ossibus cohaerentium*. Sen. *Ep.* 24.8; *macilentam uel omnino evisceratam formam diri*

*cadaveris fabricatam, prorsus horribilem et larvalem*, Apul. *Apol.* 63; Petron. *Sat.* 34.

<sup>36</sup> Hyperbole at Priap. 32: *aridior ... pallidior ... pro sanguine pulverem ... ad me nocte solet venire et affert pallorem maciemque larvalem*-, at Apul. *Met.* i 6, *lurore + maciem* = *larvale simulacrum*.

<sup>37</sup> *terrore larvarum interfectorumque catervae*, Amm. Marc. XIV 11.17; *larvale simulacrum ... et miserabiles umbrae*, id. xxxi 1.3; *Manias autem. quas nutrices minitantur parvolis pueris, esse larvas, id est manes, quos deos deasque putabant, quosque ab inferis ad superos emanare credebant*. Festus s.v. 'Manias', p. 115 Lindsay.

<sup>38</sup> *tenet ora profanae / foeda situ macies, caeloque ignota sereno/j terribilis Stygio facies pallore gravatur / inpexis onerata comis*, Lucan vi 515-18.

<sup>39</sup> Petron. *Sat.* 62; *Larvati—furiosi et mente moti, quasi larvis exterriti*, Fesrus. p. 106 Lindsay.

<sup>40</sup> I have come across no Greek texts which describe the underworld or its inhabitants as bloodlessly white or pallid. Latin references are numerous: Sen. *Oed.* 583-98 (*inter umbras, pallentes deos ... exsanguie vulgus*). Sil. Ital. xiii 408. and often in Stat. *Theb.* (shades—ii 48, 98; iv 519, 625; viii 1; corpses—iv 510 f.; Pluto—iv 525; Charon—viii i8).

<sup>41</sup> Not only are the living dead so described, but the nearly dead, persons emaciated or anaemically white, are said to look like ghosts. See Athenaios' collection of comic passages (xii 551C-552O. *iurisconsulti e tenebris procedebant, pallidi, graciles, vix animam habentes, tanquam qui tum maxime reviviscerent* (Sen. *Apocol.* 12). I take this to be the meaning of Soph. *Phil.* 946 f. (*νεκρον, ἢ καπνοῦ σκιάν, / εἶδωλον ἄλλως*) and Soph. *O.C.* 109 f. (*τόδ' ἄθλιον / εἶδωλον*), since paleness and emaciation seem to be implied quite clearly in the former.

<sup>42</sup> Sw athing oneself in a white sheet is the commonest impersonation of a ghost in American folklore. For an example from modern Greece of the same appearance, see R. & E. Blum (n. 25) 100: 'When one of my babies was just three days old I expected the Moirai to come to bless the child, for they usually do that on the third day. I decided to stay up and wait for them in order to see what they looked like. But curiosity is a bad thing and the Moirai decided to punish me for mine. At midnight they appeared in the form of three big white sheets and they danced around me. I was very, very frightened and felt ashamed of having been curious. I immediately ran off to bed and saw nothing of what the Moirai did to my child.'

<sup>43</sup> Smoke—*Il.* xxiii 100, Lucian *Philops.* 16; clouds—Sil. Ital. xii 652 f.; dreams—A. Ag. 1218, Proklos *in remp.* ii 130.13 Kroll; shadows—*σκιοειδῶ φαντάσματα* seen flitting about graveyards and tombs, Pl. *Phaedo* 81d; the same phrase of a ghostly army glimmering in dawn light and also at noon. Damascius *Vita Isidori* (C. Zintzen [Hildesheim 1967] 92).

<sup>44</sup> Sen. *Thy.* 668-74; Lucan iii 420; a prayer for protection at night—*φόβους δ' ἀπόπεμπε νυχαυγείς*, Orphic hymn 2.14; demons are *ὕλης καὶ πονηρίας ἀπαυγάσματα*, Tatian *adv. Graec.* 15, and see E. R. Dodds (ed.) *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford 1963) 309, 318 f. Maximus of Tyre described the ghost-raising at Avernus: *εἶδωλον, ἀμυδρὸν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀμφισβητήσιμον* (viii 2b Hobein).

<sup>45</sup> If Damaskios' collection of tales of haunting and supernatural visitation had survived (Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 130), our examples of white, black and tenuous ghosts could no doubt be extended. Since the issue is fright, I have not included examples of ghosts

who appear as they looked in life, since these are regularly benign, nor of those with radiant faces, who are divine or angelic.

<sup>46</sup> C. Bonner, 'Demons of the Bath'. *Studies Presented to F. Ll. Griffith* (London 1932) 203–8.

<sup>47</sup> The same incident is described by Pausanias (x 1.11) and Polyainos (vi 18). Both add a visual detail: the moon was shining.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. the ghosts in flickering light mentioned above, p. 163.

<sup>49</sup> Henrichs 124–9. There is some evidence which suggests that robbers actually did wear black clothing. *Arte-midoros* ii 3 (103.6–8 Pack): "Black clothing is in general a bad sign, except for those who work by stealth"; *id.* ii 20 (137.4 Pack): 'The crow is symbolic of an adulterer or a *thief* both on account of its *colour* and because it often changes its voice'. The plausibility of this is confirmed by a folk-etymology: *furtum a furvo, id est nigro, dictum Labeo ait, quod clam et obscure fiat et plerumque nocte* (*Digesta* xlvii 2.1). I am not sure of the meaning of Paulus *Sententiae* iii 4b (*de inst. her.*) 2: 'condiciones contra leges et decreta principum uel bonos mores adscriptae nullius sunt momenti: ueluti si *uxorem non duxeris, si filios non susceperis. si homicidium feceris, si larvali habitu processeris* et his similia'.

<sup>50</sup> Henrichs 7.

<sup>51</sup> 'Bisher war nur die Einkleidung von Einzelpersonen bekannt', *ibid.* 124.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 124.

<sup>53</sup> *Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult*, RGVV ix 1 (Giessen 1910) 16–18.

<sup>54</sup> The author of *The Sacred Disease* (ch. 2, p. 589 Kühn) nicely marks it as superstitious when he gives it as one of the rules of witch-doctors, faith-healers, quacks and charlatans that their patients are not to wear black because it is a sign of death. See also *Reg.* iv 91 f. and the Pythagorean taboo (D. L. viii 19, 33 f.). In a liturgical context, the mixture of white and black is shocking: 'On the birthday of the temple of Artemis at Ephesos, when all were clad in white, John alone put on black raiment and went up into the temple; and they took him and essayed to kill him'. *Acts of John* 38 (James 236). For other examples of the liturgical incompatibility of black and white, see A. C. Rush, 'The Colors of Red and Black in the Liturgy of the Dead', in *Kyrialeon* (n. 1) 698–708. The gods' and *daimones*' sensitivity to colour-integrity is shown by Pliny's observation that the shades refuse to obey a necromancer who has freckles, *N.H.* xxx 1.16.

<sup>55</sup> Henrichs 56–73. The interesting fragment of Euphorion (88 Powell=103 Scheidweiler), *πάντα δέ οἱ νεκυηδὸν ἐλενκαίνοντο πρόσωπα* shows that the Titans' frightening approach to Zagreus fits into the larger pattern I have traced of ghostly disguises, and is perhaps most similar to Hermes' black-ghostly disguise to frighten the infant Artemis (Kallim. *H.* iii 69). It does not follow that any white-face disguise is automatically a reference to the Titans.

<sup>56</sup> The *pais* is certainly a male person, but whether a child or an adult servant is not determinable. Much of Henrichs' argument is based on taking the *pais* as a child, though the two contemporary narrative texts upon which he draws most heavily in other respects deal with the sacrifice of a centurion's 'companion', who is male and may be either young or old, slave or free (Dio lxxi 4) and the sacrifice of a free young woman (A.T. iii 15). Most of the narrative parallels from novels concern free young women. This may be Lollian's deliberate inversion, comparable to the conclusion of Book i, where the hero loses his virginity but is offered a compensatory payment.

<sup>57</sup> Paul Stengel, 'ΣΦΑΓΙΑ', *Hermes* xxi (1886) 307–12.

<sup>58</sup> F. Schwenn. *Die Menschenopfer bei den Griechen und Römern*, RGVL xv. 3 (Giessen 1915).

<sup>59</sup> J. G. Griffiths, 'Human Sacrifices in Egypt: the Classical Evidence'. *Ann. du Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte* xlviii (1948) 409–22 incorrectly considers A.T. iii 1\$ as evidence for actual human sacrifice in Egypt. He points to aspects of the style which indicate that it is a *Bildbeschreibung* and assumes that an actual mural depicted such a scene. But Achilles Tatius often uses an ecphrastic style and seems to feel that it is sadistically appropriate to moments of physical horror: cf. iii 1–4, 7–8, v 3–5. Much less is Leukippe's gut-filled pseudo-stomach (A.T. iii 21) to be compared to one of the parts of the dismembered Osiris (Henrichs 70 n. 77).

<sup>60</sup> Making a solemn oath may include the drinking of human blood, but it is the oath-takers' *own* blood: Hdt. i 74. iv 70 (Lydians and Medes), Tac. *Ann.* xii 47 (Armenia). Herodotos specifies (i 74.6) that this custom goes beyond Greek practice. At Hdt. iii 11 Phanes' sons are killed and their blood drunk, but this is a sheer atrocity with no religious element, as is the Skythian revenge, Hdt. i 73.

<sup>61</sup> One character even draws attention to the extraordinary coincidence between the ritual's prescriptions and the theatrical illusion which they design: πάντως δὲ καὶ ὁ χρησμός ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ λαθεῖν χρήσιμος (iii 21.3).

<sup>62</sup> Fictional desperadoes are likely to worship Ares: Apul. *Met.* iv 21 (hymn to Mars); Lucian *Navig.* 36 (an imagined band of brigands whose watchword is Enyalios). But the fact that outlaws are regularly conceived in fiction as having a quasi-military organization (so too Lollianos' brigands, Henrichs 43), does not mean that we can derive any factual information about robbers as soldiers from such descriptions. The Groningen commentary on Apuleius *Met.* iv 1–27, App. I 'Military terms in the robber episode', seems to blur the line between historical report and fictional image.

<sup>63</sup> E.g., Sympathetic Executioner: ii 11.3–9, iv 6.4–7. v 5.4–6. Rapist Foiled by a Religious Scruple: iii 11.3–5. v 4–5–7: iii

<sup>64</sup> E.g. Potiphar's Wife: iii 12.3–6. Bride Buried Alive: iii. 8, and Chariton i 8.

<sup>65</sup> Other heroines suffer this fate, or seem to: Sinonis (actually Trophima) eaten by a dog (Iambi. *Bab.*—Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 44 p. 77a 29 ff.); Thisbe apparently eaten by a lion (Ovid *Met.* iv 96–104). Cf. A.T. iii 5: Kleitophon and Leukippe worry about death by sharks, just before they land on the brigand-infested shores around Pelousion.

<sup>66</sup> Skylla, Kyklops, Laistrygonians in the *Odyssey*; Hdt. iv. 106; Alexander's letter to Aristotle 5 (hippotami), 7 (bats with human teeth), 13 (cinocephali); Pliny *S.H.* vi 187–95; vii 2.24; Bousiris a cannibal (Schol. Lucian *Jup. Trag.* 21), Sphinx a cannibal (Ps.-Quint. *Ded.* 12); Lucian *V.H.* 1 3, 35; ii 44. 46; *Martyrdom of Matthew* (James 460); in witchcraft, *PCM* iv 2594–2596, cf 2656 f.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Xen. *Eph.* iii I 1.4, δεισιδαίμονες δὲ θύσει βάρβαροι

<sup>68</sup> Char, i 7–14, Long, i 28–30, ii 19–29, Xen. *Eph.* i 13–ii 12. These groups are hostile but not deadly, so their presence in the story does not lead to those thrilling scenes of ritual murder. One group of pirate-kidnappers is not ultimately even hostile: A.T. ii 13–18, viii 17. Kallisthenes gathers a group of idle fishermen to help him kidnap the heroine, but instead of Leukippe they snatch her cousin Kalligone. We learn six books later that she has fallen in love with her captor and he has mended his ways.

<sup>69</sup> E.g. the near-crucifixion of Habrokomes (Xen. *Eph.* iv 2), of Chaireas (Char. iv 2-3), or Rhodanes (twice, Iambl. *Bab.* = Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 94 p. 74a12, 78a12); the near-ignition of Charikleia (Hld. viii 9); the induced epileptic fit of Leukippe (A.T. iv 9).

<sup>70</sup> Consider the contrast between Kleitophon explaining his misfortunes to the Egyptian general, who will turn out to be a villain but who is able to give Kleitophon the appearance of a sympathetic hearing (A.T. iii 14), and Kleitophon's lament in the case of the outlaws: 'Now, o gods, you have put us into the hands of Egyptian brigands, to deprive us even of a sympathetic hearing. A Greek outlaw would respond to our speech and his hard heart might melt at our prayers ... If I were as persuasive as the Sirens, still the butchers would not listen' (A.T. iii 10.2 f.).

<sup>71</sup> There is an allusion to the possibility of other such sacrifices at iii 22.3.

<sup>72</sup> Josephus knew an anti-semitic legend of an annual human sacrifice (*contra Apionem* ii 8) and Damokritos of a seven-yearly one (*περὶ Ἰουδαίων* Suda s.v. 'Damokritos'). Josephus' critique of the legend is in many ways parallel to my analysis of Lollianos and Dio lxxi 4.

<sup>73</sup> Chankleia and Kalasiris are secret witnesses of a gruesome necromancy at Hid. vi 12-15. For an historical parallel, cf. the role of Vindicius in Plut. *Publ.* 4.

<sup>74</sup> M. P. Nilsson, *The Dionysiae Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age* (Lund 1957, repr. N.Y. 1975) 4: "Whereas the old mysteries were hidden in secrecy, the Bacchic mysteries were not. Otherwise, we should not have so many representations that refer to their ceremonies ...".

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* 133-9; A. D. Nock, 'A Cult Ordinance in Verse', *HSCP* lxxiii (1958) 415-21 = *Essays* (n. 1) 847-52.

<sup>76</sup> This is properly a Pythagorean observance, probably quite ancient, and taken over by a Dionysiae fellowship. Nock (n. 75) 416 (= *Essays* 848).

<sup>77</sup> Nilsson (n. 74) 106-15.

<sup>78</sup> Some of the Desperadoes vs Victim scenes, insofar as they contain any religious structure at all, may be viewed as a subgroup of the tales of Impiety Punished. The classic instance is the tale of Kinesias (Lys. *fr.* 53 Thalheim = Ath. xii 55 id), the leader of what is virtually a satanic group celebrating a Black Mass, as Lysias describes them. Cf. the parody of Eleusinian initiation enacted in the house of Poulytion, Paus. i 2.5.

<sup>79</sup> Though only A.T. iii 15 among the surviving novelists has given us a scene of sacrifice which serves for the induction of new recruits into an outlaw band, the idea that outlaws are a counter-society with their own quasimilitary rules of organization, inflexibly opposed to the established order, is common (*Onos*, Apuleius, Xen. *Eph.*, Heliodoros). Even if Lollianos' scene were not fiction but a camera-accurate glimpse of actual proceedings, one could view the atrocities as 'motivated by ... anti-social feelings rather than by religious convictions' (Sandy (n. 1) 371).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Livy x 38, the Samnite *legio linteata*; x 38.2, *velut initiatis militibus*.

<sup>81</sup> 'Sacramentum infanticidii. Die Schlachtung eines Kindes und der Genuss seines Fleisches und Blutes als vermeintlicher Einweihungsakt im ältesten Christentum', *Ant. u. Christ.* iv (1934) 188-228.

<sup>82</sup> Sallust makes clear that some of his information is transmitted by rumour (14.7. J7-7. 19-4, 22.1, 48.7). His report of Catiline mentions only human blood (22.1, which may be no atrocity at all but merely a solemn oath on a self-inflicted wound, cf. n. 51) but was later understood as an instance of child murder (D10 xxxvii 30.3). The pattern



of accusation is pre-set and can ironically be charged against the very reporter (*Invect. in Sail.* 14).

[83](#) Brigandage, sacrilege and child murder combined in a scrap of modern Greek folklore: 'I think I read somewhere that in France two men wanted the devil to help them do bad things, to steal or something. They set up a picture of a goat and they killed a boy for the devil so he would help. They prayed, "Oh Diavolo, we give you this boy so that you will see we pray to you and that we worship you so that you will come help us. Diavolo, you who help the woman murder her unwanted child, you help those who steal.. I don't know how the rest of it went. The Solomonaiki has the liturgy for the black magic in it.' R. & E. Blum (n. 25) 99.

[84](#) 'Dieser heidnische Weiheakt (Kindestötung und Verschwörungsritualen) ist für uns nur in der Polemik fassbar, deren Zuverlässigkeit meist zweifelhaft ist. Hier ist die Bedeutung des Romanpapyrus evident, der Dölgers Kombinationen in überraschender Weise bestätigt. ... Die gnostischen Sekten und Christen nachge-sagten Vergehen wie Kindesmord, Kosten von dem Fleisch und Blut des Opfers sowie Promiscuität finden sich hier als Bestandteile eines zusammenhängende Rituals ohne die Verzerrungen, die eine der Propaganda dienende Polemik notwendig mit sich bringt.' Henrichs 37.

[85](#) *μυστήρια* is used of women's 'secrets' or 'genitals' in a rare reference to Lesbianism. Artem, i 80 (97.9-14 Pack).

[86](#) Both sophisticated and popular entertainment show cases of hypocritical religious facades concealing an erotic adventure: low-brow—the *moechus Anubis* mime (Tert. *Apol.* 15, Joseph. *Ant.* xviii 66-80); middle-brow—Ps.-Pack). Kallisth. *Alexander Romance* 11-21; high-brow—Hld. ii 33, iii 9. iv 5-9. 295

[87](#) Both *παῖς* and *μειράκιον* are used in the discussion of love at A.T. ii 35-8, but there the tone is rather different from that of the narratives.

[88](#) Hyg. 274.10-13 (Hagnodike the first woman doctor) represents the story-pattern of a popular novella; cf. Bonner, 'The Trial of St. Eugenia', *AJP* xli (1920) 253-64; Paus. v 6.7-8 (a mother passes as a male trainer to bring her son to the Olympic games); Suet. *Aug.* 45; Iambi. *Bab.* (Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 94 p. 78a), Euphrates dresses as the farmer's daughter and she as the executioner; J. Geffcken, *The Last Days of Greco-Roman Paganism*, tr. S. MacCormack (Amsterdam 1978) 291; E. Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London 1969) 68. According to Eustathios, Parthenope cut her hair short for a different reason (on Dionys. *Perieg.* 358, Müller *GGM* 280); he may be reporting not the novel but a parallel legend.

[89](#) The corpses might even be identical with the two corpses in P. Oxy. 1368: Glauketes is frightened by their ghostly request for burial.

[90](#) James n. 22 473 f. Resurrection is so taken for granted in the *Acts of John* that characters discuss its advisability in particular cases as if they were recommending a hot toddy. Drusiana, lying in her tomb, is nearly violated by the wicked Kallimachos and his henchman Fortunatus, but a huge serpent kills the latter and sits on the former for several days. John enters the tomb and brings Kallimachos back to his senses, then restores Drusiana to life, at which point they debate whether to resurrect Fortunatus as well. They do so but it turns out to have been a bad judgment: the resurrected villain gnashes his teeth, curses them and exits stage left (70-84, James 245-9).

[91](#) Plut. *de soll. anim.* 973e-974a.

[92](#) The cross-over from drama to novel may be illustrated by stories of sleeping draughts thought to be poison—Apul. *Met.* x ii, Xen. *Eph.* iii 5.11. The Apuleian novella

is analysed as a mime by H. Wiemken, *Der griechische Mimos* (Bremen 1972).

<sup>93</sup> Supported by refs in the *Hist. Augusta* (a hollow reed indeed) to Marius Maximus (*Marc. Ant.* 21.2, *Avid. Cass.* 6.7.).

<sup>94</sup> Or A.D. 171, as argued by J. Schwartz, 'Sur une demande de prêtres de Socnopéonèse', *Ann. du Service des Antiquités de l'Égypte* xliv (1944) 235–42.

<sup>95</sup> E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*<sup>5</sup> 451 n. 1, 623; A. von Premerstein, *Klio* xiii (1913) 93; F. Altheim, *Literatur und Gesellschaft* i 123; Sethe, 'Βουκόλοι', *RE* iii (1899) 1013.

<sup>96</sup> Henrichs believes that the human sacrifice of the *Phoinikika* is that of the Boukoloi ('Die Eingeweihten des Romanpapyrus kann man mit den ägyptischen Bukolen identifizieren' 37; '... so war die kultische Wirklichkeit der Bukolen', 50) but that it is not directly connected with the celebrated (or notorious) episode narrated by Dio lxxi 4. 'Even if our attempt to link the Boukoloi and the *Phoinikika* were to be contradicted by new finds, it remains true that the oath-sacrifice in Lollianos' novel is strikingly similar to the ritual murder of the Boukoloi described by Cassius Dio and Achilles Tatius. This similarity is explained best by related phenomena, which first become fully intelligible in connection with the myth of Dionysos-Zagreus', Henrichs 51.

<sup>97</sup> Trenkner (n. 3) refers to tales of wily thieves (29 f., 87 f.) and desperate *coups* (49 f.). In the novels, a favourite ploy is the noble youth doubling as a bandit: Thyamis in the *Aithiopika*, Hippothoos in the *Ephesiaka*. Menelaos and Kallisthenes in *Leukippe* (cf. viii 17.3, *ἔρως δέ με ληστείας ὑποκριτὴν πεποίηκε*); already in the *Odyssey* a noble man pretends to be an illegitimate noble man turned adventurer, xiv 199 ff.; and Lucius is falsely believed to have turned to a life of crime (*Met.* vii 1 f.). On the popular stage there was the robber-mime (Reich, *Der Mimos* i 88–92, 198, 564) and historiography contains many anecdotes about heroic desperadoes (Dio lxxv 2.4, Claudius in Judaea; lxxvi 10.1, Bulla in Italy; Alexander's *Letter to Aristotle* 9) and in later times the same stories were sanctioned by adding the reform of the brigand into a monk (*PC* xxxiv 1145, xxi 105; *PL* lxxiii 1170 f.; Pallad. *Hist. Laus.* 52, 73; Sulp. Sev. *Vita Martini* 5.6; R. Mac-Mullen, *Aegyptus* xlv (1964) 198). The 'Robin Hood' stories told of Bulla contain the very same elements that are used in the accounts of the Boukoloi: bribery, disguise and military entrapment; see below p. 176. The larger social and historical picture of banditry is well sketched by E. Hobsbawm, *Bandits* (London 1969). Since his historical sources are poems and ballads. Hobsbawm faces a similar problem of interpreting the myths of banditry as an image of the real patterns of bandit behaviour. His analysis of 'social bandits' is the proper background for further study of the Boukoloi.

<sup>98</sup> *RE Suppi*, vii (1940) 1239–44.

<sup>99</sup> R. MacMullen, 'Nationalism in Roman Egypt', *Aegyptus* xlv (1964) 179–99.

<sup>100</sup> J. Schwartz, 'Quelques Observations sur des romans grecs'. *Ant. Class.* xxxvi (1967) 536–52. 'En fait, sa "description" des Boucoloi ne peut pas être cohérente, car il unit, non sans quelque arbitraire, deux histoires.' I put 'account' in quotes, as Schwartz does 'description', to pose the question of the historicity of the text.

<sup>101</sup> History: Hdt. v 18; Xen. *Hell.* v 4.5–6 with an alternative version at v 4.7 = Plut. *Pelop.* 11. 1–2 = Plut. *de gen. Sorr.* 596d (an historical novella based on the incident); Plut. *Solon* 8.3. Fiction: A.T. li 18.; Ps.-Quint. *Decl.* 259 *Tyrannicida veste muliebri*, in which the tyrannicide complains that the statue honouring his deed has represented him in the woman's clothing in which he actually performed it; perhaps also we should



list Eur. *Hek.* 1160–71 as a variant on this theme and, facetiously, Plaut. *Casitia* 900–10, which does conceal a ‘sword’.

[102](#) Atrocity as an act of display: Hdt. i 73.5, Klearchos *fr.* 47 Wehrli (= Ath. xii 541C–e).

[103](#) The military situation in A.T. contains the same elements—desperation and massive numbers (*ἀνδρῶν*

*ἀπονενοημένων . . . πολὺ συνηθροῖσθαι ληστήριον, ὥς εἶναι*

iii 24. 1) and reluctance of the general to attack under these circumstances (iv 1.1).

[104](#) F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford 1964) 34, 42 f., 72.

[105](#) *ἐς ὅσον γε καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψε*, i 2.

[106](#) A. Fuks, ‘The Jewish Revolt in Egypt (A.D. i 15–117) in the light of the Papyri’, *Aegyptus* xxxiii (1953) 131–58. He labels the ‘account’ in Dio lxviii 32 as a ‘late, clearly anti-Semitic story’ (156). J. Schwartz, ‘Avidius Cassius et les Sources de l’Histoire Auguste (à propos d’une légende rabbinique)’ *Historia-Augusta-Colloquium 1963* (Bonn 1964) 135–64.

[107](#) Cannibalism, quite apart from whether it occurs or not, is still *used* as a xenophobic fiction by writers on classical subjects. A glaring example is E. A. Wallis Budge, *Osiris* (London 1911, repr. 1973) 176, 195 (note the explicit statement of the audience’s and narrator’s self-identification with the government Administrator as a safe context for the narration). A less outrageous example which nonetheless contains the same assumptions about the narrative context is M. Cary-E. H. Warmington. *The Ancient Explorers* (London 1929) 8. Some ancient authors were more acute; *cf.* the strong statement of Hdt. ii 45, also Isok. *Bousiris*, Diod. Sic. i 67, and the analysis by Eratosthenes, p. 179 below.

[108](#) I remember only one instance of that Herodotean note: the Armenian leader Tiridates at costly games in his honour at Puteoli shot at wild beasts from his elevated seat and—if anyone can believe it, *εἰ γέ τῳ πιστόν*—transfixed and killed two bulls with a single arrow (lxiii 3.2).

[109](#) J. Schwartz (n. 89) 540: ‘Ces Boucoloi se présentent comme l’un des accessoires obligés du roman grec exotique. ... Pour (Heliodore), ils ne constituent plus qu’un souvenir littéraire, tout comme chez St. Jérôme (*Vita Hilarionis* 43 = *PL* xxiii 52 f., *ad ea loca quae vocantur Bucolia, eo quod nullus ibi Christianorum esset, sed barbara tantum et ferox natio*).’

[110](#) Kleitophon and friends set sail from Berytos on a ship bound for Alexandria (ii 31.6). When it sinks they are washed ashore at Pelousion, the easternmost branch of the Nile (iii 5.6), from which they set out by small hired boat to sail along the Nile to Alexandria (iii 9. i). While passing an unspecified city they are attacked by a group whom their boatman identifies (in the generic singular) as *ὁ Βουκόλος* (iii 9.2). The ‘King’ of the Boukoloi, and presumably their base of operations, is said to be a two-day journey from there (iii 9.3). Within two stades of that village they encounter militia (iii 13.1). By the next day they have reached a trench and the place of Leukippe’s sacrifice, which is near a village filled with tens of thousands of brigands (iii 24.1) and from which Menelaos and Satyros have just escaped by running (iii 17.1). That village is described and its name given as Nikochis (iv 12). It is destroyed by a force from Alexandria (the metropolis, iv 18.1) and the whole river celebrates its freedom from the Boukoloi (iv 18.1, 3). The subsequent boat journey to Alexandria takes three days along the Nile (v 1.1).

[111](#) Prof. Sandy calls attention to *Od.* xi 293: Melampous in his attempt to rustle cattle from Iphikles was captured for the king by βουκόλοι ἀγροῖσθαι.

[112](#) R. Goossens, 'L'Égypte dans *VHéiène* d'Euripide', *Chronique d'Égypte* x (1935) 243-53 assembles some of the same data that I have used, but interprets fiction as historical fact wherever possible, alleging that Euripides knew of the herdsmen at Rhakotis because Theoklymenos mentions watchers (σκοπούς, 1174) whom the Greeks have eluded. He is tempted to believe that Euripides used these 'historical Egyptian' herdsmen in *I.T.*, though he otherwise omitted them from *Helen* (249 n. 1).

[113](#) Kallimachos seems to be the earliest source for the version with a rescued maiden (*Dieges.* iv 5-17 Pfeiffer i 103). From earliest times there are stories of maidens being carried off by pirates (*Od.* xv 427. *Arist. fr.* 76 Rose, Hdt. i 1.4, vi 138), only in later times are they also rescued (outside the novels, cf. Sositheos' *Lityerses*', the cluster of stories concerning Hymenaios, assembled by R. Schmidt, *de Hymenaeo et Talasio* [Kiel 1886]).

[114](#) R. MacMullen (n. 99).

## THE *AITHIOPIKA* OF HELIODOROS

### Narrative as riddle *J. R. Morgan*

In the last book of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika* (*Ethiopian Story*), Hydaspes, king of Ethiopia, returns in triumph, after a spectacular victory over the forces of Persia. During the celebrations he is presented with commemorative gifts by his subject nations, including:

a specimen of an unusual and bizarre kind of animal: in size it stood as tall as a camel, but its hide was marked with garish leopard spots. Its hindquarters and rear parts were squat and leonine, but its withers, forelegs, and chest were disproportionately taller than the rest of its anatomy. Notwithstanding the bulk of the rest of its body, its neck was as slender and elongated as the crop of a swan. In appearance its head was like a camel's, in size not quite twice that of a Libyan ostrich. Its eyes were rimmed with a black line like mascara and darted hither and thither with an expression of pompous disdain. Even its method of locomotion was unique, since it rolled from side to side like a ship at sea, in a manner quite unlike any other creature, terrestrial or aquatic: it did not advance each of its legs individually, in rotation, but its two right legs moved forward in unison, separately from the two left legs, which also functioned as a distinct pair, thus leaving each side of its body in turn without support. It was so halting in its gait and so docile in its temperament that its keeper could lead it on a slender cord wound around its neck, and it obeyed the directions of his will as if it were a chain that brooked no disobedience. The arrival of this beast produced universal amazement. The people spontaneously invented a name for the creature derived

from the most prominent features of its anatomy:  
*kamēlopardalis* [the normal Greek word for 'giraffe'].

(10.27.1-4)

It is worth spending a little time analysing what is going on in this passage. The first point to note is that an essential piece of information, the creature's name, is not divulged until the last possible moment, after the description is completed.

The information contained in the description itself is not imparted directly by the narrator to the reader. Instead it is channelled through the perceptions of the onlooking crowd. They have never seen a giraffe before, and the withholding of its name from the reader re-enacts their inability to put a word to what they see. From their point of view the creature is novel and alien: this is conveyed partly by the naive wonderment of the description, and partly by their attempts to control the new phenomenon by fitting it into familiar categories. Hence the comparisons with leopards, camels, lions, swans, ostriches, eyeliner and ships. Eventually they assert conceptual mastery over visual experience by coining a new word to name the animal, derived from the naively observed features of its anatomy. However, their neologism is given in Greek (*kamēlopardalis*), although elsewhere Heliodoros is scrupulously naturalistic in observing that Ethiopians speak Ethiopian.

The reader is thus made to watch the giraffe from, as it were, inside the skull of a member of the Ethiopian crowd. The narration does not objectively describe what they saw but subjectively reenacts their ignorance, their perceptions and processes of thought. This mode of presentation, involving the suppression of an omniscient narrator in direct communication with the reader, has the effect that the reader is made to engage with the material with the same immediacy as the fictional audience within the frame of the

story: it becomes, in imagination, as real for him as it is for them.

But there is a double game going on, since the reader, as a real person in the real world, differs from the fictional audience inside the novel precisely in that he does know what a giraffe is. This assumption is implicit in the way the description is structured. If Heliodoros' primary aim had been to describe a giraffe for the benefit of an ignorant reader, he would surely have begun with the animal's name, not withheld it. So for the reader the encounter with the giraffe is not a matter of coming to terms with a new experience, so much as an exercise in matching Heliodoros' deliberately eccentric formulations with what is already known about giraffes.<sup>1</sup> Knowledge about giraffes in late antiquity will have derived from autopsy in only a very few cases, although exotic animals were regularly exhibited in the arena. However, there exist a number of descriptions in classical authors which confirm that a literate reading public could be counted upon to have at least second-hand information about the animal.<sup>2</sup>

What all this means is that the description of the giraffe functions on a second level as a riddle aimed at the reader. The information it releases at such a measured pace serves as a series of clues from which the animal can be identified, although Heliodoros does not observe the modern protocol in such games of making the clues progressively easier.<sup>3</sup> The answer to the riddle of course is the name of the creature: the rules of riddling entail both that the answer should be postponed until all the clues have been supplied and that it must be properly given, even when it has become perfectly obvious. So although the Greek word *kamēlopardalis* is introduced in a way formally consistent with the dramatic frame of the narrative (i.e., it is supplied by people within the story rather than by authorial

statement), it functions to confirm to the reader that this passage truly was a riddle, and that the riddle is now over.

Heliodoros has taken some pains to observe the proprieties of realism here. The use of an ignorant audience within the fiction allows the riddle to be accommodated without damage to dramatic illusion. Nevertheless, once the riddle is recognized as such it becomes a game played directly between author and reader, bypassing the dramatic situation and even the narrative structure. Perhaps we can think of two Heliodoroi, first the author, a real man sitting in a room somewhere writing this text, and second the narrating voice in the text, which is just as much part of the fiction as the events it narrates. The narrator maintains the dramatic realism, but the author grimaces over his shoulder at the reader, playing with the etymology of the word *kamēlopardalis* in a way which is not meaningful for the Ethiopian-speaking spectators. Similarly the reader operates on two planes: one addressed by the narrator, responding to events with the immediacy of real experience, the other bookishly responding to the author's textual game, which challenges him into interpretative activity, into being a solver and realizer of the text rather than just a passive consumer of it.

I have subjected the giraffe to such prolonged analysis because it is an emblematic beast. The point I want to stress in this paper is that Heliodoros' whole novel demands an active interpretative response from his reader. The *Aithiopika* is a much more challenging read than any of the other Greek novels, precisely because it is pervaded at every level by the kind of self-conscious game-playing typified by the riddle of the giraffe.

Here, for instance, is the Egyptian priest, Kalasiris, who acts as narrator for about a third of the whole novel, describing a dream he had on the island of Zakynthos:

as I slept, a vision of an old man appeared to me. Age had withered him almost to a skeleton, except that his cloak was hitched up to reveal a thigh that retained some vestige of the strength of his youth. He wore a leather helmet on his head, and his expression was one of cunning and many wiles; he was lame in one leg, as if from a wound of some kind.

(5.22.1)

The vision reproaches Kalasiris for failing even to pay him a visit while in the vicinity, prophesies punishment for the omission, but conveys greetings from his wife to Kalasiris' charge, the heroine Charikleja, 'since she esteems chastity above all things' (5.22.3).

Again a riddle is set up by not immediately identifying the old man, and again the description is presented from the point of view of a character within the story. Here, however, the situation is rather more complicated, since Kalasiris himself has two aspects, as narrator and character within his own narration. As narrator he knows the identity of the dream figure, but in his presentation of his own experience he omits any explanatory gloss, and re-enacts the perplexity of his initial reaction. He describes the dream as he saw it, rather than as he subsequently understood it. Again the reader is challenged to disambiguate the riddle by matching the points of the description with knowledge acquired elsewhere. Every detail corresponds to something in the Homeric poems.<sup>4</sup> This time Heliodoros has succeeded in keeping the easiest clues to the end, particularly the formulaic epithet *polytropos* ('of many wiles'), proverbially associated with one epic individual, and the reference to a wound in the leg which also clinches its owner's recognition in the original. Further clues are offered by the fact that the old man has a home not far from Zakynthos and a wife associated with chastity.



From all this any half-educated reader would have little difficulty in identifying the figure as Odysseus. Again, by the rules of the game, a formal answer must be supplied, and again it is supplied realistically without breaching the narrative frame. A few sentences later Kalasiris makes this final request of his host on Zakynthos:

Take your boat over to Ithake and make an offering to Odysseus on our behalf. Ask him to temper his wrath against us, for he has appeared to me this very night and told me that he is angry at having been slighted.

(5.22.5)

In these cases, the game is played gently. Heliodoros wants to stimulate his reader, not defeat him. Ample help is given so that the identification can be made correctly; the game is collaborative rather than competitive. However, it concerns material from outside the novel, and is perhaps not so very far above the level of a general-knowledge quiz. When Heliodoros starts playing comparable games with his own invented story, where all readers start equal, he is apt to make greater demands.

Let's start with an easy example. At the very end of the novel, Charikleia has returned to her native Ethiopia after eloping with her beloved Theagenes from Delphi, where she was brought up as the daughter of the priest of Apollo, Charikles. She has been recognized by her real parents, Hydaspes and Persinna, king and queen of Ethiopia, but Theagenes stands in mortal peril, since he has been designated a sacrificial victim in celebration of the Ethiopians' victory over the Persians. At this juncture a message arrives from Oroondates, the defeated satrap of Egypt, asking Hydaspes to restore to her father a girl captured by the Ethiopians while on her way to Memphis; Oroondates adds that he is himself attracted to her, and knows that she has been brought to Ethiopia on Hydaspes'

orders (10.34.3-4). Hydaspes allows the father, an old man in pitifully shabby clothing, to look around for his daughter. Unable to find her among Hydaspes' captives, the old man weeps, but suddenly rushes at Theagenes, drags him from the sacrificial altar, calling him villain and scoundrel, and informs the king, 'This is the man who kidnapped my daughter' (10.35.1-2).

Again a vital piece of information is withheld: the identity of the old man. And again we are presented with a series of clues provided dramatically from inside the narrative frame: partly through the satrap's letter, which the reader of the novel reads through the eyes of a character in the novel (Hydaspes), and partly through the subsequent action, description of which is limited to what could have been seen and heard by those present, thus enabling the narrator to conceal his omniscience about the old man's identity and motives.

The contents of the letter, however, cohere so closely with events already narrated that it is plain that the daughter the old man is seeking is Charikleia. This is confirmed when he fails to find her among Hydaspes' captives, since she has been removed after her recognition by her natural parents. But even when the reader has become sure that the object of the old man's quest is the heroine of the novel, he may still be reluctant to identify the old man himself as Charikles, because of the sheer improbability of the priest of Delphic Apollo suddenly turning up in rags beyond the southern frontiers of Egypt—until, that is, he recognizes Theagenes and refers to the elopement from Delphi which took place six books previously. These clues are quite sufficient to enable the reader to work out who the old man is before Heliodoros gives us the answer: 'Pressed by Hydaspes to explain more clearly what he meant, the old man (who was none other than Charikles) ...' (10.36.1).

What must be noted here is that the reader can entertain and confirm the identification of Charikles only because he

has a surplus of knowledge over the Ethiopians which is the result of his having read the novel so far and their having not. The riddle this time does not involve material from outside the text and is more than just an incidental piece of fun. The game which the reader is being invited to join is a riddle which not only tests his memory of earlier sections of the plot, but also has a crucial bearing on its future. For if the identity of Charikles is enigmatic, even more so is how he might affect the prospects of Theagenes; the hero is condemned to die as a human sacrifice, but the reader's expectations are geared up to a reprieve, partly by the knowledge that romantic heroes do not get killed on the last page,<sup>5</sup> but also, more specifically, by Theagenes' exhibition of prowess in wrestling a runaway steer and an Ethiopian giant, and by suggestions that, despite her maidenly inhibitions, Charikleia is on the verge of coming clean about him to her parents. The sudden intervention of her wronged foster-father confounds all expectations, and his well-founded accusations make Theagenes' future look decidedly bleak. The solution of the riddle, then, moves the plot forward into a new and more unpredictable (and hence exciting) phase.<sup>6</sup>

This characteristic pattern of withholding information (riddle), releasing it obliquely and gradually (clues), and then explaining it in retrospect (answer) also informs larger spans of narrative. In Book 8, for example, the hero and heroine have fallen into the clutches of the nymphomaniac Persian princess, Arsake. Charikleia is sentenced in a rigged trial to be burned at the stake for a murder she did not commit, a sentence she welcomes as a release from the miseries of her life. The fire is lit, and with a fearsome denunciation of Arsake and assertion of her own innocence, Charikleia leaps into the heart of the flames:

There she stood for some time without taking any hurt.  
The flames flowed around her rather than licking against

her; they caused her no harm but drew back whenever she moved towards them, serving merely to encircle her in splendour and present a vision of her standing in radiant beauty within a frame of light, like a bride in a chamber of flame. Charikleia was astounded by this turn of events but was nonetheless eager for death. She leapt from one part of the blaze to another, but it was in vain, for the fire always drew back and seemed to retreat before her onset.

(8.9.13-14)

A miracle! At least it seems so because a vital piece of information is omitted: *how* does a romantic heroine escape being fried to a crisp when she jumps into a bonfire? The passage exhibits all the by now familiar features. Events are presented from partial viewpoints, first Charikleia's in her dramatic speech; then the moment of her mounting the pyre and her unexpected survival are seen through the crowds eyes (note how *visual appearance* is stressed); and finally the heroine's again in her astonishment. The absence of any authorial explanation for such an inexplicable and unexpected development constitutes a riddle, and invites speculative interpretation. Knowledge from outside Heliodoros' novel is of marginal utility, and consists mainly of an awareness that romantic novels simply do not incinerate their heroines with two books still to go, so that the reader was in some sense expecting Charikleia to survive.<sup>7</sup> The actual course of the plot was never really what was at issue, so much as the means by which the inevitable outcome would be accomplished, and it is precisely those means which are problematized by the riddle structure.

As usual, the answer is provided retrospectively and within the dramatic frame, but in this case the solution involves the introduction of new 'facts' of which the reader has hitherto been quite unaware. That night, in their prison cell, Theagenes and Charikleia talk over the day's

remarkable events. Charikleia suddenly remembers a dream vision of her now dead mentor Kalasiris that had visited her the previous night and delivered this prophecy:

If you wear *pantarbe* fear-all, fear not the power of flame  
Miracles may come to pass; for Fate 'tis easy game.

(8.11.2)

The solution to the riddle is itself a riddle, which Charikleia elucidates for her sceptical beloved: thinking she was about to die, she had secreted about herself the recognition tokens left her by her mother, including a ring set with the jewel called *pantarbe* and engraved with mystic characters. This, she surmises, protected her from the fire (8.11.7-8).

Heliodoros' manipulation of his narrative is obvious. Any 'honest' writer would have narrated this self-evidently important dream in its proper chronological place. The postponement is halfheartedly explained within the dramatic frame by the suggestion that Charikleia simply forgot about it, but this is only for form's sake.<sup>8</sup> Heliodoros is deliberately withholding information, to induce puzzlement and speculation, to encourage the reader to take, in Umberto Eco's notorious phrase, 'inferential walks'.

In comparison with the other riddles we have discussed, this one may seem adversarial rather than collaborative. Rather than slowly releasing material which will guide the reader safely to the correct solution, Heliodoros' aim appears to be to keep us in the dark until such time as it suits him to tell us something we could not have otherwise known. But, although the author is playing more roughly here, he is still observing the rules: the clues *are* there, though probably their significance is realized only in retrospect. As Charikleia goes to face trial, intending to denounce herself and find release from the torment of her existence, Heliodoros duly records that she wore her

recognition tokens 'as a kind of burial shroud, fastened around her waist beneath her clothes' (8.9.8). And this reference to the tokens takes us back, across half the novel, to the embroidered message in Ethiopian hieroglyphs which Persinna exposed with her daughter and which remained unread until Kalasiris tracked her down in Delphi and deciphered it:

Above all, be sure to find among the treasures that I laid beside you a certain ring. Keep it by you always. It was a gift that your father gave me during our courtship, engraved all around with the royal crest and set with a *pantarbe* jewel that endows it with holy, mystic powers.  
(4.8.7)

These holy, mystic powers are unspecified.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the mere mention of them would lead a competent reader to surmise that the plot would exploit them sooner or later, and an exceptionally alert reader might beat the author to the connection in Book 8.

It is not difficult to find other sections within the narrative of the *Aithiopika* which are constructed as riddles, a vital piece of information being kept back and then released as an answer. Two more examples can be mentioned briefly, both from the ninth book, whose military subject matter could easily lead to the false assumption that its narrative technique is simple.

Oroondates is besieged by the Ethiopians in Syene. He parleys with them, and secures their permission to send two envoys to his troops at Elephantine, *ostensibly* to negotiate their surrender at the same time as his. His real motives are not divulged, nor are they when he makes an apparently impossible break-out and stealthily enters Elephantine by night (9.7ff.). The riddle set is: what is his plan?, and, as is by now familiar, the reader's ignorance is produced by the exploitation of partial in-text viewpoints. In this case all

Oroondates' actions are described as seen by the Ethiopians without authorial explanation. Some additional clues are given later in the narrative, but the full answer is withheld until the moment when the Persian army from Elephantine suddenly turns up with Oroondates at its head (9.13), at which point the omniscient narrator intervenes to fill in the gaps he had left in his own narrative.

There ensues a battle, in which the Persians have a seemingly decisive weapon, their armoured cavalry. A lengthy description stresses the totality of the protection of both rider and horse and the awesome power of their arms (9.15). Against them Hydaspes stations troops of the Blemmyes and Seres, two subject nations, with special instructions which are not communicated to the reader. This is the riddle. The answer emerges in the battle, when the Blemmyes rush forward like madmen (all this is seen from the Persian point of view, without explanation), throw themselves to the ground and stab upwards with their swords into the horses' unprotected bellies as they thunder over their heads (9.17-18), and then butcher the dismounted knights through the one vulnerable point in their armour, between the legs, as they lie helpless, too heavy to move. Meanwhile the Seres part ranks to reveal Hydaspes' corps of elephants, the sight of which throws the cavalry into panic. Ethiopian archers pick off the survivors by shooting arrows through the eye-slits in their helmets. Unobtrusive clues to the stratagem were furnished in the description of the armour, where all the details which become important in the battle were unostentatiously included.

These examples present the riddle format over a medium-term narrative span. The pattern recurs with sufficient frequency for us to identify it as a characteristic feature of Heliodoros' narrative technique. To reiterate, release of information is deliberately controlled so as to entice the reader into identifying and answering, with varying degrees



of certainty, questions posed by the narrative. The implied reader of the *Aithiopika* is compelled to be constantly engaged in interpretation and speculation, and must respond to the author's games in order to actuate the text fully. Formalist critics earlier this century made a distinction between what they called *histoire*, that is the story as it 'actually' happened, complete and in chronological order, and *récit*, that is, the way that the story is presented, the textual surface. To use their terms, Heliodoros' *récit* consistently omits or postpones important aspects of the *histoire*, and the author communicates directly with the reader about the *histoire* through riddles, over the head of the narrator and his *récit*.

By this stage, it has probably become clear to anyone who knows the *Aithiopika* and the recent secondary literature on it that what I have been discussing is an exact counterpart in microcosm to the macrotextual structure of the whole work. This is where Heliodoros marks a spectacular advance over his predecessors in the romance form. At the end of the tradition, when Heliodoros was writing,<sup>10</sup> two weaknesses of conventional romantic narrative must have become obvious. The first was its predictability: curiosity to know what happens next is the motor of reading any fiction, but with a stereotyped basic plot there can never be any real doubt about the ending. Heliodoros redirected curiosity from outcome to explanation. The second problem is lack of direction and unity: romance was prone to fall apart into a series of exciting but only loosely connected adventures, at the end of which the protagonists recovered their lost happiness and simply lived out the rest of their lives as if nothing had happened. By leaving central questions unanswered Heliodoros is able to hold large spans of text together, and the most important answers, when they do arrive, involve decisive change for the protagonists. Both these strategies imply an interpretatively active reader.

The opening of the novel is deservedly famous.<sup>11</sup> A gang of bandits come across a beached ship, surrounded by twitching corpses and the wreckage of a banquet. Through their eyes, and with their ignorance of what has taken place, the reader is made to assimilate the scene in obsessive but unexplained visual detail. In the midst of the carnage sits a fabulously beautiful young woman, nursing a fabulously handsome young man. It does not take long to identify them as the hero and heroine of the novel, and learn that their names are Theagenes and Charikleia, but Heliodoros tantalizes us over further details. Thus at the very beginning of the novel two riddles are established: what has happened on the beach? and who exactly are the hero and heroine? Heliodoros prolongs the reader's ignorance by his characteristic use of partial viewpoint. Sometimes, as with the bandits, there is a fictional audience whose specific perceptions act as a channel of partial information to the reader, but elsewhere Heliodoros as narrator simply relates what an uninformed witness of the events would have seen or heard. For example, we are only allowed to find out about the hero and heroine as they speak to others or are spoken about: Heliodoros as author knows all about them but keeps quiet in favour of his recording but not explaining narrative voice.

The opening scene is eventually disambiguated by Kalasiris, an Egyptian priest. He regales Knemon, a surrogate reader within the text who shares the real reader's curiosity about the protagonists, with a long story, beginning in Book 2, of how he met Charikleia at Delphi, witnessed the birth of her love for Theagenes and helped the lovers to elope. He chronicles their subsequent experiences, until at the end of Book 5, half-way through the novel, the story circles back to its own beginning and at last resolves the mystery of the scene on the beach.

Kalasiris, however, is no more a straightforward narrator than is Heliodoros.<sup>12</sup> In fact, he comments himself (2.24.5) on the apparently tricky quality of his story-telling. By the time he tells Charikleia's story to Knemon, Kalasiris has long known her to be the natural daughter of the King and Queen of Ethiopia, exposed by her mother at birth because of her white skin, but he suppresses this knowledge so that Knemon (and through him the reader) can actively participate in the discovery. First he learns (through a reported narrative, 2.30ff.) that she is only the adopted daughter of her ostensible father, Charikles, the priest of Apollo, and how she came to be adopted. Then (2.35) he is granted an enigmatic prophecy by the Delphic oracle, and visited in his sleep (3.11) by Apollo and Artemis who tell him to take the young lovers with him to Egypt and onwards. Assisting their love against Charikles' wishes through a complex and duplicitous intrigue, he eventually tricks Charikles into allowing him to see the embroidered band exposed with her, a message from the Ethiopian queen to her abandoned child.<sup>13</sup> The performance of Kalasiris is in many ways emblematic of the whole novel, intensely self-aware, theatrical, manipulative, enigmatic. He is the focus where the roles of author and reader intersect. Like the reader he has to make speculative sense out of cryptic fragments of information, and like the author he employs less than complete release of information to puzzle and please his audience; he is both a solver and setter of riddles.

But his narrative does not resolve all the ambiguities it poses. The obscure oracle is in fact a predictive armature around which the whole future course of the plot is built.<sup>14</sup> Some elements of it are obvious and others are resolved by Kalasiris, but it also looks beyond his death to the very end of the novel. It is another large-scale riddle, whose answers

are supplied by the course of the story itself. Its last couplet, which predicts that the lovers will:

... reap the reward of those whose lives are passed in  
virtue: A crown of white on brows of black

only receives full explication in the last sentence of the work, when Theagenes and Charikleia, now formally to be married and honorary Ethiopians (hence the brows of black), don the white mitres of the High Priest of the Sun and High Priestess of the Moon in Ethiopia. In the interim, it has served to elicit deliberately misguided guesses about the ending of the novel, for example as the terms of its prophecy appear to be fulfilled in the human sacrifice which threatens Theagenes and Charikleia when they reach Ethiopia.

To conclude: it is characteristic of Heliodoros at every level of narration to withhold information, not simply to produce effects of shock and surprise, but to enlist the reader into an actively interpretative role. If this essay has dwelt on specific examples from the second half of the work, that is because there has been a tendency in scholarly work on the novel to dwell on its overall structure and particularly the figure of Kalasiris and to regard the sections narrated by Heliodoros himself as technically simpler and less interesting. This is untrue; the technique is all-pervasive. The plot itself contains frequent examples of characters compelled to speculate interpretatively, notably in response to dreams, not surprisingly since the narrator so conspicuously fails to provide an authoritative centre of final meaning. Heliodoros was clearly very interested in these issues of cognition and comprehension, but I do not think his interest was a post-modernist one in hermeneutic theory, nor that these recurrent situations are intended to focus the reader's attention on the reading process *per se*.<sup>15</sup> For all the self-conscious artificiality of individual examples, I

would prefer to see the enigmatic narrative mode of the *Aithiopika* as an attempt to move fiction closer to life.

Real life, after all, tends to be confused and senseless. We are not always immediately aware of the causes or meanings of what we see and suffer. These things more often become clear only in retrospect, as we learn more or impose patterns on raw experience. Whereas other Greek novelists, in predigesting the story for us, reduce us to the role of audience, Heliodoros has contrived to make his reader an imaginative participant in the story of Theagenes and Charikleia.<sup>16</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> An illuminating modern parallel is provided by Craig Raine's poem 'A Martian Sends a Postcard Home', in which an alien from outer space describes familiar Earth objects with disorienting unfamiliarity:

In homes a haunted apparatus sleeps  
that snores when you pick it up.

If the ghost cries, they carry it  
to their lips and soothe it to sleep

with sounds. And yet, they wake it up  
deliberately, by tickling with a finger.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, our passage itself probably derives from literary sources rather than first-hand experience, and may well share a source with an account of the beast by the fifth-century grammarian Timotheos of Gaza, preserved in the second book of the so called *Sylloge Constantini* printed in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. 1, Berlin, 1885, 94, §270. Compare my note 'Two giraffes emended', CQ 38 (1988), 267–9. For other descriptions of giraffes see Diod.2.51 (preserving Poseidonios); Strab. 16.4.7 (preserving Artemidoros); Plin. *Nat. Hist.*8.69; Oppian, *Kyn. ἑΑΒλν.*; Philostorgios, *Hist.Eccl.*3.11.

<sup>3</sup> In fact he gives the game away rather early by mentioning camels and leopards in the first sentence; but perhaps this heavy hint should be read as a signal that the animal is not going to be named any more directly—in other words that there is a riddle being set at all.

<sup>4</sup> The withering of age refers to the disguise given to Odysseus by Athene at Oá.13.398ff.; the strong thigh revealed by a hitched-up cloak recalls the preparations for the wresling bout at *Od.*18.66ff.; the leather helmet comes from the nocturnal raid of *Iliad* 10.

[5](#) I am oversimplifying the dynamics of fiction here. Even when readers know (from their acquaintance with the conventions of the genre) what is going to happen next, they are often quite happy to pretend that they do not and respond accordingly. This is one term of the contract we make in reading a work of fiction, and is an aspect of Coleridge's famous 'suspension of disbelief'. Nevertheless, many novelists—and Heliodoros is one—exploit the tension between what generic rules say ought to happen and what looks likely to happen. For the manipulation of expectations in this scene see my article 'A sense of the ending', in *TAPhA* 119 (1989), esp. 315–18.

[6](#) In this case, the answer to the riddle is given by the author himself, not one of the characters inside the narrative frame. Such explanatory interventions are rare in Heliodoros (but not unique: compare those at 2.12.2ff., 5.4.3ff., 9.13.2ff., all incidentally good examples of medium-scale narrative riddles). The present instance can be explained partly by the fact that none of the characters in the narrative knows as much about Charikles as the reader does, and partly by the consideration that Hydaspes must not be allowed to hear Charikles' name since its similarity to that of Charikleia would make it very implausible for him not to realize that the old man's 'daughter' is actually his own recently recovered child.

[7](#) In fact Heliodoros himself signals as much a few sentences previously, when Charikleia embraces her beloved 'for what she thought would be the last time' (8.9.8).

[8](#) It is not even that considerations of mimetic realism have led Heliodoros to postpone mention of the dream until it can be spoken of by his characters. Elsewhere dreams, which are invariably significant, are narrated in due sequence by the omniscient narrator; for example, those at 1.18.4 and 2.16.1, although a similar example of a duplicitously postponed dream occurs at 9.25.1. We are dealing here with a deliberate device to produce a specific effect in its context.

[9](#) The *pantarbe* is an unidentified red gem; various powers were ascribed to it, such as that of attracting other jewels; cf. FGH 688 F 45 (Ktesias), Philostr. Vit. *Apoll.* 3.46, but no writer apart from Heliodoros, so far as we know, linked it with fireproofing.

[10](#) Heliodoros' dates are a matter of dispute. There is clearly some connection between the spectacular siege of Syene in the ninth book of the novel, and the references to an exactly similar stratagem used at Nisibis by the Parthians in CE 350 in two orations by the Emperor Julian. This would indicate a date for Heliodoros after 350, except that other sources for the siege of Nisibis describe significantly different tactics, which leaves open the possibility that Julian was copying from Heliodoros rather than vice versa, and that Heliodoros could have written his novel up to a hundred years earlier. However, no one disagrees that the *Aithiopika* is the latest romance that we know of, and papyrus fragments suggest that although novels continued to be read into the sixth and seventh centuries, the composition of such texts had ceased by the fourth.

[11](#) For more detailed analysis of this scene, see my paper 'Reader and audiences in the *Aithiopika* of Heliodoros', in *GCN* 4 (1992) 90, 86–90.

[12](#) Kalasiris has been the focus of much important work on this novel; see esp. J. J. Winkler, 'The mendacity of Kalasiris and the narrative strategy of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*', *YCS* 27 (1982), 93-158; G. N. Sandy, 'Characterization and philosophical décor in Heliodoros' *Aethi-opica*', *TAPhA* 112 (1982), 141-67; M. Futre Pinheiro, 'Calasiris' story and its narrative significance in Heliodoros' *Aethiopica*', *GCN* 4 (1992), 69-83.

[13](#) At which point his narrative takes another twist into its infinite regress, because he tells Charikleia (if he is to be believed) that he had been commissioned by her mother to find her, so that what he reads in the embroidery is not a discovery so much as a confirmation of what he already knew (4.12.2ff.). The answer seems to be that, although enlisted to look for Persinna's daughter, the search was not the reason for his coming to Delphi; only gradually did he come to realize who she was and to recognize the subtlety of the divine governance which had united the two strands of his experience (4.9.1). However we read Kalasiris' motivation (see Winkler, 'The mendacity of Kalasiris' and Futre Pinheiro, 'Calasiris' story'), this is clearly a spectacular, and hyper-enigmatic example of the postponement of explanatory material.

[14](#) On this oracle and its structural function, see my paper 'A sense of the ending' in *TAPhA* 119 (1989), 299-320.

[15](#) Against, for example, Winkler and Bartsch.

[16](#) In life an external centre of authoritative meaning can be provided by religion; in a text of literature that centre is represented by the author himself, which is why the elusive omniscient Heliodoros tends to allow us a fleeting glimpse of himself in riddling situations, which thus become simultaneously the most lifelike and the most artificial aspect of his fiction. Perhaps we can accept his intrusions as a kind of divine epiphany. At the very deepest level of understanding, when all the patterns finally cohere, god and author are indistinguishable. Certainly epiphanies of coherence within the novel are ascribed to realization of the divine economy; I think particularly of Kalasiris' realization that his personal pursuit of wisdom at Delphi and his care for the love of Theagenes and Charikleia are one and the same as his mission to find the Ethiopian princess (4.9.1), and of the supreme moment at the end of the novel when Charikles, of all people, who has been an uncomprehending victim of seemingly malign events, is granted a realization that everything has happened as the oracle predicted and nothing has been random (10.41.3). Disguised as God, Heliodoros takes his final bow.

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## **Longus: Daphnis and Chloe and Roman Narrative Painting**

It is a generally accepted idea that in any given culture certain affinities exist among the various forms of its artistic expression. Thus scholars and critics have even found it convenient to label certain stages of development in a society with general descriptive tags such as 'the Geometric Age' when speaking of Mycenaean art. We hear of 'the Baroque Age', or 'the Elizabethan Age', the 'Age of Romanticism', the 'Victorian Age', and the like. The mere usage of such titles indicates acceptance of the fact that certain intimate relationships exist among the various art forms in any given period, that the dominant ideas and values of a society are reflected in each of its several art forms.

This interrelationship, moreover, reveals itself in a dynamic process in which each and every art medium organically affects and is affected by the others. An artist is to a large extent conditioned by the dominant intellectual and aesthetic forces of his own culture. Perhaps for this reason it might be said that such a thing as purely 'personal' art is impossible. Though it is true that the looser the cohesion between individuals in society the less communal and hence more individualistic will be the artist's product ([1](#)).

Examples of parallelism in art forms are not difficult to find in history. One readily calls to mind here the affinities which exist between early Greek vase painting in the Geometric style and the style of the Homeric epics, between fifth century Greek sculpture which portrays the human body idealistically, a tragedy of Sophocles, and the Parthenon. After the demise of the city-state and the emergence of the megalopolitan society of Hellenistic times

particularization in art became manifest in almost every form.

The obvious place to begin an investigation of such inter-relationships would be with those existing between the visual arts, especially painting, and the literary arts. These are the arts which operate upon each other most frequently and with most conscious intention on the part of the artist. Descriptions of engravings, paintings and murals, for instance, have a long history in classical literature. The prototype of this literary device which became traditional and heavily stylized later on is found, of course, in Homer's *Iliad* where the poet describes the shield of Achilles, the marvelous creation of the smithy god Hephaestus ([1](#)). Examples in classical literature of this literary device are plentiful and in the period of the Second Sophistic of the Roman empire descriptions of paintings (ἐκφράσις) became a stock rhetorical exercise for students in the *Progymnasmata*, the schools of the Hellenistic east. Philostratus and his *Imagines* offers us perhaps the finest example of this literary form ([2](#)).

The authors of the Greek love romances of this period, Achilles Tatius, Heliodorus and Longus, make frequent use of this device. Achilles Tatius is especially fond of pictorial descriptions. More often than not, however, they have no organic connection with the plot in his novel and are hardly more than irrelevant digressions intended to dazzle or entertain the reader. With Longus, the author of the pastoral Greek love romance, *Daphnis and Chloe*, it is an entirely different matter. His entire novel, as I intend to show, from the prologue through the final episode, he composed consciously employing principles associated with a fairly definite style of narrative painting of a definite period—2nd-3rd century A.D.

Unfortunately a problem immediately encountered is the question of Longus' date. There are absolutely no objective

criteria by which to establish his date. We know nothing of the man except his name which has come down to us on the manuscripts. Most of the stylometric arguments thus far put forward do, however, place him in the period 150–250 A.D., and these arguments, reinforced by another line of reasoning which I shall present here, give the latter date a high degree of probability (3).

The key to Longus' date lies in the relationship not so much to other literary works, but to the *pictorial* methods which he uses. Longus is the only ancient novelist who based his entire work upon a series of idyllic paintings *which tell a story of love*, (ἱστορίαν ἔρωτος), i. e. narrative painting of the type termed by the art historian Wickhoff 'continuous' and distinctive of the Roman empire period (4). Later I shall examine the structure of *Daphnis and Chloe* in terms of this kind of art.

O. Weinreich was the first to have made important observations about Longus' novel and its affinity with Roman narrative painting (5). First of all, as he points out, the story unfolds on the island of Lesbos, which is described rather accurately by Longus as by one who was familiar with it in general. Lesbos, however, was never considered the land of the pastoral idyll. It would be reasonable to assume, therefore, that only a person whose home it was, or who knew it well, would choose it as a setting for a pastoral romance. A family, the Pompeii Longi, we know to have lived on Lesbos at least from the time of Caesar. C. Gichorius, the prosopographer, actually considered our author a descendant of this family (1). Thus it is quite possible that Longus was a Roman, well educated in the Greek tradition. This fact, if true, would have an important bearing upon the relationship of his novel to the peculiarly Italian or Roman method of pictorial narrative art which he seems to have followed in composing *Daphnis and Chloe*.

Now the closest parallel to the *literary* bucolic idyll in prose is Dion of Prusa's *Hunter* (Or. VII) which unfolds on the island of Euboea. It too idealizes country life and disparages city life as ugly, tainted and decadent, notions certainly implicit in Longus' romance. Daphnis and Chloe, though having city origins by birth, prefer to remain in the country even after they discover this fact. Dion's idyll was written about 100 A.D. We find a similar description of the vale of Tempe in Aelian (V.H. III.1) which may have been composed about 200 A.D.

Such idyllic description in Longus, Dion and Aelian bear a very close relationship to certain features of the so-called post-Pompeian period of wall-painting, specifically of the period 130 to 160 A.D. (2). The resemblances in delicacy of color (if we may use such terminology in connection with writing), and in composition, i. e. in a series of small, pastoral scenes, are very striking. The best examples of paintings of this type are the frescoes in the tomb of the Pancratii outside of Rome (ca. 150 A.D.) and the scenes in the vaulted tombs of Caivano near Naples (c. 130-160 A.D.). Franz Wirth assigns these paintings to what he calls the 'Philhellenic' period (3).

So far the observations of Weinreich who, however, neglected to take into account the elder Philostratus and his *Imagines*. I think it is very important for this argument to note that we have by an author of a slightly later period (c. 170-249 A.D.) numerous descriptions of what he purports to be actual paintings. A good many of them are of landscape paintings exactly of the type mentioned above (4). Philostratus (who calls himself a Lemnian—the proximity of this island to Lesbos is interesting here) says that he is describing panel-paintings set in the walls of a gallery in Naples (I. 15 ff.). It may well be that some of these paintings, at least, were a part of a narrative sequence.

At any rate the art historian Wickhoff contends that the pictures which Philostratus describes are definitely characteristic of the peculiarly Italian type of narrative wall-painting ([1](#)). And whether or not Philostratus is describing actual pictures is unimportant. A. Fairbanks in his edition of Philostratus points out that in any case we have no means of knowing whether the paintings and the gallery were real or figments of the imagination. Philostratus, however, was first of all a sophist who developed the description of paintings as a form of literary art. There would have been no inconsistency in describing imaginary paintings provided that he preserved the illusion that he was dealing with existing paintings. Secondly his descriptions of paintings and the paintings actually existing from his day reveal no inconsistencies when compared ([2](#)). A student of late Greek paintings may thus use his descriptions as data for his research whether or not the actual paintings existed.

Philostratus, as a matter of fact, furnished such data for the art historian Wickhoff in his evaluation of the painting of the period. Another authority on Roman art, Mary Swindler, also takes Philostratus into account, and in a way extremely important to our thesis. She sees in the descriptions of Philostratus examples of the so-called Fourth Style or 'Illusionistic' type of painting. This was the favorite Italian manner of painting especially prominent in the period 50 to 79 A.D.

By the Second Century A.D. we see the impressionism of earlier days beginning to return in monuments such as the Tomb of the Pancratii with its illusionistic landscapes, and from this time on the two styles existed side by side in various works of art. In the Third Century, Philostratus in his *Images* describes the kind of painting current in his time and he recognizes again the presence of the illusionistic style ([3](#)).

I think that the above information clearly shows a marked taste for landscape scenes, both in writing and painting, of a similar style in a particular period—roughly 100 to 200 A.D. The argument is conjectural to some extent, but if it is generally true that in any period literary art betrays certain formal characteristics common to other arts, i. e. if artistic analogies and affinities do exist between one art form and another, the argument does have force and meaning.

On the basis, then, of the relation of Longus' novel to a definite kind of pictorial art, particularly of the 2nd century to early 3rd century A.D., and upon the philological and stylometric arguments thus far put forward which place Longus in this period, Longus most probably wrote about 150 A.D. but not likely after 250 A.D.

At this point a structural analysis of *Daphnis and Chloe* is necessary after which we shall concentrate more upon its aesthetic organization in relation to narrative painting (4). Such an analysis readily reveals in *Daphnis and Chloe* a causally unconnected series of twelve distinct episodes. The organic connection between episodes and the unifying element of the entire plot is the leading theme with a psychological basis: the gradual growth and development of the erotic instinct in both lovers. The plot, then, though causally disconnected in its episodes displays nevertheless a psychological continuity. Each episode, moreover, is tripartite in structure, consisting, that is, of three distinct scenes. The first scene is usually purely descriptive, e. g. a landscape or a particular season, the second narrative and containing action, the third idyllic. In the latter scene we generally find the lovers alone in a pastoral setting and in an atmosphere of tender sentiment and love. The first scene of each episode, moreover, is usually devoid of human figures and serves as the setting for the action which is to follow in the second scene.



This kind of episodic structure and the tri-partite division within each individual episode is directly reminiscent of the method of narrative scene painting. Murals which tell a story are arranged in sequence, but the action necessarily cannot be continuous since painting by its very nature freezes passage of time from one painting to the next. The passage requires a mental leap on the part of the spectator. It is the theme, then, which gives unity to a series of pictures. It is precisely such a series which Longus presents in his romance. In fact he tells us in the prologue that he is actually describing a sequence of pictures on a set theme, a series of paintings which he saw himself.

Fleschenberg has analyzed this prologue in terms of a program for each individual episode. He sees in it the same tri-partite division which can be stated graphically as follows ([1](#)):

- I. Discovery of raw material (setting and subject matter)
- II. Setting (pastoral motifs and action on picture) Matter (Love story)
- III. Shaping of these elements according to the unifying idea of love (psychological element)

The following interpretation sees it in a decidedly different way, for it shows the prologue as a kind of program for the *entire plot*, as Longus himself tells us.

The romance, he tells us, is actually an interpretation of a series of scenes on a mural depicting a story of love. It has eight scenes in the following order: 1) Women bearing children 2) Women wrapping infants 3) Children exposed

4) Animals nursing them 5) Shepherds taking them up 6) Young people courting 7) Pirate raid  
8) Enemy invasion

The plot of the romance, as we have seen, includes each of these scenes, beginning of course with scenes 4 and 5,

where Lamon discovers the babe Daphnis being nursed by a goat. (Scenes 1, 2 and 3 are inferred from the context). The same scenes are repeated in the case of Chloe when she is discovered under similar circumstances by Dryas. Scene 6 is introduced when we are given a hint that Daphnis and Chloe are destined by Eros for love (1. 7). Scenes 7 and 8 constitute the two major adventurous episodes of the story: the raid of the Tyrian pirates and the incursion of the Methymnaeans (1. 28; 2. 9). The foregoing, then, is the skeletal structure of the plot as Longus envisioned it from the pictures. The remainder of the plot consists mainly of idyllic portraits—variations of scene 6, the courting—with some expansion of scenes 7 and 8 or scenes similar to these.

There are several points to note about this prologue. First, Longus is definitely following a conventional manner of narrative art which can be traced in literature all the way to Homer ([1](#)). Second, though the series of pictures are in a kind of logical order, they end in no conclusion—e. g. a marriage scene. Third, according to the scheme—eight images—there can be no central scene. Longus thus ignores the pattern of the picture by concentrating on scene 6, the young people courting, though he does use all the other scenes.

No other extant Greek love novelist begins his romance with such a prologue or bases his entire romance upon a series of scenes from a painting. As we have mentioned earlier, descriptions of paintings in these romances are frequent, but usually they are not at all essential to the plot. *Daphnis and Chloe* is thus unique within the genre in this respect. Its author has successfully transferred aesthetic impressions from one artistic mode—painting—to another—narrative writing. Furthermore, Longus uses a particular process of synthesis and expansion to develop his individual episodes. In other words, he uses the *static* motifs or images

found on the painting as a basis for an extended *dramatic* narrative. Elsewhere I have shown that in exactly the same way he used individual static motifs drawn from Theocritus or Sappho to construct dramatic episodes (2). This makes his romance even more unique, for it then becomes a remarkable synthesis of three art forms organically related: romance, pastoral and painting.

The relationship of Longus' novel, furthermore, in its overall structure to pictorial narrative art of the so-called 'continuous' method is striking. Wickhoff contends that by the 2nd century A.D. this art form, the continuous method, appears as an independent style, no longer a Hellenistic, but a Roman mode of narration (3). The method may be defined as follows: « The continuous method is realized in a series of consecutive compositions, each with a separate and centered action in which the chief actor or actors recur, so that in each individual scene the unities of time and place are preserved. Since, in contradistinction to the isolated or monoscenic method, it presents a sequence of several scenes possessing iconographie coherence, such a series may be considered as a cycle, and the new mode itself might thus be called the *cyclic* method» (1).

In its more mature form this kind of narrative art consisted of an arrangement of scenes in which the incidents are interrelated by common background features; that is, thrown up against a continuous architectural or landscape setting which unifies the frieze or set of scenes as a whole (2).

A very early Hellenistic example of this method in an initial stage is the famous Telephus frieze of the great altar of Pergamum dated 197-159 B.C. Though fragmentary, it tells recognizably the story of Telephus, the mythical founder of Pergamum.

The frieze is well enough preserved to show that the action unfolds against a background partly architectural and

partly landscape, in which plane trees alternate with oaks, laurels, rock seats and backdrop, sometimes partially hollowed out like a shallow niche to provide space for a few figures. The various scenes represented, taking place at different times and in different places, follow one another in a narrative sequence without formal or tectonic interruption. Still, they do not present a fully continuous narration, since sudden change of places occur, while trees and other objects act as definite elements of separation between one scene and another. The background is not continuous; the scenes do not flow one into the other.

It was left to Italian artists to perfect this technique which reached its most mature state in the column of Trajan. Art historians trace the peculiarly Roman development of this technique to the Romans' historical mindedness. Literary sources reveal the existence in early Republican times of many wall-paintings in Roman temples depicting the victorious exploits of Roman generals. Some of these are in *tabula* form ([3](#)).

This trend appears much more clearly in the larger number of paintings preserved to us from the late Republic and the early years of the Empire. All are in frieze form and fall into two classes: those dealing with themes from the Greek epics, and those concerned with the legendary history of Rome. Two friezes, for instance, with scenes from the Trojan war and the last books of the *Iliad* are to be found in the House of the Cryptoporticus at Pompeii; there is one in the house of M. Loreius Tiburtinus, which, with fifteen of the original twenty episodes preserved, follows closely the course of the war as described in the *Iliad*.

There is also a frescoed frieze from the columbarium of the Statilii on the Esquiline, with twelve scenes assigned to the late Republican or early Augustan period. They form a kind of chronicle, from the arrival of Aeneas at Latium

through the establishment of Alba Longa, the story of Rhea Silvia and so on to the founding of Rome ([1](#)).

One of the most important examples, however, of the continuous method of painting in relation to our discussion of Longus' narrative method is the sequence known as the *Odyssey Landscapes*. These were painted on the walls of a house by a Roman artist about the middle of the first century B.C. They are generally praised as the finest example of Roman illusionistic painting, the style as we have noted above that was to recur in the 2nd century A.D. Their settings are spacious, the perspective fine and the colors beautifully blended ([2](#)).

The series illustrates in a continuous narrative sequence a number of scenes drawn from Books ten and eleven of the *Odyssey*. Those which have been preserved show from left to right: the arrival of Odysseus and his companions in the land of the Laestrygonians, the treacherous attack on the landing party by the giants, the bombardment of the fleet with rocks, and the destruction of all ships except that of Odysseus, the killing of the last Greek left ashore, the final escape of Odysseus' vessel which takes him on to further adventures on Circe's isle, his stay in her palace, and his visit to the underworld. All of these scenes are set in a continuous landscape background formed of delightful marine vistas glimpsed between rugged cliffs and sloping promontories. A painted pilaster which sometimes breaks up a scenic unit separates each scene. But the landscape unifies the whole series and Dawson points out that if one disregards the pilasters and looks at the landscape frieze as a whole, one sees the separate episodes more clearly defined, a series of bays and recesses each of which contains a scene from the *Odyssey* ([3](#)).

Dawson discusses many later examples of this kind of narrative art in a further stage of development, mostly frescoes from Pompeii. From these and others he

demonstrates the existence of at least fifteen paintings of the so-called Third Style in which the narrative principles employed on the Column of Trajan are fully exploited.

These landscapes carry on and develop the system of narration which appears for the first time among extant monuments in the Odyssey Landscapes. At its first appearance it was connected with a sketchy style that had certainly been practiced in Italy for some time and with a type of landscape which is without parallel in ancient art outside of Italy, finally, with a form of wall decoration which is of indubitable Italian origin. The practice of narrative representation is typical of Roman art from its beginnings; it is attested for almost every period and enjoyed exclusive attention in the infancy of the art. It seems to be an inescapable conclusion that this form of continuous narrative representation, along with the development of a spatially extensive landscape art and perhaps certain new mythological composition types, was an independent contribution of Romano-Campanian painters ([1](#)).

The structure of Longus' novel shows remarkable affinities with this kind of narrative landscape painting. First of all, the pictures he describes in his prologue form a series, though technically separated since there is no unity of action. But he tells us that these paintings told a story of love. He needed an interpreter, however, to explain the continuity of action. Obviously, then, each scene did not flow into the next. Hence the need for the interpreter to fill in the gaps. But, as in the Odyssey Landscapes, there is a unifying principle, namely the pastoral background or landscape. Each scene on the paintings he describes takes place against such a background which serves, together with the love theme, as a unifying principle. Longus' series of paintings, then, resemble in this respect quite closely the Odyssey Landscapes.

The episodic construction of the novel itself, however, resembles much more closely a more highly developed and elaborate variation of this technique translated, of course, into writing.

We have already noted that the whole of the *Daphnis and Chloe* easily divides into twelve distinct, causally unconnected, tri-partite episodes. These episodes, however, are connected by two constants: the continuous love theme and the ever present pastoral landscape.

If we examine each episode closely in terms of painting we shall see that what Longus has achieved is to translate and to combine into each episode *three separate genres* of painting of the *monoscenic* method. These three genres we could term as follows: 1) the monoscenic *descriptive* (pure landscape with no action. 2) the monoscenic *narrative* (emphasis on action); 3) the monoscenic *idyllic lyric* (emphasis on tender emotion and sentiment, particularly love, against a natural landscape). These three types may well serve as a convenient classification for most landscape paintings. Examples of ancient paintings of all three types are numerous. Besides extant paintings, the *Imagines* of Philostratus illustrate a variety of all three types.

Each of Longus' twelve distinct episodes is constructed according to the above genres as principles of organization. For instance, as we have already noted, each episode generally begins with the description either of a locale or a season. This is the *static* or *descriptive* part of the episode. Here the emphasis is on color, atmosphere and tone. The middle part of each episode contains the external action or adventure. Thus it is purely *narrative* and corresponds to a purely narrative painting (e. g. a pirate attack—the attack of the Laestrygonians on the Odyssey Landscapes is a good example). The third part of the episode usually centers on Daphnis and Chloe together and by themselves in idyllic surroundings. These scenes exhibit tender sentiment. This is



the *lyric* part and corresponds to a painting of the type as Philostratus describes in his *Perseus and Andromeda* (I, 29).

The three parts of each episode, however, display a remarkable unity. There is really only a single constant in each of the three distinct parts of a typical episode: the pastoral landscape. It is this which unifies the individual episode, disjointed as it may appear by its three different parts.

Thus, if an artist were to translate back into painting a given episode of Longus, he would have to paint it in three successive *monoscenic* pictures, each of a different genre: 1) a pastoral landscape either with no human figures at all, or with human figures completely subordinated to the landscape; 2) the same landscape, but including action scenes at the forefront with Daphnis and Chloe involved, perhaps in a threatening situation; 3) a similar landscape, but with Daphnis and Chloe in the forefront alone kissing, perhaps, or embracing.

The organic construction of the complete novel goes a step further. Here Longus employs the principle of separation even more ingeniously. The episodes themselves are quite distinct causally, i. e. discontinuous if analyzed according to the principle of motivation. Any given episode of Longus is a unity in itself in that it is neither motivated by its predecessor nor does it motivate its successor. All the other extant love novels employ the principle of motivation by episodes. Yet the episodes of Longus, as already noted, are united into a whole by two constants: the pastoral background and the progressive love theme.

Longus' novel is architectonic to a high degree, if analyzed in terms of modes of painting. Starting from the monoscenic, or isolating, as the basis for constructing episodes, he progresses to an organic *continuous* method in constructing the whole novel. Looking back now at our definition of the continuous method of narrative art we can now see that his novel fits it in a remarkably striking way. In

effect he was able to integrate successfully two distinct methods of narrative art—the monoscenic isolated, and the continuous—into a plot with a coherent and unified sequence of movement.

There is no doubt in view of this evidence that Longus was a connoisseur of painting, and in particular of Roman or Italian painting of the second century A.D. I think the analysis has shown that he was well aware of at least two of the three methods distinguished by Wickhoff as the isolating, the complementary, and the continuous (1). From the prologue, to the episode, to the completed novel Longus displays this fact very well.

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(1) This is essentially the approach to the history of art taken by Arnold HAUSER, *The Social History of Art* (New York, 1959), tr. by Stanley Godman.

(1) *Iliad*, 18, 478 ff.

(2) There seems to be little doubt that these exercises in *ekphrasis* are related to actual paintings. See A. LESKY, *Geschichte der Gr. Lit.* (Bern, 1963), 759. Lesky discusses this also in 'Bildwerk und Deutung bei Philostratos und Homer', *Hermes*, 75, 1940, 38.

(3) For a review of the problem of dating and the arguments see O. SCHÖNBERGER, *Longos* (Berlin, 1960), 1-3.

(4) F. WICKHOFF, *Roman Art* (London, 1900), 16-17. Translated by S. A. Strong.

(5) O. WEINREICH, appendix to German translation of Heliodorus by R. Reymer (Zurich, 1950), 323-379.

(1) C. CICHORIUS, *Römische Studien* (Leipzig, 1922), 321-323. See also IG XII 2, 88 which shows the patron of the family to have been Pompey the Great. Also a consul of the year 49 A. D. whose name was Pompeius Longus (Prosop. Imper. R. III p. 67) may have come from the same family.

(2) Franz WIRTH, 'Römische Wandmalerei vom Untergang Pompejs bis Hadrian', *Römische Mitteilungen*, 49, 91 ff.

(3) WIRTH, note above.

(4) See especially Dionysus and the Tyrrhenian Pirates (I, 19); Andros, island favored by Dionysus (I, 25); Palaemon (II, 16); Bosphorus (I, 12); The Nile (I, 5); The Islands (II, 7); Marsh (I, 9).

(1) Note 2, page 753. Also Wickhoff (note 4, page 753), p. 158, 163-164.

(2) A. FAIRBANKS, *Philostratus; Callistratus*, The Loeb Classical Library (London and New York, 1931), 26 ff.

(3) M. SWINDLER, *Ancient Painting*, Yale University Press (New Haven, 1929), 396.

(4) For the structural analysis of *Daphnis and Chloe* see O. SCHISSEL VON FLESCHENBERG, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des griechischen Romans im Altertum*, (Halle, 1913). His theories on the romance are conveniently summarized in W. Schmid's Anhang of the 3rd edition of E. ROHDE'S *Griechische Roman*, p. 612.

(1) FLESCHENBERG, *Philologus*, 1913 (36), 95.

(1) In second Sophistic literary productions, descriptions of paintings as introductions to large sections or whole books of an individual work are fairly common. Such prologues consist of four main parts: the localization of a picture, its description, the author's own interpretation, and, finally, mention of the leading theme emerging from the picture. Each of these parts are in Longus' prologue, though his is not the usual type of pictorial introduction. Cf. FLESCHENBERG, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, (note 14 above), 84-114. This was, of course, a favorite device in Hellenistic poetry and in Latin poetry (e. g. Catullus 64 and Virgil, *Aen.* I where Aeneas gazes at the mural depicting the Trojan War). The prototype of this device is Homer, *Iliad* 18, 478 ff.

(2) M. C. MITTELSTADT, *Longus and the Greek Love Romance*, diss. Stanford University, 1964, 65-73.

(3) Wickhoff (note 4, page 753), 16-17.

(1) E. H. SWIFT, *Roman Sources of Christian Art*, Columbia Univ. Press, (New York, 1951), 58.

(2) Swift, *op. cit.*, above), 59.

(3) Swift records the following paintings, p. 61: a victory of C. Junius Brutus Bubulus on the walls of the temple of Salus ca 302 B.C. by C. Fabius Pictor; similar frescoes are mentioned for the temple of Consus ca. 272 B.C., and for the temple of Vertumnus about a decade later; and the subjugation of all Italy to Roman rule in paintings in the temple of Tellus ca. 252 B.C. Examples of early *tabulae*: the victory of M. Valerius Maximus Messala over the Carthaginians in 264 B.C., and the victory of M. Marcellus at Syracuse in 211 B.C., those of L. Scipio in Asia, 188-186 B.C., and of T. Sempronius Gracchus in Sardinia 174 B.C. Similarly were depicted Pompey's triumph over Mithridates and Caesar's victories in Egypt and elsewhere. For the wealth of literary evidences on paintings of Roman military exploits and their probable representation cartographically, see URLICH, *Die Malerei in Rom von Caesar's Dictatur, passim*; also, Swindler (note 13 above), 361-364, and DAWSON, *Romano-Campanian Mythological Landscape Painting*, p. 50-52.

(1) Swift, *op. cit.*, his notes 33, 34, 37, p. 62.

(2) For a beautiful illustration and discussion of this, see Amedeo Maiuri and Lionello VENTURI, *Painting in Italy*, Albert Skira Publisher, 1959, 61 ff.

(3) C. M. DAWSON, *Romano-Campanian Mythological Landscape Painting*, Yale Classical Studies, IX, (New Haven, 1944).

(1) Dawson, *op. cit.*, 198-199..

(1) Swift, *op. cit.*, p. 58 and his note 8.

## CHPATER SEVEN

### **Μῦθος οὐ λόγος: Longus's Lesbian Pastorals**

*B. P. Reardon*

In 1988 the British Library mounted an exhibition on *Daphnis and Chloe*, with several dozen versions of the book on display; it was called *Daphnis and Chloe: The Markets and Metamorphoses of an Unknown Bestseller*,<sup>1</sup> Bestseller it certainly has been: according to Giles Barber's catalogue for the exhibition, in the five hundred years since the first printed reference to the work, by Poliziano in 1489, some five hundred different editions, translations, and adaptations have appeared, in various languages. An impressive average. Perhaps its perennial appeal is due in part to its tantalizing quality, for readings of it have varied widely. This chapter will look at some of them, and at some general questions of structure and interpretation.

First, the interpretation that sees the book as trivial, nothing more than a charming idyll, without pretensions, "a most sweet and pleasant pastoral romance for young ladies," as George Thornley's celebrated seventeenth-century translation puts it.<sup>2</sup> And there is a variant of this interpretation, which sees the story as trivial, certainly, but not at all charming; rather, unhealthy, indeed immoral, in its emphasis on the sexual experimentation its heroes participate in; as near-pornography, in fact, written by a mere *littérateur*, a "sophist" in a pejorative sense, quite lacking in sincerity. That was what Rohde thought.<sup>3</sup> Nowadays few people would go as far as Rohde did; but as we shall see, the questions he asked have not gone away. More recently we have seen interpretations of a quite different kind: *Daphnis and Chloe* as a serious novel, a

religious novel, or a symbolic one. Or again, as above all an exercise in literary composition in which the plot is relatively unimportant, and whose effectiveness depends largely on the reader's receptiveness to the author's literary methods; the interest, that is, lies in the way themes are handled, the way models are used—the story is a piece of “literary creation,” in short, in a quite narrowly defined sense.

The essential question, then, is: how serious is Longus? Should we set him beside Xenophon of Ephesus, who is serious to the point of being solemn? Or beside Achilles Tatius, who (in my view) is playing with the genre almost to the point of parody? I shall consider *Daphnis and Chloe* in a number of perspectives: symbolism and religious intentions, realism, literary execution; and also the literary tradition behind the story, the tradition of romance and the Hellenistic literary tradition. Whether he is serious or not, what Longus offers us is a novel, or looks like one; at any rate it is a story. If he has something to say to us, he communicates it to us by means of a *δράμα*, a “thing done.” He does it in his own manner. What is that “thing done,” and what is that manner? I shall take each of the two basic interpretations—a serious novel, not a serious novel—using the analyses of H. H. O. Chalk and Rohde as a basis.<sup>4</sup>

First, the nonserious interpretation: *Daphnis and Chloe* has no deep meaning. In that case, the story is more pastoral than novel; in fact it contains little but the pastoral setting. As far as the human story is concerned, all that happens, essentially, is that two young people fall in love; at first they do not know what is happening to them, and they notoriously do not know what to do about it. But they learn what to do about it; and at the end this spiritual good fortune is translated into temporal good fortune as well, and they are enabled to marry. There is the skeleton of the story. The only essential element in the plot, between its beginning and its end, is the children's sexual ignorance.

This scarcely credible ignorance is perhaps acceptable in an idyll, a fairyland. But it is the less readily acceptable in that it is made to carry too much weight; the ignorance becomes the action, an action that lasts for practically three books, out of four. It is still less acceptable in view of the way in which the author presents it to us, in that not only does the ignorance carry the weight of the plot, but the author actually emphasizes that ignorance. The explicit lesson of Philetas, at the beginning of book 2, is followed by four chapters which are just as explicit. They begin by underlining the topic—τό δέ τρίτον ὥκνουν φάρμακον ἀποδυθέντες κατακλιθῆναι θρασύτερον γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρθένων ἀλλὰ καὶ νέων αἰπόλων—“the third remedy—lying together naked—they shrank from trying; for that was too bold a step not just for young girls but for young goatherds too.” And finally they very nearly short-circuit the whole story: ἴσως δ’ ἂν τι καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν ἔπραξαν, “perhaps they would really have got down to business,” if something else had not happened. The something else—it is the war—keeps us waiting a whole book, and the onset of winter keeps us waiting several more chapters. In the middle of book 3 Daphnis and Chloe resume their experiments; and where other authors might talk vaguely about the birds and the bees, Longus and his characters talk not at all vaguely about sheep and goats. And once more they get nowhere. Immediately afterward, the experienced city-woman Lycaenion takes pity on Daphnis and teaches him what he needs to learn, τὰ ἔργα Ἑρωτος, the deeds of love. But even now the reader has a long time to wait before Longus finishes his story and calls it a day.

That is to say, the ignorance which is so charming at the beginning of the story is so heavily underlined that it becomes the subject of the main plot of the story; for although there are other incidents—Dorcon assaults Chloe in the disguise of a wolf, Daphnis is briefly captured by pirates, Chloe by soldiers—these incidents pale in comparison with

Philetas, Lycaenion, and the goats. In any other Greek novel the pirates and so on would have been the principal elements in the action; in this one, they are upstaged by the erotic plot. But no laborious demonstration is really needed to come to the conclusion that there is something in this story that does not quite come off; and the thought comes readily to mind—it came to Rohde’s—that this is titillating, a form of pornography. But even a pornographic work has a structure, and here it is the structure of *Daphnis and Chloe* that is in question. In the plot, regarded as a catalogue of “things done,” there are only two essential stages: the situation in book 1, the birth of love; and the denouement in book 4, the marriage, which after all comprehends the erotic action (or rather inaction) of books 2 and 3. There is very little “novel” in this because there is very little δράμα, drama, thing done. The incidents that in another story would constitute the drama—pirates, war—arc left undeveloped; and the interior drama, the erotic progress, is limited to the discovery of the ὄνομα καὶ ἔργα Ἔρωτος, the name and deeds of love—where in a modern novel there would be, for instance, an altogether fuller psychological development. As a theme, the name and deeds of love are limited. In underlining the erotic progress, Longus has given it a lubricious aspect. Of course, one could accept the sexual experimentation; but let us remember that Longus is inventing, not reporting. Let us remember also that apart from *Daphnis and Chloe* his characters are not naive, or at least not in that sense. Lycaenion and Gnathon are not; the cowherds Dorcon and Lampis are not; and Chloe has ποικίλαι φωναί aimed at her, insinuations, double-edged remarks. In this respect their world is realistic enough.

Here we are in fact getting near to the crux of the matter. But for the moment let us consider the other interpretation: *Daphnis and Chloe* as a serious novel, *Daphnis and Chloe*—the characters—as symbols; the story has a message. What is the story talking about? Love; that is what Longus says in



the proface: the story is an ἀνάθημα Ἐρωτι, an offering to Love, it will remind him who has loved and instruct him who has not. What Love is, we are told quite explicitly in the exposition of Philetas in 2.7: Love is a god, the god of creation, supreme, fecund, violent. Now if the story is nothing more than a divertissement, an entertainment, then all we have here is a commonplace, a topos: Love makes the world go round, and here it is making Daphnis and Chloe go round. But in Chalk's interpretation Love is much more than that. Love is the very subject of the story—Love, not Daphnis and Chloe; and it is the operation of Love that constitutes the actual body of the story, its plot. For Eros controls everything that happens, all events divine and human. The seasons progress, and Daphnis and Chloe progress with the seasons; and it is Eros who manages all this. If this is correct, the story does have a structure: the passing of the seasons *is* its structure. The erotic progress of the heroes is only one element in that structure; it is a manifestation, a function of the cycle of the seasons. Furthermore, this erotic progress is nothing less than an initiation into the mystery that Love constitutes. The candidates for initiation are at first in a state of innocence, which is ignorance—so their ignorance is necessary. They learn, partly from nature and partly from man, the name and deeds of Love; in so doing, they leave their condition of innocence, to attain, when they are married, the condition of experience; and so they are initiated.

There is drama enough here; continuous drama, things done. The natural setting—the time and place where the things done take place—is not just a setting, it *is* the action. The pastoral mechanism is not just decorative, it is functional. The main difficulty with the entertainment theory is that it does not take enough account of this pastoral mechanism, which is very complex if the story is merely a charming fantasy. If it can be shown that this mechanism is not purposeless, the story immediately becomes dynamic,

since the mechanism is dynamic. It becomes, in fact, a novel; a drama, with not only a beginning and an end but a middle as well. In that case, one can see this novel in the same perspective as the novels of Xenophon Ephesius, for instance, or Achilles Tatius: in that the initial movement, the birth, growth, and nature of love—a movement which in Xenophon is brief and simplistic, and in Achilles Tatius is much more complex and profound—becomes, in *Daphnis and Chloe*, the entire story. It is the only thing that does have any importance for the hero and heroine. The rest—the adventures—is relatively unimportant. Longus reduces it, and includes it in the action it contributes to, namely the process whereby Daphnis and Chloe learn what love is; a process which in this case is complete only at the end of the story.

The principal element, then, in the pastoral mechanism is the progression of the seasons. Eros is the motor of this mechanism, an Eros who is older than Time and all-powerful, a primitive Eros who performs the functions of the Magna Mater—or, as Chalk says, of Dionysus. When the second autumn arrives, the “Manifestation of Dionysus,” Dionysophanes, arrives with it. I cannot accept the attempt to assimilate practically every element in the story to elements of Dionysiae mystery-ritual; many of them have a much more natural explanation.<sup>5</sup> All the same, many of them do in fact have Dionysiae associations: pines, birds, springs, plants, music, things that occur on every page. Of course, it is hardly surprising to find things of that kind in a country story; but the associations are there, and are only reinforced by the name of Dionysophanes as the *deus ex machina*. These elements have not been given enough weight. They contribute, and are meant to contribute, to an impression that the story is impregnated with a theology, an “erotic theology” in the sense of a theology of Eros-Dionysus. It is Eros who makes shepherds of Daphnis and

Chloe, who reunites them, who authorizes their marriage. Whether in his own person or through Pan and the Nymphs, Eros watches over everything they do, and sometimes he actually guides them. Eros sets in motion and controls the progress of Daphnis and Chloe as he sets in motion and controls the progress of the natural world that they are part of. It *is* initiation into his mysteries that we are concerned with, even if this is a metaphor. This religious vocabulary unquestionably does figure in the common imagination of the period.

The essential thing, then, is this conjunction of heroes and settings. The mechanism is not decorative; it is functional. This is Chalk's thesis. So far, one can agree. But this is where the problem arises: in this very action, this plot, this subject. It is not enough to say, as Longus does, that one is going to be symbolic, to write a symbolic story; one also has to do it successfully, to bring it off. If the subject of the story is Eros, Love, it ought not to be. The subject ought to be people, human beings. This remark calls for some elaboration.

What exactly is it that Longus is saying about Love? That Love is a cosmic force. Perhaps that had to be said. People do say it from time to time: Euripides did, and D. H. Lawrence. Love is not pretty, it is violent, it is not cozy; something of that kind. Perhaps it was particularly necessary to say it to novel-readers, or *romance*-readers, in the second century; even Chariton's Callirhoe, who knows very well that love is not cozy, wishes it were. Longus, let us say, is showing us Love as it really is. So, this is a lesson which applies to everybody: this is how Love is. Only it is hard to see how this lesson, in the form Longus gives it, can apply to any world other than the pastoral, exotic, unique world of this story, or even, within this pastoral world, to anybody but the children Daphnis and Chloe themselves. It is an entirely special case.

Does this special case instruct us? τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα παιδεύσει, says Longus, “it will instruct him who has not loved.” If he means that “this story, which does not claim to apply to everybody, will nonetheless recall to you what Love is—τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει”—or, as the case may be, “will give you an initial lesson,” that reduces its effect quite seriously. Perhaps that is the measure of the story: more than charming, but less than profound. Yet Longus uses ambitious terms: Eros, Dionysus, the natural world. Perhaps it is not an initial lesson, but a basic lesson? Love is sexual, fecund, energetic, it expresses itself in deeds and not just words or social conventions, it is not “respectable.” In that case, *Daphniis and Chloe* is a treatise: Longus’s treatise *On Love*. Certainly it is not really a representation, a mimesis, of people acting thus and thus in life, a μίμησις πράξεως—however serious, however σπουδαῖος, its subject may be. It is difficult to be moved by Daphnis and Chloe, the characters Daphnis and Chloe. They are really a bit insipid; they do not really display much character—much προαίρεσις, or human choice of action, to continue with Aristotelian vocabulary. They *are* children, when all is said and done; charming, yes, but only occasionally *sympathiques*, moving; when Chloe omits to tell Daphnis she has kissed his rival Dorcon might be one such occasion; another might be when Daphnis, after his lesson from Lycaenion, tells Chloe a white lie about saving the goose from the eagle. But we have seen that Daphnis and Chloe are not the real subject; the real subject is Love. Now, in a story in which there is a human action, a πράξις, a drama, it surely is not natural for the main interest to lie anywhere other than in the action and in the human beings. That is the point of saying that the subject ought to be not Eros but people.

Of course, the reader’s interest may lie in the adventures, if they are adventures that happen to people; and in this story they are. But if Love is a cosmic adventure, the human

beings Daphnis and Chloe are not the only creatures to know Love, and they are not necessary to Love; the seasons would go on revolving, and the birds and the bees and the flowers and the sheep and the goats would go on doing what it is Eros makes them do, without Daphnis and Chloe. That is the whole point, one may say: it is a *cosmic* process; human beings are not all that matters, for nature. But can one tell stories about natural forces? Some myths do, certainly. But myths are usually peopled by superhuman characters. The *dramatis personae* of Longus's story are human; and the proper study of mankind is man.

At this point one may argue that this is symbolism; realism is not to be expected in the characters in a symbolic story. The element of plot, *μῦθος*, is slim, the element of *ἥθος*, character, is weak; but the element that matters is the thought; *διάνοια*, perhaps, in Aristotle, but here the abstract thought. But other characters in this story are real people. In fact all the other characters are; only Daphnis and Chloe are not. And we return here to the crux of the problem, the mixture of levels: the ideal side by side with the real. Daphnis and Chloe are the figures in an allegory, or perhaps, rather, the actors in a parable; but the rest, who provide them with their context, are presented realistically.

Is this simply a literary manner? A delicate manner, attractive, the opposite of solemn; a light touch? Longus's apologist Chalk, for instance, suggests that it is a matter of tension between real and ideal: "A tension is set up between real and ideal, which gives rise to a legitimate irony."<sup>6</sup> To be quite accurate, he is talking about the contrast between the town and the country, but the analysis will serve for the purpose here too. And as far as the two levels are concerned, we can think of *The Magic Flute*.

Explained in this way, the mixture works for much of the story. Dorcon's assault on Chloe, for example, can take place on two levels at once, Dorcon's and Daphnis's,

because there is no conflict between the two interpretations of the incident. It can have one meaning for Dorcon and a different meaning for Daphnis, without the two interpretations clashing, without disturbing the attitude of either participant; and in that case the mixture does just create irony. Or the episode in which Chloe is carried off by the Methymnians: if we accept, as we may, that a second-century reader could have found Pan's intervention credible, then the incidents surrounding Chloe's escape—mysterious noises, anchors sticking fast, oars breaking, sheep howling like wolves, Pan's pipe—can appear perfectly natural to Chloe, wrapped as she is in the cocoon of divine protection, and utterly inexplicable to the Methymnians; and again, there is no conflict between these two reactions, the incidents become merely comic. There are minor incidents where the same happens. When in book 3 Daphnis finds the purse of money that enables him to become a formal suitor for Chloe, the realism of the stench of the dead dolphin near which he finds it highlights the naiveté that makes Daphnis thank the sea, without its being indispensable that we choose between the two interpretations. Again, in 1.23, describing the idyllic life that his heroes lead in the country, Longus suddenly brings in the flies that stop Chloe from curdling her goats' milk; but what that does is to let us measure the distance between idyll and reality—Longus does that quite often.

In all these cases, nothing depends on the relationship between the two levels. They can coexist without clashing, and without doing any harm to the plot, the action. But when it comes to the erotic episodes that are central to the action, the case is different. In these episodes there *is* conflict; the two levels do clash. "Ideal" behavior—idyllic, allegorical, symbolic—can hardly be realistic at the same time, where the principal junctures of the plot are at stake. For the purposes of the religious story, Daphnis and Chloe have to be innocent, and therefore ignorant. We accept that,

for the purposes of the symbolism; we tell ourselves that after all, they are only children. But Longus insists on the reality of this ignorance; and he insists on it so much that we begin to look at the matter a little more closely. When we do that, we begin to have doubts. We find ourselves, ultimately, forced to *choose between* the two levels, since the one does, in this case, exclude the other; the story must take one of two paths, it cannot take both as it can in more minor details. It is not the ignorance itself that is hard to swallow; it is the way the author presents it. But he has so to present it if he wants to have any action, any “thing done” at all, on the human level; because as Rohde said, his story contains little else that can count as action. We find ourselves, thus, back at Rohde’s analysis. Rohde did put his finger on the problem after all. It does not disappear in the light of religious interpretation; any story has to have a structure. These episodes are crucial, and they appear to be either lubricious or miscalculated; no other explanation seems possible. To say, as Chalk does, that “when [Longus] is at his most serious he is simultaneously at his most cynically witty” is not an adequate resolution.<sup>7</sup> Mixing serious content and light manner is one thing; wanting to eat your cake and have it too is quite another. It is in this respect that the “serious” interpretation appears to be—not wrong, but inadequate.

But is it adequate to see the erotic episodes as either lubricious or miscalculated? We should look more closely at the element of calculation in *Daphnis and Chloe*. We have to take account, in the first place, of the contribution to the story of pastoral; more broadly, of the literary practice of the period—the period, we will recall, of Lucian and literary mimesis, of literary creation in the sense of recreation from familiar literary materials. We must take into account, in short, the way Longus uses literary, Hellenistic tradition and



the tradition of the novel. But there is also Longus's own contribution.

Let us get back to the basic question implied by all of this: what *is Daphnis and Chloe*? Is it a "novel"? Or a "romance"? Or a "pastoral"? This is not quibbling over a label. Different forms have different functions, and at this point it is functions we are concerned with. The story is clearly in some degree both novel and pastoral, but this is not an answer; there can be no "average" between the two, there is no middle ground between them. Questions of form, in the sense of prose or verse, or length, are of no importance here. The essential thing is the function. The specific of pastoral is that it is metaphor: idealizing metaphor, of innocence, or virtue, or utopia, or escapism; or it can serve as a code. Whatever form it takes, pastoral represents a condition in which values are other than what they are in reality. Ideal values are certainly present in *Daphnis and Chloe*; they go together with the rustic setting. But there is more in it than that. There is also drama: the movement from innocence to experience. Pastoral is not propitious to drama, for drama would disturb its ideal world by changing it; Rohde saw that too. On the other hand, drama, action, *is* proper to the novel. Because this spiritual journey seems to me to be the major element in the story, I consider it basically a novel—but a novel with a pastoral, idealizing base.

Longus uses this pastoral base. It allows him to master two major structural elements that in the early Greek novels cause serious problems: the obligatory journey, with its adventures, and divine intervention. The journey becomes a journey in time, motivated and controlled no longer by unpredictable Chance, but by the progression of the seasons; and the gods are no longer external to the action, they are integral in it because they are integral in the country setting. And as a side effect of this pastoral contribution, the birth of love now takes up the entire story,

and that offers interesting psychological possibilities. But this is also what embarrasses Longus. The pastoral contribution is not all positive. The writer has to prolong the metaphor, which as we have seen is idealizing, and does not lend itself readily to action, to *πρᾶξις*. The heroes do nothing. Yet Longus wants innocence to become experience; he wants to teach us what Love is; and Love, he says, is active. In presenting the action to us as the initiation of archetypal figures, he stays in his ideal world. But he cannot remain on that track; since his heroes have to take part in a human action too, the writer has at some point to change to the track proper to the novel.

In his attempt to make his heroes interesting, to make human beings of them—and also to avoid appearing heavy and pretentious, which with such a theme is a real danger—he makes his heroes and his story ambiguous; he adopts the light manner that offended Rohde. That is where the irony, the cynical wit that Chalk talks of, comes in. In fact, under cover of this irony, he leaves the idealizing pastoral track for the realistic novel track; innocence is faced with action. And he conceals his hand by throwing us a challenge: “Interpret that!” What we have here, then, is idealism, but with reservations: a degree of realism is necessitated by the action. What about the rest of the story, the elements that surround and highlight these ideal heroes? Are they realistic?

The setting is in some respects fairly realistic. For instance, the social position of the local aristocrat as represented by Dionysophanes corresponds well enough to the social structure of the area and period. The picture we get of his estate reflects the picture of land use that can be drawn from contemporary inscriptions; the topography of Lesbos corresponds quite well, although not exactly, to Longus’s description of it.<sup>8</sup> All this is realistic enough, at any rate, to be recognizable to the average contemporary

reader, although perhaps an inhabitant of the island could have picked holes in it. But if the setting is passably realistic, the action is less so; rather, what we are offered is the standard catalogue of conventional action in the novel—pirates, travels, war—but in the form of parody. What are the high points of the traditional novel? The birth of love: in Chariton, Xenophon, Heliodorus, it is dramatic and decisive, love at first sight, *le coup de foudre*. In Longus it is a much less dramatic business, and above all it is presented by the author with humor and irony. Or, pirates, and how to escape from them: instead of shipwrecks and scenes of terror, the air alive with melodramatic sentiment, what do we have in Longus? Cows following the music of a flute, “jumping into the sea lowing”—cows can swim, notice; oh yes, “cows never drown, unless their hooves get soft in the water and drop off ...”<sup>9</sup> Or the travels: these travelers travel a few hundred yards, a mile or two at most. Or the war. Is it Egypt in revolt against Persia, as in Chariton? No; it is a comic-opera war, which breaks out because somebody steals a length of rope. We can call all this “realism” if we will; it is above all the realism of parody. This parody, this mocking, contributes a great deal to the light touch, the ironic, humorous tone that characterizes the whole story—including its principal action. Longus pretends not to take his own story seriously, frames it with parody; by doing that, he gets us to accept it the more readily.

It is just the same with the realism of Longus’s *dramatis personae*. What he wants to do is to frame the main elements of his story—Daphnis and Chloe and their mystic progress—rather than to create characters. The standard novel is inhabited for the most part by conventional people: rather colorless young man and young woman, anxious parents, faithful companions, wily slaves, opportunist rivals, shameless women, noble seigneurs; the types of New Comedy. Longus owes even more to New Comedy than the

other novel-authors do, and that is true of his characters: Lamon, Dionysophanes, Gnathon, Dorcon, Lycaenion do what they have to do to fit the plot, far more than they display προαίρεσις, choice of action. Menander, of course, could manage both. But Longus does not need thorough realism. In fact, he does not want it; it would militate against his purpose; the central story he is telling is an idealizing story.

So he calculates; he measures out his realism. He needs enough of it to bring out, by contrast, the central action and the central characters. He needs enough of it to point up his parable, to make it interesting and attractive. But not too much, because we do have to stay in an unreal world. Let us recall the examples quoted earlier: Dorcon's assault on Chloe; the seizure of Chloe by the Methymneans; Daphnis and the dolphin; Chloe as milkmaid and the flies. In these cases, we get a mixture of real and ideal in the same incidents. If we look at the narrative line, we find for instance the sequence of events in book i: idyllic life, with poetic contest; shepherds pasturing their flocks; the growth of love—followed by the relative realism of Dorcon and the pirates. Or in book 2: Philetas's mythic lesson, experiments that almost become realistic, followed by the irruption into this ideal world of the real men of Methymna. Throughout, Longus is calculating. As he calculates the disposition of episodes within given stages of his work, so too does he calculate the overall economy of the story. With the seduction of Daphnis by Lycaenion, halfway through book 3, Longus passes definitively from idyllic track to realistic track, and the content and whole tone change notably. The major action in the hero's individual spiritual progress is over, and from now on the action of the story becomes almost wholly New Comedy (with occasional plaintive reminders of the idyll). The very style is more straightforward; no longer do we find the leisurely, elaborate tricolon structures that characterize earlier,

pastoral scenes.<sup>10</sup> It would be interesting to apply to Longus the statistical method that Hägg uses to analyze the narrative technique of Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius.<sup>11</sup> It would show a clear difference between the first part of the story and the ending.

The most important realistic element is the city, the city and the people who live in it, or come from it; the natural contrast for the life of the country. Eros, the principal force in the psychological action, manifests himself in the country; but it is the town that is responsible for the events in the social action that lead to the story's happy ending: that is, the exposure of the children, the Methymnean incursion, the contribution made by the city-woman Lycaenion to Daphnis's progress, the arrival on the scene of Dionysophancs, which results in the recognition of the children. That is to say, it is the city that imposes form on the story, form in an Aristotelian sense, that realizes its potential; that realizes, in fact, the ideal. But Dionysophancs, Lycaenion, Gnathon themselves remain types; they are there to contribute to a situation, and it is the situation, a situation created by the author, that dominates.

Realism in Longus, that is, is essentially a literary means of attaining a highly literary end. That end is to highlight the parable, not to represent people in action, μιμεῖσθαι πράττοντας. Realism is one element among others in the story's *mise en oeuvre*, its literary execution. The *mise en oeuvre* is more important in this novel than in others, in that there is less drama in its action than there is in others. Everything hangs on the author's skill. This is the point at which, and the reason for which, one must turn to the *mise en oeuvre*, those elements which Rohde would have called "literary decoration," and which in Chalk's analysis are integral in the story. Chalk pointed out that the text typically proceeds by a series of triptychs: in each triptych Longus

sets out a description of the season, the reaction of the lovers to the season, and the events arising from the season; that is, setting, state of mind, and action. This entails description of the pastoral setting, the deployment of bucolic motifs and Dionysiae motifs, the disposition of numerous topoi, the narration of incidents; the *mise en oeuvre*, in short. The literary execution, in *Daphnis and Chloe*, is emphatically not a mere accompaniment of the action, or a substitute for it. It is what situates it and energizes it. The “how” is quite as important as the “what.” Longus is after all a contemporary of Lucian, Achilles Tatius, Philostratus.

The case is just the same for the story’s main action, the erotic progress. That action really is extremely slender. Longus disguises just how slender it is by creating his setting carefully and linking it to the action; by telling his story unhurriedly; by including in it piquant adventures, picturesque episodes, intrigues, descriptions, myths. But at the end of it all he has sooner or later to turn to the action; he has to dispose it within the story, and narrate it. The truth is that there is little to tell. But the action cannot disappear totally. It has to be seen to be there, however briefly. And since this is so, here too everything hangs on the “how,” on the author’s attitude. What is that attitude? After all this, is this a serious novel? Is Longus serious?

Yes; after his fashion. One is tempted to call the work a fairy story written by a Nabokov. It is something less than a novel, perhaps; Eros has made a μῦθος of Chloe, a fable—as Longus predicts, in 2.27. In 2.7 he tells us that the children understood Philetas’s story, which is their story, as μῦθος οὐ λόγος: a fable, not a rational account; an echo of Plato, of course, as the book is replete with echoes of earlier writers. There are elements in *Daphnis and Chloe* of Cinderella, of Snow White: their innocence, impenetrable to outsiders without innocence; idealism in the principal characters, despite the realism of the ugly sisters and wicked barons.

Like Cinderella, Daphnis and Chloe are divinely protected, untouchable, because they are innocent. But for all that, the story does have another dimension. It would tell us what Love is; that is serious enough.

Only, the manner is not. Longus disguises his enthusiasm. He is constantly retreating from pretension, guarded, constantly putting the ball in the reader's court: deconstructing himself. He gave us fair warning in the proem, before he even started on his story: ἡμῖν δὲ ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι σωφρονοῦσι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων γράφειν—"Help me that God," as Thornley puts it, "to write the passions of others; and while I write, keep me in my own right wits." That is what Rohde, with his background, could not understand: that distance, that irony, that ambivalence. We, in the twentieth century, are better fitted to understand. Like Longus, we have seen enough drama. In short, the story will not work on only one level. It limps here and there, but Longus is well aware of that. He does what he can about it; then he withdraws. He has done what he said he would do: τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα παιδεύσει: remind him who has loved, and instruct him who has not. He has told us what Love is. We must make what we can of it.

## NOTES

1. October 1988-January 1989. See G. Barber, *Daphnis and Chloe: The Markets and Metamorphoses of an Unknown Bestseller*, Panizzi Lectures, British Library (London, 1989).

2. The translation, revised by J. M. Edmonds, is published in the Loeb edition of Longus by Edmonds (London, 1916). Perhaps, in so describing the story in 1659, Thornley had one eye on Puritan sensibilities.

3. E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig, 1876). This work dominated scholarship on the Greek novel for a century; it was reedited, with an important foreword, by W. Schmid in 1914 (3d ed., Leipzig, the original pagination being indicated in the margin), and reissued with an additional preface by K. Kerényi (4th ed., reprint, Hildesheim, 1960; 5th ed., Hildesheim, 1974).

4. H. H. O. Chalk, "Eros and the Lesbian Pastorals of Longos," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 80 (1960): 32-51. For Longus in general, see particularly



R. L. Hunter, *A Study of "Daphnis and Chloe"* (Cambridge, 1983), which gives a useful lead to the quite extensive bibliography. A valuable general study, to which I here acknowledge a substantial debt, is W. E. McCulloh, *Longus*, Twayne's World Authors Series (New York, 1970). The standard text is the Teubner of M. D. Reeve (Leipzig, 1982); there is also a recent Budé edition by J. R. Vieillefond (Paris, 1987). The most recent English translation is by C. Gill in *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, ed. B. P. Reardon (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1989).

5. R. Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike* (Munich, 1962); on this book, see, e.g., the criticisms by R. Turcan, "Le roman 'initiatique': A propos d'un livre récent," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 163 (1963): 149-99 (rejecting the general thesis that almost all the ancient novels are "mystery-texts" based on mystery cults), and A. Geyer, "Roman und Mysterienritual: Zum Problem eines Bezugs zum dionysischen Mysterienritual im Roman des Longos," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft*, n.s. 3 (1977): 176-96 (some novels—e.g., Apuleius's *Metamorphoses*—are mystery-texts, but *Daphnis and Chloe* is not). Most recently, Merkelbach has developed the thesis, for *Daphnis and Chloe*, to the point of attempting a reconstruction from the novel of the (Dionysiae) mysteries (in the period of the Roman Empire, when they were substantially different from the cult of Dionysus in the classical period); see his *Die Hirten des Dionysos: Die Dionysos-mysterien der römischen Kaiserzeit und der bukolische Roman des Longus* (Stuttgart, 1988).

6. Chalk, "Eros," 49.

7. Ibid.

8. Social structure and land use: E. L. Bowie, "The Novels and the Real World," in *Erotica Antiqua: Acta of the International Conference on the Ancient Novel*, ed. B. P. Reardon (Bangor, Wales, 1977), 91-96, esp. 93. Topography: H. J. Mason, "Longus and the Topography of Lesbos," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 109 (1979): 149-63; P. Green, "Longus, Antiphon, and the Topography of Lesbos," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 102 (1982): 210-14; Bowie, "Novels," 94, and most recently Bowie, "Theocritus' Seventh *Idyll*, Philetas and Longus," *Classical Quarterly* 35 (1985): 67-91. See also, on Longus's "realism," A. M. Scarcella, *La Lesbo di Longo Sofista* (Rome, 1968).

9. Longus 1.30.6; "obviously an interpolation," says Dalmcyda in the old Bude edition (Paris, 1934—now replaced; see 11. 4 above). I doubt it.

10. L. Castiglioni, "Stilo e testo del romanzo pastorale di Longo," *Rendiconti del Istituto Lombardo* 61 (1928): 203-23.

11. T. Hägg, *Narrative Technique in Ancient Greek Romances* (Stockholm, 1971).

# MEMORY AND DESCRIPTION IN THE ANCIENT NOVEL

## STEVE NIMIS

In the introduction to his translation of *The Adventures of Leucippe and Clitophon*, a Greek novel of the second century C.E., Jack Winkler gives the following advice to its readers:

The unanswerable enigma of its contradictory style should be enjoyed directly as a lascivious surface and nothing more, making us conscious that the quest for depth, for meaning, and for unity is a fraud of the ages. That cannot quite be the author's intention, since he could not have foreseen the time when tentative endeavors for unity of meaning, perspective, and point of view would one day have created a system of seeing and reading that knew no other possibility, but as children of that system it must be part of the author's meaning for us. Otherwise we will misread his stressful irresolutions as bad rather than purposefully ineffable.

Winkler here faces up to a difficult fact about many kinds of ancient literature: the circumstances of their production and circulation are either unknown or alien to us, and hence our ordinary modes of reading are necessarily ahistorical to some degree. In the case of the ancient novels, the application of our own standards for a well-made story necessitates either the judgment that they are incompetent, or it necessitates a more subtle reading that recuperates a "unity" of questionable historical provenance. The old battle between the "Analysts" and "Unitarians" in Homeric scholarship is analogous: both sides took for granted the same standards of reading, the former rejecting various parts of the received texts of Homer as the interpolations of an incompetent *Arbeiter*, the latter spinning out ever more complicated justifications for the

inclusion of those suspected parts. It is now well known how the Parry-Lord theory of oral composition provided a third way of viewing Homer, one in which the process of production and circulation itself provided the basis for viewing the texts as self-consistent in a different way. Is it possible to find a third way of looking at the ancient novels based on a “theory of prosaic composition” analogous to the theory of oral composition for Homer? I would like to advance such a project by investigating the status of description in the novel of Achilles Tatius to which Winkler alludes in the quotation above, taking my cue from two studies that correspond roughly to an “analyst” and a “Unitarian” approach to *Leucippe and Clitophon*. Dorit Sedelmeier identifies a clear structure in the novel *once the various descriptions and digressions have been discounted*,<sup>2</sup> Shadi Bartsch, on the other hand, focuses on these very elements of the text to identify a complex authorial strategy of hermeneutic hide and seek in the novel (Bartsch 1989). Each of them takes for granted that the meaning of the novel must be grasped as a whole, that the parts either resonate with the whole or are to be set aside as extraneous or “merely” ornamental.

In assuming these positions. Bartsch and Sedelmeier implicitly rely on the general view that description, when it occurs in narrative, is either ornamental or symbolic: in the first case, description produces *enargeia*, vivid visual realization that contributes to some specific rhetorical impact: in the second, description serves to foreshadow events, delineate character, or otherwise reflect or figure the key interpretive issues raised by the text.<sup>3</sup> In the latter case, description is sometimes seen as a miniature version of the themes or poetic design of the text, a *mise-enabyme* “reduplicating, reflecting, or mirroring (one or more than one aspect of) the textual whole.”<sup>4</sup> Such accounts, however, often take for granted an instrumental view of the switch from narrative to description: description is selected at some point in a narrative from a set of available options because it suits the author’s overall purpose best. I will argue that in *Leucippe*

*and Clitophon* descriptions, can perform a *generative* role in the unfolding of the story: rather than “reflecting” or “mirroring” the narrative as a whole, descriptions sometimes present a tentative “first draft” or preliminary sketch of it. That is, rather than being elements of a design that is clearly articulated from the start and instantiated at every step along the way, descriptions are elements that, when first introduced, have many possible futures, and are deployed by the author as part of a more local strategy to get and keep things going and in this way *create* possibilities for the course of the story.

This is not to say we must imagine our author plunging forward without ever revising anything—although the logistical problems in substantially revising a work of this scope would have been daunting in antiquity—but rather that the actual articulation of the story, how one thing leads to another, is itself an important part of the creative process and that the linear unfolding of the work will bear the traces of that creative process. This is especially true in the ancient novels, whose non-traditional character (namely, they are “novel” plots in prose) means more energy must be allocated to constructing the story as it goes along, and not just to ornamenting an already well-plotted narrative. Such texts especially require what Godzich and Kittay call, in a partially analogous context a “prosaics” approach:

Trained as we are to perceive texts as totalities, we seek to apprehend their structure and, in the description of that structure, to assert our mastery over the text. Prosaics seeks instead to espouse the movement of the text as it manages the economy of its discourses, to establish where the thresholds of decision arise, what the decisions are, and what their motivations and determinations as well as their consequences have been. In other words, we must learn to follow the processive threading of the text.<sup>5</sup>

If assuming that our novel is already complete at every point produces one set of conclusions, assuming that it is “under construction” at any point along the way will produce others.

Such an approach may allow us to identify better the forces and interests that have produced this peculiar narrative, while remaining alive to the radical differences such a text presents to us modern readers.

Achilles Tatius novel begins with a description of the harbor of Sidon where an unnamed narrator lands after a storm. This is followed by yet another description, this time of a motive tablet depicting the rape of Europa. This second description is what modern critics call an “ekphrasis,” a description of a work of art. of which there are two others in the novel.<sup>6</sup> Hach ekphrasis has numerous links to the text that follows, and Bartsch, citing contemporary evidence for the “proleptic” character of such descriptions, argues that they function to foreshadow these events. Second sophistic readers, she shows, would have expected these descriptions to presage the plot of the story. However, there is another level of complication since the events in the story are not quite what the ekphrases would lead one to expect. Hence Bartsch concludes it was the author’s intention to lead the reader astray, to set up expectations that are then frustrated, leading to the undermining of the reader’s confidence in his or her ability to read. Thus, for example, there are a number of parallels between the description of the rape of Europa and the story of the main characters. Clitophon and Leucippe. The ekphrasis sets the erotic tone and foreshadows the character of Leucippe by referring to her virginity and her willingness to be abducted (Bartsch 1989.49–54). Imagistic links, such as the description of flowers, springs, and hedges in both ekphrasis and narrative, also establish parallels. But the scene also, to the reader’s surprise, foreshadows the rape of Calligone, the hero’s half-sister, and “the correspondence of small details serves to confirm the fulfillment of what was foreshadowed.” But the reader is resurprised when Clitophon elopes with Leucippe, for this turns out to be the real event foreshadowed by the ekphrasis of Europa (Bartsch 1989.63–65).

Bartsch’s account of the motives of Achilles Tatius is perhaps over ingenious, but it is clear that she considers the ekphrasis

of Europa to be the kind of beginning that is added on at the end of the composition process, the kind of beginning that prepares for what follows because it already knows what follows. Hence she often speaks of the necessity for readers to exercise “hindsight” and “post-hindsight.” This could be the case in Achilles Tatius novel, for this introductory scene is a kind of prologue that has a different narrative status than the rest of the novel. The unnamed narrator is greeted by a stranger. Clitophon, whose autobiographical account of his amorous misfortunes constitutes the rest of the narrative. It is thus possible that our author composed the ekphrasis of Europa last, designing it—after the novel had been finished—to foreshadow thematically the events that shortly follow in Clitophon’s narrative. But it is more likely that this ekphrasis is a real beginning, that our author has a general idea for a story, is casting around for a good way to get underway, and that details he introduces at this point become, as the story unfolds, generative or determinative of events that follow in ways that were not clearly foreseen when they were introduced. Indeed, it has often been noted that the ending of this novel fails to take into account the way the story began; for the novel ends with the happy couple sailing off to Byzantium and we are never returned to the initial scene of the unnamed narrator and the apparently unhappy Clitophon speaking in Sidon.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, Achilles Tatius attributes an explicit “generative” function to the ekphrasis: the effect of the picture on the first narrator prompts Clitophon, who overhears his reaction, to introduce himself and tell his tale. The description thus seems to function as a “grounding” device comparable to the invocation of the Muses by the epic poet or the prologue in a drama.<sup>8</sup> Its placement here suggests a certain anxiety about how this discourse will be taken. What does the author really want to say? What kind of story should he write? There is no reason to believe that these questions are completely answered for the author until he has actually finished the novel, and there is no reason to assume that he has finished it already as he composes this opening scene.



Rather, this description could serve the author as a sort of preliminary outline or heuristic premise, a semantic and narrative resource that the author proceeds to unfold.<sup>9</sup>

Descriptions of paintings—real or imaginary—by second sophistic figures like Lucian and Philostratus, roughly contemporary with Achilles Tatius, are good examples of how a picture can function as a prompt for narrative elaboration. Philostratus' *Imagines*, for example, consists of a series of explanations of paintings for a pupil, which take the form of narratives that clearly go far beyond what could actually have been represented in a painting. Also of interest are Lucian's *prolaliai* ("prologues"), which survive as independent pieces, but seem to have performed an introductory function not unlike the ekphrasis of Europa in *Leucippe and Clitophon*.<sup>10</sup> General discussions of literary description often identify a generative relationship between graphic and narrative articulation. Heffernan, for example, states that "ekphrastic literature typically delivers *from* the pregnant moment of graphic art its embryonically narrative impulse, and thus makes explicit the story that graphic art tells only by implication" (Heffernan 1991.302). M. Beaujour calls description an "instrument of *anamnesis*, and as such, a vector of psychic energy" (Beaujour 1981.33). Philippe Hamon, finally, maintains the role of description is "to organize narrative and, through the redundancy which it introduces into the narrative, to act as its memory" (Hamon 1982.168).

These last two quotations draw attention to the link between description and memory in antiquity, an association that lends support to the view of description I am suggesting. Simonides of Ceos, who is credited with the remark that painting is "silent poetry" and poetry "speaking painting," is also credited with the invention of memory systems based on description, a well-attested practice of ancient orators.<sup>11</sup> According to the rhetorical handbooks, this art of memory consists in setting up in the mind a series of places (*loci*, τύποι) and inhabiting them with "vivid images" (*imagines agentes*, εἰδωλα), a process Cicero compares to painting a picture.<sup>12</sup> Once this is done, the



*loci* can be revisited in the mind and the associations will act as reminders. The rhetorical tradition thus had a specific practice that linked images and places to discourse so that the former generated the latter. This is not to say that behind every ekphrasis is some complex set of *loci* and *imagines* used to memorize the discourse that follows, but rather that description, in the rhetorical tradition, was used to create imaginative vectors that indicated the direction and movement of a discourse. The very terms *τοπος* and *communis locus* for “subject matter” and “common idea” indicate the degree to which the ancients conceived of the universe of thought as a map of regions able to be traversed along metonymic paths of association. As Bettina Bergmann says, the orator is the “topographer of the imagination” (Bergmann 1994.226).

The importance of the connection between memory and description is that it allows us to see such non-narrative elements serving a function in the *management* of the novel’s discourse. Bartsch cites Eco’s notion of an “inferential walk” to describe the process by which readers make tentative assumptions about the future of a story as it unfolds, assumptions that may have to be modified as new incidents and information are introduced. But Eco explicitly compares this process of *reading* narratives with the process of *producing* them:

[Various levels of textual organization) are interconnected in a continuous coming and going. The cooperation of the interpreter at the lower levels can succeed only because some hypotheses which concern upper levels (and vice versa) are hazarded. *The same happens also for a generative process: frequently an author makes decisions concerning the deep semantic structure of his story only at the moment in which he chooses at the lexical level, for merely stylistic reasons, a given expression.*<sup>13</sup>

Like Godzich and Kittay, Eco is thinking of texts as “processive threadings” rather than as static objects brought forth whole,

like Athena from the head of Zeus. The experience of the linear unfolding of the story need not at every point be qualitatively different for the reader and the author, as if that unfolding were staged by an author who has absolute control over its every aspect. "The author," writes P. Maeherey, "is the first reader of his own work" (Maeherey 1978.9). Moreover, Bartsch's thesis that Achilles Tatius has carefully constructed an elaborate hermeneutic game that thematizes reading and interpretation makes the novel into a sophisticated diversion only incidentally concerned with exploring issues of gender and desire. But it seems to me that Achilles Tatius has embarked on a more radically experimental narrative adventure in which *he* deploys a whole range of elements from a variety of genres that take up issues of *eros*, without having a monolithic strategy from beginning to end. The character of the descriptive "digressions" that occur throughout the novel may be rooted in a more tentative and vaguely defined impulse to try out new ideas. Such a view of the novel's narrative agenda resonates with Bakhtin's characterization of novelistic discourse as "unfinal" and "open-ended," part of the "centrifugal forces of language."<sup>14</sup> It also takes account of the fact that any complex text—and *Leucippe and Clitophon* is not simple in any way—will inevitably exceed the *conscious* intentions of its author. As we shall see, this novel cries out for attention to manifestations of *unconscious* intentions.

If we take the position that the initial ekphrasis is a real beginning that serves a managerial function in the creative process of composing the novel, the circumstances of the other two instances of ekphrasis in the novel suggest that they have a parallel function.<sup>15</sup> The second ekphrasis occurs near the beginning of Book 3, when the characters see a pair of paintings: one depicting the rescue of Andromeda by Perseus, the other the rescue of Prometheus by Heracles. The third ekphrasis occurs at the beginning of Book 5, when the characters see a painting of the rape of Philomela. Once again there are many uncanny correspondences between these paintings and the narrative that follows in which the heroine

Leucippe is apparently killed twice, once by disembowelment and once by decapitation.<sup>16</sup> Here it is useful to take into account Dorit Sedelmeier's analysis of the "structure" of *Leucippe and Clitophon*, an analysis that depends, as I have said, on ignoring all the non-narrative digressions. Once that is done, she argues, a clear narrative structure emerges that falls into four parts (Sedelmeier 1959.113):

Books 1-2: The love plot proper

Books 3-4: The adventures of the lovers

Books 5-6: Temptation by seducers

Books 7-8: Resolution and happy ending.

Within this schema, Sedelmeier identifies a number of structuring elements, like ring composition and thematic symmetries, that give coherence to each of the segments. Like Bartsch, she must assume that the whole novel is somehow already composed in detail before its actual articulation in writing: in addition, she assumes that the non-narrative digressions are added in an independent process that is unrelated to the structure of the novel she has identified. Whereas Bartsch sees these descriptions as central to the novel's purpose, Sedelmeier sees them as extraneous. Her analysis is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, but like "analyst" discussions of Homer, it does identify passages and qualities of the narrative that require explanation. In particular, Sedelmeier draws our attention to the shift in the *character* of the narrative after Book 2 and again after Book 4.<sup>17</sup> It is noteworthy that these two sections of the novel each, begin—like the opening scene—with an arrival by sea followed by an ekphrasis describing works of art. Moreover, in each case the ekphrasis is inserted into the narrative as an independent description, so that we no longer seem to be listening to Clitophon, the character and narrator of his own story, but to an omniscient narrator.<sup>18</sup> The three scenes that involve ekphrasis are thus positioned at the beginning of these larger narrative divisions, and the numerous connections between ekphrasis and subsequent narrative suggest that in

each case the descriptions have a generative role. In the following brief summaries I will try to focus on the way the *character* of the story changes in each of these three sections.

Books 1-2: the description of the rape of Europa is followed by the story of the “seduction” of Leucippe by Clitophon and their subsequent elopement. This portion of the novel is dominated by representations of *eros* and marriage derived from the traditions of elegy and New-Comedy. As David Konstan has shown, the *eros* that Leucippe engenders in Clitophon produces not a desire to marry her, but a desire to seduce her, on the recommendation of his confidants Kleinias and Satyros, who produce the standard advice on how to go about manipulating an object of desire (Konstan 1994.65-69). Besides the rape of Europa, other mythic exempla of unequal relationships of *eros* are given in the novel, such as Apollo’s rape of Daphne. The second book ends, while Leucippe sleeps, with a philosophical/rhetorical disquisition on the relative merits of heterosexual and homosexual love (2.35-38), which picks up on earlier references to Plato’s discussions of love.<sup>19</sup> As the lovers make their escape, although they have yet to consummate their union, there is a certain sense of resolution and closure given by this lengthy digression, what Fusillo calls “the narrative equivalent of a caesura” (Fusillo 1997.225).

Books 3-4. Book 3 begins with a shipwreck, a convenient way of changing the story and a typical entree into the world of romance and adventure. Clitophon’s friends, Kleinias, Menelaos, and Satyros, all disappear into the sea leaving the hero alone with Leucippe. Arriving in Pelusion, they catch sight of paintings of Prometheus’ rescue by Heracles and Andromeda’s rescue by Perseus that are described in detail (3.6-8). The incidents narrated next all have parallels in the other extant novels and, indeed, the character of the story here is quite different from that of the first two books. There follows capture by pirates, the apparent death by disemboweling of Leucippe in a way that has uncanny parallels to the ekphrases of Prometheus and Andromeda,<sup>20</sup> followed by the eventual reappearance of Menelaos, Satyros, and

Leucippe. In Book 4, two erotic rivals make attempts on Leucippe, one of them rendering her insane with a drug. A new character, Chaereas, is introduced who helps Leucippe recover from her fit. The book ends with learned and seemingly irrelevant disquisitions on the Nile river (4.18) and the crocodile (4.19). This “shift of gear” into the mode of description, like the philosophical discussion “that ended Book 2, produces a sense of closure to this segment of the story.

Books 5–8. The opening of Book 5 has the character of a new beginning. The lovers arrive in Alexandria, which was their original destination when they left Tyre back in Book 2. There is an important description of the city that also parallels the opening description of Sidon and its double harbor. This is followed by the ekphrasis of the rape of Philomela, which bodes “lawless sex, adultery without shame, women degraded,” according to one of Clitophon’s companions (5.4).<sup>21</sup> The characters thus decide to scuttle their plans for the day, but only long enough for Clitophon to redescribe the painting at the request of Leucippe. Subsequently, the lovers and their friends do go off and have the disastrous adventure that seems to have been augured by the picture: Leucippe is stolen by bandits and apparently decapitated before the eyes of her lover. Bartsch however, notes the thematic continuities between the painting and the new story that now begins, involving a new pair of characters, Melite and her husband Thersander. The mutual fidelity of the hero and heroine now becomes the center of attention, as Melite and Thersander each press themselves on one of the lovers, apparently—like the “barbarian” Tereus in Clitophon’s description—unsatisfied with a single spouse.<sup>22</sup> With the appearance, at the end, of a series of New Comedy motifs (reconciliation with parental blocking figures, trials, recognitions, and marriage), the parallels between ekphrasis and narrative, however vague, weave a thematic continuity between rape and marriage.<sup>23</sup>

This brief and highly selective summary indicates how the three ekphrases could be seen as part of a strategy of production aimed forward, rather than a strategy that is

oriented from the end: as places where, as P. Hamon characterizes them, “the narrative comes to a temporary halt, while continuing to organize itself” (Hamon 1982.170). In this way, the ekphrases can be seen as part of the resources the prose author has at his disposal to manage the flow of his discourse as it is being constructed. Rather than non-narrative ornaments “added” to the text after the fact, so to speak, they are places where decisions are in the process of being made, places where the creative process itself is at work. Such, in particular, seems to be the case with the passage combining a description of Alexandria and the ekphrasis of Philomela that occurs roughly half way through the novel. I will conclude my remarks by considering this important passage in more detail, for it ties together issues of memory, description, and the management of discourse in a remarkable way.

As I have already mentioned, the arrival of the hero and heroine in Alexandria has the earmarks of a new beginning, with some reminiscences of the opening description of Sidon and its harbor. As Clitophon approaches Alexandria, he focuses on two aspects of the unfolding sight: the astonishing beauty of the city, on the one hand, and, on the other, its remarkable spatial organization (5.1). This latter aspect recalls the mnemotechnics of the orators;

A double row of columns led straight across from the entrance of Helios to the opposite entrance of Selene, Sun and Moon being the guardians of the city gates. Between the columns there lay the city’s open area. Crossing it is such a long journey that you would think you were going abroad, though you were staying at home. Proceeding a little distance into the city, I came to the quarter (*topos*) named for Alexander himself, where I saw a whole other city, one whose beauty was split up in separate sections: for a row of columns went in one direction, and another just as long crossed it at right angles (5.1).<sup>24</sup>

This description resembles the kind of *loci* that the author of the *ad Herennium* recommends be used as memory devices,



scenes “that are naturally or artificially set off on a small scale, complete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and embrace them easily by natural memory—for example, a building, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch or the like.”<sup>25</sup> But if the spatial character of Alexandria’s plan suggests the memory techniques of the orators, the other aspect of Clitophon’s description implies a different characteristic of memory: for the plan of the city is so beautiful and magnificent that it is incapable of being comprehended:

My eyes tried to travel along every street, but I was left an unsatisfied spectator. The totality of its beauty was beyond my eyes’ scope. At every moment when I was actually glimpsing some parts. I was on the point of seeing more and pressing on to others still but reluctant to pass some by. The things to see outstripped my sight: the prospects lured me on. Turning around and round to face all the streets, I grew faint at the sight and at last exclaimed, like a luckless lover. “Eyes, we have met our match.” But then I saw two new and unexpected contests, one between the magnitude of the city and its beauty, and another between the population and the space of the city itself: and both won. The space of the city was larger than a continent: the population more numerous than a nation. If I considered the city, I well might doubt that any swarm of men might fill it: but if I looked at the populace, I was amazed that any urban space could contain them (5.1).<sup>26</sup>

This elaborate adynaton seems to conceive of the city as a memory space too large to be tilled completely with *imagines agentes* and as a population of *imagines agentes* too numerous to fill up any series of *loci*. Contemplating this space and its occupants leads one irresistibly from one image to another, as though the onlooker cannot control what does and does not come into his purview. This representation suggests to me the vast array of narrative possibilities lying before our author at this particular place in the novel. What should happen next? What sequence of events will best suit his



purposes? For an ancient author to pose these questions is to conjure a swarm of images and a series of ordered places in which to organize them. Commenting on Quintilian's discussion of this use of places and images for mental organization. Bryson states that, "architecture not only stands for the control of self: it is the actual material means by which the self exercises control over its words and its world."<sup>27</sup>

All the more striking, therefore, is the emphasis in the description on the fact that this space is unable to be mastered by the mind, for it is larger than a "continent" (ἡπειρος: probably from ἄπειρος and hence an "unbounded" region), its inhabitants numerous beyond counting. Such a space inevitably suggests the unconscious, that boundless region teeming with images, feelings, and creative impulses, which, at some level, must be the generative source for this novel narrative.<sup>28</sup> Traversing this vast memory space gives Clitophon the strange feeling of making a journey abroad in one's native land (ἔνδημος ἀποδημία). This expression recalls that peculiar sensation that Freud calls the "uncanny," *unheimlich*: the sensation that one feels when encountering something familiar (*heimlich*) that has been estranged by the process of repression.<sup>29</sup> As the novel is about to make a new beginning, as the narrative itself gives way to description and the text seems in this way to pause and gather its semantic resources before plunging ahead into a new set of uncanny adventures—adventures that will see Leucippe apparently beheaded, her headless trunk the subject of an elaborate lament by Clitophon, followed by her "return" shortly afterward—it is most appropriate that we find at such a point this peculiar evocation of the workings of the imagination and the unconscious and, more particularly, of a kind of surrender to those workings, an inability of the symbolic order, represented by the grid of streets, to master the effects of the unconscious, represented by the swarming population surging forward at every turn.

The ekphrasis of Philomela that follows shortly in the narrative is certainly at one level about the return of the

repressed as well:

It showed the violation of Philomela, the violence of Tereus, the cutting of her tongue. The plot of the drama was there in every detail—the robe, Tereus, the banquet table. A maid was holding the unfolded robe: Philomela was standing beside it and kept pointing her finger and indicating the pictures: Prokne nodded that she understood: her eyes glowed fiercely and angrily at the picture. *King Tereus of Thrace was embroidered there, wrestling Philomela to his lust: her hair had been torn, her waistband broken, her dress ripped open, one breast, exposed; she planted her right hand against his eyes and with her left tried to hold the torn shreds of her garment across her breasts. Tereus held Philomela tightly in his arms, drawing her body as close as he could to his own and tightening his embrace on her flesh*—so deftly had the artist designed the robe’s picture. In the rest of the icon the women are showing Tereus his dinner—scraps in a basket—the head and hands of his infant son. They are laughing, at the same time terrified. Tereus is shown leaping up from his couch and drawing his sword against them. He plants one leg on the table, which is neither standing nor fallen, a picture of impending collapse (5.3).<sup>30</sup>

A second description of this painting given by Clitophon to Leucippe only a few sentences later focuses on the crime of Tereus—particularly his betrayal of the marriage arrangement—the terrible revenge of the sisters against him and their transformation into birds. This first description, however, focuses on the robe that Philomela weaves in order to reveal the truth that Tereus has kept hidden by cutting off her tongue. When we are told what is depicted on the robe, we have a kind of “ekphrasis within an ekphrasis” (the part italicized in the above passage), that involves a complex *mise-en-abyme* of the representation of narrative voice and the reader’s gaze.<sup>31</sup> Tereus’ crimes against Philomela are not

described as a separate part of the painting, but only as they appear on Philomela's robe, so these deeds are specifically represented as a form of repressed discourse returning: the "voice of the shuttle." in Sophocles' words<sup>32</sup> The focus of the description is thus not the deeds themselves, but the way deeds come back to haunt the perpetrator who had tried to suppress them. If the second description of the painting by Clitophon casts it in its more traditional light as a cautionary tale about infidelity and revenge, the first description of the painting highlights the unofficial forms of discourse that women have available to them to circumvent the measures men take to limit their circulation, both physical and linguistic. Note the emphatic way in which Philomela's presence, remarkable enough in itself, is foregrounded by the use of tenses of continuous action. Not only has she woven the picture but she "was standing beside it and kept pointing her finger and indicating the pictures" (παρειστήκει καὶ ἐπετίθει τῷ πέπλῳ τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ἐδείκνυε τῶν υφασμάτων τὰς γραφάς). The male dread that women will define themselves as a group with their own parallel universe of language is being centralized here.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, what is actually described as woven on the *peplos* is a highly eroticized version of what happened to Philomela, designed to appeal to a male gaze, revealing another level of ambivalence about the picture's meaning. This whole scene suggests to me thematically the novel's "uncanny" juxtaposition of desire and aversion, of pleasure and pain, of *eros* and violence, like the mixture of laughter and fear on the faces of Philomela and Prokne (γελῶσι δὲ ἄμα καὶ φοβοῦνται)<sup>34</sup>

Also remarkable in this passage are examples of what seem to be revisions and adjustments to the plot. Between the description of Alexandria and the first description of the painting, Clitophon prays to the great god for an end to his adventures. He then uncharacteristically switches from his usual narrative voice, as someone who narrates events only as they unfold and as he himself and the reader simultaneously come to understand them, to the more omniscient voice of

one who has already experienced the events about to be narrated:

But the god, I suppose, did not listen to our prayers, and further trials were in store for us on Fortune's obstacle course. For, unbeknownst to us, Chaereas had long been lusting after Leucippe ...(5.2-3).<sup>35</sup>

The revision of the role of Chaereas from a helper in Book 4 to an aggressor madly in love with Leucippe in Book 5 is something Clitophon the character won't find out till the end of the story, so that its abrupt introduction here in a breach of narrative decorum seems to be a kind of adjustment made by the author on the fly. Returning to his blow-by-blow narrative, Clitophon relates an ominous event that occurs on the way to meet the treacherous Chaereas: Leucippe is buzzed by a swallow. Clitophon then prays for a confirmation of this evil omen, whereupon his eyes fall upon the painting of the rape of Philomela that confirms the omen (5.3). After the description of the painting, Menelaos recommends changing their plans for the day, foregrounding in his recommendation the power of pictures to generate narrative:

Interpreters of signs tell us to consider the stories of any paintings we chance to see as we set out on business and to liken the future to the plot of the story (5.4).<sup>36</sup>

The characters thus delay their plans, but only long enough for Clitophon to give an explanatory description of the picture at the request of Leucippe, after which the story is resumed where it left off. All readers have noted that this second description introduces elements not mentioned in the first one, usually taken as an oversight on the author's part. But this second description seems motivated by a desire to supplement or revise the first one, as though the first description had not adequately fulfilled whatever function had called it forth, signaling that the narrative itself is "under construction" at this point. Clitophon's exegesis seems to be a corrective, more reassuring version of something that had

been left too open-ended. Thus, whereas the first description ends with “the image of an impending fall” (γραφὴν μέλλοντος πτώματος), a moment of transition that must immediately change (but with what outcome?),<sup>37</sup> Leucippe asks specifically about the metamorphosis that is the conclusion of the story, something not mentioned at all in the first ekphrasis: “What does this picture mean?” she asks. “In the story, who are these birds?”<sup>38</sup>

Clitophon’s more traditional story ends with the transformation of the women into birds, speechless bodies that are. as rendering of the Heffernan notes, “forever powerless to speak or weave any more graphic stories of rape” (Heffernan 1993.52), From the standpoint of the management and organization of the novel’s discourse, the double elaboration of the story of Philomela thematizes the problem of telling a story all the way to a satisfactory conclusion<sup>39</sup>

It is remarkable the way this concentration of issues of narrative organization dovetails with the novel’s thematic concerns. Philomela’s ekphrasis is perhaps the “uncanniest” moment in this very uncanny novel, for it combines many elements Freud enumerates as provoking this sensation: dismemberment with its obvious overtones of castration, but also revenants, repetition, and the envoicing of silent objects. The last of these is a characteristic of ekphrasis itself, which means literally to “speak out” or “tell in full.” indicating its connection with tomb inscriptions that frequently “envoice” the buried person (Heffernan 1991.302). But as an object offered up to readers to visualize, the *mise-en-abyme* of an ekphrasis within an ekphrasis brings out another often recognized characteristic of the story: its voyeurism. Although ekphrasis allows something silent to “speak out,” voyeurism is the opposite process by which living things are “objectified” by the piale gaze.<sup>40</sup> That Philomela “speaks out” a version of her story that is addressed, it would seem, not to her sister but to male readers, thus crystallizes what David Konstan notes is a central tension in the novel. For he argues that, like the other

Greek novels. *Leucippe and Clitophon* projects a new vision of *eros* in which a lover and beloved of equal status are bound together by a mutual and reciprocal commitment that eventuates in marriage. But the difficult (and only partially successful) task of maintaining an ego-narrator rather than an omniscient narrator seems designed to maximize the sensational pleasure of the objectifying and unequal gaze reminiscent of the older model of domination and submission (Konstan 1994.59–72).

The mnemonic techniques of the orators, like Homer's oral poetics, are methods for managing discourse, for maintaining a set of relationships among discursive objects. The ekphrases of Achilles Tatius novel are descendants of the formula system of Homer and the memory spaces of the orators: with their combination of narrative linearity and spatial density they reproduce the meandering, associative quality of Achilles' novel—indeed, all the novels—which often present to the careful reader the appearance of a thematic deep structure, perhaps because their looser, experimental character gives freer rein to unconscious structures. Free association, uncanny repetition, apparent randomness that suddenly takes on the appearance of structure: these characteristics describe the dream work of individuals as well as the dreaming up of a “novel” story like *Leucippe and Clitophon*. The ekphrases of Achilles Tatius could be self-conscious acts of foreshadowing by a careful author plotting his every move from the perspective of the outcome. More likely, they are similar to one's first attempt to recall a dream, a recollection that is already fundamentally constructive the first of a series of revisions that is necessarily the way that consciousness encounters unconscious stirrings. The narrative traces of the ekphrase that Bartsch identifies scattered and transformed throughout the novel are thus generated by impulses that are articulated and given form precisely in the process of writing the novel. The double elaboration of the story of Philomela—the ekphrasis followed by Clitophon's redescription—parallels the way in which successive accounts of dreams result in

revisions activated by the censorship of consciousness, or the way our symbolic structures intervene to make order out of strange and uncanny experiences.<sup>41</sup>

To return to the dichotomy with which I began, I would argue that ekphrasis in *Leucippe and Clitophon* is neither an irrelevant decoration nor an integral part of a unity focused on reading and interpretation. Similarly, what Winkler calls the “stressful irresolutions” of the novel are neither a “lascivious surface” devoid of any deeper purpose, nor a hermeneutic labyrinth in which we confront the blind alleys of postmodern aesthetics. The evolving practice of what I would characterize as “prosaic composition” is one that is inherently innovative, exploratory, and resistant to the kinds of closure and unity that we generally expect of the verse genres of antiquity. Ekphrasis is often seen as a point where issues of readability are explicitly raised in a self-conscious manner.<sup>42</sup> It is perhaps our own desire as literary critics that makes us hasten to put the word “self-conscious” into that assertion. A better formulation is that of Don Fowler, who argues that ekphrasis is a place that manifests a desire for integration and a simultaneous resistance to integration (Fowler 1991.35). Thus it is the perfect place to look for the contradictions—conscious and unconscious—that both generate a novel like *Leucippe and Clitophon* and that the novel seeks imaginatively to overcome.

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- 1 Winkler 1989.174. Quotations from *Leucippe and Clitophon* are from this translation, slightly modified; Greek text is that of S. Gaselee in the Loeb edition.
- 2 Sedelmeier 1959.113. Cf. Mittelstadt 1967.753: pictorial descriptions in *Leucippe and Clitophon* "have no organic connection with the plot in his novel and are hardly more than irrelevant digressions intended to dazzle and entertain the reader."
- 3 Most useful for my understanding of literary description have been Fowler 1991. Walker 1993. Goldhill 1994. Becker 1992. Beaujour 1981. Hamon 1982. Blanchard 1980. I also would like to acknowledge the criticisms and suggestions of James Creech, Joseph Farrell, Mitchell Greenberg. Susan Jarratt. David Konstan. Donald Lateiner, and Peler Rose.

- [4](#) Becker 1995.4. citing. Graff's *Dictionary of Narratology* (Norman 1987).
- [5](#) Godzich and Kittay 1987.48. For a general account of such a project's appropriateness to the ancient novels, see Nimis 1994.
- [6](#) The term "ekphrasis" occurs first in the second sophistic, but with the more general meaning of any kind of description. I will use the term only in the narrower sense of a 'literary description of a graphic description" (Heffernan 1991.300).
- [7](#) Most 1989 argues that the novel's happy ending precluded a return to the initial autobiographical scenario, since autobiographies always end tragically in antiquity. If true, this confirms that the author started out in a way incongruous with what he ended up with. Others see the ending to be imitative of abruptly ending Platonic dialogues like the *Symposium*.
- [8](#) Godzich and Kittay 1987.139-75, discuss numerous "prosaic" versions of grounding devices. See also Maeder 1991.
- [9](#) Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*. roughly contemporary with Achilles Tatius, also begins with an ekphrasis consisting of a bare enumeration of a sequence of scenes, which the author's story subsequently elaborates. Xenophon's *An Ephesian Tale*, also roughly contemporary with Achilles Tatius, contains an obscure oracle near the beginning that is a vague outline of that novel. For the originality and inventiveness displayed in such opening scenes, see Maeder 1991.
- [10](#) These and other second sophistic examples of ekphrasis are discussed fully by Bartsch 1989.7-39. Harlan 1965.135 states that "description of paintings as a literary device is rooted in the rhetorical practice of evolving an imagined painted scene as an introduction to a discourse." Whether such ekphrases describe real or imagined pictures, see now Bryson 1994.
- [11](#) For ancient mnemotechnics. see Yates 1966 and Farrell 1997.
- [12](#) Cicero *de Oratore* 2.87.358. discussed by Bergmann 1994.
- [13](#) Eco 1984.17; my emphasis.
- [14](#) Bakhtin 1981 and Fusillo 1988. Compare Winkler's characterization of Longus as an author who "may have no single intention but rather experiments with a variety of possibilities and perspectives, shifting from scene to scene" (Winkler 1990.111).
- [15](#) Harlan 1965.136 concludes that these two other descriptions of paintings are "adaptations of. the introductory technique for use in the middle of the story."
- [16](#) Bartsch 1989.55-60 and 65-76 where her explanation of these correspondences is once again that the reader is being drawn into a clever game of interpretation and reinterpretation.
- [17](#) Sedelmeier's division of the novel into four sections rather than the three I here propose does not seem justified to me. There is certainly no significant break, in the story between Books 6 and 7 comparable to the others. The account by Reardon 1994 of the significant changes of the story's character coincides better with my view.
- [18](#) Bartsch 1989.50 makes this observation. For the vicissitudes of the novel's "ego-narrative." see Hägg 1971 and Reardon 1994.
- [19](#) Anderson 1982 argues that Books 1-2 are an "anti-Phaedrus." Goldhill 1995.82-92 shows that this serio-comic dialogue is an example of Achilles Tatius' complex twisting of the philosophical and rhetorical discourses on *eros*, and is the climax of the *praeceptor amoris* theme of the first two books.
- [20](#) See Bartsch 1989.55-60. Montague 1992.244-45.

[21](#)

ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅσων γέμει κακῶν ἡ γραφή· ἔρωτος παρανόμου, μοιχείας ἀναισχύντου, γυναικείων ἀτυχημάτων.

[22](#) Bartsch 1989.69 argues that these “love triangles” are what is really foreshadowed by the ekphrasis of Philomela, but this part of her argument is the least convincing.

[23](#) Heffernan 1993.61. Segal 1984 discusses the novel’s end as an attempt to mediate between the ideals of Aphrodite and Artemis, the “dual aspects of the archetypically feminine.”

[24](#)

στάθμη μὲν κιόνων ὄρθιος ἐκατέρωθεν ἐκ τῶν Ἡλίου πυλῶν ἐς τὰς Σελήνης πύλας· οὗτοι γὰρ τῆς πόλεως οἱ πυλωροί. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ τῶν κιόνων τῆς πόλεως τὸ πεδίον. ὁδὸς δὲ διὰ τοῦ πεδίου πολλὴ καὶ ἔνδημος ἀποδημία. ὀλίγους δὲ τῆς πόλεως σταδίους προελθὼν ἦλθον εἰς τὸν ἐπώνυμον Ἀλεξάνδρου τόπον. εἶδον δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἄλλην πόλιν καὶ σχιζόμενον ταύτῃ τὸ κάλλος. ὅσος γὰρ κιόνων ὄρχατος εἰς τὴν εὐθυωρίαν, τοσοῦτος ἕτερος εἰς τὰ ἐγκάρσια.

[25](#) *ad Her.* 3.16.29: “Locos appellamus eos qui breviter, perfecte, insignite aut natura aut manu sunt absoluti, ut eos facile naturali memoria comprehendere et amplecti queamus: ut aedes, intercolumnium, angulum, fornicem, et alia quae his similia sunt.” See Yates 1967.7.

[26](#)

ἐγὼ δὲ μερίζων τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐς πάσας τὰς ἀγυιάς, θεατῆς ἀκόμεστος ἤμην καὶ τὸ κάλλος ὅλως οὐκ ἐξήρκουν ἰδεῖν. τὰ μὲν ἔβλεπον, τὰ δὲ ἔμελλον, τὰ δὲ ἠπειγόμεν ἰδεῖν. τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἤθελον παρελθεῖν· ἐκράτει τὴν θέαν τὰ ὁρώμενα, εἴλκε τὰ προσδουκόμενα. περιάγων οὖν ἑμαυτὸν εἰς πάσας τὰς ἀγυιάς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὕψιν δυσερωτιῶν, εἶπον καμῶν· “Ὀφθαλμοί, νενικήμεθα.” εἶδον δὲ δύο καινὰ καὶ παράλογα, μεγέθους πρὸς κάλλος ἄμιλλαν καὶ δήμου πρὸς πόλιν φιλονεικίαν καὶ ἀμφοτέρω νικῶντα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠπείρου μείζων ἦν, ὁ δὲ πλείων ἔθνους, καὶ εἰ μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀπεῖδον, ἠπίστουν εἰ πληρώσει τις δῆμος αὐτὴν ἀνδρῶν, εἰ δὲ εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐθεασάμην, ἐθαύμαζον εἰ χωρήσει τις αὐτὸν πόλις.

[27](#) Bryson 1994.278. See also Eisner 1995.76–80.

[28](#) The comparison of the space to a “continent” calls to mind Freud’s comparison of female sexuality to a “dark continent” (presumably Africa).

[29](#) Freud 1919. Freud cites the Greek word ξενικός as an equivalent, but the pair ἔνδημος ἀποδημία based on δῆμος is a remarkable parallel to the pair of German terms based on *heim*.



30

Φιλομήλας γὰρ εἶχε φθοράν καὶ τὴν βίαν Τηρέως καὶ τῆς γλώττης τὴν τομήν. ἦν δὲ ὀλόκληρον τῇ γραφῇ τὸ διήγημα τοῦ δράματος. ὁ πέπλος, ὁ Τηρεὺς, ἡ τράπεζα. τὸν πέπλον ἠπλωμένον εἰστήκει κρατοῦσα θεράπεινα· Φιλομήλα παρειστήκει καὶ ἐπετίθει τῷπέπλῳ τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ἐδείκνυε τῶν ὑφασμάτων τὰς γραφάς· ἡ Πρόκνη πρὸς τὴν δεῖξιν ἐνενεύκει καὶ δριμὺ ἔβλεπε καὶ ὠργίζετο τῇ γραφῇ· Θράξ ὁ Τηρεὺς ἐνύφαντο Φιλομήλα παλαίων πάλιν Ἀφροδίσιαν. ἐσπάρακτο τὰς κόμας ἡ γυνή, τὸ ζῶσμα ἐλέλυτο, τὸν χιτῶνα κατέρρηκτο, ἡμίγυμνος τὸ στέρνον ἦν, τὴν δεξιάν ἐπ' ὀφθαλμούς ἤρειδε τοῦ Τηρέως, τῇ λαιᾷ τὰ διερρωγότα τοῦ χιτῶνος ἐπὶ τοὺς μαζοὺς ἐκλειεν. (ἐν) ἀγκάλαις εἶχε τὴν Φιλομήλαν ὁ Τηρεὺς, ἔλκων πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἐνὴν τὸ σῶμα καὶ σφίγγων ἐν χρῶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν. ὧδε μὲν τὴν τοῦ πέπλου γραφὴν ὕφηνεν ὁ ζωγράφος. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῆς εἰκόνος. αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν κανῶ τὰ λείψανα τοῦ δείπνου τῷ Τηρεῖ δεικνύουσι. κεφαλὴν παιδίου καὶ χεῖρας· γελῶσι δὲ ἅμα καὶ φοβοῦνται. ἀναπηδῶν ἐκ τῆς κλίνης ὁ Τηρεὺς ἐγέγραπτο, καὶ ἔλκων τὸ ξίφος ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας τὸ σκέλος ἤρειδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν· ἡ δὲ οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε πέπτωκεν. ἀλλ' ἐδείκνυε γραφὴν μέλλοντος πτώματος.

31 Moreover, the *peplos* of Philomela is already a privileged icon of *mise-en-abyme* by its association with the *peplos* of Athena. See Thomas 1983, speaking of Athena's *peplos* in the ekphrasis at Carthage in the first book of the *Aeneid*. LaPlace 1991 discusses other examples of *mise-en-abyme* in *Leucippe and Clitophon*.

32 ἡ τῆς κερκίδος φωνή: Aristotle *Poetics* 16.1454b, quoting the lost *Tereus*.

33 Marder 1992 and Joplin 1984 discuss this theme of the Philomela myth.

34 Compare this with the other ekphrases: the faces of the companions of Euiropa are marked by joy and fear (χαράς καὶ φόβου) and then desire and fear (βούλεσθαι. ... φοβεῖσθαι); Andromeda's face has both beauty and fear (καλλός καὶ δέος); the face of Prometheus has hope and fear (ἐλπίδος ἅμα καὶ φόβου); Philomela and Prokne are also laughing and afraid simultaneously in the second description (γελῶσαι φόβῳ).

35

οὐκ ἐώκει δὲ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἐπινεύειν ταῖς ἡμετέραις εὐχαῖς, ἀλλ' ἔμενεν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἄλλο τῆς Τύχης γυμνάσιον. Ὁ γὰρ Χαιρέας πρὸ πολλοῦ τῆς Λευκίππης ἐλάνθανεν ἐρῶν ...

36

λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τῶν συμβόλων ἐξηγηταὶ σκοπεῖν τοὺς μύθους τῶν εἰκόνων, ἂν ἐξιούσιν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν συντύχῳσι. καὶ ἐξομοιοῦν τὸ ἀποβησόμενον τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας λόγῳ.

37 "Motion in suspense is the last feature of the painting" (Garson 1978.84).

38 Τί βούλεται τῆς εἰκόνος ὁ μῦθος; καὶ τίνες αἱ ὀρνιθες αὐταί: C5.5). This request of Leucippe thus puts the swallow, which seems to have prompted the story of Philomela in the first place, *back* into the picture.

- [39](#) Note that the first ekphrasis begins with an enumeration of three images that constitute “the whole plot of the drama” (ὁλόκληρον τὸ διήγημα τοῦ δράματος): the robe, Tereus, the table. These three items are then elaborated one by one as though they made up a table of contents. The second ekphrasis also begins with an enumeration of three images, but this time the list consists of the very things that make up the conclusion left out of the first ekphrasis: nightingale, swallow, hoopoe.
- [40](#) Joplin 1984.34. The classic discussion of the “male gaze” in film is Mulvey 1988. In a more apposite context, see Walker 1992, Egger 1994, Elsom 1992.
- [41](#) Plantiga 1992, Wooffitt 1992.
- [42](#) Goldhill 1994. More specifically on Achilles Tatius, Goldhill 1995.70–72.

## **Discussion Note**

**THE RHETORIC OF A “DIVINE MAN”:  
APOLLONIUS OF TYANA AS CRITIC OF  
ORATORY AND AS ORATOR ACCORDING  
TO PHILOSTRATUS.1**



## Alain Billault

If someone who is not a god, but more than a man, talks to other men, what kind of rhetoric will he use? This question arises when we consider an important tradition in the history of ancient philosophy and spirituality. In this tradition, the first place is held by philosophers who are supposed to do more than fulfill the wish that Plato expressed when he said, in his *Theaetetus*, that philosophers must become as godlike as humanity will allow (ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν)<sup>2</sup> and are really considered as divine beings. They belong to the type of philosopher, magician, and holy person known as the θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, who emerged in the third century A.D. as a complete model of wisdom in the Pythagorean Platonism that was then prominent in the philosophical field<sup>3</sup> and was exemplified by men who often lived in the previous centuries. One of them was Apollonius of Tyana who lived in the first century A.D. In the third century, Philostratus wrote an admiring account of his life. In his *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus draws a picture of rhetoric in the early Roman Empire; he emphasizes a particular side of it in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*. Apollonius is an assiduous traveler, speaker, and miracle worker. He criticizes the rhetorical tradition and the oratory of his time and puts speech to a use of his own. He practices a rhetoric of authority and truth that implies a concept of teaching, morals, metaphysics, a whole worldview: in short, a philosophy.

According to Philostratus's *Life*, Apollonius, from youth upward, regards rhetoric as an inferior subject. In Tarsus, he attends the classes of the rhetor Euthydemus of Phoenicia. Euthydemus is a good teacher, but the young man wants to study philosophy and considers the atmosphere of the city unsuitable to his project. Thus, to carry it out, he chooses to go to Aegae and to stop studying rhetoric (I, 7). This is an important step in his education, and one that illustrates a hierarchy of sciences that the story will confirm. Apollonius points out that when Hermes gave Aesop the talent of storytelling, the god gave gifts first to other solicitants who had brought him wonderful presents. The man who had

brought him the most beautiful gift was granted philosophy. The profession of oratory was given to the man whose gift the god considered only second (V, 15). Thus, in the traditional rivalry of rhetoric and philosophy that began with Socrates' debate with the Sophists as we attend it in Plato's dialogues,<sup>4</sup> Apollonius champions philosophy and derogates rhetoric.

Euxenus, a Pythagorean philosopher, is the first to teach Apollonius philosophy. However, Apollonius soon forms a low opinion of him because he does not practice what he preaches. His lessons are nothing but words and his way of life is unconnected to them. This is what bad philosophy is made of: wordiness and mere rhetoric that bears no relation to reality. Euxenus utters words automatically, just like birds that have been trained to pronounce sentences (I, 7). Later (VI, 36), Apollonius meets a youngster who wants to train birds to speak. Since the boy speaks bad Greek, the wise man blames him for perverting the birds by taking their natural language from them and replacing it with a poor one. However, Apollonius advises the boy, in order to find protection against the sycophants who are threatening him, to attend the classes of the rhetoricians because, while being too old to have a philosophical education, he can still learn their art, which is an easy one (ἐξόδια δ' ἡ τέχνη). Thus Apollonius considers rhetoric a second-rank subject, a makeshift that mediocre persons will find serviceable sometimes. This explains why Greek youngsters turn aside from it to attend Apollonius's lessons: They are still able to choose philosophy and they prefer to learn from a philosopher rather than to listen to teachers who teach only with their tongues (VIII, 21). This depreciation of rhetoric and rhetoricians is inseparable, in Apollonius's view, from the irresponsible use of speech that he often witnesses and criticizes.

Apollonius replies harshly to a young man who wants to bestow on Zeus encomiums celebrating gout, blindness, and deafness, but abstains from praising his own father lest his speech should not befit the occasion (IV, 30). He denounces the frivolity of a futile and absurd rhetoric that is displayed without any reference to a hierarchy of values, that is to say, without any thought as its basis; it is thus a mere self-centered display of

technique with no relation to reality. On the other hand, Apollonius advocates an eloquence that would be responsible and serious and would submit to criteria other than its own. This implies that one should speak pertinently about what one knows.

Euphrates and Dion do not behave that way in the presence of Vespasian (V, 33–36). Vespasian, who has just proclaimed himself emperor, holds a meeting in Alexandria with Apollonius and his two disciples and asks for their advice. Euphrates blames him for not having acted sooner and invites him to reestablish democracy. Dion would prefer for the people to have the possibility to choose between democracy and the empire: Should the former be chosen, what beautiful speeches indeed would be delivered to celebrate Vespasian's glory! Apollonius blames his companions for their speeches (V, 35). He considers them as vain chat by youngsters who do not understand that Vespasian is not a philosopher, but a man of action engaged in a bid for power that he cannot give up. This unrealistic approach arises from excessive rhetorical speaking: Concentration on words results in the misunderstanding of facts. In Apollonius's view, Dion's philosophy yields too much ground to eloquence and tries too much to please (V, 40). As for Euphrates, he spoke "when his feelings overcame him and raising his voice above its usual pitch."<sup>5</sup> This artificiality seems all the more to deserve blame, as it is exactly the opposite of Apollonius's rhetorical style.

The critic of rhetoric is himself a self-restrained orator who avoids showing off. He refuses to celebrate Vespasian's arrival in Alexandria because he considers the matter too rhetorical (V, 27: ῥητορικωτέραν ἡγούμενος τὴν τοιάνδε ἰδέαν τοῦ λόγου). He learned this haughty self-restraint from the Gymnosophists while staying in India (VI, 11). Rhetoricians, in contrast, speak incautiously without any control over their speech and its consequences. Philolaos of Cittium exemplifies this bad quality (IV, 36). This orator, who has fled from Rome under the reign of Nero, meets Apollonius on his way to Rome. By resorting to pathetic words, he tries to make Apollonius change his mind and succeeds in frightening twenty-eight (out of thirty-four) companions of the wise man. Apollonius displays a serene command of speech, which is the opposite of this panic-inspired

eloquence. Prior to appearing before Domitian (VIII, 2), he says that he can speak a few words, or many words, or just for a while, according to circumstances, and that he knows also the power of silence. That is why he had already refused to prepare his speech when he had had to appear before the emperor for the first time (VII, 30). His self-confidence is not based on a flashy verbal virtuosity, but on a rhetoric that bans every kind of seduction.

Philostratus defines that rhetoric in this way:

The literary style which he cultivated was not dithyrambic or tumid and swollen with poetical words, nor again was it far-fetched and full of affected Atticisms: for he thought that an excessive degree of Atticising was unpleasant. Neither did he indulge in subtleties nor spin out his discourses; nor did anyone ever hear him dissembling in an ironical way, nor addressing to his audience methodical arguments.<sup>6</sup>

In this definition, Apollonius's eloquence is contrasted with several trends of rhetoric at the time of the Roman Empire. The wise man rejects the pomposity of the Asian style and the purist stance of the Atticists, although, born in Cappadocia, he could speak perfect Attic with no Cappadocian accent at all (I, 7). He ignores the caviling and the verbosity that are typical of the rhetoricians and uses neither the Socratic nor the Peripatetic method of conversation. A philosophy of speech is at stake here. Apollonius does not assume an unconventional attitude toward the fashionable styles of his time for tactical reasons. The originality of his eloquence arises from a fundamental difference.

This difference appears in the way the wise man uses Socratic dialogue. As a matter of fact, while Philostratus says that he rejects it, one is surprised to find it in the narrative.<sup>7</sup> Apollonius converses in the Socratic way with Damis who travels with him, with young men from Rhodes, with his fellow prisoners in Domitian's jail, and with his pupil Isagoras, but he soon puts his own mark on the conversation. This is what Damis experiences: After a short dialogue, Apollonius more often than not lectures him, showing a condescending indulgence toward the nonsense that Damis's words at times imply. He behaves in that way, for

instance, when they discuss painting and the young man says that the figures that the clouds draw in the sky when the wind pushes them on are imitations (II, 22). With the young men from Rhodes, Apollonius ends the conversation by blaming their way of life (V, 22-23), whereas he praises a young Arcadian prisoner who refused at his own risk to become Domitian's lover (VII, 42). He lectures Isagoras on nature and human works as being complementary to one another (VIII, 18). In every case, he speaks the final word. In his relation with his interlocutors, the balance between them does not hold. The common search for truth, which is typical of the Socratic method, soon comes to an end and gives way to a proclamation of truth issued in a monologue by the wise man. There is never any ἀπορία. Apollonius speaks with the authority that arises from his conviction that he is telling the truth, and nobody challenges the supremacy of his words.

Philostratus not only represents this rhetoric of sovereign speech, but also provides the theory behind it. While emphasizing the singularity of Apollonius's style, he says (I, 17) that he speaks as if he were seated on the Pythian tripod (ἐκ τριπόδος), that is to say, with the divine authority of the Delphic oracle. This is not a casual remark. Throughout the story, Philostratus emphasizes Apollonius's relationship with the gods. For example, as a student in the temple of Asclepius in Aegae, Apollonius soon becomes the best servant of the god who trusts him and tells his supplicants to ask him for the best way of life to follow (I, 9). Thus, it is supposed that the young Apollonius is saying the divine truth and consequently giving sound pieces of advice (I, 9-12). This divine acquaintance is fundamental to Apollonius's life, and this is where his authority comes from. Therefore, he never hesitates; his categorical style of talking signifies the divine origin of his words. Philostratus points out (I, 17) that Apollonius's favorite phrases are "I know" and "In my opinion" and "What do you mean?" and "We must know" ("οἶδα" ἔλεγε καὶ "δοκεῖ μοι" καὶ "ποῖ φέρεσθε"; καὶ "χρὴ εἰδέναι"): Apollonius is accustomed to uttering sentences that sound like royal decrees (ὥσπερ ἄπο σκήπτρου θεμιστευόμενα).

To someone who once expressed surprise at his not asking any questions, he answers that for him the time for questions is over, but that the time has come to teach what he has found out (“διδάσκειν ἃ εὔρηκα”). This wise man thinks that his conversation has to be like the conversation of the legislator who has to design commands for the crowd out of his own persuasions (“ἃ πέπεικεν ἑαυτόν, ταῦτα ἐπιτάγματα ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι”). So Apollonius speaks according to the idea he has of his mission and in accordance with the doctrine he designed for himself when he was young. Prior to quoting his speech before Domitian, Philostratus remarks (VIII, 6) that this speech is in keeping with the nature of the wise man. Therefore, the amateurs of rhetoric may well not like it because they will find in it, not superficial virtuosity, but high-mindedness (ὕπόσεμνος).

This high-mindedness accounts for the forms that Apollonius’s sovereign eloquence takes. Rebukes to individuals or cities tend to prevail. Thus, a youngster from Sparta who does not care about politics (IV, 32), two young men from Thebes who dedicate themselves to the luxury of their house and to food (V, 22-23), the people of Ephesus who indulge too much in pleasures (IV, 2), Athenians who show a decadent devotion to Dionysus and have a shameful passion for gladiator fighting (IV, 21-22), and Alexandrians who love circus games (V, 26) are all castigated in a scathing way. Such final judgments are often issued in terse sentences. The people of Elis invite Apollonius to come to the Olympic Games: He answers that they are debasing the prestige of the games when they invite those who would have come anyhow (IV, 24). He makes stern and laconic replies to a hierophant who is reluctant to initiate him into the Eleusinian mysteries (IV, 18) and to the Spartan people who ask him about the proper worship of gods, heroes, and men (IV, 31). In order to make his verdicts more slashing, the wise man resorts to sententious talk, whether he blames a decaying sanctuary in Antioch (I, 16) or the way of life of some Spartans (IV, 27), or appreciates the way the people of Elis organize the Olympic Games (IV, 29), or corresponds with Musonius the philosopher (IV, 46). This striking brevity sometimes results in cryptic

utterances: Apollonius predicts that the making of the Corinthian canal will be stopped (IV, 24), that lightning will strike just ahead of Nero (IV, 43), and that Vindex will rebel against him (V, 10), but his words seem to be unclear at the moment. Sometimes he makes unintelligible statements: When he advises the people of Smyrna to emulate one another in public-spiritedness (IV, 8), he talks about “a mixture of concord with party spirit” (ὁμονοίας στασιαζούσης). When an island appears between Thera and Crete, he declares (IV, 34) that the sea has given birth to the earth (“ἡ γὰρ θάλαττα γῆν ἔτεκε”). Nobody consequently understands him. To justify his resorting to cryptic utterances, he refers to Pythagoras’s wisdom (VI, 11) and does not seem to care much about the consequences for the audience.

The audience is often puzzled, and their puzzlement draws harsh judgments from Apollonius. He blames the people of Ephesus for their silliness when they wrongly interpret a flight of birds and do not understand his enigmatic warnings on the eve of an epidemic (IV, 3-4). Impatience is added to severity. He wants his audience only to submit to his words. His speeches are available in shakers out of which everyone may help themselves (IV, 24), which means that Apollonius alone mixes the cocktail. People do not take part in its making. They are expected to assume a passive attitude, which will result in entire approval. This rhetoric of authority does not aim at persuading. It is based on the idea of a self-sufficiency of statements: once spoken, truth becomes law. So Apollonius’s eloquence appears to be unconventional in comparison with the three classical genres of oratory. It does not exactly belong to the deliberative genre because it does not try to persuade people, but strikes the truth into their minds. Sometimes, it comes close to the forensic genre: for example, in the presence of Domitian, Apollonius states his case, but he disappears immediately afterward, so the trial is cut short. As for the epideictic genre, Apollonius resorts to blame more often than praise, but the main point is that he rejects, as we have seen, any kind of technical showing off. The one thing he celebrates is truth. Apollonius’s eloquence is an ἐπίδειξις τῆς ἀληθείας (a revelation of the truth). Its self-reliance is based on philosophy.



This philosophy appears first in the authoritative concept of teaching that the wise man puts into practice. He is not on a level with his audience. He knows the truth. The audience does not know it, and takes no part whatsoever in its discovery. Nothing happens that might change this basic inequality. On the contrary, Apollonius's eloquence highlights it incessantly, because it is the instrument of an unequal morality: Persons who possess the truth have the power and the duty to inculcate it in others who benefit by it. This severe altruism, this authoritative philanthropy, implies the natural dominance of some persons over others. These are the "divine men."

In the order of creation, they are between gods and humans, but are closer to the former than to the latter. Everyone is free to imitate them, to seek the inner purity that they have already attained as reflected by their acts and words. When, in the presence of Domitian, Apollonius narrates his whole philosophical life, he shows the path to follow: What matters is to choose a diet, a timetable, a way of life, a manner of being in the world that will keep the ether of one's soul pure and will make a direct relationship with the divine possible (VIII, 7). But Philostratus also emphasizes the fact that Apollonius was predestined to his career as a wise man, as is made clear by the divine omens at the time of his birth (I, 4-5). Between him and ordinary persons, there exists a difference that no emulative effort can abolish, and the philosopher remains superior to the people he wants to educate. Thus the story exemplifies an idea of philosophy as the privilege of a few spiritual masters. *They* possess the truth, and when they unveil it, it is invested with the power of its authority and the weight of their prestige. This divine philosophy requires the sovereign speech of those whose dominion is legitimized by their outstanding nature. The Platonic ideal of the philosopher as king is indeed implemented, though not in the field of politics, but in the realm of the spirit.

Thus Apollonius rejects a rhetoric as an embellishment of speech. He does not follow the beaten paths of previous philosophers, but puts into practice a supremacy of speech whose legitimacy is based on a privilege of the speaker: that of a

truth that the latter possesses thanks to his divine nature and unveils in the presence of ordinary people. He is a θεῖος ἄνθρωπος. Therefore, his rhetoric has an authority and a prestige derived from another world. Because of his superhuman nature and his close relationship with the gods, he resorts less to discursive reason and to the common search for truth, of which Socrates was the emblematic figure, than to practicing truth-revelation. A concept of the philosopher and of the philosophical life is at stake in his eloquence. Thus, we may consider Philostratus's narrative a spiritual record as well as a biography in praise of its hero.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>. This article originates in a paper I read at the Biennial Conference of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, which took place in September 1991 at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. I want to express my deep gratitude to Franck Lessay, Professor of English Literature, Université Paris III. He read a first draft of the text and his sound remarks improved it a great deal.

<sup>2</sup>. 176B.

<sup>3</sup>. L. Bieler, *ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ* (Wien: Oskar Höfels, 1935–36), 2 vol. Reprint: (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967). R. Goulet, "Les Vies des philosophes dans l'Antiquité tardive et leur portée mystérieuse," *Les Actes apocryphes des Apôtres. Christianisme et monde païen*, Publications de la Faculté de Théologie de l'Université de Genève n°4, (Genève: Labor & Fides, 1981), pp. 161–208. G. Fowden, "The Pagan Holy Man in Late Antique Society," *JHS* 102 (1982): 33–59. Patricia Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity, A Quest for the Holy Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

<sup>4</sup>. For an account of this controversy from Antiquity to the twentieth century, see Brian Vickers, *In Defense of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 148–213.

<sup>5</sup>. IV, 33: ἀνοιδήσας δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τότε καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπάρας παρ' ὃ εἰώθει. I quote the text by V. Mumprecht, *Das Lehen des Apollonios von Tyana*, (München & Zürich: Artemis Verlag, 1983), and the translation by F. C. Conybeare, (London & New York: Loeb Classical Library, 1912).

<sup>6</sup>. I, 17:  
Λόγων δὲ ἰδέαν ἐπήσκησεν οὐ διθυραμβιώδη καὶ φλεγμαίνουσαν  
ποιητικοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδ' αὖ κατεγλωττισμένην καὶ ὑπεραττικίζουσαν, ἀηδὲς  
γὰρ τὸ ὑπὲρ τὴν μετρίαν Ἀτθίδα ἡγεῖτο, οὐδὲ λεπτολογία ἐδίδου, οὐδὲ διῆγε τοὺς  
λόγους, οὐδὲ εἰρωνευομένου τις ἤκουσεν ἢ περιπατοῦντος ἐς τοὺς ἀκρωμένους.

<sup>7</sup>. I, 11; II, 5, 7, 11, 14, 22; V, 14, 22, 23; VIII, 18.

## SINGING HEROES—THE POETICS OF HERO CULT IN PHILOSTRATOS'S *HEROIKOS*

Corinne Ondine Pache In this paper, I would like to explore the poetics of hero cult as presented in Philostratos's *Heroikos*. I am particularly struck by two facets of hero cult as described in the dialogue: the important part played by hymns and laments in the rituals described, and the emphasis placed on the emotional bond between worshipper and hero. I propose to investigate these twin themes in some more depth, and to do this by focusing on some of the examples provided by Philostratos himself, and more particularly on the cult of Melikertes.

Melikertes is mentioned—alongside the children of Medea—as an example of a hero who, like Achilles, is worshipped through singing. The allusion to Melikertes is embedded in a passage devoted to the history of the cult of Achilles, in which we see worshippers singing for the hero as well as Achilles himself performing his own song.

The passage that compares the cults of Melikertes and of the children of Medea comes close to the end of the dialogue, as the vinegrower and his interlocutor discuss the cult of Achilles. The vinegrower starts with a description of the rites performed by the Thessalians in honor of Achilles:

καὶ μὲν καὶ ὑμνων ἐκ Θετταλίας ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἔτυχεν, οὓς ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος ἐπὶ τὸ σῆμα φοιτῶντες ἤδον ἐν νυκτί, τελετῆς τι ἐγκαταμιγνύντες τοῖς ἐναγίσμασιν, ὥς Λήμνιοί τε νομίζουσι καὶ Πελοποννησίων οἱ ἀπὸ Σισύφου.

From Thessaly, of course, Achilles also received **hymns**, which they sang at night when they visited his tomb every year, mixing something of an **initiatory rite** with

their **offerings to the dead**, as both the Lemnians and the Peloponnesians descended from Sisyphos practice.

*Heroikos* 52.3

When he learns of the rites in honor of Achilles, the Phoenician confesses that this is a subject of great interest to him. The vinegrower cautions him that a digression into these practices might be time-consuming, but encouraged by the Phoenician's enthusiasm ("the soul's cargo is sweeter to me and more profitable"), he agrees that digressions make for worthwhile conversations, and he elaborates the comparison by specifying that he was referring to two Peloponnesian rites in particular:

τὰ μὲν γὰρ Κορινθίων ἐπὶ Μελικέρτῃ (τούτους γὰρ δὴ τοὺς ἀπὸ Σισύφου εἶπον), καὶ ὅποσα οἱ αὐτοὶ δρῶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς Μηδείας παισίν, οὓς ὑπὲρ τῆς Γλαύκης ἀπέκτειναν, **θρήνω** εἵκασται **τελεστικῶ** τε καὶ **ἐνθέω**. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ **μειλίσσονται**, τὸν δὲ **ὑμνοῦσιν**.

The rites of the Corinthians for Melikertês (for these people are those whom I called the descendants of Sisyphos) and what the same people do for Medea's children, whom they killed for the sake of Glaukê, resemble a **lament** that is both **initiatory** and **inspired**, for they **propitiate** the children and **sing hymns** to Melikertês.

*Heroikos*, 207 Kayser = 53.4 (Lannoy)

The vinegrower specifies that the rites for Melikertes and the children of Medea are similar in that they resemble a lament (*thrênos*), which is of an initiatory nature (*telestikos*), as well as divinely inspired (*entheos*). But while worshippers propitiate the children of Medea, for Melikertes, they perform hymns. Both these cults, then, like the one in honor of Achilles consist of a blend of initiatory rituals and offerings for the dead.

In all three cases, Philostratos describes these rites in terms of singing: the performance of hymns and laments, in fact, appears to be what defines these rites as *teletai*, as rituals of an initiatory nature.<sup>1</sup>

There is also evidence in the dialogue—to which I will come back—that other cults in honor of heroes resemble initiation into mysteries. But first, what can the allusion to the cult of Melikertes tell us about hero cult in general and about hero cult in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD?

What do other ancient authors have to say about the cult of Melikertes? The Isthmian myth is well documented in earlier sources, and, although they disagree on points of details, the same basic elements are found in most versions of the story: baby Melikertes dies when his mother Ino, tries to escape the murderous fury of her husband, Athamas, by jumping into the sea from the White Rock, holding her son in her arms. The Nereids welcome her and she is deified as Leukothea, while the body of her son, Melikertes, is brought ashore at the Isthmus by a dolphin, where Sisyphos finds him, gives him a funeral and establishes the Isthmian Games in the honor of the boy, renamed Palaimon. Pindar is the earliest source to mention the ritual established by Sisyphos in honor of the dead child:

Αιολίδαν δὲ Σίσυφον κέλονται  
ὥ παιδὶ τηλέφαντον ὄρσαι  
γέρας φθιμένῳ Μελικέρτῃ

They ordered Sisyphos, the son of Aiolos, to establish an **honor that can be seen from afar** for the dead child Melikertes

Pindar, *Isthmian* Fr. 6.5 (Maehler)

While Melikertes appears in lyric, tragedy as well as in Hellenistic poetry, as Helmut Koester has shown in a 1990

article, the cult in honor of Melikertes begins to be described as a mystery cult only in the Roman period.<sup>2</sup>

One of our major sources is Pausanias, who describes the temple of Melikertes-Palaimon, which he places within the sanctuary of Apollo, “to the left.” There is also something called the *adyton*, an underground chamber, where Palaimon is supposed to be hidden—anyone, either Corinthian or foreign, who falsely swears an oath there has no way to escape his oath (Pausanias 2.2.1). It is unclear from Pausanias’ description whether the *adyton* was part of the temple or a different structure altogether.

Near where the temple of Palaimon should have been according to Pausanias, excavators found the foundations of an earlier stadium, as well as the concrete foundation of a Roman building. An earlier cult place for Melikertes was probably located somewhere in this area, but all remains were obliterated during the destruction of Corinth by Mummius (146 BC). Elizabeth Gebhard has tentatively identified an area located immediately to the south of the temple of Poseidon as a *temenos* for Melikertes, dating from the classical period.<sup>3</sup> The earliest remains, however, that can be directly linked with Melikertes are from two sacrificial pits from the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD filled with animal bones, pottery, and lamps of a unique shape unknown anywhere else in Greece.

The Palaimonion was rebuilt in the Roman period, and the temple as it stood in the second century AD has been reconstructed from the few remains found and from representations on coins from the Isthmus and Corinth. The reconstructed temple has eleven columns, with an opening leading to a passageway under the temple. From the foundations, the height of the passage can be estimated at about 1 m 90, high enough to allow a person to stand

upright. The passage was completely underground, and a bend in the tunnel would have prevented light to penetrate inside the underground chamber.

What about the cult, then, and the lament that is both “initiator and inspired?” Philostratos is not our only source for this aspect of the ritual. Plutarch also mentions the cult in his life of Theseus:

ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ Μελικέρτῃ τεθεὶς αὐτόθι νυκτὸς ἐδράτο,  
τελετῆς ἔχων μᾶλλον ἢ θέας καὶ πανηγυρισμοῦ τάξιν.

For the contest established **in honor of Melikertes** was taking place there at night, organized like an **initiator ritual** rather than like a spectacle or public festival.

Plutarch, *Theseus* 25.5

In this passage, Plutarch is distinguishing between the pan-Hellenic athletic games, which he claims were founded by Theseus, and the rites in honor of Melikertes, which he describes as already in place by the time Theseus comes to the Isthmus. Plutarch uses the traditional ritual syntax *epi* plus the dative, indicating that the *agôn* is offered to Melikertes as a compensation for his death. This *agôn*, however, is not a simple public athletic festival, but rather it is organized like an initiator ritual (*teletê*), which takes place at night.

Another important source for the cult of Melikertes-Palaimon is Philostratos’ *Imagines*. I want to focus on just a couple of sentences referring to the ritual:

This people sacrificing at the Isthmus, that would be the people of Corinth, and the king of the people here is, I think, Sisyphos himself; this is the sacred precinct (*temenos*) of Poseidon, which resounds gently with the



sea, for the leaves of the pine trees sing in this way, and this, my boy, is what it means: Ino, after she threw herself into the sea, became Leukothea and one of the circle of the Nereids; as for her son, the earth will benefit from the baby (*brephos*) Palaimon. Already he puts into port on the well-disposed dolphin, and the dolphin carrying the sleeping child spreads his back, slipping through the calm sea noiselessly, so that the child may not be waken from his sleep. And with him approaching, an *adyton* breaks forth out of the earth split apart by Poseidon, who, it seems to me, is announcing the child's sailing-in to Sisyphos here, and also that he should sacrifice (*thuein*) to the child. And Sisyphos sacrifices this black bull here, having dragged him away from the herd of Poseidon. The **logos of the sacrifice** and the **attire** worn by those sacrificing as well as **the offerings**, my boy, and **the slaying** must be kept **for the secret rites of Palaimon**. For **the loeos is holy**<sup>4</sup> and altogether **secret**, since Sisyphos the wise himself deified it [ὁ μὲν οὖν τῆς θυσίας λόγος καὶ ἡ τῶν θυσάντων ἐσθῆς καὶ τὰ ἐναγίσματα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ τὸ σφάττειν ἐς τὰ τοῦ Παλαίμονος ἀποκείσθω ὄργια – σεμνὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος Σισύφου τοῦ σοφοῦ]. That Sisyphos is wise is indeed shown by the thoughtfulness of his appearance. As for the face of Poseidon, if he were about to break the Gyrean rocks or the Thessalian mountains, he would certainly have been depicted as terrible and such as someone striking a blow, but since he is receiving him as a guest so that he might keep him in his land, he smiles at the child coming into harbor, and orders the Isthmos to unfold its breast and become a home (*oikos*) for Melikertes. The Isthmos, my boy, is painted in the form of a *daimon* sprawling himself on the land, and he has been appointed by nature to lie between the

Aegean and the Adriatic as if he were yoking the two seas together. There is a young man on the right, Lechaïos probably, and girls on the right, who are the two seas, beautiful and suitably calm, lying beside the land representing the Isthmos.

Philostratos, *Imagines* 2.16

Neither the “*logos* of the sacrifice,” the costume of the people performing the sacrifice, the offerings, or the way of killing the animal, are to be disclosed. Never mind that this prohibition is transgressed in this image that shows precisely what must be kept secret.

The “*logos* of the sacrifice” (*ho tês thusias logos*) is in itself a mysterious phrase: is it referring to the language used during the sacrifice, the order in which it is performed, the beliefs of the participants, or the story behind it? <sup>5</sup> I suggest it refers to the narrative dealing with the death and coming back to life of the hero Melikertes. We see a similar preoccupation in the *Heroikos*, with the vinegrower carefully distinguishing between which part of the *logos* of Protesilaos can be told and which parts kept secret.

Aelius Aristides also mentions the cult of Melikertes at the end of his hymn to Poseidon. He wonders whether the story of Melikertes and Ino should be described as a story (*logos*) or a myth (*mythos*), and is distressed at the idea that the goddess Leukothea might have undergone the sufferings ascribed to the mortal Ino (46.32–34). Thus, for him, Leukothea must have been a goddess from the beginning, and since there can be no evil among the gods (46.36), he rejects the violent details of the narrative: Leukothea actually never threw herself into the sea, and neither was the child Melikertes snatched away—he was actually entrusted to Poseidon, as a source of delight and a gift (*athurma kai dôron*). There is an interesting precedent for

this story, of course, in the myth of Poseidon falling in love with another beautiful young boy, Pelops. When it comes to the cult of Melikertes, Aristides describes it in much the same terms as Philostratos:

Παλαίμονα δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν καλὸν καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτοῦ  
ὀνομάσαι καὶ ὄρκον ποιήσασθαι καὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῆς ἐπ’  
αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ ὀργιασμοῦ μετασχεῖν—τοσοῦτος τις  
ἥμερος πρόσσεστι τῷ παιδί—καὶ ἰδεῖν γε καὶ ἐν γράμματι,  
. . . ὅπου δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν νώτων τῆς θαλάττης,  
ὅπου δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν τῆς μητρὸς τὸ θάλος τοῦ  
παιδὸς καὶ τὴν ῥαν καὶ τὸ ἄνθος. ταῦτα γὰρ  
θεάματα θεαμάτων ἥδιστα καὶ ἰδεῖν γε καὶ ἀκοῦσαι.

It is good **to talk about** Palaimon and **say his name** and **swear his, oath, as well, as to take, part in the Initiation ritual** (*teletê*) **and the celebration of secret rites** (*orgiasmos*) in his honor, and also—**so great is the desire** (*himeros*) attached to the boy—to see in the picture **the bloom and freshness and flower** of the boy when he is on the back of the sea, and when he is in his mother’s arms. **For these are the sweetest of sights to see and to hear.**

Aelius Aristides, 46.40 (Keil, vol. 2, p. 375)

Like Plutarch, Aristides uses the traditional ritual syntax *epi autôi*. Although Aristides just dismissed the story of Ino and Melikertes throwing themselves into the sea, the picture he describes seems to show precisely this scene: the mother holding her child in the sea, and the child being carried forth by the sea.

Aristides uses a series of adjectives associated with youth to describe Palaimon in his mother’s arms: *thalos*, *hôran*, *anthos*, all belong to the metaphorical world of flowers and spring, and draw attention to Palaimon’s youth and beauty.

Two aspects of Aristides' description are particularly intriguing: Aristides insists on both the importance of *speaking* about Palaimon (both talking about him and saying his name), as well as the pleasure inherent in *seeing* the boy.

The mention of the swearing of oath in the name of Palaimon recalls Pausanias's description of the *adyton* at Isthmia where worshippers swear oaths. Pausanias' claim that Palaimon is hidden (*hekruphthai*) begs the question: does Melikertes ever appear to his worshippers? Pausanias describes another *adyton* in the context of a hero cult, that of the oracle of the hero Trophonios at Lebadeia, where in order to consult the oracle, the worshipper descends into an underground *khasma*. There, those who reach the inner sanctum, the *adyton*, learn the future. According to Pausanias, there is no single way of doing this, but some learn through seeing, others through *hearing* (9.39.11).

What about the *himeros* evoked by Aristides? The word can express longing or yearning, but also love and desire. This is the word used by Philostratos, for example, when he describes how desire is awakened in Achilles and Helen after they hear descriptions of each other. Yet, in the case of Melikertes, Aristides is not talking about romance, but about a dead, heroized, child. At first glance, it may seem that the *himeros* described by Aristides is caused by the vision of the boy's image, but on closer examination, it becomes clear that this *himeros* is very closely related to what precedes as well; it is the participation in the rites (*teletê*, *orgiasmos*) and oath, as well as the description of the picture that follows that awakens the *himeros* for the hero. Moreover, Aristides emphasizes at the end of the passage that these sights are the sweetest to see and to *hear* (*kai idein ge kai akousai*), making it very clear that both components are essential.

In some way, then, *himeros* is closely linked with initiation into the mystery of the hero Melikertes. Something similar seems to be at work in the *Heroikos*, where we see worshippers falling in love with heroes. Indeed, in some cases, loving a hero seems to be a form of initiation.

When phantoms first appear, the vinegrower explains to the Phoenician, the identity of each is not immediately obvious. Heroes may appear in different guises—they can change their appearance, their age, or their armor—and they can be difficult to recognize from one time to the next (21.1ff). He gives the example of a Trojan fanner who particularly empathized with the hero Palamedes. After the farmer displays his admiration for Palamedes in various ways, the hero decides to visit and reward his admirer, whom he describes as his *erastês*. Palamedes appears to the farmer as he tends his vine:

“σὺ γινώσκεις με” ἔφη “γεωργέ,” — “καὶ πῶς” εἶπεν,  
“ὃν οὐπω εἶδον;” — “τί οὖν” ἔφη, “ἀγαπᾷς ὃν μὴ  
γινώσκεις.” ξυνῆκεν ὁ γεωργὸς ὅτι Παλαμήδης εἶη· καὶ  
τὸ εἶδος ἐς ἥρω ἔφερε μέγαν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον,  
οὐπω τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα· καὶ περιβαλὼν αὐτὸν  
μειδιῶν “φιλῶ σε, ὦ Παλάμηδες” εἶπεν, “ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς  
φρονιμώτατος ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι καὶ δικαιοτάτος  
ἀθλητῆς τῶν κατὰ σοφίαν πραγμάτων, πεπονθέναι τε  
ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔλκειν διὰ τὰς Ὀδυσσεύως ἐπὶ σοὶ  
τέχνας”

“Do you recognize me, fanner?” He answered, “How would I recognize you whom I have never seen?” “Then do you love [agapâis] him whom you do not recognize?” said the other. The farmer realized that it was Palamedes, and he reported that the hero’s image was tall, beautiful, and brave, although he was not thirty years old. The farmer embraced him and said with a smile, “I love[philô] you. Palamedes, because you

seem to me to be the most sensible of all and the most fair champion in deeds of skill.”

*Heroikos* 21.4-6

As soon as Palamedes asks him if he loves him, the farmer recognizes the hero. In this passage, to love the hero comes to the same thing as to be able to see the hero. Just before this epiphany, one of the ways in which the farmer shows his devotion to Palamedes, besides mistreating his dog, is by experiencing the sufferings [*pathos*] of the hero and singing laments [*ethrêne*] for him.

In another passage, later in the dialogue, there is a similar conflation of loving and seeing, or loving and recognizing. The vinegrower tells the Phoenician what Protesilaos told him about Achilles’ physical appearance. He starts with Achilles’ hair, “lovelier than gold,” and then goes on to his nose, brow, and eyes. “When he is rushing on,” he adds, “[his eyes] spring out along with his purpose, and then he seems more lovely than ever **to those who love** [*tôis êrôsin*] **him**.” Clearly, then, seeing, loving, and knowing the hero are all intertwined.

Nagy has shown how cult heroes are already eroticized in Homer’s *Iliad* where longing or yearning for the hero is conventionally described in the language of desire (*pothos*).<sup>6</sup> In the *Heroikos*, the same language is used both of longing for the hero, and also of the longing to acquire knowledge about the hero. The Phoenician, in particular, describes his thirst for knowledge in terms of *pothos* as well as *erôs*.<sup>7</sup>

Love is never far removed from fear, and there is another intriguing and gruesome link between Melikertes-Palaimon and Achilles, in a mythic thread that survives exclusively in

Hellenistic poetry.<sup>8</sup> According to this version, the body of Melikertes never came ashore at the Isthmus:

A [...] Μελικέρτα, μιῆς ἐπὶ πότνια Βύνη  
Ἐξῆς. ἐπεὶ <σύν> Μελικέρτη τῷ παιδί ἐαυ-  
τὴν κατεπόντισεν Ἰνώ, ἐξέπε-  
σεν εἰς αἰγιαλὸν τῆς Τενέδου τὸ σῶ-  
μ[α] τοῦ Μελικέρτου. τοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖ πο-  
τε κατοικοῦντας Λέλεγας ποιῆσαι  
αὐτῷ βωμόν, ἐφ' οὗ ἡ πόλις ποιεῖ  
θυσίαν, ὅταν περὶ μεγάλων φο-  
βῆται, τοι[ά]νδ[ε]. γυνὴ τὸ ἑαυτῆς βρέ-  
φος κα[ταθύσα]σα παραχρῆμα τυφλοῦ-  
ται. τοῦ[το δ' ὕσ]τερον κατελύθη, ὅτε  
οἱ ἀπὸ Ὀ[ρέστου] Λέ[σβ]ον ᾤκησαν.

After Ino leapt into the sea  
with her child Melikertes,  
the body of Melikertes was thrown  
ashore on a beach at Tenedos.  
The Leleges who lived  
there made an altar for him,  
on which the city performs the following  
sacrifice whenever it fears something great.  
The woman who sacrifices her own baby  
is instantly blinded.  
This custom was later ended, when  
the descendants of Orestes settled on Lesbos.

Callimachus, *Aitia* IV, *Diegesis*, Fr. 91 (Pfeiffer)

After Ino throws herself in the sea with her son, Melikertes, the body (*sôma*) of the boy is washed up ashore on the beach at Tenedos. The Leleges, who once dwelled there, make an altar (*bômos*) for him, upon which the city performs sacrifices, whenever it fears some great dangers: a woman sacrifices her own infant (*brephos*), and is immediately blinded. This ritual was later discontinued, when the descendents of Orestes came to live in Lesbos.



This is a peculiar story and it finds only one echo, in one line of Lycophron's *Alexandra*, in a passage that depicts the Greek fleet arriving in Tenedos, on its way to Troy:

καὶ δὴ Παλαίμων δέρκεται **βρεφοτόνος**

and there Palaimon **the Baby Slaver** is watching  
Lycophron, *Alexandra* 229

It is a strange scene, with the Baby Slayer (*Brephoktonos*) hero gazing on as the Greek fleet—and Achilles!—passes by. A scholion explains Palaimon *Brephoktonos* in the following way:

Παλαίμων ὁ Μελικέρτης ὁ τῆς Ἰνουῦς υἱός. οὗτος σφόδρα ἐτιμᾶτο ἐν τῇ Τενέδῳ, ἔνθα καὶ βρέφη αὐτῷ ἐθυσίαν.

Palaimon is Melikertes, the son of Ino. He is especially honored in Tenedos, and there they even sacrifice babies to him.

schol. *Alexandra* 229 (Scheer)

According to this explanation, then, Melikertes is honored in Tenedos with a cult that includes baby sacrifices.

It is likely that the body of Melikertes was claimed to be found in different locations, and there might have been several cults devoted to him, wherever people claimed to have his grave. There could also be a conflation at work between Melikertes and Melqart, the Phoenician deity worshipped at Tyre and Carthage with human sacrifices.<sup>[9](#)</sup>

In any case, this emphasis on human sacrifice is something that is inconsistent with everything we know about hero cult: while it is frequent for the spirits of young victims to take revenge on their living counterparts—as is the case

with the children of Medea, for example, who cause all Corinthian infants to die—there is no evidence of any hero cults requiring human victims.<sup>10</sup> The function of such myths may be apotropaic. We find it, of course, in the *Heroikos* as well, in the story of Achilles requesting that a young Trojan girl be left on the beach for him, only to be torn apart limb from limb (56.10).

I want to come back to my point of departure: why are laments so important in the cults of Melikertes and Achilles? It seems that in both cases, the songs and the laments are closely linked to the nature of the ritual in honor of these heroes: in both cases, hymns and laments are described as being part of initiatory or secret rites. What are we to make of the (mostly later) authors' insistence on describing these cults as initiations into mysteries? And what is the link between hero cults in general and such rites?

The key to interpreting these allusions in the *Heroikos* may be hidden in Sophocles 5<sup>th</sup> century BC tragedy: *Oedipus at Colonus*. The play describes the death and heroization of Oedipus near the grove of the Eumenides at Colonus. As many have noticed before, and as Calame has recently shown, the establishment of the cult in honor of Oedipus described in Sophocles' resemble in many ways an initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries.<sup>11</sup> If the link between a hero cult and mysteries can already be attested for the fifth century BC, then, the initiatory nature of the cult of Melikertes in the Roman period as well as the cult of Achilles described in the *Heroikos* are perhaps not exceptions, or late (Roman) developments, but rather represent a particular strand of hero cult.<sup>12</sup>

What about initiation and mysteries in the *Heroikos* in general? I would like to turn back to an episode at the very beginning of the dialogue: "Stranger," says the vinegrower,

“you have not yet even heard the nightingales that sing here both when evening comes and when day begins, just as they do in Attica.”

This, of course, is very reminiscent of the chorus’ description of Colonus in Sophocles’ play where the nightingales play an important part:

εὐίππου, ξένε, τᾶσδε χώ-  
ρας ἴκου τὰ κράτιστα γᾶς ἔπαυλα  
τὸν ἀργῆτα Κολωνόν, ἔνθ’  
ἀ λίγεια μινύρεται  
θαμίζουσα μάλιστ’ ἀη-  
δὼν χλωραῖς ὑπὸ Βάσσαις  
τὸν οἴνωπὸν ἔχουσα κισ-  
σὸν καὶ τὰν ἄβατον θεοῦ  
φυλλάδα μυριόκαρπον ἀνήλιον  
ἀνήνεμόν τε πάντων  
χειμώνων.

In this country of fine horses, stranger,  
You have reached the mightiest shelter upon  
earth,  
White Colonus.

**The clear-toned nightingale,**

**Frequenting it most.**

**Pipes plaintively within green glades.**

Occupying the wine-dark ivy  
And the foliage of the god  
Where none may step, with untold berries, out  
of the sun  
Out of the wind of all storms.

Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 669–678 (Blundell)

The noun *Kolônos* here refers to the sacred grove near Athens where the heroization of Oedipus takes place. As Nagy argues, the word has also many associations with hero cult: it is used in the *Heroikos* to describe the mound that

extends over the grave of the hero Protesilaos (9.1). The same word later on describes the grave of Achilles and Patroklos (51.12).<sup>13</sup> *Kolônos* can be a marker of the hero's grave; metonymically, it can also be perceived as the boundary as it were between life and death.<sup>14</sup>

The Greeks traditionally understand the song of the nightingale as a song of lament,<sup>15</sup> and clearly this is also how the vinegrower presents it when he asks the Phoenician if he heard the nightingales singing. But what interests me even more is the Phoenician's answer:

Δοκῶ μοι ἀκηκοέναι ξυντίθεσθαι τε μηδὲ θρηνεῖν αὐτάς,  
ἀλλὰ ᾄδειν μόνον.

"I think that I heard them," he says, "gathering together **not to lament** but **only to sing**."

*Heroikos* 5.5

Is this an indication of the Phoenician's failure to understand what is really at stake? He seems to catch the literary allusion, but not the ritual one. He is not able to hear the nightingale *yet*, said the vinegrower, because he is not yet initiated into the mysteries of the cult of Protesilaos. By the end of the dialogue, however, the Phoenician has been converted as it were and is ready to understand, and perhaps experience, the bond between worshipper and hero.

By way of a conclusion, I would like to come back one final time to the role of lament and hymns in hero cult: this is clearly at the center of hero worship in the *Heroikos*, but it is also something we see at work in other sources: telling the story of the hero, singing him, lamenting him, is constantly described as the focus of the cult of Melikertes and Achilles. Lamenting the hero is a form of community for the

worshippers, and perhaps the beginning of an initiation into the mysteries.

In many ways, the Phoenician in the *Heroikos* seems to be himself undergoing an initiation of sorts: at the beginning of the dialogue, he makes it clear he does not believe in heroes; by the end, he is so entranced by the vinegrower's narrative that he asks to come back the next day to hear more about yet another subject.

Through hearing the vinegrower's stories, he begins to see a truth he had not suspected even existed before, and by the end of the dialogue, we see him claiming that his soul's cargo, as he puts it, is more valuable than that of his ship, and that he would rather delay his business than miss the opportunity to hear more about one very particular topic:

τοὺς δὲ Κωκυτοὺς τε καὶ Πυριφλεγέθοντας καὶ τὴν  
Ἀχερουσιάδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ποταμῶν τε καὶ  
τῶν λιμνῶν ὀνόματα καὶ νῆ Δία τοὺς Αἰακοὺς καὶ τὰ  
τούτων δικαστήριά τε καὶ δικαιωτήρια αὐτός τε ἴσως  
ἀπαγγελεῖς καὶ ξυγχωρεῖ διηγεῖσθαι.

On those who dwell by the **Kôkytos (Wailing)** and the **Pyriphlegethôn (Blazing Fire)** and about the **Akherousias (Woe)**, and such names of rivers and seas, and, by Zeus, the Aiakidai and their courts of justice and places of punishments, you yourself will perhaps report and he [Protesilaos] will agree to set forth the details.

*Heroikos* 58.3

The Phoenician wants to learn more from both the vinegrower and Protesilaos himself, and the subject he wants to hear more about is the place where the rivers Kokytos (Wailing), Pyriphlegethon (Blazing Fire), and Akherousias (Woe) flow, or the place—as we know it from the *Odyssey*—which is just beyond the White Rock, beyond

the world of the living, beyond everyday consciousness.<sup>16</sup>  
This, it seems to me, is the perfect way to conclude an  
initiation into mysteries:

Πείθομαι σοι, ἀμπελουργέ, καὶ οὕτως ἔσται· πλεύσαιμι  
δὲ μήπω, Πόσειδον, πρὶν ἢ καὶ τοῦδε ἀκροάσασθαι τοῦ  
λόγου.

**I am persuaded** by you, vinedresser, and so shall it be.  
May I not sail, by Poseidon, before I listen to this **story**  
as well.

*Heroikos* 58.6

Kokytos, Pyriphlegethon, and Akherousias: Wailing, Blazing  
Fire, and Woe, these are the topics the Phoenician wants to  
learn more about. And, in the *Heroikos*, the *logos* of death  
and mourning gets the last word.

<sup>1</sup> Alexiou 1974:61–61 and notes for laments in honor of cult heroes (lament  
for Leukothea in Thebes, Achilles at Elis, and the Bakchiadai at Corinth), and  
lamentation in the Dionysiae and Orphic tradition. On *teletē* as a term used to  
describe mysteries, see Burkert 1987:9–11.

<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere (*Baby and Child Heroes in Ancient Greece*, Ph.D. diss. Harvard  
1999), I argue that the adjective *telephantos* refers both to time and space; the  
word also has connotation both of “appearing” and “speaking.” The Indo-  
European root *\*bha-* from which *telephantos* is derived means “to shine,” or “to  
illuminate.” A similar root meaning “to speak” gives rise to words of the *phēmi*  
family. Chantraine demonstrates that the two roots can be conflated and that  
many Greek words, such as *phasis*, which can mean “appearance” or  
“denunciation,” actually do carry both meanings. In the case of Pindar’s  
*Isthmian* fragment, the *telephanton geras* belongs to the rhetoric of cult: I  
suggest that it refers both to the poetic narrative of the hero’s death as well as  
to the concrete visible heroic shrine built in his honor.

<sup>3</sup> Gebhard and Dickie 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Euripides uses same word when he describes Medea establishing a *semnên  
kai telé* ritual.

<sup>5</sup> On cult of Melikertes being secret [*aporrêta*], cf. Libanius, *Orations* 14 (p.  
110 Roster).

<sup>6</sup> Nagy in Aitken & Maclean 2001.

<sup>7</sup> The Phoenician’s desire (*potheô*) to learn: 7.1 and 23.1; *erôs* for knowledge  
or wisdom: 23.24, 33.1, 33.36, <sup>8</sup> See Nagy 1985 on Leukothea.

<sup>9</sup> See Brown 1991:55 and Bonnechère 1994.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Gebhard, who argues that the story of the death of Melikertes fits a pattern of myths dealing with child sacrifices performed in times of crisis to save a city (Gebhard E., "Child in the Fire, Child in the Pot: The Making of a Hero" [talk given at the 7<sup>th</sup> International Seminar on Ancient Greek Cult 16–18 April 1999] forthcoming).

<sup>11</sup> See Jouanna 1995, Edmunds 1981 and 1996, Calame 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Brelich 1958:121 for heroic cults "di carattere misterico."

<sup>13</sup> See Nagy in Aitken & Maclean 2001, note 34.

<sup>14</sup> See Nagy 1990 on the associations between Kolônos and the White Rock.

<sup>15</sup> Calame 1999:338 note 16, with references. For nightingales in Sophocles, see Segal 1981:373–375 with note 34.

<sup>16</sup> See Nagy 1990.



## **CHAPTER 3**

# **Hypatia's Murder—The Sacrifice of a Virgin and Its Implications**

Sarolta A. Takács

It was Edward Gibbon who coined the phrase “the sacrifice of a virgin” when he described Hypatia’s gruesome murder in 415. According to him, it was the philosopher’s murder that “has imprinted an indelible stain on the character and religion of Cyril of Alexandria.”<sup>1</sup> Whether or to what a degree Cyril was involved in this calamity, we may never know. Undoubtedly, Hypatia with her knowledge, her humility, her modesty, her charisma, and her “mass appeal” irritated the young patriarch who relentlessly tried to expand the base of Christian influence in Alexandria and, consequently, his own religious and political authority.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover patterns and dynamics that changed the intellectual fabric of Alexandria. Hypatia, who lived in the late fourth and early fifth century, stands out as a pivotal figure in this period of transition. She was not only one of the few women intellectuals of antiquity, or as the journal of feminist philosophy *Hypatia* puts it, a “foresister,” but also, unlike the cultured hetairai of old, a chaste virgin who had traits of a Christian ascetic role model. However, in a Christian world with soaring misogynistic traits there was increasingly less room for a learned pagan woman and those of other beliefs, and certainly hardly any margin for a female, pagan philosopher/mathematician/astronomer; not even for the one who might have inspired Palladas to write: “ὅταν βλέπω σε, προσκυνῶ, καὶ τοὺς λόγους” [Whenever I see you, hear your words, I worship you].<sup>2</sup>

Hypatia was the daughter of Theon of Alexandria, a mathematician and member of the Alexandrian Museum

(Mouseion). Theon wrote a commentary on Ptolemy's *Syntaxis*. Of the original twelve books, only the first has come down to us in its entirety. E. Hoppe puts forth two advantages of Theon's work; namely, that it introduces us to Pappos' explanation, now lost, and shows Hipparchus' input into the work of Ptolemy. And secondly, Theon wrote out various mathematical methods such as the calculation of the sexagesimal fraction. His other work, a new edition to Euclid's *Elements*, is the true achievement of a man associated with Alexandria's libraries. Less interesting for the mathematician, the edition gives a solid commentary on the various problems in Euclid's work and their different scholarly explanations.<sup>3</sup>

Theon was a contemporary of Theodosius I. His learned daughter Hypatia lived during the patriarchates of Theophilus and his nephew Cyril, both shrewd and relentless politicians. Father and daughter saw their ideological world slowly give way to that of Christianity. Ptolemy Soter's foundation of the Museum with its library, whose first guardian was Demetrios of Phaleron, made the cosmopolitan city the intellectual center of the Greco-Roman world. There should be no doubt that Alexandria was to the Roman world what dying Constantinople was to western medieval Europe, the initiator of a new intellectual era.

Alexandria, which its founder Alexander the Great never saw completed, was παντοτρόφος,<sup>4</sup> a nurse to everyone settling there, wedged between the Mediterranean and the island of Pharos to the north and Lake Mareotis to the south. The hero of Achilles Tatius' novel *Leucippe and Clitophon* phrased it this way:

But then I saw two new and unheard-of contests. The city's very largeness challenged its loveliness, and the populace vied with the city for size. Both won. This city was more massive than any mainland; this populace was more numerous than any nation. If I considered the city, I

well might doubt that any swarm of men could fill it; but if I looked at the populace, I was amazed that any urban space could contain them.<sup>5</sup>

Five sections comprised Alexandria.<sup>6</sup> The oldest area and home of the native Egyptian population was the Rhakotis. It occupied the western part of the city, which sprawled in a more or less rectangular fashion from west to east. The Rhakotis contained the Serapeum with the smaller Alexandrian library, the Serapiana. Northeast of the Rhakotis lay the Brucheion. The entire front of this quarter faced the Great Harbor. Alexander's tomb, the Soma, the palace, and the Museum were part of the Brucheion. This area was home to the foreign population of Alexandria. The Jews lived south of it, governed by their own ethnarch and their own laws. Another Jewish area, the fourth Alexandrian district (Delta) might have been located north of the Rhakotis. Tensions among ethnic groups were not uncommon in pagan times,<sup>7</sup> what changed was that at the time of powerful patriarchs, the tensions were used politically. The all-nourishing mother watched over her quarreling children. Patriarchs might on occasion supersede the authority of the prefect, the actual civil authority, but as we will see in the case of Cyril of Alexandria, monks from the city's outskirts could force even a patriarch's hand.

The foundation of the Catechetical School in Alexandria by the former Stoic philosopher, Pantaenus,<sup>8</sup> in the second century and the surge of monasticism in the fourth century C.E. are highlights in Alexandria's Christianity. Both occurrences are of importance to this paper and warrant a more detailed description. The former was, next to the literary school in Antioch, a major intellectual center for Christianity in a period when the Christian faith was searching for self-definition in the realm of Greco-Roman philosophy. Here we have only to mention Origen, whose teachings Theophilus, Alexandria's patriarch from 385 to

412, attacked and whose followers Theophilus combatted.<sup>9</sup> Theophilus sought the support of the majority in order to solidify his own ecclesiastical and, therefore, political position in the eastern empire.

Although the following story recorded by Eutychius is most likely apocryphal,<sup>10</sup> it emphasizes the extraordinary sociopolitical position of this Alexandrian prelate. Theophilus once interpreted a dream of Theodosius I, emperor from 379 to 395, with whom he had a close relationship. One was to become emperor and the other patriarch. When Theodosius became emperor, he at first forgot about Theophilus—that is how stories operate—but, after he had a vision setting him straight, installed his friend as patriarch of Alexandria. There is no need to find historical truth in this story. The most important point is that it accentuates the actual primacy of the see of Alexandria over that of the new capital at the time of Theodosius I. In this political more than religious struggle, Rome, a mere shadow of its former political self, stood off to the side.

Theophilus became patriarch of Alexandria in 385. Asked by Theodosius to establish the specific days of Easter, for which there was no set time, Theophilus, versed in mathematics and astronomy, tabulated the paschal cycle for 418 years and projected the days of the Easter celebration for one hundred years in advance starting with the year 380, the first year of Theodosius' reign. A major assertion in Theophilus' calculation was that Jesus Christ had been crucified on 15 Nisan and not 14 and that, should the fourteenth moon fall on a Sunday Easter ought to be postponed for a week.<sup>11</sup> The imperial court in Italy received the calculations in 388.

In the following year, Theophilus lashed out against the god, Sarapis, a Ptolemaic creation.<sup>12</sup> He ordered the Serapeum at Menouthis, approximately eleven miles northeast of Alexandria, destroyed, while the temple of Isis in the same area was left untouched. Preceding the imperial

edict on outlawing pagan practices, this attack on a pagan temple on the outskirts of the largest city in the East seems like a test case in a controlled or controllable environment. Why would Theophilus have the temple of the Ptolemaic god destroyed while ignoring the temple of the eons-old personification of the Pharonic throne, Isis? Would an attack on the much older Isis not better demonstrate the superiority of the Christian God over any pagan deity? Did he think Isis, the consort of Osiris, and later Sarapis, and mother of Horus, incarnate in each pharaoh, too potent or simply too powerless? At first the latter seems quite probable considering that a church, the one of the Evangelists, was constructed in lieu of the destroyed temple of Sarapis. The Christian God, one could argue, would show the worshippers of the henotheistic Isis the right way to salvation.

Another reason for Theophilus' ignoring of Isis, however, comes to mind. Ptolemy I advanced Sarapis, the Greek transcription of the Egyptian Osor-Hapi (the Osirified i.e., dead, Apis-bull), from a local Memphian to an imperial deity. The god's major sanctuary was in the new capital, Alexandria.<sup>13</sup> Sarapis acquired attributes of Osiris, Isis' original consort, and eventually replaced him in the sphere of political symbolism, which, unlike the religious sphere with its formulaic structure, permits change. It should be noted that Sarapis did not usurp Osiris' central position in the Isiac mysteries, for this would have meant not only a break with tradition, but with well-established religious formulas that would have jeopardized, at least in the minds of the ancients, the well-being of the country as a whole. Essentially, the Ptolemies claimed their right of succession in accordance with the old and well-tried pharaonic system, but through their founder's chosen god. Thus by elevating a deity from local to "national" significance, one action expressed political and ideological continuity and change without upsetting the religious equilibrium.

After the suicides of Cleopatra VII and Mark Antony in 30 B.C.E., Ptolemaic Egypt irrevocably became a Roman imperial province. The country in the Mediterranean basin with the oldest history and visual monuments attesting to its past beyond perceivable time became a part of the *imperium Romanum*. Aided by the line of *divi imperatores*, a practice that had its beginning with the Senate's decision to deify Julius Caesar, and Augustus' institutionalization of the emperor worship, Roman *principes* eventually found themselves operating on a plane removed from the ordinary. They functioned somewhere between the terrestrial and the celestial. The emperor, the man who held the state's highest sociopolitical position, ascended through his position to become a living god; and for this, whether conscious or not, the Ptolemaic ruler concept and its myth of succession and dynastic rule best captured the existing political realities at Rome. The construction of a temple of Sarapis in Rome paralleling that of Jupiter Maximus at the time of the Severi marks the moment of the final disintegration of the barrier separating the emperor from being a living god.<sup>14</sup>

This is the context in which Theophilus operated. His singling out of Sarapis and the destruction of a temple in the outskirts of Alexandria was a symbolic action against the traditional, pagan view of the emperor and his position as well as an attempt to void emperor and emperorship of their original pagan context. The temple of Isis at Menouthis did not concern Theophilus at this point, for this temple was dedicated to Isis Medica and the healing Isis did not hold any political symbolism that needed to be curtailed. The time was also not yet ripe to take on the Serapeum in Alexandria, which could toss the metropolis and with it the whole empire into chaos. The importance of Alexandria as port city and provider of grain for the empire cannot be stressed enough. Furthermore, 388 was not such a great year for Theodosius I and Theophilus might have taken this into account. Occupied with fighting the usurper Maximus, whom Theodosius I finally

defeated outside Aquileia in late July, and the continuous problems along the Rhine, the emperor did not need additional problems.

Two years later, Theodosius I, writing to Evgarius, the prefect of Egypt, on 16 June 391, prohibited any pagan practices.<sup>15</sup> Theophilus felt confident enough to order the great Serapeum in Alexandria destroyed. The church historian Socrates has Theophilus destroying a temple of Mithras. Though this is a doubtful action since there is no evidence of a mithraeum in Alexandria.<sup>16</sup> One might argue on Socrates' behalf that Mithras and Sarapis had some common traits, both were associated with mysteries, for example, but even such a train of thought will not carry far. In Sozomen's account,<sup>17</sup> Christians under the leadership of the prelate destroyed the temple of Dionysus. Holding onto tradition, Greek writers following in Herodotus' footsteps equalled Osiris to Dionysus. It is Theodoret who gives a vivid description of the destruction of the Serapeum and its prized statue of Sarapis, apparently fashioned by no other than the famed Bryaxis.<sup>18</sup> The patriarch appropriated the Nile gauge and with it the power over the life-giving Nile. To the detriment of the pagans, the Christian God did not fail in providing the same continuity as the pharaonic and Ptolemaic gods had before. The ceremony, purged of pagan elements, remained "structurally" the same.<sup>19</sup>

Since the smaller library, the Serapiana, was part of the greater temple structure, some scholars thought the library destroyed as well.<sup>20</sup> This does not necessarily follow, for pagan literature remained an essential part of Christian education despite Julian the Apostate's attempt to change it. Theophilus, a member of the literati, would hardly oversee a wholesale destruction of books. And there is no mention in the primary sources that the library (i.e. the books) was destroyed nor that Theophilus lost control over the mob, which went about thrashing the library and destroying books.



As a matter of fact, pagans like Hypatia, who were associated with the Alexandrian libraries, not only remained in Alexandria, but kept on working.

Although Christians would unite against common external foes, for example, the pagans, this did not mean that they were a cohesive unit. In actuality, they never were nor would be. The ideological superstructure lacked the unconditionality of faith, logic could serve the one as well as the next in proving whatever point. Theophilus promoted monks to high church positions; one of them was Dioscorus, one of the four so-called “Tall Brothers.” The patriarch appointed him bishop of Hermopolis Minor. Two others, Eusebius and Euthymius, aided him in Alexandria.<sup>21</sup> In view of this and the fact that Theophilus most likely sent his nephew Cyril to study with monks in the Wadi n’ Natrun, a region scattered with natron (soda) lakes about sixty miles south of Alexandria, shows his confidence in the monks’ abilities. According to Palladius “five thousand hermits lived in this desert,” in which water was harder to come by than in the Thebaid, which was further upstream and closer to the Nile. As Douglas Burton-Christie rightly states:

Egypt was neither the first or only place in which the ascetical ideal came to expression in early Christianity. ... What we have come to know as monasticism—that is the withdrawal of individuals or small groups of people toward the fringes of society in order to live lives of ascetical rigor and spiritual purity—came to expression more or less at the same time in Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and Cappadocia as well as in the West.<sup>22</sup>

A most intriguing fact is that monasticism “developed ... particularly in areas with a strong Jewish influence.”<sup>23</sup>

When conditions required pragmatic steps, Theophilus did not shy away from abandoning his original convictions, if the move would serve his person and position. Thus, he could appoint a former student and pen pal of Hypatia,<sup>24</sup> Synesius

of Cyrene, bishop of the Ptolemais in 410,<sup>25</sup> assured that this bishop would not fall into the trap of doctrinal controversies. And Theophilus knew what that meant! Originally supporting Originist monks, he abandoned them and their views.<sup>26</sup> When the four “Tall Brothers,” Ammonius, Euthymius, Eusebius, and Dioscorus, and other Originist monks made their way to Jerusalem and then Constantinople, the whole affair became highly charged and finally pitched the patriarch of Constantinople, John Chrysostom, and Theophilus against each other. The details and outcome of this struggle are well-documented and known. To pin Theophilus’ relinquishing of the Originist ideas on a personal animosity against Isidore, Theophilus’ former confidant and his choice for the Constantinopolitan see, seems too narrow a focus, especially when we think that Jerome of Jerusalem had a hand in the controversy as well.<sup>27</sup> Theophilus took on Originist monks, a minority in the church, when his standing and credibility in the universal church hung in the balance. As a result, he won a victory over John Chrysostom who had sheltered the fleeing monks and tried to mediate between the two parties.

Cyril, the nephew and successor of Theophilus, participated in the Council of the Oak held outside Chalcedon in 403, during which his uncle presided over the banishment of John and accepted the Nitrian exiles’ plea for forgiveness. Theophilus’ career had reached its acme and the Alexandrian see’s prestige soared, reaching its ultimate height of power under Cyril’s leadership. The man whom Palladius spitefully described a most violent man, died on 15 October 412.<sup>28</sup> Cyril received the episcopate three days later, after defeating Timotheus, who was the archdeacon of Alexandria.<sup>29</sup> As deputy of the prelate he excelled Cyril, who either had been secretary of the Chancellery or a personal assistant and scholar interpreting the Scriptures.

In the first five years on the job, Cyril succeeded in eliminating elements that interfered with having a cohesive Christian community. Most conveniently, these actions foiled the authority of the prefect and played civil authority into the hands of the newly elected patriarch. The Novatians under their bishop Theopemptus were the first to feel Cyril's iron fist.<sup>30</sup> Cyril was hardly threatened by a small schismatic group whose view that bishops could not grant remission for grave trespasses, Cornelius had successfully contested more than one hundred-fifty years earlier. Their elimination, however, made a cohesive orthodox community possible. Furthermore, it suggested the powers Cyril saw fit for his position: for one, that a bishop had the power to forgive any kind of trespasses, and, last but not least, the power to fill the patriarchal coffer with the loot taken from the Novatian churches. The inaction of the prefect, Orestes, regarding plundering of property, which can hardly be called an internal ecclesiastical affair, highlights the ineffectiveness of imperial civil authority in Alexandria. Thus, Cyril strengthened his newly achieved position.

In 414, Cyril had the opportunity to target Alexandria's Jewish population. It all started with a disturbance in Alexandria's theater. Jews accused a Christian named Hierax of having provoked a commotion. The fellow was tortured and when the church of Alexander burned down (Jews had supposedly set the fire), Cyril retaliated ordering synagogues destroyed, Jews expelled and their property confiscated. Again, Orestes, the prefect, did not hinder these actions. One can but believe that religious puissance superseded civil authority. In addition, monks from the Wadi n' Natrun came to Alexandria and denounced Orestes as a *ελληνικός*, in short, a pagan. Throwing a stone, a militant monk injured the prefect. Caught by the prefect's men, the zealot was in turn tortured to death. Cyril then went about to create a martyr. Not much came of it, except that the fellow, Ammonius by name, received a new name, Thaumasius, in the process.

Clearly, a name like “Ammonius,” resounding of the ancient Egyptian deity Ammon, could not suit a pure Christian soul.

The expulsion of the Jews proved profitable for Christians who could fill the economic vacuum left behind by those forced to leave the city and their livelihoods. Jews were, as a law in the Codex Theodosianus attests, in the business of dispatching ships with grain to Constantinople.<sup>31</sup> And so was the Alexandrian church.<sup>32</sup> Considering that Egypt was still the empire’s main grain supplier and here we have to think only of the famine of 408 in Constantinople and the resulting imperial decrees,<sup>33</sup> the economic advantage Christians could reap after the expulsion of Jews becomes clear. Further, the ousting of the group that was and is a constant reminder that Jesus Christ was not everyone’s Messiah empowered those who otherwise could hardly argue away Christianity’s root, Judaism. How convenient though to be able to convert inherent insecurity into simple, straightforward hatred.

It is important to note that we are dealing here with militant monks from three areas: the Wadi n’ Natrun, the Ennaton (an area nine miles from Alexandria), and the Mariout. These monks carried their message from the periphery, the desert, to the center, Alexandria; thus, breaking with their original position of fleeing the tensions of the center to live an unburdened life that was to bring them closer to God. Certainly, the political conditions of the late fourth and early fifth century were different from those of pre-Constantinian times, but a change in politics does not solely explain the change in attitude of some monks, which led to an interest in Alexandria’s politics. Monks seeking to come closer to God through their separation from secular society and its everyday pressures, now found themselves compelled to reenter society sporadically to guide it onto what they perceived to be the right road. Their understanding of their life’s purpose had undergone a change; to serve God involved active participation in the body politic, never mind how sporadic. In addition the power

dynamics had changed as well. The one with the highest religious authority in the city, the patriarch, could, if he played his cards well, supersede the one with the highest civil authority, the prefect.

Orestes associated himself with Hypatia, even though he was a Christian and baptized by the patriarch of Constantinople. For the Nitrian monks this fact did not change their opinion. Orestes was a *ελληνικός*. But why would they consider him thus? Why do we not hear the same accusation of Synesius of Cyrene, another student of Hypatia? The answer is rather simple. Synesius did not hold a position or give orders that “harmed” Christians. As prefect Orestes had to consider the best for the whole city and, considering the importance of Alexandria in the grain supply chain, by extension the capital, he could hardly ignore the non-Christian inhabitants of the metropolis. Furthermore, we should not be led to conclude that Orestes was in actuality a pagan and only for the sake of political convenience Christian. Christians of late antiquity were more tolerant on the issue of intellectual inquiry and pursuit than the Nitrian monks liked to think or some modern scholars dare to imagine. For Cyril eager to expand his political power base, Orestes was a rival affiliating himself with an ideological foe, Hypatia.

Her painful murder incited ancient and modern authors to write her life story.<sup>34</sup> Since facts of Hypatia’s life and her scholarship are hard to come by,<sup>35</sup> authors of all periods could unleash their imagination. The *Suda* provides the biggest bits and pieces of Hypatia’s achievements. She wrote commentaries on Apollonius’ *Conic Sections* (Apollonius was a student of Euclid),<sup>36</sup> and on a contemporary of Pappos, Diophantus, who broke with the traditional Pythagorean arithmetic.<sup>37</sup> Hypatia devised an astronomical table either as an independent piece of work or in the form of a commentary on Ptolemy.<sup>38</sup> In addition, she

gave public lectures on philosophers, especially on Plato and Aristotle. J. Rist has convincingly shown that Hypatia did not concern herself with Plotinian philosophy, nor did Plotinus exercise major influence over her successor, Hierocles.<sup>39</sup> The same, of course, is true of Porphyry and Iamblichus. In Alexandria of the late fourth and early fifth century, traditional Platonism was taught attracting pagans and Christians alike.

Hypatia, who most likely held a public teaching position,<sup>40</sup> stood outside the traditional sphere assigned to women. Wearing a *tribōn*, she mingled with men in public and had discussions with them. Unmarried and determined to stay that way,<sup>41</sup> Hypatia followed the Cynic mode of life, a lifestyle that could easily be that of an ascetic. I partially agree with J. Rist that “it seems most unlikely that she was murdered *because* she was a philosopher.”<sup>42</sup> It was not philosophy per se that made her dangerous, but her public teaching of an aspect of philosophy (Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy), which Christian intellectuals had appropriated for themselves as the basis for their explanatory system. Then there was her “mass appeal” and potential power she had through it. Hypatia’s circle of students, especially the pagan ones, could be seen as a potential threat to Christian dominance; and as we can gather Hypatia attracted powerful and rich men such as Orestes and Synesius.

Whither were they dragging her? ... Why did the mob, increasing momentarily by hundreds, pour down upon the beach, and return brandishing flints, shells, fragments of pottery? ... She [Hypatia] shook herself free from her tormentors, and springing back, rose for one moment to her full height naked, snow-white against the dusky mass around. ... With one hand she clasped her golden locks around her; the other long white arm was stretched upward toward the great still Christ appealing—and, who dare say in vain?—from man to God. Her lips



were open to speak; but her words that should have come from them reached God's ear alone; for an instant Peter struck her down, the dark mass closed over her again ... and then wail on wail, long wild, ear-piercing, rang along the vaulted roofs, and thrilled like the trumpet of avenging angels through Philammon's ears. ... "To the Cinaron! Burn the bones to ashes! Scatter them into the sea!"

Thus struggles and dies Hypatia in the words of Charles Kingsley.<sup>43</sup> The method of "execution," i.e., slicing, chopping, and finally burning the body, was reserved for those convicted of dealing in magic and mathematics,<sup>44</sup> the latter in the sense of astrology. That Hypatia was an astronomer and not an astrologer did not make much difference to her murderers, knowing of stars and their paths was to tinker in God's front yard, the future was his and not man's to know. Whether Cyril had anything to do with the murder of the *ἔμφορνά τε καὶ πολιτικήν* woman will never be known. Even if the militant monks followed their own agenda of cleansing the world of nonconformists, they helped rid the patriarch of a powerful, ideological<sup>45</sup> adversary. Her death sealed the fate of pagan Alexandrian Neoplatonism and scientific development in general. In her student Synesius, however, Christian Neoplatonism of Alexandria originated.<sup>46</sup> "The link between Neoplatonism and mathematics," according to E. Hoppe, "became a more and more mystic one. Scientifically there was nothing more to have."<sup>47</sup> In matter of fact in terms of the development of new mathematical theories the world had to wait until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Hypatia's murder is usually considered the last turbulence of Cyril's early patriarchate. Firmly established as prelate in his hometown, which apparently did not experience any more internal turmoils, Cyril could now take on the world. Pagans, on the other hand, found themselves on the precarious fringes of acceptability.<sup>48</sup> Although details of



Hypatia's life and scholarship will forever elude us, she stands tall as one of Alexandria's last academic pagans. She flourished during the patriarchates of Alexandria's most powerful prelates, Theophilus and Cyril, both men eager to expand their own power base without concern for others. Another important element in Alexandrian politics of the early fifth century C.E. were the monks who came to the city and raised havoc. Theophilus by choosing monks for higher church offices moved them from the periphery to the center of religious and political power. In addition, the Origenist controversy forced some of them to become active in politics and leave their chosen life-styles of societal seclusion behind. Thus, a mechanism was put into place, which at the time of Cyril, reached its acme; militant monks attacked whomever they considered an enemy of the faith. Whether Cyril encouraged them we may never know; it is certain though that he benefitted from their deeds. Hypatia, one of their victims, symbolizes the rather painful transition from the pagan to the Christian world, which, although it tried, could, in regard to the intellectual sphere, never completely rid itself from its pagan past.

<sup>1</sup> *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chap. 47 (New York: The Modern Library, W2), 2.816.

<sup>2</sup> Palladas 9. 400, ed. F. Dübner, *Epigrammatum Anthologia Palatina*, vol. 2 (Paris: A. F. Didot, 1877). On the question of authorship see G. Luck, "Palladas, Christian or Pagan?," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958): 455-71.

<sup>3</sup> E. Hoppe, *Mathematik und Astronomie im klassischen Altertum*, reprint (Wiesbaden: M. Sändig, 1966), 425-6.

<sup>4</sup> U. Wilcken, "Zur Ägyptischen Prophetie," *Hermes* 40 (1905): 552.

<sup>5</sup> Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Bk. 5. 1, trans. J. J. Winkler, ed. B. P. Reardon, *Collected Greek Novels* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1989), 233.

<sup>6</sup> Described, for example, in Rhilo, *In Flaccum* 8.55, eds. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, vol. 6 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1896-1930).

<sup>7</sup> As an example, A. Kasher, *The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt. The Struggle for Equal Rights* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985).

<sup>8</sup> Sozomen, *Historia ecclesiastica* 7.15; Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 11.29, ed. J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Graeca, vol. 67 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1864).

<sup>9</sup> Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6.9; Sozomen, *Historia ecclesiastica* 8.13; Jerome's letter no. 90, ed. J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Latina, vol. 22 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1854). For a more detailed discussion see C. W. Griggs, *Early Egyptian Christianity From Its Origins to 451 C.E.* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 186–90.

<sup>10</sup> *Annales* 1.496–528, ed. L. Durbecq, *Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium* (Louvain, 1954) or *Eutychii Patriarchae Alexandrini Annales*, trans. E. Pocock (Oxford, 1656). The latter is the second important Arabic book (with Latin translation) printed at Oxford.

<sup>11</sup> W. Huber, *Passa und Ostern. Vntersuchungen zur Osterfeier der alten Kirche* (Berlin: A. Töppelmann, 1969), 45–55 and 84–8.

<sup>12</sup> I will employ the older spelling “Sarapis” throughout this paper.

<sup>13</sup> J. E. Stambaugh, *Sarapis Under the Early Ptolemies*, *Études préliminaires des religions orientales* 25 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972).

<sup>14</sup> For more detail see S. Takács, *Roman Politics and the Cult of Isis and Sarapis* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilm International, 1992) and on the destruction of the temple of Isis at Menouthis “The Magic of Isis Replaced or Cyril of Alexandria's Attempt at Redirecting Religious Devotion,” *Poikila Byzantina Varia V* (Bonn: Habelt, forthcoming).

<sup>15</sup> *Codex Theodosianus* 16.10.11, ed. Th. Mommsen and P. M. Meyer, 2d ed. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1954).

<sup>16</sup> P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, vol. 2 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), 437.746.

<sup>17</sup> *Historia ecclesiastica* 7.15.

<sup>18</sup> *Ecclesiastica Historia* 22, ed. J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Graeca, vol. 80 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1859).

<sup>19</sup> For a description see D. Bonneau, *La crue du Nil divinité égyptienne*, *Etudes et Commentaires* 52 (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1964), 438–9.

<sup>20</sup> An interesting discussion on this E. A. Parsons, *The Alexandrian Library. Glory of the Hellenic World* (Amsterdam, London, and New York: The Elsevier Press, 1952), 356–70.

<sup>21</sup> Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6.7.

<sup>22</sup> *The Word in the Desert. Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Also Armand Veilleux, “Monasticism and Gnosis in Egypt,” *Roots of Egyptian Christianity*, eds. Birger A. Pearson and James E. Goehring (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 301–6.

<sup>24</sup> Letters addressed to Hypatia by Synesius of Cyrene, ed. J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Graeca, vol. 66 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1864), nos. 10, 15, 16, 33, 81, and 154. Letters in which Hypatia is mentioned by name nos. 133, 136, 137, and 159.

<sup>25</sup> See J. Bregman, *Synesius of Cyrene. Philosopher-Bishop* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1982).

<sup>26</sup> Jerome translated the fateful paschal letter of 401. Letter 96, Migne.

<sup>27</sup> Letters 39, 63, and 82, Migne.

<sup>28</sup> *Dialog. Hist.* 9.25–36, ed. J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Graeca vol. 47 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1863).

<sup>29</sup> Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica*, 7.7.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> *Cod. Theod.* 13.5.18.

<sup>32</sup> G. Zereteli, ed. *Papyri russischer und georgischer Sammlungen*, vol. 3, reprint (Amsterdam, A. Hakkert, 1966), 27–31, no. 6, 1. 14: “[... καί] Ἰέρακος ναυτῶν ἐκκλησίας.”

<sup>33</sup> *Cod. Theod.* 13.5.32 and 14.16.1. For the description of the unrest see, for example, *Chronicon Pascale*, 407, ed. J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Graeca, vol. 92 (Paris: Bibliothecae cleri universae, 1860).

<sup>34</sup> R. Asmus, “Hypatia in Tradition und Dichtung,” *Studien zur vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte* 7 (1907): 11–44.

<sup>35</sup> For a biographical sketch see J. M. Rist, “Hypatia,” *Phoenix* 19 (1965): 214–25.

<sup>36</sup> Hoppe, 286–306.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 400–10.

<sup>38</sup> Rist, 216.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 217–9.

<sup>40</sup> *Suda*, ed. A. Adler, *Suda lexicon*, (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1935), vol. 2.644: “... περι-

βαλλομένη δὲ τρίβωνα ἢ γυνή καὶ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἄστεος ποιουμένη τὰς προόδους ἐξηγεῖτο δημοσίᾳ τοῖς ἀκροᾶσθαι βουλομένοις ἢ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἢ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην ἢ ἄλλου οὗτου δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων.”

<sup>41</sup> The story of the youth who had fallen in love with her makes this clear. Hypatia threw a used menstrual pad at him declaring (ibid.)’. “τούτου μέντοι ... ἐρῶς, ὡ νεανίσκε, καλοῦ δέοτδενός.”

<sup>42</sup> Rist, 221.

<sup>43</sup> Charles Kingsley, *Hypatia or New Foes with an Old Face*, chapt. 29 (London: MacMillan, 1908), 321–2.

[44](#) *Cod. Theod.* 9.16.5: “de maleficis et mathematicis et ceteris similibus.”

[45](#) “Ideological” here has to be understood in the sense of the German word *Weltanschauung*.

[46](#) H. I. Marrou, “Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism,” ed. A. Momigliano, *The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), 126–50.

[47](#) Hoppe, 426–7: “Das Verhältnis des Neoplatonismus zur Mathematik wird mehr und mehr ein rein mystisches. Wissenschaftlich ist dort gar nichts mehr zu holen.”

[48](#) P. Chuvin, *A Chronicle of the Last Pagans*, trans. B. A. Archer (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

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